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this  qUote  from the last paragraph of David Lodge’s novel Thinks cap-
tures with ironic pithiness the central premise of this book and the para-
dox it seeks to investigate. Despite long being considered a relic of the 
nineteenth-century novel, the ostensibly outmoded figure of the omniscient 
narrator has become a salient feature of contemporary British and Ameri-
can literary fiction. From the 1990s, and particularly since the turn of the 
millennium, a number of important and popular novelists have produced 
books which exhibit all the formal elements we typically associate with 
literary omniscience: an all-knowing authorial narrator who addresses the 
reader directly, offers intrusive commentary on the events being narrated, 
ranges freely across space and time, provides access to the consciousness 
of characters, and generally asserts a palpable presence within the fictional 
world.
The return of omniscience in 
Contemporary fiction
i n t r o d U C t i o n
1
“What happened to the omniscient author?” Gone interactive. 
—Jeanette Winterson, The Powerbook 27 (2001)
In the first year of the new millennium Helen published a novel which one reviewer 
described as “so old-fashioned in form as to be almost experimental.” It was 
written in the third person, past tense, with an omniscient and sometimes intrusive 
narrator. 
—David Lodge, Thinks 340 (2002)
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 These authors range from relatively new writers such as Zadie Smith, 
Adam Thirlwell and Nicola Barker, to established literary figures such 
as Jonathan Franzen, David Foster Wallace and Rick Moody, to liter-
ary icons such as Tom Wolfe, Salman Rushdie, Martin Amis, and Don 
DeLillo. They include writers who have won or been shortlisted for two 
of the most significant literary prizes in the Anglo-American world, the 
Booker and the Pulitzer, such as David Lodge, A. S. Byatt, Gail Jones, and 
Edward P. Jones. Many of these writers have received sustained scholarly 
attention for their significance to postmodern and postcolonial fiction, and 
have generated much debate about the contemporary novel through their 
nonfiction writing, notably Wolfe, Wallace, and Franzen.
 Despite the critical scrutiny these writers have received, their collective 
contribution to the development of new modes of omniscient narration in 
contemporary fiction has yet to be recognized. Indeed, criticism today still 
seems to be in thrall to an historical narrative about the anachronicity of 
omniscience fostered by modernism. For instance, Timothy Aubry opens a 
2008 article on the “politics of interiority” in middlebrow fiction with this 
claim:
Although occasionally called upon to perform certain emeritus functions, 
the omniscient narrator has retired decisively from the scene of contem-
porary United States fiction. In the place of this appealingly wise but 
problematic figure emerges an array of speakers no less ignorant, preju-
diced, and confused than the reader. . . . A modernist innovation origi-
nally, the refusal of omniscience has become a fixed principle, especially 
within what is frequently referred to as middlebrow fiction. (85)
 Aubry’s characterization of an omniscient narrator as “appealingly 
wise” betrays the continued association of this narrative voice with canon-
ical works of nineteenth-century fiction, and hence an unwillingness to 
consider how formal conventions of omniscience may have been adapted 
to a different historical context, invoking a different figure of authorship.
 One reason for the critical neglect of contemporary omniscience is that 
surveys of the novel today—unlike, say, Joseph Warren Beach’s The Twen-
tieth Century Novel (1932)—tend to concern themselves less with formal 
developments than with interpretative criticism in relation to broader the-
ories of nationalism, history, gender, postmodernism, and postcolonial-
ism. Excursions into literary form are rare, and may be summed up by 
Brian Finney’s claim in his 2006 book, English Fiction Since 1984: Nar-
rating a Nation, that what unites British novelists of the last two decades 
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is a belief that “an omniscient narrator is an anachronism” (12). Even 
avowedly formalist and narratological accounts of contemporary fiction 
continue to cast omniscience as an outmoded narrative voice which writ-
ers have rejected in favor of more radical experiments with form. This, 
for instance, is Brian Richardson’s argument in his 2006 book, Unnatural 
Voices. In an exhaustive survey of twentieth-century fiction, Richardson 
claims that there “is a general move away from what was thought to be 
‘omniscient’ third-person narration to limited third-person narration to 
ever more unreliable first-person narrators to new explorations of ‘you,’ 
‘we,’ and mixed forms” (13). There is much truth to these general claims, 
of course, but the emergence of new types of omniscient narration com-
plicates their currency and requires a re-evaluation of existing histories of 
novelistic form.
 This book seeks to answer why so many contemporary writers have 
turned to omniscient narration, given the aesthetic prejudice against this 
narrative voice which has prevailed for at least a century. The Anglo-
American study of novelistic method which emerged early in the twenti-
eth century established conventional critical wisdom regarding omniscient 
narration. According to this tradition, exemplified by Percy Lubbock’s 
The Craft of Fiction (1921), the artistic “progression” of the novel can be 
understood as a series of innovations to efface the intrusive presence and 
superior knowledge of the author. The most favored form of narration in 
this tradition was that of a third-person narrator who does not comment 
on the action, and tells the story solely from a character’s perspective, 
revealing only what that character could know: in other words, the mod-
ernist impersonality championed by Henry James. As a result, the omni-
scient narrator employed in classic eighteenth- and nineteenth-century 
novels has been considered both technically obsolete and morally suspect 
in the twentieth century. “In the age of perspectivism,” Eugene Goodheart 
pointed out in 2004, “in which all claims to authority are suspect, the 
omniscient narrator is an archaism to be patronized when he is found in 
the works of the past and to be scorned when he appears in contemporary 
work. Omniscience is no longer an entitlement of the novelist” (1).
 An aesthetic prejudice against omniscient narration, based on a claim 
for its artistic supersession and historical redundancy, continues to be per-
petuated by the industry of creative writing programs, from which the 
majority of new writers now emerges. Handbook after handbook on fic-
tion writing reiterates the poetics of modernist criticism enshrined in the 
Anglo-American study of novelistic method by dispensing the “practical” 
advice that limited third-person narration offers the technical solution to 
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the disadvantages of other “points of view,” as well as reminding readers 
that omniscient narration is too old fashioned to sell books.1 In a 2007 
writing handbook, How to Write Fiction (and Think About it), Robert 
Graham claims that: “From the earliest literature all the way through to 
the end of the nineteenth century, the author speaking, the author acting 
as an omniscient narrator, was standard practice” (47). Graham asserts 
that omniscient narration has fallen from favor since Chekov, before pro-
viding this advice to aspiring writers:
If you’re going to use an omniscient narrator in the twenty-first century, 
chances are you will not want to wear your omniscience on your sleeve; 
nobody likes a show-off. . . . Alternatively, you need to use a tone so 
arch, so dripping in irony, that the reader is bound to realise you know 
fully well the omniscient narrator went out of fashion in 1899. (56)
 How, then, are we to evaluate novels which employ an ostensibly 
redundant nineteenth-century form in the twenty-first century?2 Are they 
conservative and nostalgic by virtue of their form, or are they experimen-
tal and contemporary in their use of this form? We are accustomed to an 
historical trajectory of the novel which holds that modernist and postmod-
ernist fiction throughout the twentieth century can be characterized, in 
part, as a rejection of the moral and epistemological certainties of omni-
scient narration. But to claim, along with Goodheart, that “omniscient 
narration is a lost cause, a sign of successive triumphs of modernism and 
postmodernism” (2) is to operate with a static understanding of novelistic 
form. In this book I argue that the contemporary revival of omniscience in 
fact emerges out an encounter with some of the technical experiments of 
postmodern fiction.
 Movements in contemporary fiction have been described by various 
new millennium terms such as “hysterical realism,” “recherche postmod-
ernism,” “neo-realism,” and “neo-Victorian fiction.” These terms indi-
cate that postmodern fiction, as it has been defined in classic studies of the 
1980s by Brian McHale and Linda Hutcheon, continues to undergo new 
developments. In his 2005 book, From Modernism to Postmodernism, 
Gerhard Hoffmann identifies the last decade of the twentieth century as a 
period in which the “post-postmodern” novel emerged, characterized by 
“the return to traditional forms of narrative and storytelling” but without 
“a return to the belief system of traditional realism” (623). In this book I 
approach omniscient narration as the exemplary narrative voice of post-
postmodern fiction. My contention here is that while the philosophical 
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underpinnings of classical realism were challenged by postmodern fiction, 
the ironic appropriation of formal elements of omniscience, exemplified by 
the intrusive narrator of John Fowles’s The French Lieutenant’s Woman 
(1969), has now been absorbed into mainstream literary fiction, facilitat-
ing a general shift away from the modernist ideal of an impersonal narra-
tor and toward an aesthetic of maximalism in which the narrator’s voice is 
always present.
 I want to further argue that the reworking of omniscience in con-
temporary fiction can be understood as one way in which authors have 
responded to a perceived decline in the cultural authority of the novel over 
the last two decades. Claims for the death of the novel have been a critical 
commonplace since the mid-twentieth century, part of the rhetoric of post-
modernism, but the latest iteration accompanies significant widespread 
shifts in the literary-historical conditions which determine the status and 
function of the novel in the public sphere. These determining conditions 
over the last decade or so include: increased sales and cultural capital for 
literary nonfiction such as memoirs, the personal essay and popular his-
tory; the commercial orientation of multinational publishing houses, large 
chain bookstores, and online booksellers such as Amazon; the compet-
ing claims of cinema, television, and new media; the broader challenge 
to traditional print culture presented by technological advances in online 
publishing, print on demand, ebooks and ebook readers such as the Kindle 
and the iPad; and the attendant proliferation of demotic opinion in pub-
lic debate via blogs, customer reviews, and opinion polls made possible 
by the same technology. All of these conditions contribute to a sense of 
the fragmentation of the public sphere and a diminishment of the cultural 
capital of literature and literary fiction.
 These conditions feature in current discourses of anxiety about the cul-
tural status of literature, ranging from broader social concerns about lit-
eracy in the age of digital media to more specific literary debates about 
the social function of the novel. Sven Bikerts provides an epochal frame-
work for this anxiety in The Gutenberg Elegies: The Fate of Reading in an 
Electronic Age, originally published in 1994 and reissued in 2006. “The 
decade of the 1990s,” Bikerts claims, “was a classic historical watershed” 
(xi), marking the irrevocable influence of digital technology on the way 
people think and relate to each other. For Bikerts, “the societal shift from 
print-based to electronic communications is as consequential for culture as 
was the shift instigated by Gutenberg’s invention of movable type” (192). 
The effect, he argues, was to transform our sense of society being com-
posed of isolated individuals who seek solace in the introspective contem-
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plation and subjective immersion in deep time afforded by literature, to 
one of information seeking citizens interconnected by a digital grid which 
keeps them perpetually in the present moment. This “network conscious-
ness” (202), Bikerts argues, is at odds with the experience of inwardness 
cultivated by serious reading, and this explains the waning influence of lit-
erature in contemporary culture. A natural consequence is that “the writ-
er’s social and cultural status is as low as it has been for centuries. If there 
is anything consoling to be said, it is that the need for the writer is right 
now probably as great as ever” (208).
 The claim that digital technology has had a significant influence on 
modes of thinking, on interpersonal relations, on the nature of reading, 
and on the material form of print literature itself, is, I think, uncontro-
versial. Many scholars, however, eschew Bikerts’s nostalgic lament for 
the supersession of literary fiction. Michael Wutz’s 2009 book, Endur-
ing Words: Literary Narratives in a Changing Media Ecology, exemplifies 
a field of scholarship devoted to the study of intermediality, tracing the 
effects of modern technology, from the gramophone and photography to 
the internet, on the structure of literary fiction, and on the materiality of 
books themselves, to demonstrate the enduring power of the printed word 
to productively engage with new technologies.3 This field of scholarship 
nonetheless accepts the premise of a diminished cultural status for liter-
ary fiction. As Joseph Donatelli and Geoffrey Winthrop-Young claimed in 
the introduction to a 1995 special issue of Mosaic: “It is not surprising, 
therefore, that a period which is witnessing the slippage of the authority of 
the book as a media form, should pay such close attention to the circum-
stances under which it first gained prominence” (2).
 The tenor of Bikerts’s lament also resonates throughout public dis-
course. A palpable sense of escalating crisis is no more overtly expressed 
than in the 2004 National Endowment for the Arts report, Reading at 
Risk: A Survey of Literary Reading in America and the 2007 follow-up 
To Read or Not Read: A Question of National Consequence, issued with 
the imprimatur of the federal government and supported by a battalion 
of statistical data. The executive summary of the 2004 NEA report claims 
that it “contains solid evidence of the declining importance of literature to 
our populace. Literature reading is fading as a meaningful activity, espe-
cially among younger people” (ix). The key findings suggest that the “per-
centage of adult Americans reading literature has dropped dramatically 
over the past 20 years” (ix); the decline in literary reading is accelerating; 
this decline can be correlated with the competition of “an enormous array 
of electronic media” (xii); and represents a larger social problem because 
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it “foreshadows an erosion in cultural and civic participation” (xii). The 
Summary and Conclusion section, in fact, provides methodological quali-
fications to these “findings,” and in opposition to the rhetoric of a crisis 
of book culture manifested in these reports, Ted Striphas asserts, in The 
Late Age of Print (2009), that “books remain key artifacts through which 
social actors articulate and struggle over specific interests, values, prac-
tices, and worldviews” (3). However, he says, the late age of print means 
“books exist in a more densely mediated landscape than ever before” (3).
 The emergence of contemporary omniscience, I would venture, can be 
situated within the discourses of anxiety generated by this densely medi-
ated landscape. The concerns about book culture which I have outlined 
are present in the nonfiction writing of many of the authors under scrutiny 
in this book, and arguments for a causal link between perceptions of liter-
ary decline and the cultural projects of postmodern or late postmodern or 
post-postmodern novelists have been made respectively by Jeremy Green, 
Kathleen Fitzpatrick, and Robert McLaughlin.
 In Late Postmodernism (2005), Green states that his book “addresses 
the ways in which literature, particularly the American novel, has 
been described under the rubric of postmodernism and asks how these 
accounts should be modified in the light of recent literary activity” (3). 
For Green, this literary activity is the body of work produced in the 
1990s by both the first “generation” of postmodern writers such as Pyn-
chon and Barth, and later writers such as DeLillo, Richard Powers, and 
David Foster Wallace. Green’s book, however, as he makes clear, “is less 
a typology by which new writing might be categorized, than an attempt 
to comprehend the conditions under which literary novels are now writ-
ten and understood. These conditions shape the readership, the literary 
and political ideologies, the self-understanding, and the aesthetic choices 
available to writers” (3). Green’s main goal, then, is to elaborate what he 
calls the literary field, the institutional conditions of novelistic production 
and reception which, in the 1990s, featured “widespread dismay over the 
current conditions and future prospects of the novel” (5). According to 
Green, the literary field has shaped a sense of crisis of which novelists of 
late postmodernism are acutely aware and seek to negotiate through their 
writing:
The novelist’s sense of impending obsolescence is bound up with a per-
ceived loss of cultural authority. Although the backward glance that 
imagines better times for the novel earlier in the century—with the nov-
elist at the center of a de facto coalition of high, low, and middlebrow 
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cultural interests—is fanciful and nostalgic, the anxiety over present con-
ditions remains powerful and indicative of genuine change. (7)
 In very similar fashion, Kathleen Fitzpatrick’s The Anxiety of Obso-
lescence (2006) investigates the sense of cultural crisis engendered specifi-
cally by television and new technologies which threaten to undermine the 
authority of print culture and hence of those who write novels. The ques-
tion which Fitzpatrick takes up in her book, “is not whether print culture 
is dying at the hands of the media, but rather what purpose announce-
ments of the death of print culture serve” (3). Her claim is that
the anxiety of obsolescence, a cultural pose struck by the beleaguered 
postmodern novelist, has at its root three discourses with which it is 
mutually constitutive. These discourses—the death of the novel, the 
threat of new technologies, and the rise of postmodernism—all bespeak 
obsolescence in the interest of creating a protected space within which a 
threatened form might continue to flourish. (47)
 Through case studies of the work of Thomas Pynchon and Don 
De Lillo, Fitzpatrick focuses specifically on the gendered and racial impli-
cations of this cultural pose, arguing that it operates discursively as an 
attempt to shore up the high cultural elitist position of largely white male 
authors, with television figured as the feminized space of mass culture: 
“This is, at its root level, the function of the anxiety of obsolescence: the 
release of the white male author from responsibility through an at times 
histrionic concern for his own imminent demise, a conversion of the forms 
and gestures of oppressed cultures to his own project of maintaining his 
cultural (and social) centrality” (233).
 Green and Fitzpatrick argue, like Striphas, that, despite protesta-
tions of doom, the novel continues to flourish in terms of both aesthetic 
achievement and cultural importance, albeit under changed and complex 
conditions. They also point out how anxiety over the fate of the novel 
and the authority of fiction writers is manifested in the way authors estab-
lish a public voice to frame the reception of their fiction. “As writers have 
become aware of these shifts,” Green argues, “they have tried to make 
sense of the new pressures and difficulties of an altered cultural landscape 
through their writing, through essays and statements, but above all within 
novels themselves” (15). Both Green and Fitzpatrick proceed to read their 
chosen authors’ specific concerns—cultural memory, the public sphere, 
and the political vocation of the novel for Green; and the machine, the 
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spectacle, and the network for Fitzpatrick—as thematized and dramatized 
largely at the level of story or plot structure.
 My focus in this book is specifically on the formalist category of narra-
tive voice, and, rather than providing interpretations of individual works 
as thematic explorations of cultural crisis, I wish to demonstrate how the 
narrative voice of contemporary omniscience is symptomatic of the broad 
anxiety within the literary field over the cultural capital of literary fiction, 
and hence the public authority of the novelist. I do not mean to assert 
that each writer under scrutiny here has deliberately chosen omniscient 
narration out of concern for their relevance to contemporary culture, but 
that the increasing presence of this narrative voice as a viable option for 
writers can productively be related to changes in the institutional condi-
tions of literary production and reception. If there is a crisis of cultural 
authority at play in the literary field, it makes sense that a mode of nar-
ration vested by convention with the highest narrative authority would 
become ripe for renovation. How contemporary writers have adapted the 
narrative authority of classic omniscience to a more fragmented and rela-
tivistic intellectual environment is at the core of this book. “If religion is 
the opium of the people,” comments the narrator of White Teeth, “tradi-
tion is an even more sinister analgesic, simply because it rarely appears 
sinister” (193). This aphoristic statement is a typical assertion of narrative 
authority which nonetheless evinces a modern skepticism toward two dis-
courses of authority which have informed the concept of omniscience.
 Evidence for my claim that a turn to omniscience is vitally linked to 
a sense of the novelist’s cultural authority can be found in the statements 
of authors themselves. In 1993, the Pulitzer Prize–winning novelist Rich-
ard Russo delivered a lecture to students which was later published as 
“In Defense of Omniscience.” In this lecture he argued that the capacity 
to handle “true” or “full” omniscience is a mark of the strongest novel-
ists and at odds with the advice dispensed in writing workshops. Russo 
describes as advantages the qualities of omniscience which the Anglo-
American tradition exemplified by Lubbock criticizes: it is the best way 
to provide the “necessary information” of the story, and it has a clear and 
confident authorial voice: “there is always a narrator, a voice that embod-
ies a clearly defined attitude, an authorial pose, a consistent and recogniz-
able way of seeing and understanding” (12). Russo is not just describing 
narrative technique here, but a figure of authorship embodied in the nar-
rative voice: “Omniscience means, of course, all knowing, and it favors 
writers who know things and are confident about what they know and 
generous enough to want to share their knowledge” (15).
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 His conclusion is instructive for the way he wishes to promote the 
authority of the mature, professional writer in contemporary culture, 
showing how such an author can respond to the challenge of omniscience. 
He does so in the context of explaining why apprentice writers shy away 
from this mode of writing:
Omniscience, in the end, is a mature writer’s technique. Our being drawn 
to it has something to do with years, with experience of life, with the 
gradual accumulation of knowledge and pain and wisdom. Omniscience 
not only invents a world; it tells us how that world works and how we 
should feel about the way it works. Few writers at twenty-five or even 
thirty are ready to assume such a mantle. Omniscience is permission to 
speak and speak with authority we know we really don’t have, about a 
world that in our century (in any century?) is too complex to know. Ulti-
mately, omniscience forces us to pretend we know more than we do, and 
we’re afraid we’ll get caught. (17)
 This attempt to claim cultural authority for the novelist is also a prag-
matic strategy, for Russo’s lecture was a way of preparing the public 
reception of his 1993 novel Nobody’s Fool. It is clear that he is inviting 
readers to see the omniscient narrator of his novels as not only a voice 
who knows about the fictional world, but the voice of Russo himself 
imparting his accumulated wisdom about life. This is a traditional under-
standing of authorial omniscience, shored up by Russo’s argument that 
omniscient narration, the “voice of choice” for the eighteenth century, 
and the point of view most suited to the Victorian novel, is “the point of 
view that has never been anything but the mainstay of storytelling in our 
own century, regardless of the literary movement then in vogue (experi-
mentalism, minimalism, postmodernism, any other ‘ism’)” (9). My aim in 
this book is not to offer a quantitative survey of recent fiction across all 
genres, from popular to highbrow, to determine the extent to which omni-
scient narration features. In talking about the “return” of omniscience, I 
mean to address contemporary novels whose use of omniscient narration 
can be related to the “literary movement” of postmodernism and thus to 
identify new modes of omniscience which differ from that defended by 
Russo.
 Omniscient narration is not simply one “point of view” for writers 
to choose from among others, for the presence of this narrative voice in 
contemporary fiction carries the weight of association with the supposed 
high point of the novel itself: a period before the competing claims of new 
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media forms, from radio, to cinema to digital age multimedia, in which a 
public sphere sought guidance in ethical conduct from literature, and nov-
elists could assume, at least in the rhetoric of their narration, a shared set 
of cultural values with their readers. In his 1968 book, The Form of Vic-
torian Fiction, J. Hillis Miller argued that the standard Victorian conven-
tion of the omniscient narrator “is so crucial to nineteenth-century English 
fiction, so inclusive in its implications, that it may be called the determin-
ing principle of its form” (63), describing this narrator as the voice of a 
“general consciousness.” Scholes and Kellogg explain in The Nature of 
Narrative why this convention of the omniscient narrator lost author-
ity as a viable point of view in the twentieth century. They argue against 
the accepted view that it fell out of favor because writers discovered ways 
of “dramatizing” a story without the need for authorial commentary or 
exposition, instead claiming that omniscient narration became philosophi-
cally untenable as a result of a broader shift in cultural sensibilities:
The whole movement of mind in Western culture from the Renaissance to 
the present—the very movement which spawned the novel and elevated 
it to the position of the dominant literary form—has been a movement 
away from dogma, certainty, fixity, and all absolutes in metaphysics, in 
ethics, and in epistemology. . . . With this broad cultural development in 
mind, we can see how the authoritarian monism of the fully omniscient 
mode of narration has become less and less tenable in modern times, 
while the multifarious relativism of that same mode has seemed increas-
ingly relevant. (276)
 In other words, presenting the multiple perspectives of characters 
remained a feature of twentieth-century fiction, but not their subordina-
tion to the single ideology of an author’s omniscient narrative voice. “It is 
not the narrator’s narrating that disturbs the modern reader,” Scholes and 
Kellogg claim, “nor his employment of multiple perspectives, it is the reso-
lution of these perspectives into a single truth or reality” (277).
 This is a compelling explanation for the “disappearance” and contin-
ued untenability of omniscient narration which has retained its currency 
today, and when examples of omniscient narration in postwar fiction have 
been discussed, they have generally been described in terms of nostalgic 
anachronism or “playful” parody. For instance, Morton P. Levitt argues 
in The Rhetoric of Modernist Fiction that the use of omniscience after the 
war was a deadly conservative reaction to modernist experimentation. 
He calls this the “New Victorianism” and proceeds to savage more recent 
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novels by Muriel Spark and Margaret Drabble as extensions of this con-
servatism. “Again and again,” Christian Gutleben claims in Postmodern 
Nostalgia, “the prerogatives of the omniscient narrator are usurped in the 
retro-Victorian novel” (105), arguing that the very use of the form in his-
torical fiction is necessarily parodic.
 Neither of these postures characterizes contemporary omniscience 
for me. But if there has been a “revival” of omniscience, does this mean 
the whole movement of mind in Western culture changed in the last two 
decades? Certainly not, so we need to be more supple with our identifica-
tion of a narrative mode with a philosophical or ideological view. We find 
today fictional works with an “authoritarian monism” at the level of nar-
rative voice which nonetheless demonstrate an awareness of the relativ-
ity of this voice in relation to extraliterary discourse in the public sphere. 
Which is to say that contemporary omniscient narrators retain the intru-
sive presence of earlier narrators, but not the assumption that they can 
address a sympathetic general readership with universal comments about 
society and human nature. “I know you are not convinced by this,” says 
the omniscient narrator of Adam Thirlwell’s Politics in a direct address to 
readers. “You are unpersuaded. Where is the realism? you say. Where is 
the accuracy of the European novel? Where is the truth to nature of Balzac 
or Tolstoy?” (131).
 Kent Puckett claims, in Bad Form, that the nineteenth century “saw 
both the European novel and an omniscient narration whose voice was 
the voice of that novel’s cultural authority come into their own” (6). If 
omniscient narration is so closely identified with the form and status of 
the nineteenth-century novel, I am interested in the specific claims for 
cultural authority which enable this narrative voice to function in con-
temporary fiction. By virtue of the fact that the omniscient narrator has 
traditionally been seen as the “voice” of the author, this mode of narra-
tion invokes a particular figure of authorship, and hence relies upon the 
prevailing status of the novel to authorize its presence in literary culture. 
With this in mind, we can see that the “universal” moral authority of the 
classic omniscient narrator is indeed unavailable to contemporary writers, 
for they can no longer claim the luxury of being spokespersons of author-
ity, asserting accepted truths on behalf of a general consciousness. Writers 
today must situate the omniscient authority of their narrators in relation 
to other extraliterary claims to knowledge or expertise in postmodern cul-
ture where literature can no longer claim to be a privileged discourse.
 I am mindful here that it is easy to both caricature nineteenth- 
century omniscience and to overstate the cultural authority which novel-
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ists enjoyed: to assume that the intrusive commentary characteristic of 
much Victorian fiction aspires to singular truth rather than simply being 
an authorial opinion, and that the garrulousness of its omniscient narra-
tors is evidence of a privileged status for their authors. To do so is to sub-
scribe to modernist (and postmodernist) critiques of the authoritarianism 
of omniscience, and to perpetuate current lamentations for an idealized 
past in which everyone read literature and novelists wielded greater influ-
ence and respect. Equally, however, it would be absurd to claim that liter-
ary form is static or that the institutional conditions and cultural status of 
literature have not changed.
 It is interesting to note that, by the mid-twentieth century, when the 
modernist ideal of effacing the textual presence of the author, of a retreat 
from overt opinion into the interior lives of characters, became entrenched 
as an aesthetic principle, it was buttressed by both the “intentional fal-
lacy” of the New Criticism, and the fundamental narratological distinc-
tion between an author and narrator. In other words, the meaning and 
structure of a work could be separated from consideration of authorial 
intent. Yet at the same time, the presence of the author in the public sphere 
became increasingly important to the marketing of fiction. This can be evi-
denced by the advent of the Paris Review interviews in the 1950s, estab-
lishing the genre of the author interview, and the emergence of writers 
festivals around the globe. In these forums, alongside a public presence 
in journalism and books of essays, authors are called upon to explain the 
genesis and motivations of their work, and to comment on broader social 
issues which their fiction engages with, as if to supplement what cannot 
be made overt in the fiction. These opportunities for authors to assert a 
public presence beyond their fiction may seem to give the lie to the cul-
tural irrelevance of novelists, but the more an author operates within the 
marketplace of celebrity the less distinct novelists become as privileged 
cultural figures. Such a tension was on display in the much publicized and 
critically discussed decision of Jonathan Franzen to refuse an invitation to 
appear on Oprah Winfrey’s Book Club. As Franzen wrote, of the reception 
of his first novel, The Twenty-Seventh City: “I had already realized that 
the money, the hype, the limo ride to a Vogue shoot weren’t simply fringe 
benefits. They were the main prize, the consolation for no longer matter-
ing to the culture” (“Why Bother?” 38).
 The figure of authorship associated with the favored narrative voice 
of modernism, the Flaubertian/Joycean impersonal artist laying bare 
the psychological interior of characters, today seems a less viable trope 
than that of the author as an intellectual intervening in contemporary 
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cultural debates. Contemporary omniscient narrators perform this trope 
most overtly, and one way to understand the difference between classic 
and contemporary omniscience lies in the different figures of authorship 
they project, not just as an artist in the literary field, but as an intellec-
tual in the broader public sphere. Two of the best-known assertions of 
novelistic authority in classic omniscience are Austen’s famous defense, 
in Northanger Abbey, of the novelist’s capacity to offer “the most thor-
ough knowledge of human nature” (34), which she pits against the value 
of commonplace books and periodicals, and the “belated historian” of 
George Eliot’s Middlemarch who has “so much to do in unraveling certain 
human lots, and seeing how they were woven and interwoven” (142). We 
can see how these comments, taken as the voice of the author, lend them-
selves to the characterization of the nineteenth-century novelist as sage 
knower of human nature and guide to ethical conduct. Contemporary 
novelists are more accurately characterized as public intellectuals compet-
ing with other nonliterary discourses of “knowledge”: journalistic, his-
torical, scientific, critical, etc. As Franzen claimed in an interview: “The 
poetic, the subjective, and particularly the narrative account of what a 
person is and what a life means—I feel like the novelist’s vision is engaged 
in a turf war with the scientific, biological, medical account” (Antrim).
 No other narrative voice or “point of view” is as contested as that of 
literary omniscience, and this is because the term refers to both the author 
and the narrator. This slippage between the two, however, encouraged by 
the analogy with God, is precisely what makes manifestations of literary 
omniscience a barometer for the figure of authorship which circulates in 
public discourse. Rather than maintain a strict narratological distinction 
between author (or creator) and narrator (or knower), I think it is impor-
tant to understand how the combination of these two concepts produces 
narrative authority. Most of the authors I have mentioned have produced 
manifestos, essays, interviews or critical works in which their thoughts 
on the cultural function of contemporary literature are clear, and which 
seek to establish the conditions by which their work may be received.4 It is 
possible, then, to establish a discursive continuum from narratorial com-
mentary in a work of fiction (by which I mean narrative statements whose 
ideological provenance cannot be attributed to a character) to critical pro-
nouncements in a work of nonfiction which establish mutually reinforcing 
claims for an author’s cultural capital. Rather than interpreting a novel 
through an author’s paratextual statements I want to situate an author’s 
fictional narrative voice as one element of public discourse alongside their 
nonfictional “authorial” voice.
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 This approach is particularly apposite for understanding the function 
of contemporary omniscience because critics of the novels I have identi-
fied typically condemn their narratorial commentary as inartistic autho-
rial intrusion. For instance, in his article “Character in Contemporary 
Fiction,” Brian Phillips claims that the characters in Jonathan Franzen’s 
The Corrections often lack life because “Franzen adjourns to analysis and 
the ease of his own vocabulary” (640) when he is unable to manage the 
subtleties of free indirect discourse (FID). Phillips’s example is this internal 
analysis of character motivation: “how sweet the optimism of the person 
carrying a newly scored drug that she believed would change her head; 
how universal the craving to escape the givens of the self” (324). If we 
eschew aesthetic prejudice, however, we can see the narrative voice of The 
Corrections precisely as an invocation of Franzen’s authorial voice in his 
famous 1996 Harper’s essay, which offers a critique of “the retreat into 
the self” (80) and “the rhetoric of optimism that so pervades our culture” 
(91).
 This essay, which was republished in the wake of the novel’s success 
as “Why Bother?” in his collection, How to Be Alone, outlines Franzen’s 
lament for the novel’s loss of authority since the nineteenth century and its 
increasing obsolescence in contemporary society as a result of “the banal 
ascendancy of television, the electronic fragmentation of public discourse” 
(36). The Corrections, then, is an overt example of a novelist’s deployment 
of omniscient narration as part of a broader project to reassert the author-
ity of the novel in contemporary culture. The fact that The Corrections has 
been simultaneously championed as signaling a return to the social realist 
novel after the death of postmodernism and a post-postmodern extension 
of postmodern language games that combines realism with experimenta-
tion, is indicative of the paradox of contemporary omniscience.
 The discursive continuum between narrative and authorial voice 
moves in both directions, for novelists seek to establish their cultural 
authority through a range of genres, while still promoting the central sig-
nificance of fiction as their source of “knowledge.” So, for instance, when 
in the wake of the London bombings in 2005, the Times publishes an 
opinion article by Salman Rushdie titled “Muslims Unite! A New Refor-
mation Will Bring Your Faith into the Modern Era,” surely the “author-
ity” of his opinion rests upon the fact that he is the author of The Satanic 
Verses? This novel is one of the first examples of what I am calling con-
temporary omniscience, and, by virtue of the controversy it generated, is a 
touchstone for the way we understand the role of fiction in and as public 
discourse. Melanie Phillips went so far as to claim, in Londonistan, that 
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the “Rushdie affair became a rallying call for Muslim consciousness,” 
generating a radical Islamist presence in British public life which eventu-
ally resulted in the London bombings. The Rushdie affair also crystal-
lized the paradoxical relation between artistic freedom and freedom of 
speech. One relates to the right for an artist’s aesthetic decisions to be 
judged outside a moral framework; the other relates to a citizen’s right to 
voice unpopular opinions without fear of persecution. In conflating the 
two under the banner of Western democracy, defenders of the novel are 
claiming Rushdie’s right to voice an opinion in public, while asserting that 
the novel, as a work of fiction, cannot be taken as a literal opinion. This 
tension is mirrored by the formal distinction between author and narrator 
which The Satanic Verses, in its experiments with literary omniscience, 
deliberately complicates.
 In 2005, Rushdie was ranked as number ten on Prospect Magazine’s 
list of 100 global public intellectuals, and this is not on the strength of 
his nonfiction work. The contemporary novelist who aspires to influence 
cultural opinion can best be described as a form of public intellectual: a 
thinker and writer who is able to speak to a general audience on a range 
of public issues from a base of specific disciplinary expertise. So Martin 
Amis’s nonfiction work, The Second Plane (2008) becomes an extension of 
his fictional exploration of masculinity into social commentary, in which 
jihadism is anatomized as the product of threatened masculinity. In the 
Author’s Note to The Second Plane, Amis makes a bold bid for cultural 
authority based on this fictional work: “Geopolitics may not be my natu-
ral subject, but masculinity is” (x). As Amis said in an interview for Vice 
magazine: “When September 11 came along, I wasn’t prepared for any-
thing as interesting as that to happen in my lifetime. If I had to explain 
what my novels were about in one word it would be masculinity, and here 
was masculinity in a whole new form . . . The social history of man is sim-
ply sex” (Knight). In this sense, the cultural capital of novelists is deter-
mined by the extent to which their fiction is taken up as a contribution to 
both public debate and literary-critical scholarship, authorizing them to 
speak in other nonliterary modes of discourse.
Contemporary omniscience and narrative Theory
None of the foregoing questions and claims can be properly addressed 
without also examining what omniscient narration actually is. This is no 
easy task, for, despite the seeming unity of the term, trying to define it 
the retUrn oF omnisCienCe in ContemPorary FiCtion • 17
in a formal sense demonstrates the slipperiness of the concept it labels. 
Indeed, one of the central claims of this book is that investigating what 
constitutes contemporary omniscience will help us reconsider the formal 
category of omniscient narration itself. According to Gerard Genette, in 
Narrative Discourse, the paradox of poetics is that “there are no objects 
except particular ones and no science except of the general” (23). Existing 
theoretical accounts of omniscient narration derive largely from the study 
of classic nineteenth-century novels. While narrative theory acknowledges 
historical shifts in fashion, it operates with a synchronic understanding 
of omniscient narration as a static element of narrative, produced by the 
structural relationship between focalization and voice. A central premise 
of this book is that narrative authority is not a purely immanent feature 
of a text, to be recuperated from a formalist study of narrative conven-
tions such as privilege or level. The authority of these conventions is his-
torically contingent and must be granted by readers, as evidenced by this 
quote from Morton P. Levitt: “to criticize Trollope for being omniscient is 
ludicrous; to criticize Murdoch or Drabble for being omniscient is neces-
sary” (7). A study of contemporary fiction will enable us to approach the 
category of omniscient narration as a mutable practice of novelistic craft 
sensitive to historical and cultural contexts.
 In an instructive historical irony, a theoretical debate about omni-
science has emerged in the first decade of the new millennium, at roughly 
the same time that a revival of omniscient narration has reached a criti-
cal mass in contemporary fiction. A dramatization of this debate would 
see Nicholas Royle and Jonathan Culler lined up for a concerted new 
millennium attack on literary omniscience, and Barbara K. Olson and 
Meir Sternberg carrying out a staunch rearguard defense. And yet, so 
far, besides terminological wranglings and abstract theorizing, the debate 
has not led beyond re-examinations of nineteenth-century fiction, such 
as William Nelles’s 2006 article “Omniscience for Atheists: Jane Austen’s 
Infallible Narrator” in which he claims that the godlike attributes of omni-
science cannot be assigned to Austen’s work. The debate, which I address 
in more detail in chapter 1, revolves around the viability of the analogy 
between author/narrator and God which the term omniscience presup-
poses, and its parameters are largely epistemological and theological: how 
and how much does an omniscient narrator “know” about the fictional 
world; and what sort of figure or entity can be considered omniscient?
 By virtue of the fact that omniscience refers to the all-knowing qual-
ity of the narrator, and is typically associated with the privilege of “non-
natural” access to characters’ consciousness, it has tended to be discussed 
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within the category of focalization. A major theoretical problem arising 
from this focus is the common understanding that all third-person (hetero-
diegetic) narrators are omniscient: they either have degrees of limitation 
on their access to knowledge about the fictional world; or they choose 
to reveal or withhold omniscient knowledge according to the dictates of 
the story. Literary omniscience is thus largely defined by the epistemologi-
cal “privilege” of the narrator, and narrative authority becomes a man-
ifestation of the amount of diegetic information this narrator possesses 
or wields. For instance, in The Dictionary of Narratology, Gerald Prince 
defines authority as: “The extent of a narrator’s knowledge of the nar-
rative situation and events. An omniscient narrator (Tom Jones, The 
Red and the Black) has more authority than one who does not provide 
an inside view of the characters” (9). In this sense, a narrator’s author-
ity refers to their capacity to tell a story, to the conventional reliability of 
their narration.
 The authority of omniscient narrators, furthermore, is a product of 
their status as narrating agents ontologically distinct from the story world. 
In Narrative Fiction (1983), Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan writes: “It is pre-
cisely their being absent from the story and their higher narratorial author-
ity in relation to it that confers on such narrators the quality which has 
often been called ‘omniscience’” (95). If a narrator’s formal status as het-
erodiegetic (i.e., not a character in the story being told) and extradiegetic 
(i.e., occupying the highest level of discourse outside the story) grants 
them the “quality” of omniscience, then we have limited methodologi-
cal tools for distinguishing between different historical manifestations of 
omniscience.
 My aim in this book is to investigate how the conventional authority of 
omniscient narrators over a fictional world relates to the cultural author-
ity of their authors in the public sphere. This requires a different approach 
to literary omniscience from that which foregrounds epistemological 
concerns. Cultural authority refers to the status of authors in the public 
sphere, their visibility and capacity to influence public opinion through 
their fiction. It is thus contingent upon historical context and measured by 
critical standing. The very anxiety about a decline in the cultural authority 
of novelists is predicated upon the possibility of this contingency. The fact 
that omniscient narration fell out of favor as a viable narrative voice in lit-
erary fiction indicates that its formal narrative authority is also subject to 
the contingency of literary fashion and critical reception.
 The first step, then, is to understand what has been considered prob-
lematic with the narrative authority of omniscient narration. While omni-
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science is typically characterized as a narrator’s privileged access to the 
consciousness of characters, works of omniscient narration are criticized 
on aesthetico-moral grounds for overtly asserting an authorial presence in 
the telling of a story and thus breaking the mimetic illusion, dictating the 
response of readers, and denying the autonomous selves of characters. In 
these terms, the authoritative possession of knowledge is less of a concern 
than the assertion of power through overt rhetorical attempts at influence.
 The next step is to consider what authorial image is modeled by omni-
scient narration. While the quality of omniscience is analogous to that 
of God, its conventional authority is established by the traditional equa-
tion of narrator and author. As Francine Prose remarks in Reading like 
a Writer: “The omniscient voice in Dickens always sounds far more like 
the voice of Dickens than the voice of God” (108). Likewise, William 
Nelles claims that “the model for Austen’s infallible narrators is not God 
in heaven, but Jane Austen” (128). When one considers the broader ques-
tions of the institutional conditions of literary production and the prevail-
ing discourses of anxiety over the cultural authority of the novelist which 
I outlined earlier, asking whether contemporary omniscient narrators are 
as godlike in their knowledge of a fictional world as their nineteenth- 
century forebears will yield little insight.
 In contrast to the prevailing theoretical emphasis on narratorial 
knowledge, then, I approach omniscience as the rhetorical performance 
of narrative authority which simultaneously invokes and projects a his-
torically specific figure of authorship. This theoretical move will estab-
lish a shift in analytical focus away from static concerns with narratorial 
privilege and toward a more dynamic study of narratorial performance, 
enabling an investigation of the discursive relationship between narrative 
voice and the extrafictional statements of authors in the public sphere. My 
use of the term performance here bears a relationship to the distinction in 
Chomskyan linguistics between a speaker’s competence (a knowledge of 
language) and performance (the actual use of language). An omniscient 
narrator’s competence (i.e., putative knowledge of the fictional world) is 
a theoretical postulation. Only in performing this knowledge, through a 
range of rhetorical strategies, does a narrator claim the authority of omni-
science. Indeed, this rhetorical performance is how we determine a narra-
tor’s “competence.”
 To study the rhetorical performance of contemporary omniscient nar-
rators, a more dynamic approach to narrative authority than the posses-
sion of knowledge is required. By narrative authority, I mean the status 
of narrating agents which emerges out of a relational exchange involving 
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both the rhetorical assertion and the institutional conferral of authority. 
This relational exchange is not specific to omniscient narration; it is funda-
mental to the communicative act in all forms of narrative fiction. Likewise 
a figure of authorship can be projected by or inferred from any narra-
tive voice, such as a first-person confessional narrative being paratextually 
framed and received as a fictionalized autobiography, the author’s per-
sonal experience lending testimonial authenticity to the character narrator.
 In the case of omniscient narration, the authority of the narrator over 
characters is not simply a convention of form granted by “third person” 
status, but rhetorically performed by “extranarrative” elements such as 
evaluative commentary and reflexive statements of creative control (of 
lack of it) over these characters, and by various modes of representing 
consciousness. The authority of the narrator over the narratee is not only 
a product of the omniscient narrator’s mediating presence between narra-
tee and characters, but again a rhetorical performance in the form of nar-
ratorial commentary, and particularly an apostrophic instantiation of the 
narratee via direct address.
 These two formal features of narrative authority—the relation between 
narrator and character; and the relation between narrator and narratee—
both establish the framework for a reader’s encounter with the text and 
its author. Narrative commentary, such as an aphoristic statement with 
relevance to the extratextual world, has greater authority when uttered 
by an omniscient narrator rather than a character or first-person narrator, 
not simply because of that narrator’s formal (extradiegetic-heterodiegetic) 
status but because it is most likely to be attributed to the author who must 
assume responsibility for that statement in a way they would not have 
to were it attributed to a character (which was the crux of the trial over 
Flaubert’s Madam Bovary). With character narrators, authorial opinion 
involves what James Phelan calls “mask narration.” Quoting passages 
from A Farewell to Arms and The Big Sleep, Phelan writes: “In these pas-
sages, Hemingway and Chandler use their respective character narrators 
to voice their own beliefs. Both authors, I daresay, would be comfortable 
with the idea of having these passages lifted from their novelistic contexts 
and put on posters attributing the thoughts to them rather than to their 
character narrators” (Living 202). In omniscient authorial narration, the 
intrusive commentary is more likely to be attributed directly to the author, 
without masking.
 The narrator–narratee relation in omniscient narration establishes a 
model for the author–reader relation, but the key difference is that nar-
rative authority at this extrafictional level is contingent upon a work’s 
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critical reception. Much narrative theory interested in reader response con-
ceptualizes this response in terms of the “real” reader’s private encounter 
with a text, their ethical judgments, their cognitive processing. I intend 
to approach author–reader relations in a discursive sense, by which 
I mean narrative voice is one discursive and generic mode by which an 
author utters statements in the public sphere, and the cultural authority 
of this voice is contingent upon its critical reception, rather than the pri-
vate response of individual readers. The narrative authority of authors, 
as opposed to narrators, then, refers to the public assertion of authorial 
opinion via the narrative discourse of their fiction, and the granting of this 
authority by its public reception.
 My argument is that contemporary omniscient narration is an overt 
attempt to parlay the conventional authority of a fictional narrator into 
cultural authority for the author, or, to put it another way, into cultural 
authority for narrative fiction itself. This does not mean that a narra-
tor’s knowledge of the storyworld is unimportant to the narrative act, 
rather that engaging the narratee’s desire for knowledge of the storyworld 
becomes a way of engaging the reader’s desire for cultural insight.5
 The following chapters in this book are organized around the ques-
tion of narrative voice and its relation to authorship. They take as their 
base the classical narratological concept of voice, what Genette calls the 
“narrating instance,” and test the useful of this concept in the face of sub-
sequent refinements, criticisms and rejections from the perspective of rhe-
torical, cognitive and feminist approaches to narrative theory. Throughout 
the book I analyze how the formal features of omniscient narration are 
deployed to rhetorically perform narrative authority in a broader cultural 
context framed by the anxiety of obsolescence. Each chapter demonstrates 
how the methodological requirements for investigating the nature of con-
temporary omniscient narration call for a reconsideration of key elements 
of narrative theory, from the relationship between voice and focalization, 
to the representation of consciousness, to the narrative communication 
model.
 Chapter 1 anatomizes the main theoretical problems associated with 
literary omniscience: the theological (the viability of the analogy between 
author and god); the epistemological (the difference between omni-
scient narration and other modes of third-person or heterodiegetic nar-
ration); and the ontological (the division and overlap between narrator 
and author). I argue that one of the reasons for the theoretical instabil-
ity of the concept is that definitions have shifted in response to historical 
developments in novelistic form and according to the prevailing critical 
22 • introdUCtion
climate of the time. I proceed to offer a genealogy of the term and chart its 
theorization in Anglo-American formalism and structuralist and postclas-
sical narratology, before elaborating my approach to the narrative author-
ity of omniscient narration in opposition to scholarly debates which have 
emerged in the new millennium.
 The next four chapters identify and classify four modes of contem-
porary omniscience and the figures of authorship they project, especially 
through extranarrative or extrarepresentational statements, including 
direct addresses, intrusive commentary and self-reflexive statements. Each 
chapter focuses on a particular aspect of the narrating instance and how it 
facilitates narrative authority. Chapter 2 more fully elaborates how con-
temporary omniscience is situated within a turn to post-postmodern fic-
tion before offering cases studies of the ironic moralist (Salman Rushdie, 
Martin Amis, David Foster Wallace, Adam Thirlwell). The most promi-
nent aspect of this mode is the direct address to readers through which 
narrators self-consciously grapple with the “universal” moral authority of 
the authorial narrator in the wake of metafiction.
 Chapter 3 discusses the literary historian (Gail Jones, Michel Faber, 
Edward P. Jones, David Lodge), an omniscient narrator who asserts the 
historiographic value of imaginatively reconstructing history in fictional 
form, both drawing upon and challenging the authority of scholarly 
approaches to the archive. The key aspect of this mode is the temporal 
distance of the modern “time of narrating” from the historical past, in 
which extratextual historical knowledge is drawn upon to legitimize pro-
leptic commentary. Chapter 4 provides case studies of the pyrotechnic 
storyteller (Nicola Barker, Rick Moody, Zadie Smith, as well as Rushdie 
and Wallace). Drawing upon Richard Aczel’s “qualitative” approach to 
narrative voice as the stylistic evocation of subjectivity it analyses the ways 
in which stylistic expressivity establishes the intrusive presence and lin-
guistic control of the narrator. In chapter 5, I examine the immersion jour-
nalist (Tom Wolfe) and the social commentator (Don DeLillo, Jonathan 
Franzen, Richard Powers), a narrator whose “omniscience” operates in 
the hyperbolic sense of displaying polymathic knowledge. Typically these 
narrators offer a paradigm for explaining the conditions of human behav-
ior, such as neuroscience, genomics, the forces of capitalism and history, 
manifested in commentary and internal analysis, which competes with the 
conventional authority of the novelist’s insight into human nature.
 Chapter 6 addresses the question of “double-voiced” language in 
contemporary omniscient narration, investigating how the conventional 
“privilege” of access to character thought operates through FID. My argu-
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ment is that theoretical accounts of FID have established an interpretive 
frame of alterity which perpetuates aesthetic and ethical prejudices regard-
ing the historical progression of novelistic form toward the liberation of 
characters from narratorial control. The chapter proposes a model of FID 
as a self-conscious narratorial performance of the process of character 
thought and point to the self-reflexive experimentation with FID across 
all four modes of contemporary omniscience. A feature of this experimen-
tation is shared linguistic habitus, in which readers’ assumptions regard-
ing idiomatic attribution are challenged by a deliberate interplay between 
stylistic contagion (the “infection” of narratorial language by a charac-
ter’s idiom) and narratorial usurpation (the narrator’s linguistic intrusion 
in a character’s interior monologue). As well as interrogating the relation 
between speech and thought, this self-reflexive experimentation facilitates 
a post-postmodern concept of characterological cognitive self-awareness, 
in which characters not only think, but reflect upon their own cognitive 
processes, including their lexical choices, in the act of reflection.
 In chapter 7 I address the question of omniscience in the context of a 
different voice, that of the first-person narrator. First-person omniscience 
is another prominent form in contemporary fiction, and typically has been 
seen as a parodic critique of the claims for authority made by classic omni-
science. The chapter demonstrates how Genette’s concept of paralepsis (an 
infraction of the dominant code of focalization in which a narrator pro-
vides more information than is licensed by this code) has become a syn-
onym for omniscient character narration (a narrator saying more than he 
or she knows), and transformed into a cognitive frame by which this mode 
of narration can be described as “unnatural.” This approach is criticized 
as a product of the epistemological fallacy in narrative theory. I draw upon 
David Herman’s concept of hypothetical focalization as an alternative to 
paralepsis and argue that characters employ hypothetical focalization to 
perform omniscience in the narrative act, relying upon the imagination 
rather than unnatural knowledge to authorize their stories. By virtue of 
invoking the figure of the novelist, rather than that of the autobiographer 
or the memoirist, these narrators project an authorial desire for a more 
relativized mode of omniscience in contemporary fiction.
 Chapter 8 elaborates the broader methodological ramifications of 
my investigation of narrative voice. Keeping in mind the relationship I 
have established between contemporary omniscience and cultural anxi-
eties about the decline of literature and the diminished status of novelists, 
I propose a discursive narratology, a formalist study of narrative which 
is capable of addressing the nature of fiction as public discourse and the 
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role of the author in the construction of narrative authority. The chapter 
offers a critique of the ways in which the “real” reader has been theo-
rized in contemporary narratology and reader response theory, and argue 
for an approach to the author as a concrete textual agent in the struc-
ture of narrative communication. Drawing upon Susan Lanser’s theory of 
an “extrafictional” voice, and Genette’s theory of the paratext, I present 
a discursive reformulation of the narrative communication model. This 
approach emphasizes the public nature of fictional narratives and their 
reception, rather than the mechanics of private individual reading.
 In my proposed model, the paratext is reconceptualized as a Foucaul-
dian discursive formation, with the narrative discourse of fiction situated 
alongside other nonliterary discourses in the public sphere, from autho-
rial statements to readers’ textual responses. The typical agents of narra-
tive communication are thus reconfigured as a series of textual sites within 
which subject positions can be adopted and articulated along a discursive 
plane (rather than an inside/outside conception of the fictional text), with 
narrative authority emerging from the relations between subject positions 
in this formation.
in  this  ChaPter  I elaborate my approach to narrative authority in con-
temporary omniscient narration by reconsidering existing theories of 
literary omniscience. My claim is that formalist accounts of omniscient 
narration have developed and altered in response both to different mani-
festations of the form in the history of the novel, and to the prevailing crit-
ical orthodoxies which have accompanied this history. I will begin with a 
brief discussion of self-reflexive references to omniscience in the following 
two extracts. The first is from Thackeray’s Vanity Fair (1848):
If, a few pages back, the present writer claimed the privilege of peeping 
into Miss Amelia Sedley’s bedroom, and understanding with the omni-
science of the novelist all the gentle pains and passions which were toss-
ing upon that innocent pillow, why should he not declare himself to be 
Rebecca’s confidant too, master of her secrets, and seal-keeper of that 
young woman’s conscience? (171)
 The second is from Martin Amis’s The Information (1995):
omniscience and 
narrative authority
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Omniscience is not simply a hyperbole, it is an incoherent and flawed plot device 
in a story that critics and theorists have been telling for a hundred years and more. 
Why retain the concept of omniscience at all? 
—Nicholas Royle, The Uncanny 206
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And I made the signs—the M, the A—with my strange and twisted fin-
gers, thinking: how can I ever play the omniscient, the all-knowing, when 
I don’t know anything? (63)
 Both passages are examples of intrusive omniscient narration in which 
the narrators reflect on their own authority as storytellers, and present 
themselves not just as narrators, but as novelists, as the author of the book 
we are reading. I have chosen these two examples, of course, because both 
of them make specific reference to the function of literary omniscience as 
a form of knowledge. If we conduct a classic taxonomic study of these 
two novels, we will see that both narrators display all the knowledge of 
their respective fictional worlds that is characteristic of omniscience, in 
terms of access to consciousness and spatio-temporal freedom. So in terms 
of narrative perspective there is little difference, although the Amis novel 
is less panoramically ambitious, focalizing mainly through the protago-
nist, Richard. In terms of narrative voice, both novels are narrated in the 
third person by authorial narrators who are outside the frame of repre-
sentation. So we can tick off the list of formal properties and classify syn-
chronically the two novels as omniscient.
 And yet there is surely a palpable difference between the performative 
stances which these two narrators adopt. In the Thackeray passage there 
is a confident and playful assertion of the novelist’s privilege of omniscient 
knowledge, whereas in the Amis passage there is a manifest anxiety about 
the narrator’s omniscient authority. In fact, Amis’s narrator is not grap-
pling with a failure of diegetic knowledge, but a failure of novelistic insight 
resulting from his own limitations as a person. He is reflecting scenically 
on his own experience in order to ask whether he can satisfy his role as an 
observer of human nature.
 Both of these novels enact what for me is the key feature of literary 
omniscience: the performance of narrative authority through intrusive nar-
ratorial commentary, which “personalizes” the narrator. If there is a for-
mal difference between these two examples, it lies in the way they engage 
the reader, in how they establish different modes of narrative authority 
as omniscient story tellers. These formal differences can productively be 
understood with reference to the historical shift in the cultural status of 
the novel, from the mid-nineteenth to the late twentieth century, which I 
discussed in the previous chapter.
 In the passage from Thackeray’s Vanity Fair cited above, the narrator 
follows up his rhetorical question about access to consciousness by pro-
viding an account of Becky’s thoughts and of her social context required 
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for the “history” being written. In describing Becky’s regrets over turning 
down a marriage proposal which would have secured her a prosperous life 
and increased social status, the narrator engages the narratee directly:
In this natural emotion every properly regulated mind will certainly 
share. What good mother is there that would not commiserate a penniless 
spinster, who might have been my lady, and have shared four thousand 
a year? What well-bred young person is there in all Vanity Fair, who will 
not feel for a hard-working, ingenious, meritorious girl, who gets such 
an honourable, advantageous, provoking offer, just at the very moment 
when it is out of her power to accept it? I am sure our friend Becky’s dis-
appointment deserves and will command every sympathy. (171)
 Thackeray’s narrator solidifies this ironic identification with Becky’s 
plight with reference to his own experience, when he claims: “I remem-
ber one night being in the Fair myself, at an evening party” (171). In this 
breach of the story/discourse division, the narrator relates a first-hand 
observation of how impending marriage into a higher social rank will alter 
a person’s standing: “If the mere chance of becoming a baronet’s daugh-
ter can procure a lady such homage in the world, surely, surely we may 
respect the agonies of a young woman who has lost the opportunities of 
becoming a baronet’s wife” (172).
 This section is a good example of J. Hillis Miller’s claim that the Victo-
rian narrator is immanent rather than transcendent, possessed of an omni-
science which moves within the community of the story being narrated. 
Miller draws attention to a quality of Thackeray’s omniscient narrator 
which
identifies him as a perfect example of a spokesman for the general con-
sciousness of the community. This is his use of the editorial “we.” The 
novel is punctuated by direct addresses to the reader in which he is 
encouraged to think of himself as one of a vast number of other readers 
who share similar experiences of life and similar judgments of it. We are 
asked to identify ourselves with one another and with the narrator who 
speaks for us until by a kind of magical sympathy we lose our identities, 
are drawn into the group, and taken all together come to form a ubiqui-
tous chorus of judgement. (72)
 Miller calls this a “rhetoric of assimilation” (72) which in “establishing 
the reader’s participation in a community mind surrounding the individual 
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minds of the characters in the story gives the strength of a universal judg-
ment” (78).1 So the diegetic authority, the omniscient knowledge, of Thac-
keray’s narrator, established in the prefatorial chapter as “the Manager of 
the Performance” and a puppeteer, is supplemented by this extradiegetic 
appeal to a common reading public. This “community mind” is obviously 
a rhetorical construct rather than a sociological fact, and the judgments 
it endorses, as the preface intimates, are those of a “man with a reflective 
turn of mind” who will be in sympathy with the narrator’s stance toward 
the characters.
 The editorial “we” is largely absent from contemporary omniscience, 
as it is from Amis’s The Information. Amis’s narrator is as equally intru-
sive as Thackeray’s but he cannot so readily invoke a community mind. He 
thus requires recourse to a different means of character evaluation. The 
protagonist, Richard Tull, is a failed writer, his dedication to avant-garde 
experimentalism heightened by the obscene popular success of his friend 
with a work of middlebrow fiction. “Essentially Richard was a marooned 
modernist,” the narrator tells us. “Modernism was a brief divagation into 
difficulty; but Richard was still out there, in difficulty. He didn’t want to 
please the readers” (170). Richard’s struggle as a writer, which provides 
the narrative momentum of the novel, is in fact a struggle over the concept 
of the universal. “And writers should hate each other, Richard naturally 
believed. If they mean business. They are competing for something there is 
only one of: the universal” (312).
 In an argument over when Richard will finish his novel, whether it 
will end up being published and earning money, his wife, Gina, says: 
“I don’t know if you still really believe in it. Your novels. Because you 
never . . . Because what you . . . Ah I’m sorry, Richard. I’m so sorry” (87). 
This line of dialogue is followed by a brief paragraph of narration which 
completes Gina’s unfinished sentence: “Because you never found an audi-
ence—you never found the universal or anything like it. Because what you 
come up with in there, in your study, is of no general interest. End of story. 
Yes, this is the end of your story” (87–88). This passage could be the nar-
rator’s rendering, via omniscient knowledge, of Gina’s unvoiced thoughts, 
or the rendering of what Richard thinks are her unvoiced thoughts, dou-
bling as an internal dialogue with his own self-doubts. It could also be the 
narrator’s address to his character, for Richard’s anxiety is echoed, both 
ironically and agonistically, by the narrator who struggles throughout the 
book with the “universal” authority of his own omniscience.
 Richard’s difficulties in finishing his book are paralleled by his dimin-
ishing sexual potency (at one stage using anxiety over “the death of the 
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novel” as an excuse to his wife for his poor sexual performance) and much 
of the book deals with his experience of a midlife crisis. In one scene Rich-
ard experiences a spontaneous erection while his young son is moving 
about innocently on his lap:
This used to cause him disquiet, and struck him as something he had bet-
ter shut up about. But, again, he was enough of an artist to have faith in 
the universality of his own responses. He asked around among the dads 
and found that it was so. It was general—universal. It still struck him as 
essentially perverse. When you thought of all the other occasions which 
cried out for hard-ons that never came. And here you not only didn’t 
need one. You didn’t even want one. (195)
 While Thackeray’s narrator describes himself in the book as “an 
observer of human nature” (177), moving through Vanity Fair in person, 
drawing upon the novelistic convention of omniscient access to character 
thought to supplement his moral commentary, the observations of Amis’s 
narrator are more introspective. The effect is not to undermine his author-
ity, but to ground the legitimacy of his observations in his own experience. 
The passage I quoted at the beginning of this chapter, in which the narra-
tor questions how he can be omniscient when he doesn’t know anything, 
comes from a section of commentary which begins: “This whole thing is a 
crisis. This whole mess is a crisis of the middle years” (62). In what follows 
it becomes obvious that these lines refer not only to Richard’s life, but to 
the book itself, perhaps its genesis if we wish to read it autobiographically, 
but more importantly its form.2 The next line reads: “Every father knows 
the loathed park and playground in the unmoving air of Sunday morning 
(every mother knows it Friday evening, Tuesday afternoon—every other 
time)” (62). This “universal” comment about parenthood is personalized 
by the narrator’s own account of a time in the playground when he was 
approached by a child who proceeded to spell out letters in sign language. 
The narrator believes the child is deaf and dumb and leans forward, 
attempting to decipher the letters, “suddenly braced for revelation, frown-
ing, essaying, as if the boy could tell me something I really might need 
to know” (63). When the boy announces that he has spelled out his own 
name this precipitates the narrator’s crisis of omniscience, a sense that he 
lacks the knowledge of human nature, the “information,” necessary to 
write a novel. His strategy is not to build this sense of crisis into the struc-
ture of the novel in metafictional fashion, but to reassert his authority by 
a confessional identification with his character: “I wrote those words five 
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years ago, when I was Richard’s age. Even then I knew that Richard didn’t 
look as bad as he thought he looked” (63). Amis’s narrator, then, con-
fesses to readers rather than engaging them in a dialogue. And rather than 
asserting the “universal” through detached observation and an assump-
tion of collective agreement, he offers it provisionally through individual 
introspection (the line “Every father knows” echoing Richard’s knowledge 
of universality derived from having “asked around among the dads”). 
This is what allows the narrator to claim: “Intimations of monstrousness 
are common, are perhaps universal, in middle age” (64).
 It is clear that Amis’s narrator is gendered, as his strategy is to iden-
tify with Richard’s perspective. This strategy foregrounds the relativity of 
the narratorial commentary, which is replete with stereotypical statements 
about gender differences: “She was a woman. She knew so much more 
about tears than he did” (9). A gendered narrator uttering “perhaps” has 
less conventional authority than a nongendered one uttering unmoored 
extrapresentational statements. One can see at work here both a recog-
nition and a disavowal of the role gender politics has played in render-
ing the concept of the “universal” untenable. Vera Nunning locates The 
Information within a trend of contemporary fiction which she describes as 
“a merging of realism and experiment” (249). According to Nunning, in 
this book Amis “parodies nearly all the characteristics of nineteenth-cen-
tury authorial narration and refuses to conform to the dogmas of political 
correctness” (249). I would suggest that The Information is less a parody 
then an agonistic encounter with these characteristics, and that its refusal 
of “political correctness” is an element of this agon. For instance, after 
describing the beauty of Gina (focalized through Richard), the narrator 
offers this version of the editorial “we” in a search for universality:
We are agreed—come on: we are agreed—about beauty in the flesh. Con-
sensus is possible here. And in the mathematics of the universe, beauty 
helps tell us whether things are false or true. We can quickly agree about 
beauty, in the heavens and in the flesh. But not everywhere. Not, for 
instance, on the page. (15)
 In the difference between the performance of narrative voice in these 
two novels, emblematic of the nineteenth and the late twentieth century, 
I encounter the need for a diachronic account of shifting modes of omni-
scient authority. This diachronic account would not be so much one of 
the historical decline and revival of a narrative convention (hence map-
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ping onto the standard evolutionary model of the progression of the novel 
from authorial to figural narration), but one of the historical mutability 
of this convention. And if this mutability resides largely in the narrative 
function of commentary, then its relation to a certain figure of authorship 
becomes more important than the nature of narratorial knowledge. With 
this in mind I intend to revisit and reconsider the scholarship on literary 
omniscience, drawing attention to the historical mutability of the concept 
itself, and lay the groundwork for a contextual approach to omniscient 
authority.
The problem of omniscience
It is relatively easy to list the formal features of omniscient narration and 
offer the eighteenth-century novels of Fielding, and the novels of Victorian 
authors such as Thackeray, Dickens, and Eliot, as canonical exemplars. 
Many scholars have pointed out, however, that these novels don’t always 
fit the mold of theoretical definitions. Wilhelm Fuger offered a prominent 
critique along these lines in his article, “Limits of the Narrator’s Knowl-
edge in Fielding’s Joseph Andrews.” Analyzing the functional limitations 
which Fielding’s narrator places on his privileged knowledge, Fuger con-
cludes that “there is no such thing as a fully omniscient narrator and that 
this spectral figure may only be a construct invented by literary theorists” 
(288). Once we attempt a rigorous definition of omniscient narration and 
its manifestation in particular works of fiction, once we attempt to theo-
rize the form and its effects, we are presented with a number of difficulties 
which continue to be debated. These include: the viability of the compari-
son of authorial narrators to God; the relation between author and nar-
rator; the difference between omniscient narration and other third-person 
modes; and the constitutive features of literary omniscience.
 First, how important is the foundational analogy with divinity and the 
ensuing trope of a godlike storyteller? To what extent can this analogy be 
divorced from its theological implications without rendering the descrip-
tive term redundant? As David Lodge (“The Uses”) and Nicholas Royle 
point out, omniscience describes an author’s relation to their creative 
product, and the narrator’s relation to the fictional world, in religious, 
and specifically Christian terms. “To assume the efficacy and appropri-
ateness of discussing literary works in terms of ‘omniscient’ narration,” 
Royle argues, “is, however faintly or discreetly, to subscribe to a religious 
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(and above all, a Christian) discourse and thinking” (260). God forbid! 
Whether or not this association with Christian thinking is an ideological 
problem, when the analogy is deployed as a theoretical paradigm for a 
certain type of narration it leads to the postulation of a supernatural nar-
rator ontologically distinct from character narrators and the narrators of 
nonfiction. In Authorial Divinity in the Twentieth Century, Barbara K. 
Olson argues that the author/God analogy and the omniscient narrator/
God analogy must be taken seriously for their theological implications. 
Her claim is that writers throughout history have been influenced by the 
implications of this analogy for their creative acts, celebrating or rejecting 
comparisons with God, or being troubled by the conceptions of divinity 
which follow from their artistic beliefs. Her argument is that we should 
not even be debating the analogy—we should be studying what sort of 
God is implied by both the testimonies and authorial experiences of writ-
ers, and the narrational acts they employ. There is no doubt this analogy 
has informed many writers and their fictional projects, but it does not fol-
low that it ought to be the basis for a theoretical definition of narrative 
form.
 The term and its applications certainly invite us to consider the rela-
tionship between author and narrator. Does literary omniscience refer to 
the act of writing and its genesis in authorial imagination, or to the act of 
narration and the knowledge of the author’s storytelling proxy? While in 
previous centuries omniscient narration was understood as the method by 
which an author narrates in his or her own voice, formalist distinctions 
between the two assign creation to the author and knowledge to the nar-
rator, begging the question of what sort of narratorial figure can claim 
omniscience. More importantly they divorce narratorial commentary 
from its provenance in an author’s voice. As Meir Sternberg points out, 
in Expositional Modes and Temporal Ordering in Fiction, the term omni-
scient author is logically redundant, for if it refers to the creative power 
of authors it must apply to all works of fiction. For Sternberg, omniscient 
narration only makes sense when referring to the super-knowing quali-
ties which the author has conferred upon the narrator as a storytelling 
delegate.
 We are then led to the problem of what textual features are constitu-
tive of omniscient narration: what are the minimal conventions necessary 
to a definition of literary omniscience which would enable us to label some 
narratives omniscient and others not? The “privilege” which omniscient 
narrators supposedly possess that other narrators do not is knowledge of 
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characters’ hearts and minds. The common distinction between “full” and 
“limited” or “restricted” omniscience to describe the amount of informa-
tion a narrator provides about the fictional world and the interior lives of 
characters raises epistemological questions: how can a narrator be par-
tially all-knowing? If they can reveal the thoughts of one character, why 
not all? These questions frame the problem of omniscience in abstract log-
ical terms. The response, articulated most forcefully by Sternberg (Expo-
sitional Modes, “Omniscience”), is that an omniscient narrator is indeed 
in possession of full knowledge about the fictional world, but chooses to 
reveal or withhold information according to the dictates of the story. Such 
an approach effectively grants omniscience to all third-person narrators, 
although it does point to the fact that omniscience would be better under-
stood as a rhetorical performance of knowledge.
 From the omniscient author to the “omniscient author convention” 
to the omniscient narrator to omniscient narration, the range of cog-
nate terms employed over the last century, along with the multiplication 
of narratological alternatives, manifest the historical changes in critical 
thought about novelistic form and the difficulty of explaining the concept 
of omniscience in a literary context. Most critics and theorists, however, 
continue to employ the term as an easy shorthand, a lingua franca across 
literary studies, while typically qualifying their usage with prefixes such 
as “so-called” or with scare quotes. Within the tradition of narratology, 
according to Wallace Martin, “[w]hen focalization is not treated as an 
independent category in the definition of point of view, ‘omniscient nar-
ration’ becomes a kind of dumping-ground filled with a wide range of dis-
tinct narrative techniques” (146). The diffuseness of literary omniscience 
might prove resistant to easy classification, but that doesn’t make the term 
untenable as many have claimed. The necessary first step is to chart this 
range of techniques and ask how they have come to be grouped together.
 This task cannot be approached in an abstract fashion because the 
theoretical instability associated with literary omniscience is a result of 
its historically shifting usage, from a metaphor of authorship to a formal 
category of narrative, with emphasis placed on different aspects at certain 
points in the history of criticism, depending on the prevailing novelistic 
aesthetic and theoretical climate, leaving us today with a series of sedi-
mentary layers of meanings and functions. What is most vital is to investi-
gate the reasons why certain works of fiction are labeled omniscient, and 
what characteristics are emphasized in this labeling. This will help us to 
understand different historical manifestations of the form.
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a Genealogy of Literary omniscience
A genealogy of the terms “omniscience” and “omniscient” in a literary 
context reveals the shifting preoccupations of theories of the novel and 
the histories of novelistic form which they tell, explicitly or implicitly. I 
will begin with the foundational metaphor. The constitutive feature of 
the analogy between author and God is not a narrator’s perfect knowl-
edge or absolute power, but an author’s creativity. The analogy stems from 
the Renaissance comparison of the poet with God in which, unlike clas-
sical antiquity where he is inspired by God, the poet possesses a faculty 
of imagination like that of God. This concept was introduced to English 
criticism by Philip Sidney in “An Apology for Poetry” (1595). According 
to Sidney: “the poet, disdaining to be tied to any such subjection, lifted up 
with the vigour of his own invention, doth grow in effect another nature, 
in making things either better than Nature bringeth forth, or, quite anew, 
forms such as were never in Nature” (7). Sidney’s “second nature” is what 
we would call a heterocosm. The idea of an all-knowing author is a sec-
ondary product of this theory of creativity.
 Dorrit Cohn and Nicholas Royle both point to Friedrich von Blanck-
enburg’s 1774 Essay on the Novel as the earliest critical application of 
this analogy to the novel, quoting this line: “A writer, lest he wish to dis-
honor himself, can not hold to the pretense that he is unacquainted with 
the inner world of his characters. He is their creator: they have received 
from him all their character traits, their entire being, they live in a world 
that he himself has fashioned” (qtd in Royle 256). Robert Ellis Dye points 
out that this passage refers to the authorial construction of character, an 
author’s ethical responsibility to develop a convincing interior life, and 
is not tied to a particular narrative voice or the qualities of a narrator: 
“Blanckenburg is talking, then, about the author-creator of any literary 
work, and not specifically about the narrator’s field of vision in the novel” 
(132).
 Henry Fielding claims this analogy for the novelist in Tom Jones 
(1749). “This Work, may, indeed,” the self-reflexive omniscient narrator 
claims, “be considered as a great Creation of our own” (459). The nar-
rator goes on to condemn any “little Reptile of a Critic” who finds fault 
with parts of the book before having finished reading the whole. “The 
Allusion and Metaphor we have here made use of, we must acknowledge 
to be infinitely too great for our Occasion; but there is, indeed, no other 
which is at all adequate to express the Difference between an Author of 
the first Rate, and a Critic of the lowest” (459). The allusion to God, then, 
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is founded on the metaphor of creation, used to separate the artist’s capac-
ity for invention from the critic’s parasitic reliance on older arbitrary rules 
of judgment.
 If the concept of literary omniscience can be seen as emerging from a 
theory of creativity, the analogy with God need not be retained when we 
see how the theory of creativity develops in literary criticism. The anal-
ogy, considered blasphemous before the sixteenth century, was the first 
step in internalizing earlier theories of inspiration, leading to the Roman-
tic ideal of the original genius. Coleridge’s “secondary imagination” 
becomes a mental faculty designating not only the reproductive imagina-
tion described by neoclassical critics and supported by the philosophy of 
Locke and Hobbes, but the poet’s creative power, which is an echo of the 
primary imagination, itself “a repetition in the finite mind of the eternal 
act of creation in the infinite I AM” (167). This concept leads eventually to 
a secularized democratization of creativity in twentieth-century theories of 
the unconscious as the source of creativity.3
 When it comes to English theories of the novel, omniscience is first 
mooted as a method of storytelling among others. In her “Life of Samuel 
Richardson” (1804), Anna Laetitia Barbauld assesses Richardson’s work 
in relation to the “three modes of carrying on a story” (xxiii): the narra-
tive or epic, in which “the author relates himself the whole adventure”; the 
memoir, “where the subject of the adventures relates his own story”; and 
a third way, “that of epistolary correspondence, carried on between the 
characters of the novel.” Barbauld describes the narrative or epic mode as 
“the manner of Cervantes in his Don Quixote, and of Fielding in his Tom 
Jones. It is the most common way.” She describes the method in this way:
The author, like the muse, is supposed to know everything; he can reveal 
the secret springs of actions, and let us into events in his own time and 
manner. He can be concise, or diffuse, according as the different parts 
of his story require it. He can indulge, as Fielding has done, in digres-
sions, and thus deliver sentiments and display knowledge which would 
not properly belong to any of the characters. (xxiii)
 Although she does not use the word “omniscient,” instead making an 
analogy with the muse to explain the all-knowing qualities of the author 
(which indicates that the author’s creative power is the source of knowl-
edge which animates the narrative), Barbauld elaborates the familiar range 
of conventions, from the author’s own voice, to access to consciousness 
(“the secret springs of action”), to the freedom to shift from scene to sum-
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mary (“concise, or diffuse”), to the provision of commentary. The point 
here is that only when the author narrates in his own voice, rather than 
the voice of a character, does he have license (according to the laws of real-
ism) to reveal all that he knows of the fictional world he has created.
 The earliest use of the word omniscience in a literary context that I 
have found in English appears in 1848 in Thackeray’s Vanity Fair, which 
I quoted at the beginning of this chapter. It is clear that Thackeray uses 
omniscience to denote the privilege of knowing the secret thoughts of 
characters, and in declaring himself master of these secrets the compari-
son with God is clear (for he searcheth the heart and knoweth the mind). 
It is also clear that Thackeray understands this privilege purely as a con-
vention of authorship, for the narrator draws attention to the fact that he 
is a writer and a novelist, indicates the arbitrariness of shifts in point of 
view, and even describes his omnipresence in terms of pages, not the spa-
tio-temporal coordinates of the fictional world. In short this passage is a 
rhetorical performance of omniscient authority, for the “privilege” of the 
novelist is not only access to the thoughts of characters but the capacity to 
assert an authorial presence by speaking directly to the reader in his own 
voice. The relation between these two features largely dictates the way in 
which omniscience is understood throughout the centuries.
 Barbauld’s taxonomy of storytelling methods is carried through by 
Walter Raleigh in The English Novel (1894), where he explicitly uses the 
term omniscient to describe authorial voice. In classifying the three meth-
ods of telling a story, Raleigh writes:
The first and most usual way is that the author should tell the story 
directly. He is invisible and omniscient, a sort of diable boiteux, who is 
able to unroof all houses and unlock all hearts, and who can never be 
questioned as to how he came to a knowledge of the events he narrates. 
There are stories that can be told in no other way than this; the favou-
rite way of Fielding, Scott, Dickens, and Thackeray. At a slight sacrifice 
of dramatic force the events of the story are supplied with a chorus, and 
at any time that suits him the author can cast off his invisible cloak and 
show himself fingering the “helpless pieces of the game he plays.” (148)
 There are similarities with Barbauld here, the capacity to unlock all 
hearts, the convention of infinite knowledge, but there is less emphasis on 
techniques than on a particular figure of authority, one which appears to 
be immanent in the fictional world, invisible, yet always able to assert his 
presence. One could argue here that the difference in emphasis stems from 
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the fact that while Barbauld had only Cervantes and Fielding as examples, 
Raleigh had the whole range of Victorian fiction. Again, although using 
the word omniscient, Raleigh does not invoke an analogy with God. His 
description of the diable boiteux (meaning “lame devil,” or Asmodeus, 
demon king) recalls an earlier instance of the term in Dickens’s correspon-
dence. In an 1865 letter discussing the origins of his periodical, Household 
Words, Dickens writes of the necessity to “get a character established as it 
were which any of the writers may maintain without difficulty.” This char-
acter would be “a certain SHADOW,” a “kind of semi-omniscient, omni-
present intangible creature” whose knowledge is granted not by creative 
power but by its capacity to inhabit the private spaces of the urban world, 
to “go into any place” and “be in all homes,” and thus able to articulate 
“the spirit of the people and the time,” to speak as a general voice, not just 
that of the author (qtd in Forster 511).
 According to David Pike, “the ‘Asmodean flight’ was a common 
emblem for the problematic power of the omniscient narrator” in the 
nineteenth-century realist novel. “On the one hand the term lays claim 
to supernatural knowledge on the part of the novelist; on the other hand 
it intimates the moral taint that could become associated with a fictional 
overreaching and revelation of things perhaps better left hidden” (85). 
The Asmodean desire to unroof houses continues to be referenced in 
contemporary omniscience, self-consciously in this passage from Michel 
Faber’s neo-Victorian novel, The Crimson Petal and the White: “All of 
the household, except for William, is under the sheets, like dolls in a doll’s 
house. If the Rackham house were such a toy, and you could lift off its 
roof to peek inside, you would see William in shirt-sleeves at his desk, 
working on correspondence: nothing to interest you, I promise” (200). 
Similarly, Amis’s book, set in modern London, opens: “Cities at night, I 
feel, contain men who cry in their sleep and then say Nothing. It’s noth-
ing. Just sad dreams. Or something like that. . . . Swing low in your weep 
ship, with your tear scans and your sob probes, and you would mark 
them” (3).
 Another early appearance of the word “omniscience” is in an 1874 
review of Thomas Hardy’s Far From the Madding Crowd by Henry James, 
who writes: “the author has evidently read to good purpose the low-life 
chapters in George Eliot’s novels: he has caught very happily her trick of 
seeming to humour benignantly her queer people and look down on them 
from the heights of analytic omniscience” (85). Here an immanent, rov-
ing, all-knowing narrator is not emphasized so much as one who is able to 
analyze and judge from on high. An understanding of omniscience as the 
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psychological investigation of character motivation became more promi-
nent as a result of the influence of George Eliot. Susan Lanser claims that 
classic realism, exemplified by Eliot’s novels, emerges from the contradic-
tory “narrative imperatives” of “knowing and judging, or representation 
and ideology” (Fictions of Authority 85). From the late nineteenth century 
“omniscient” and “analytic” were often used interchangeably. This can 
be seen in Brooks and Warren’s Understanding Fiction (1943), which out-
lines various types of narration, including where “the story may be told by 
the omniscient author, or analytic author, the author who does undertake 
to present the working of the mind of one, or more, of the characters, and 
who may investigate and interpret motives and feelings” (659).
 An important shift in the way novelistic method was approached in 
English literary criticism, and hence how omniscience was theorized, is 
indicated by Vernon Lee’s 1895 essay “On Literary Construction.” For 
Lee, “the most important question of all” (19) when considering novelistic 
construction is that of point of view, indicating growing interest in how 
readers are oriented to the consciousness of characters. Drawing on the 
analogy of perspective in painting, Lee writes:
This supreme constructive question in the novel is exactly analogous to 
that question in painting; and in describing the choice by the painter of 
the point of view, I have described also that most subtle choice of the lit-
erary craftsman: choice of the point of view whence the personages and 
action of a novel are to be seen. For you can see a person, or an act, in 
one of several ways, and connected with several other persons or acts. 
You can see the person from no particular body’s point of view, or from 
the point of view of one of the other persons, or from the point of view of 
the analytical, judicious author. (20)
 Here we find an anticipation of narratological theories of focalization, 
from the spatial orientation of characters, to access to consciousness, to 
ideological perspective, with “the point of view of the analytical, judicious 
author” (again with George Eliot as the exemplar) situated as one per-
spective among others in a novel. It is an important conceptual shift from 
modes of telling to modes of perception which will later become elabo-
rated in James’s famous “house of fiction” metaphor in his preface to the 
Portrait of a Lady.
 The twentieth-century concept of omniscience as a type of authorial 
intrusion in the form of excess narrative information rather than scenic 
dramatization is anticipated by George Gissing in an 1885 letter:
omnisCienCe and narratiVe aUthority • 39
It is fine to see how the old three-vol. tradition is being broken through. 
One volume is becoming commonest of all. . . . Thackeray & Dickens 
wrote at enormous length, & with profusion of detail; their plan is to tell 
everything, to leave nothing to be divined. Far more artistic, I think, is 
this later method, of merely suggesting; of dealing with episodes, instead 
of writing biographies. The old novelist is omniscient; I think it is better 
to tell a story precisely as one does in real life,—hinting, surmising, tell-
ing in detail what can so be told, & no more. In fact, it approximates to 
the dramatic mode of presentment. (166)
 Gissing offers an early argument for the redundancy of omniscience 
resulting from new methods of narration which have coincided with 
changes to the book publishing industry. This is a sentiment which James 
himself would agree with and, of course, James famously eschewed the 
heights of analytic omniscience—“the mere muffled majesty of irrespon-
sible ‘authorship’” (Art of the Novel 328)—in his own fiction as he sought 
to apply the principle of dramatization not only to the action of the story, 
but the consciousness of his characters. According to Joseph Warren Beach 
in his 1918 book, The Method of Henry James: “Mr. James is seldom or 
never, in his later work, the ‘omniscient author.’ He has a great scorn for 
this slovenly way of telling a story. It is only in his earlier work that he 
sometimes allows himself to step in and give special information to the 
reader,—information which he could not have had from the person or per-
sons who are for the moment most concerned” (57). With the increasing 
prominence of new modes of third-person narration, omniscience became 
a problem for critics of the novel to address.
point of view and the omniscient author Convention
When comparing the methods of telling employed by English novelists, 
both Barbauld and Raleigh described the value of the epistolary mode as 
combining the intimacy and immediacy of a character narrator with the 
freedom of the authorial narrator. The arguments which Barbauld and 
Raleigh make about the relative merits and disadvantages of authorial 
omniscience and character narration are still in circulation today, but we 
will no longer encounter claims that epistolary fiction is the more drama-
tized and hence mediating position between these two modes. From the 
early twentieth century this privileged technical solution has been firmly 
associated with third-person narration limited to a character’s perspective, 
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which Norman Friedman described as “to have the story told as if by a 
character in the story, but told in the third person” (1164). This critical 
formulation, of course, is a response to the development of modernist fic-
tion and its impulse toward “dramatization” for which Henry James was 
the most vocal champion and, in English fiction, pioneering exemplar.
 There is no need to rehearse in great detail here what is common 
knowledge: that James’s prefaces to the New York Edition of his collected 
work, in which he elaborates in autobiographical fashion his fascination 
with locating a center of consciousness for his narratives, necessitating a 
rejection of many aspects of omniscience (such as overt commentary and 
exposition and multiple points of view), became the basis for a poetics 
of fiction codified by Percy Lubbock’s The Craft of Fiction (1921).4 In 
this book, Lubbock claims: “The whole intricate question of method, in 
the craft of fiction, I take to be governed by the question of the point of 
view—the question of the relation in which the narrator stands to the 
story” (251).5
 Lubbock’s study of point of view in the novel is inseparable from an 
historical conceptualization of novelistic method as an artistic evolution: 
a dynamic struggle of authors to rid their fiction of their own presence as 
omniscient storytellers. This progressive development of point of view, for 
Lubbock, culminates in James’s The Ambassadors, and from James’s ideas 
he elaborates an evaluative aesthetic criterion of showing rather than tell-
ing. The significance of The Craft of Fiction for theories of omniscience 
is twofold: first, it describes, through detailed analyses of Tolstoy, Thac-
keray, Flaubert, and James, the formal features of omniscient narration 
in operation in specific texts, only to register it as a technically outmoded 
point of view, and thus provides an historical and critical framework for 
condemning the use of omniscient narration in the twentieth century. 
Secondly, in doing so, it highlights the paradox of presence and absence 
which has animated later theoretical debates about literary omniscience. 
On the one hand, the means by which the novel is able to move beyond 
omniscience is the effacement of authorial presence; on the other hand, the 
resulting orientation of “point of view” to character consciousness mani-
fests precisely the privilege of omniscience: laying bare the secret recesses 
of character’s minds and hearts.
 It is interesting to note that whenever Lubbock uses the term “omni-
science” it is not in reference to character consciousness, but all the tech-
niques which display authorial presence, that is, an author telling rather 
than showing. For Lubbock, as for Vernon Lee, point of view concerns 
the means by which readers can be supplied with their own point of view, 
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without the mediating presence of authorial consciousness. In Lubbock’s 
poetics, the omniscient author tells a story from his point of view, inter-
posing his mind between that of the reader and the character: “He tells 
it as he sees it, in the first place; the reader faces the story-teller and lis-
tens” (251). Omniscience, then, is manifested in certain elements of a nar-
rative, from “intrusive” commentary to exposition, the pictorial summary 
of events instead of the dramatic rendering of scenes, anything which does 
not place readers in a character’s center of consciousness and thus betrays 
a mediated authorial point of view, a panoramic picture of how the 
author “sees” the world. “By convention,” Lubbock writes, “the author is 
allowed his universal knowledge of the story and the people in it. But still 
it is a convention, and a prudent novelist does not strain it unnecessarily” 
(115).
 Besides the dissenting voice of E. M. Forster’s Aspects of the Novel 
(1927), Lubbock’s work set the terms for subsequent critical works which 
reinforced the modernist aesthetic in formalist criticism. Joseph Warren 
Beach’s The Twentieth Century Novel: Studies in Technique (1932) is a 
good example of the critical industry which developed from Lubbock’s 
pioneering work. To introduce the chapter titled “Exit Author” Beach 
writes:
In a bird’s eye view of the English novel from Fielding to Ford, the one 
thing that will impress you more than any other is the disappearance 
of the author. In Fielding and Scott, in Thackeray and George Eliot, 
the author is everywhere present in person to see that you are properly 
informed on all the circumstances of the action, to explain the charac-
ters to you and insure your forming the right opinion of them, to scatter 
nuggets of wisdom and good feeling along the course of the story, and to 
point out how, from the failures and successes of the characters, you may 
form a sane and right philosophy of conduct. (14)
 It can be seen here how the emphasis on authorial intrusion becomes a 
critique not just of breaking the mimetic illusion, but of asserting a moral 
control over the reader by virtue of obscuring the character. In the 1950s, 
critical accounts of the trajectory of novelistic experimentation toward 
authorial effacement were updated by Robert Humphrey’s Stream of 
Consciousness in the Modern Novel and Leon Edel’s The Modern Psy-
chological Novel. “In the old novels,” Leon Edel wrote, “the omniscient 
author was nearly always present and nearly always addressing an audi-
ence” (138). Edel and Humphrey install Ulysses rather than The Ambas-
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sadors as the high point of the development of the novel. In The Rhetoric 
of Modernist Fiction (2006), Morton P. Levitt extends this tradition into 
the new millennium when he reiterates modernist experiments with point 
of view as a specific rejection of omniscience: “Tracing the movement out 
of omniscience is surely, as I understand it, the most useful clue to the 
emergence of the Modernist novel” (125).
 And yet Flaubert and Joyce provide the touchstone of modernist aes-
thetics in two famous comments which make specific reference to the 
author/god analogy. “The author in his book,” Flaubert wrote in corre-
spondence with Louise Colet, “must be like God in the universe, every-
where present and nowhere visible. Art being a second nature, the creator 
of this nature must employ analogous procedures” (319). This is echoed 
in the dialogue of Stephen Dedalus, hero of Joyce’s A Portrait of the 
Artist as a Young Man: “The artist, like the God of the creation, remains 
within or behind or beyond or above his handiwork, invisible, refined 
out of existence, indifferent, paring his fingernails” (233). In The Rhet-
oric of Fiction (1961), his corrective to what he considered the damag-
ing aesthetic dogma of showing rather than telling, and the evasion of 
ethical questions inherent in the privileging of authorial impersonality, 
Wayne Booth engages with the paradox of omniscience which I pointed 
out earlier:
There is a curious ambiguity in the term “omniscience.” Many modern 
works that we usually classify as narrated dramatically, with everything 
relayed to us through the limited views of the characters, postulate fully 
as much omniscience in the silent author as Fielding claims for himself. 
Our roving visitation into the minds of sixteen characters in Faulkner’s 
As I Lay Dying, seeing nothing but what those minds contain, may seem 
in one sense not to depend on an omniscient author. But this method is 
omniscience with teeth in it: the implied author demands our absolute 
faith in his powers of divination. We must never for a moment doubt that 
he knows everything about each of these sixteen minds or that he has 
chosen correctly how much to show of each. In short, impersonal narra-
tion is really no escape from omniscience. (161)
 Booth argues that modernist impersonality is not an escape from 
“authorial presence,” which Lubbock and his followers claimed, because 
he locates omniscience in the implied author, the norms and values of the 
author’s second self which inform the text, and not in a set of narrative 
conventions. In other words, omniscience is a moral as well as a techni-
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cal choice, and Booth’s counterargument indicates that critiques of autho-
rial intrusion are never purely aesthetic. It is clear, though, that Booth is 
describing omniscience in terms of privileged access to character’s con-
sciousness. The effect of this is to foreground this conventional privilege, 
rather than overt authorial presence, as the constitutive feature of literary 
omniscience, thus licensing use of the term to cover virtually all narratives 
in the third person.
 This is evident in Norman Friedman’s 1955 essay, “Point of View in 
Fiction: The Development of a Critical Concept,” in which he undertook 
to provide a synoptic overview of theories of point of view and addressed 
the problem of omniscience by expanding it to include precisely those 
modernist novels which had been deemed to have eschewed it. Friedman 
provides a taxonomy of various points of view along a scale from tell-
ing to showing, understood in relation to the degree of presence of a nar-
rator, whether the narrator is the author or a character. At one end of 
this scale is “Editorial Omniscience,” in which “‘omniscience’ signifies lit-
erally a completely unlimited—and hence difficult to control—point of 
view” (1171). This point of view is characterized by the preponderance 
of summary over scene in which the author’s voice dominates. According 
to Friedman: “The characteristic mark, then, of Editorial Omniscience is 
the presence of authorial intrusions and generalizations about life, man-
ners, and morals, which may or may not be explicitly related to the story 
at hand” (1171). Here we have the typical account of omniscient narra-
tion as the intrusive presence of the analytic judicious author: “it is a nat-
ural consequence of the editorial attitude that the author will not only 
report what goes on in the minds of his characters, but he will also criti-
cize it” (1172). Friedman goes on to classify increasing limitations on this 
originary mode of storytelling, from “Neutral Omniscience” to “Multi-
ple Selective Omniscience” to “Selective Omniscience.” The only form of 
third-person narration which is not described as a type of omniscience is 
“The Dramatic Mode” in which no mental states are reported (1178).
narratology: Who Sees and Who Speaks?
The Anglo-American study of novelistic method and the pedagogy of cre-
ative writing, which emerged from it, are distinguished by their concern 
with authorial craft, with the aesthetic decisions authors make in con-
structing a work of narrative fiction, and with evaluating the efficacy of 
those decisions. As I have pointed out, this tradition is virtually predicated 
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on the assumption that omniscient narration is a technically outmoded 
method of storytelling, and an aesthetic which by default sees the key fea-
tures of omniscience as impediments to the mimetic illusion necessary for 
realist fiction. I have also shown how this critical tradition emerged out of 
an encounter with the modernist novel and the preoccupation with “point 
of view.”
 In the second part of the twentieth century, this critical tradition is all 
but subsumed by the development of narratology, which stems from struc-
turalist linguistics and seeks to identify a grammar of narrative fiction of 
which novels are particular manifestations. In classical narratology, exem-
plified by Gerard Genette’s Narrative Discourse, we are not presented with 
an account of the methods of storytelling available to an author, but with 
an taxonomy of discrete elements of narrative discourse. This tradition, 
too, emerges out of an encounter with modernism (for Genette, his touch-
stone is Proust, rather than James or Joyce) but eschews interpretation and 
evaluation.
 In Genette’s work, the formal elements traditionally unified under the 
category of the omniscient author convention become dispersed across 
multiple taxonomies: spatio-temporal freedom is understood in terms of 
order (analepses and prolepses); scene and summary are understood in 
terms of duration (or narrative speed) as well as mood (distance); nar-
ratorial knowledge and access to consciousness are understood in terms 
of focalization; and authorial voice is in understood in terms of the nar-
rating instance (time of narrating, person, level, and the functions of the 
narrator).
 Two key methodological distinctions provided by Genette, which 
separate his work from earlier studies of novelistic method, complicate a 
unified narratological account of omniscient narration: the separation of 
author and narrator (divorcing the narrating instance from the instance 
of writing); and the analytic distinction between voice (who speaks) and 
focalization (who sees). Genette’s claim that a narrator such as Balzac’s 
“knows” about the fictional world he is reporting in the narrative, while 
Balzac himself only imagines the events of the narrative he has invented 
(214), means that we cannot understand narratorial knowledge as the 
product of an author’s creative power. We may accept by convention the 
authoritative knowledge of a heterodiegetic (third-person) narrator, but we 
are left with the epistemological question of how to account for that nar-
rator’s knowledge. Genette’s claim that we must separate narration from 
perception means that we have to find ways to divide the perceptual and 
ideological features of point of view amongst these two categories. How-
omnisCienCe and narratiVe aUthority • 45
ever, Genette refers specifically to omniscience only in his section on focal-
ization. Furthermore, in defining focalization as the regulation of narrative 
information, but classifying types of focalization according to degrees of 
access to character’s consciousness, Genette is demonstrating that reveal-
ing character’s thoughts had become the prevailing definition of literary 
omniscience.
 With focalization defined as the regulation of narrative information 
based on a principle of degrees of restriction, Genette outlines a tripartite 
typology which includes: non- or zero focalization, internal (variable, fixed 
or multiple) focalization and external focalization. Following Todorov, 
Genette defines zero focalization as a case of the narrator saying more 
than any of the characters knows, which becomes the narratological alter-
native to the omniscient point of view.6 He points out that “the division 
between variable focalization and nonfocalization is sometimes very dif-
ficult to establish . . . and yet on this point no one could confuse Fielding’s 
manner with Stendhal’s or Flaubert’s” (192). This point should indicate 
that the difference between the work of these novelists is not one of focal-
ization so much as voice, and it is furthermore not a difference which can 
be accommodated by the idea of person, since they are all heterodiegetic.
 Some basis for understanding the relationship between focalization and 
voice is provided by the last, least developed, and little discussed aspect 
of voice in Genette’s method: the function of the narrator. Here Genette 
identifies a foundational narrative function, that is to tell the story, and 
then posits four extranarrative functions which a narrator can perform: 
the directing (referring to the organization of the narrative itself); the com-
municative (engaging the narratee); the testimonial (referring to the rela-
tionship the narrator has with the story); and the ideological (commentary 
on the action which establishes the authority of the narrator’s presence) 
(255–59). This last function seems most pertinent to omniscient narration: 
“the narrator’s interventions, direct or indirect, with regard to the story 
can also take the more didactic form of an authorized commentary on the 
action” (256). In Narrative Discourse Revisited Genette further points out 
that “the use of commentarial discourse is somewhat the privilege of the 
‘omniscient’ narrator” (130).
 It can be seen here that the more hazy ideological features of point 
of view have been assimilated into the function of the narrator, while the 
perceptual aspects are retained in the category of focalization. Genette 
declines, however, to establish a typology of these functions which would 
relate back to his other categories of voice and mood. Narrative theory 
since Genette has sought to clarify the relationship between focalization 
46 • ChaPter 1
and voice, and typically the emphasis has been on expanding the concept 
of focalization or perspective.
 The most significant revision of Genette’s work was offered by Mieke 
Bal, who asserted the theoretical necessity for a further division between 
the focalizer (the subject of perception) and the focalized (the object of 
perception). The focalizer, or “agent” of perception, can be attached to a 
narrator who is external to the storyworld, or to a character who is within 
the story world. Furthermore, focalization can be from without, centering 
on observable action, or from within, centering on character’s thoughts. In 
this typology, omniscient narration can be correlated with an external nar-
rator or narrator-focalizer who has the capacity to focalize from without 
or from within.
 Bal’s reformulation of focalization theory has the tendency to be 
largely visual in its orientation, which is one reason why Genette avoided 
the term “point of view.” Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan, in Narrative Fiction, 
sought to further develop Bal’s theory by adding a range of “facets” of 
focalization. These facets are divided into the following categories: the 
perceptual (space and time) in which the external focalizer has a bird’s 
eye or panoramic view and can focalize simultaneously on events in dif-
ferent places; the psychological (cognitive) in which the external narrator 
has unrestricted knowledge of the represented world; the psychological 
(emotive), referring to the narrator’s detached objectivity and capacity 
to focalize from within to penetrate the consciousness of characters; and 
the ideological, which reveals the authoritative norms of the text through 
which characters and other ideologies can be evaluated.
 In this version of narrative theory, the “focalizer” is called upon to 
explain a lot of features, but ultimately none of them can be adequately 
understood without its relation to the external narrator. In her discussion 
of narrative voice in a separate chapter, which retains Genette’s concept of 
level and person, Rimmon-Kenan writes:
The extradiegetic narrators of Tom Jones, Père Goriot, and Sons and 
Lovers are in no sense participants in the stories they narrate (hence 
they are both extradiegetic and heterodiegetic). It is precisely their being 
absent from the story and their higher narratorial authority in relation to 
it that confers on such narrators the quality which has often been called 
“omniscience.” (95)
 So on the one hand all the features of omniscience are dispersed 
throughout separate facets of focalization, on the other hand they are 
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unified under the category of narrative voice, which provides the autho-
rization for the focalization. In response, Seymour Chatman rejected the 
idea of a narrator who can focalize, arguing that the analytic distinction 
between story and discourse means narrators can never see the storyworld, 
they can only report it (“Characters and Narrators”). In Chatman’s for-
mulation, then, we would understand omniscient point of view as the nar-
rator providing an ideological slant on the filtered events of the narrative.
postclassical narratology
Narrative theory since Genette has been far more concerned with focal-
ization than with voice, or, more accurately, it has been concerned with 
discussing the relation between voice and focalization in the broader con-
text of narrative perspective or mediation. This is evident from the many 
post-Genettian reformulations of focalization theory, some of which I 
have discussed, to the number of books which continue to be devoted to 
the topic, to the whole orientation of postclassical narratology grounded 
in cognitive science, from possible worlds semantics (Herman), to the 
scripts and schemata of frame theory (Jahn, Fludernik), to the psychonar-
ratological empirical study of reader response (Bortolussi and Dixon), 
Theory of Mind approaches (Palmer, Zunshine), and neurobiological 
accounts (Young), all of which build upon the concerns latent in Vernon 
Lee’s and Percy Lubbock’s discussion of point of view as the means by 
which readers’ minds are oriented to the perspective of fictional minds.
 The reasons for the relative lack of attention to voice in narrative 
theory are several: a general critical climate of skepticism about voice as 
the stylistic expression of authorial identity; the influence of deconstruc-
tive critiques of the metaphysics of presence, of logocentric approaches to 
writing as speech embedded in the metaphor of voice (see Gibson); and 
a general impulse, consistent with a modernist aesthetic, to demonstrate 
that narrative fiction need not possess a narrator, from Chatman’s “non-
narrated” narratives to Banfield’s “empty deictic centre” to critiques of 
the narrator as an anthropomorphic construct of readers. These come 
together in the general theoretical and critical orientation across literary 
studies and within narratology toward investigating the role of readers in 
the construction of narrative meaning.
 My argument is that we will not arrive at an adequate understanding 
of omniscient narration unless we assimilate focalization, or perspective in 
the broader sense, into the category of voice and approach it as a rhetori-
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cal strategy of the narrator. Monika Fludernik claims that the narratologi-
cal distinction between voice and focalization is theoretically untenable, 
because “[t]he linguistic clues for determining focalization . . . are the 
same clues as those employed to determine voice” (“‘New Wine’” 633). 
She goes on to reject the concept of voice as an interpretive illusion. And 
yet she recognizes that, in practical terms, “readers” rely upon this illusion 
to make sense of a narrative: “It then turns out to be a useful strategy to 
hypostasize the existence of a narrator figure who is telling us the story 
and whose presence and existence seem to be vouchsafed for by the sty-
listic features of authorial diction” (623). I would suggest that the concept 
of narrative voice is an interpretive strategy of reading precisely because it 
is a rhetorical strategy of authorship, and that focalization is constructed 
from voice in the way that story is constructed from discourse.
 The separation of author from narrator, the narrowing of omniscience 
to access to consciousness, and the focus on reception have all served to 
inform the postclassical emphasis on omniscience as “unnatural” or “non-
natural” knowledge. The most influential work in this regard is Flud-
ernik’s Towards a “Natural” Narratology, which proceeds from the basis 
that narrative fiction is modeled on, and “narrativized” in terms of, cogni-
tive frames derived from naturally occurring oral storytelling situations. 
“Authorial narration,” Fludernik claims, 
performs the naturally impossible by yielding to the human narrator the 
authority of a quasi-godlike historian of human affairs. This contradic-
tion, the very non-naturalness of the historian’s omniscience, is, however, 
naturalized in the frame of empirical enquiry which authenticates a scien-
tific metaphor for the narrator’s exercise of omniscience. (167)
She argues that the reason why access to consciousness, or “mind read-
ing,” is at the forefront of discussions of omniscience is that it “violates 
expected natural frames” (167).
 In the introduction to New Perspectives on Narrative Perspective, Wil-
lie van Peer and Seymour Chatman argue there is a need for narratology 
to move beyond product analysis to process analysis, which “changes the 
basic research model from the question, What is the perspective in this 
story? to How is perspective in this story brought about?” (7). Contempo-
rary narratology approaches this question largely in terms of how readers 
process perspective. For my purposes, I think we need to harken back to 
prenarratological concerns with novelistic method, and ask how authors 
bring about perspective in a story. We can then ask the question why: 
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For what broader cultural purpose do authors construct narrators who 
employ different types of focalization as part of a rhetorical assertion of 
narrative authority?
 Developing a methodological approach to this question will gain 
more from the other significant movement in postclassical narrative the-
ory: that of rhetorical narratology. James Phelan provides a neat précis 
of this approach in Experiencing Fiction: “The first principle is that nar-
rative can be fruitfully understood as a rhetorical act: somebody telling 
somebody else on some occasion and for some purpose(s) that something 
happened” (3). The phrase “on some occasion” can be taken as a rough 
equivalent of Genette’s narrating instance. If, for Genette, voice is under-
stood as where (level) and when (the time of narrating) in relation to the 
story the narrator (person) is narrating from, rhetorical narratology sug-
gests the need for greater attention to the functions of the narrator: to 
whom and why is the narrator narrating? Furthermore, Phelan empha-
sizes the doubled communicative situation of narrative fiction, with twin 
communicative tracks between author/reader and narrator/narratee, 
which readers must negotiate as part of their “experience” of fiction. This 
approach, while also oriented toward the way readers engage with narra-
tives, and particularly the aesthetic and ethical judgments which readers 
make, is grounded in a study of the relation between narratorial voice 
and (implied) authorial intention, which invokes certain readerly stances. 
These rhetorical considerations, for me, are the basis of an approach to 
the narrative authority of contemporary omniscience. Before outlining my 
approach, I will address the debate about omniscience which has emerged 
in the new millennium.
Contemporary debates
According to William Nelles, Jonathan Culler, “will-he-nil-he, appears 
to be a lightning-rod in the current debate over omniscience” (128). In 
his 2004 article “Omniscience,” Culler undertakes the task of clearing up 
the problem of omniscience, from an explicit position of disdain for its 
theological overtones. He asserts that omniscience “is not a useful concept 
for the study of narration, that it conflates and confuses several different 
factors that should be separated if they are to be well understood—that 
it obfuscates the various phenomena that provoke us to posit the idea” 
(184). For Culler, there are four textual “phenomena” that produce effects 
generally understood as omniscience: the performative authority of reliable 
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narrative declarations about the fictional world; the reporting of charac-
ter’s private thoughts; overt self-reflexive statements which draw attention 
to the invented nature of the fictional world; and the synoptic overview of 
events as a means of producing a kind of universal wisdom.
 Culler carefully sifts through each phenomenon, explaining how the 
term omniscience is inadequate to describe its effects, and concludes by 
suggesting the need for an alternative vocabulary. It is hard to argue with 
his dissection of these phenomena, but ultimately Culler’s essay seems to 
prove nothing except what most narratologists accept: that omniscience 
is an imperfect analogy. Narrative theory has of course long employed a 
range of alternative or near-alternative terms, from “extradiegetic hetero-
diegetic narration with non or zero focalization” (Genette) to “authorial 
narration” (Stanzel) to “narrator-focalizer” (Rimmon-Kenan), to “psy-
chonarration” (Cohn). The term “omniscient narrator” still persists in the 
wider scholarly community and in the public sphere, however, and its con-
tinued traction is presumably the occasion for Culler’s essay. I am happy to 
continue using the term with its attendant narratological imprecisions, for 
it is embedded in our critical lexicon and none of the existing alternatives 
quite manages to encompass the narrative freedom (in terms of panoramic 
scope and narratorial judgment) which the trope of a “godlike” narrator 
suggests.
 One alternative to omniscience which Culler favorably invokes, in 
order to bypass the traditional analogy with God, and more accurately 
explain at least one of his phenomena, is “telepathy.” This term is pro-
posed by Nicholas Royle in his 2003 book The Uncanny. Royle argues, in 
fact, that omniscience, focalization, and point of view are all critical falla-
cies, part of an institutionalized metadiscourse of narrative theory which 
does not attend to the complexities of actual literary works. Royle wants 
to do more than abolish an unproductive critical term, though; he wants 
to reconceptualize our approach to literary history, and our understand-
ing of modern narrative fiction. For Royle, the disappearance of God, 
or should we say, the authority of God, in the eighteenth century, can be 
read in the hyperbolic appropriation of the term “omniscience” to denote 
human knowledge.
 He further argues that in the late nineteenth century, at the moment 
when omniscience becomes a common term in literary criticism, the con-
cept of telepathy emerges in the discourse of psychology. “Telepathy,” 
Royle claims, “is both thematically and structurally at work in modern 
fictional narratives, and calls for a quite different kind of critical story-
telling than that promoted by the religious, panoptical delusion of omni-
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science” (261). From brief readings of Dickens, George Eliot, and Virginia 
Woolf, Royle moves to an examination of Salman Rushdie’s 1981 book, 
Midnight’s Children, where, in the character and narrative voice of Saleem 
Sinai, “the telepathic here accedes to a new level of explicitness” (269), 
demonstrating that the structure of fictional narration is fundamentally 
telepathic rather than omniscient. 
What the novel instead offers is the metadiscursive trope of “omniscient 
third-person” reconfigured as “telepathic first-person”—in other words, 
it demonstrates in a new, even unprecedented way the fundamentally 
telepathic (rather than omniscient) structure of fictional narration more 
generally. (269)
 As evidence, Royle cites an interview in which Rushdie admits he began 
writing Midnight’s Children in an omniscient third-person voice before 
abandoning it. What, then, I find myself asking, are we to make of Rush-
die’s 1988 book, The Satanic Verses, where surely omniscience accedes 
to a new level of explicitness? Where the narrator self-consciously addresses 
us as god, or the devil, the creator of a magic realist world? Where the 
protagonist is visited by this God, who happens to look like Rushdie him-
self? In the first chapter of this novel Gibreel Farishta and Saladin Cham-
cha float safely to the ground after falling from a plane which has been 
blown up by terrorists. Toward the end of this chapter we find this passage:
I know the truth, obviously. I watched the whole thing. As to omnipres-
ence and—potence, I’m making no claims at present, but I can manage 
this much, I hope. Chamcha willed it and Farishta did what was willed.
 Which was the miracle worker?
 Of what type—angelic, satanic—was Farishta’s song?
 Who am I?
 Let’s put it this way: who has the best tunes? (10)
 God’s visitation to Gibreel later in the novel is described in these terms: 
“He saw, sitting on the bed, a man of about the same age as himself, of 
medium height, fairly heavily built, with salt-and-pepper beard cropped 
close to the line of the jaw. What struck him most was that the apparition 
was balding, seemed to suffer from dandruff, and wore glasses. This was 
not the Almighty he had expected” (318). The link between God, the nar-
rator, and the author is made clear when the narrator admits late in the 
novel that he visited Gibreel, despite a noninterventionist policy: 
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I’m saying nothing. Don’t ask me to clear things up one way or the other; 
the time of revelations is long gone. The rules of Creation are pretty 
clear: you set things up, you make them thus and so, and then you let 
them roll. Where’s the pleasure if you’re always intervening to give hints, 
change the rules, fix the fights? (408)
 The Satanic Verses, for me, is in fact a convenient historical marker of 
the moment where, critical fallacy or not, omniscient narration, uncan-
nily, like the return of the repressed, returns in serious literary fiction, but 
in a different form. In saying this, I mean that The Satanic Verses requires 
critics of the novel to engage with the way Rushdie plays with the con-
ventions of omniscient narration. The same holds true for the number of 
prominent novels published in the two decades since The Satanic Verses 
that employ omniscient narration.
 In asking whether the term “omniscience” is useful for understand-
ing the effects of particular phenomena of narrative fiction, Culler’s essay 
raises the question of whether any narrative can usefully be classified as 
omniscient, and thus whether the formal category proposed by critics 
actually exists in literary practice. In response, I would suggest that the 
idea of omniscience does not “confuse and conflate” different factors for 
which the term is used as a dumping ground. Rather, that certain works of 
narrative fiction produce the overall effect we have labeled omniscience by 
combining all four phenomena Culler identifies (and others, such as tem-
poral range). So, once they have been separated for the purposes of analy-
sis, the relation between these phenomena needs to be understood.
 Culler’s first two phenomena—authoritative reportage of the story 
world and of characters’ thoughts—also hold true for internally focalized 
heterodiegetic narratives (and the first for external focalization). Culler 
himself points out the difficulties of considering these narratives in terms 
of “limited” omniscience or of narratorial reticence: it effectively confers 
omniscience on all extradiegetic heterodiegetic narratives. The last two 
phenomena, however—narrators who self-consciously claim authorship 
of the work, and narrators who dispense universal wisdom—which are 
more specific to a typical understanding of omniscient narration (i.e., tell-
ing rather than showing), draw upon the epistemological surety of the first 
two for the authority of their claims. In classical narrative theory, these 
first two phenomena can be understood in terms of focalization, while the 
latter two can be understood in terms of narrative voice.
 Meir Sternberg provides a lengthy riposte to the challenges mounted 
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by Royle and Culler in his 2007 article, “Omniscience in Narrative Con-
struction: Old Challenges and New.” He argues that, according to Gen-
ette’s own understanding of focalization as a means of regulating narrative 
information, heterodiegetic narrators cannot possess restricted knowledge; 
they merely display a restricted performance of knowledge. 
Thus the focalizings called “internal,” whether “fixed” (The Ambas-
sadors), “variable” (Madame Bovary), or “multiple” (Rashomon), and 
“external” (Hammett’s The Glass Key): all typically exhibit an all-know-
ing (mind reading, omnitemporality, omnipresence) that keeps the given 
“focalized” information short of what its power makes accessible and 
might reveal at will to the last “nonfocalized” detail. (757)
 For Sternberg, who takes umbrage to Culler’s anti-theism, the author 
is by definition omniscient and the narrator is the author’s super-knowing 
delegate: “the narrator is constructed in God’s image to perform the 
required discourse job with authority, epistemic at least” (763). This nar-
rator’s divulgence of omniscient knowledge ranges from omnicommuni-
cation to free suppression, depending on the artistic strategy required. In 
one sense, accepting Sternberg’s claim that all heterodiegetic narrators are 
omniscient would neutralize epistemological considerations, and allow us 
to focus on the more important rhetorical function of narratorial perfor-
mance. I’m inclined, though, to use the term omniscient narration as a 
label only for certain types of fiction, rather than as a general category 
of narrative: those works which actualize a panoramic intrusive narra-
tor, which perform omniscience, rather than those narratives which report 
without comment, or in which commentary does not reveal a sense of the 
narrator’s personality.
 In his follow up to Culler’s article, “Omniscience for Atheists: Jane 
Austen’s Infallible Narrator,” William Nelles provides the most thorough 
and strict test of omniscience as a paradigm for literary narratives. “Dis-
cussions of omniscience,” Nelles argues, “assign it a broad and variable 
range of characteristics, many of which have little to do with omniscience 
per se” (120). He defines omniscience as a toolkit which authors employ 
to produce narrators with the godly powers of omnipotence, omnitem-
porality, omnipresence and telepathy, or mind reading. Nelles’s claim is 
that because these four features “are denied real human beings” they “are 
uniquely reserved to omniscient narration” (121). As a result, exposition 
cannot be included because it often conveys information which is com-
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mon knowledge to characters, and commentary on a character’s thoughts 
is excluded because once these thoughts are known, a narrator does not 
require omniscience to comment upon them.
 Nelles thus excludes the key feature of intrusive commentary from a 
definition of omniscient narration. And yet surely commentary, in the form 
of judgment of characters, is an important “privilege” of God? As Susan 
Lanser writes in her account of nineteenth-century classic realism: “It is 
only a slight exaggeration to suggest that upon this narrator rested the 
demands and powers of divinity itself, trusted at once to know all and 
to judge aright. . . . Realist ‘omniscience,’ then, means far more than a 
narrator’s privileged knowledge of fictional facts” (Fictions of Authority 
85–86). Furthermore, if literary omniscience is “pretend omniscience,” as 
Nelles says, why could a human narrator not assume the “qualities” of 
omniscience in the act of narration? Whether or not the narrators of these 
novels are sufficiently godlike to warrant the description omniscient is not 
my concern. They obviously display a constellation of formal qualities 
which produce an effect that must be named, and named as distinct from 
other modes of heterodiegetic narration.
omniscience and narrative authority
The broader claim which I intend to elaborate is that omniscient author-
ity needs to be located in the function of the narrator, and that we need to 
approach the narrating instance in terms of how it invokes a historically 
specific figure of the author. The overriding effect which the various for-
mal elements of omniscient narration both enable, and are underpinned 
by, is that of a specific rhetorical performance of narrative authority. By 
this I mean the heterodiegetic narrator’s authority to pass judgment on 
the fictional world, and the authoritative resonance of these judgments in 
the extradiegetic or public world of the reader. Essential to this authority 
is a coherent narrative persona who serves as a proxy for the author. Con-
temporary narrative theory has generally been reluctant to engage with 
this effect because it is at odds with recurring assertions that third-person 
narratives need not possess a narrator. This is the essence of Culler’s cri-
tique of omniscience: that we posit a narrator to explain unnatural knowl-
edge and then are left to explain what sort of narrator could possess this 
knowledge.
 My understanding of omniscient narration, then, is that the term is 
a trope, a figure of speech denoting a particular type of narratorial per-
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formance, not simply a quality of narratorial knowledge.7 We need not 
take the notion of an “all-knowing” narrator literally. We could enter into 
an epistemological debate about how and how much a narrator knows, 
whether limited omniscience is logically possible, but I don’t think this 
would be of much use for textual analysis. The debate over what sort of 
narrator could possess omniscient knowledge also strikes me as unneces-
sary. The Anglo-American study of novelistic method may have used the 
term omniscience, but it never posited a divine or superhuman narrator: 
it simply accepted the convention of the “omniscient author” telling the 
story directly. Narratology has productively complicated this conflation 
of author and narrator, but it has also created problems with account-
ing for narratorial knowledge. In The Rhetoric of Fictionality, Richard 
Walsh challenges several central concepts of narrative theory by present-
ing “a number of attempts to vindicate rather old-fashioned ideas in new 
terms” (1). One of Walsh’s challenges is to the concept of the narrator, 
arguing that all fictional narratives are narrated either by a character or by 
the author. As a result, omniscience “is not a faculty possessed by certain 
class of narrators but, precisely, a quality of authorial imagination” (73).
 I would qualify Walsh’s argument only by suggesting that authors can 
imagine a personalized “second self” to narrate their story, effectively 
establishing themselves as extradiegetic characters. For if, as Walsh points 
out, character narrators, such as Humbert Humbert or Huck Finn, “are 
at least as strongly characterized in the telling of their tales as they are in 
the role of protagonist” (71), then surely the same must apply to autho-
rial narrators. This effect of authorial “characterization” is achieved most 
overtly by commentary which asserts the omniscient narrator’s superior 
knowledge to the characters in terms of his or her moral sagacity, intel-
lectual breadth, and psychological and social insight. With this commen-
tary, Wayne Booth argues in The Rhetoric of Fiction, “the narrator has 
made of himself a dramatized character to whom we react as we react 
to other characters” (212). Booth describes this dramatized narrator as a 
companion and guide to readers, encouraging them to establish a relation-
ship with the author’s “second self.” The term omniscient narration, then, 
is best used to describe a certain type of narrative in which a heterodiegetic 
narrator, by virtue of being an authorial proxy, functions as an extradi-
egetic character, setting up a communicative rapport with the reader in 
order to rhetorically highlight the value of the narrative to a broader 
extraliterary public sphere.
 The value of understanding omniscience in terms of narrative author-
ity is evident when examining the grounds on which the concept and 
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examples of the form are criticized. Omniscient narration is never taken 
to task for providing access to characters’ consciousness, for this is seen 
as one of the distinguishing features of fiction itself, but it has long been 
attacked, on aesthetic, ethical and ideological grounds, for foreground-
ing the presence of the author-narrator. Consider this quote from W. J. 
Harvey’s 1979 essay on George Eliot’s omniscience: “I take it as axiom-
atic that the omniscient author convention becomes objectionable only 
when the author intrudes” (88). Furthermore, it is “the intrusive moral 
comment” (98) which is of most concern. This chief characteristic of omni-
science, authorial presence, is a performance of narrative authority over 
both characters, in the moral judgment of them, and readers, in assum-
ing their complicity with this judgment. The narrative authority which 
arises from judgment is central to denunciations of the religious associa-
tions of omniscience. It is the basis of Culler’s atheistic disdain for authors 
“playing God”; it is at the heart of Sartre’s famous attack on Mauriac; it 
underpins Bakhtin’s critique of the monologic novel; and it is figured as 
the source of repressive panopticism by theorists such as Mark Seltzer and 
D. A. Miller, who link narrative omniscience with Michel Foucault’s con-
cept of modern disciplinary surveillance.
 By virtue of referring both to authorial creativity and narratorial 
knowledge, literary omniscience cannot be understood in purely formalist 
terms, and narrative authority cannot be a product simply of formal con-
ventions. This is because the performance of authority is bound up with 
the author’s cultural status and the circulation of the novel in the public 
sphere. Understanding what historically specific figure of cultural author-
ity omniscient narrators project to assert the importance of their fictional 
narratives, and fiction in general, to public discourse is the most important 
aspect of this study.
 Scholes and Kellogg provide a history of this figure when they approach 
the ways in which “point of view” developed from ancient narratives to 
modern fiction in terms of “the problem of the authority of the narrator” 
(242). They offer an early criticism of the analogy with God presupposed 
by omniscience, and demonstrate how Fielding, building upon the influ-
ence of Cervantes, offers a model of omniscient narration which draws 
upon the authority of three figures: the bard, the histor, and the maker. 
The bard draws its lineage back to the Homeric epic, in which the epic 
poet appeals to the inspiration of the muse rather than tradition to autho-
rize his performance (242). The histor draws its lineage back to ancient 
historians, Herodotus and Thucydides, where again, rather than tradition, 
the narrative is authorized by the critical spirit with which he approaches 
his sources. The “intrusive” commentary offered by the histor “is simply 
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the histor going about his business” (266). In his novels, Scholes and Kel-
logg argue, Fielding’s “narrative persona” (267) models his authority on 
the epic bard and the histor, while also drawing attention to the fictitious 
nature of his narratives: “in practice he sometimes adopts the role of his-
tor (there are things he cannot find out), of bard (he can reveal unspoken 
thoughts when he wants to), and of maker (he admits he is making things 
up)” (268).
 Scholes and Kellogg thus provide an excellent model for linking the 
various formal features of omniscience to particular figures of narrative 
authority. What must be noted is that the development of this mode in 
Victorian fiction, while still demonstrating the relevance of these figures, 
presents in the omniscient narrator a different kind of authority: that of 
the novelist, and especially the novelist as ethical guide. As Susan Lan-
ser writes, the Victorian omniscient narrator possesses a “self-authorizing 
authority” grounded in, “not, as it was a century earlier, the illusion of 
empirical evidence, but (tautologically) the narrative voice itself” (Fictions 
of Authority 85–86). Which is to say, narrative authority is the function of 
a certain kind of cultural capital for the novelist.
authority, Gender, and authorship
To develop an approach to narrative authority which understands omni-
science as an historically contingent and culturally located mode of nar-
ration, feminist narratology offers the most productive resources. Here I 
turn to Susan Lanser’s Fictions of Authority. In this book Lanser develops 
a feminist poetics of narrative voice centered on attempts by women writ-
ers to assert their cultural authority in a gendered public sphere. By posit-
ing a link between “social identity and narrative form” Lanser emphasizes 
that the rhetorical strategies authors employ to establish the authority of 
their narrative voices must be understood in the social context of their 
reception: 
Discursive authority—by which I mean here the intellectual credibility, 
ideological validity, and aesthetic value claimed by or conferred upon a 
work, author, narrator, character, or textual practice—is produced inter-
actively; it must therefore be characterized with respect to specific receiv-
ing communities. (6)
 The social identity which has traditionally carried the most discursive 
authority is that of white educated men, and hence the status of a narrator 
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is received in relation to this dominant power. For Lanser, then, the ques-
tion of narrative authority cannot be separated from the discursive forma-
tions which produce what Foucault called the author function, generating 
modes of authorship which can be adopted or challenged by various nar-
rative strategies. As such, she claims:
the emphasis of this book is on the project of self-authorization, which, 
I argue, is implicit in the very act of authorship. . . . [T]he act of writing 
a novel and seeking to publish it—like my own act of writing a schol-
arly book and seeking to publish it—is implicitly a quest for discursive 
authority: a quest to be heard, respected, and believed, a hope of influ-
ence. (7)
 In the course of her book, Lanser discusses the historically shifting 
negotiation of masculine authority by women novelists through their 
strategic deployment of narrative voice, and articulates three “narrative 
modes” which she calls authorial, personal, and communal voice. “Each 
mode,” Lanser explains, “represents not simply a set of technical distinc-
tions but a particular kind of narrative consciousness and hence a par-
ticular nexus of powers, dangers, prohibitions and possibilities” (15). This 
approach requires Lanser to reconfigure some of the categories of classical 
narratology to investigate particular figures of authorship which emerge 
from them. One of these is Genette’s distinction between extradiegetic and 
intradiegetic, which Lanser reframes, not so much in terms of level, but in 
terms of the connection of these levels to the narratee. This leads her to 
make a “distinction between private voice (narration directed toward a 
narratee who is a fictional character) and public voice (narration directed 
toward a narratee ‘outside’ the fiction who is analogous to the historical 
reader)” (15). Given that the capacity to speak with authority in public 
discourse has traditionally been a male privilege, Lanser’s introduction 
of the public voice enables her to make considerations of gender a vital 
contextual complement to formalist discussions of level and to narrative 
authority in general.
 The narrative mode which Lanser calls the authorial voice is the most 
relevant to this book because this is her term for the authority vested in 
omniscient narration. Where Rimmon-Kenan had accounted for the 
authority of omniscient narration in purely formalist terms, produced by 
the extradiegetic and heterodiegetic status of the narrator, for Lanser, the 
relation between narrator and narratee established by this status must be 
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correlated with the public relationship between author and reader which it 
invokes:
The mode I am calling authorial is also “extradiegetic” and public, 
directed to a narratee who is analogous to a reading audience. I have 
chosen the term “authorial” not to imply an ontological equivalence 
between narrator and author but to suggest that such a voice (re)pro-
duces the structural and functional situation of authorship. (16)
 For Lanser, the “privilege” of the omniscient authorial voice resides in 
a rhetorical invitation for readers to equate the narrator with the author, 
speaking directly to them. In discussing the textual specificities of this 
act of self-authorization, Lanser makes what I think is a key distinction 
between omniscience as the narratorial performance of authority and 
other forms of heterodiegetic narration in which access to consciousness 
is at the fore. This distinction is between narratorial acts of representa-
tion (reporting the fictional story) and extrarepresentation, which involves 
“reflections, judgments, generalizations about the world ‘beyond’ the fic-
tion, direct addresses to the narratee, comments on the narrative pro-
cess, allusions to other writers and texts” (17). Lanser employs the term 
“authoriality” to refer to the extrarepresentational practices of “hetero-
diegetic, public, self-referential narrators,” arguing that these narrators 
make greater claims to discursive authority than more reticent narrators, 
because they “expand the sphere of fictional authority to ‘nonfictional’ 
referents and allow the writer to engage, from ‘within’ the fiction, in a 
culture’s literary, social, and intellectual debates” (17). So here Lanser is 
giving more weight to what Genette called the ideological function of the 
narrator in order to understand the narrative authority of omniscience in 
terms of the gendered and public nature of voice.
 Having established that narrative authority must be understood as 
emerging from the relationship between narrative voice and a particular 
figure of authorship, I will turn, in the following chapters, to the mani-
festation of this relationship in contemporary omniscient narration. An 
important question to consider is the extent to which the modes of nar-
rative authority and the figures of authorship which constitute contem-
porary omniscience must be understood in terms of gender. The first 
observation to make is that contemporary omniscient narration seems to 
be largely a phenomenon of male writers. A. S. Byatt has been a vocal 
defender and dedicated practitioner of omniscient narration, citing 
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George Eliot as her model. But the practice of asserting discursive author-
ity through an intrusive third-person narratorial presence founded on 
the conventional “privilege” of zero focalization has, to my knowledge, 
been taken up by far fewer female than male novelists. Hence, of the fif-
teen authors whose work I will be classifying and providing cases studies 
of, only three of these are women: Gail Jones, Zadie Smith, and Nicola 
Barker. The next step is to consider the extent to which this gender imbal-
ance carries methodological implications.
 In her earlier work, The Narrative Act, Lanser offers a series of claims 
regarding the conventional assumptions readers make about the gender of 
authors and narrators. First, that “in the absence of textual information to 
the contrary, a certain degree zero of narrator identity is presumed,” and 
that “the unmarked case for both writing and narration is the male case: 
writers and narrators are presumed male unless the text offers a marking 
to the contrary” (166). She also points out that, despite this degree-zero 
assumption, readers will conventionally equate the unmarked voice of a 
heterodiegetic public narrator with the social identity of the author. So if 
readers note that the author of the book they are reading is female, this 
“signals a female narrative voice in the absence of markings to the con-
trary” (167). These claims strike me as uncontroversial, and are clearly rel-
evant when considering the long held practice of female authors adopting 
male or androgynous pseudonyms to take advantage of a default assump-
tion of normative male authorship.
 It would seem important to note, then, that if omniscient narration 
by convention has the highest narrative authority, this authority must be 
gendered male. We might then think about the formalist definition of the 
“privilege” of omniscience. Traditionally this privilege has been equated 
with the “godlike” capacity to know the interior lives of characters, and 
one could easily extend the implications of the metaphorical comparison 
to the ultimate “male” authority of god. However, I have argued that epis-
temological and theological approaches to omniscient narration are less 
important than considerations of the rhetorical performance of omniscient 
authority. In which case, the key “privilege” of omniscience is the author-
ity to speak with influence in public discourse, particularly through what 
Lanser calls “extrarepresentational acts.”
 This enables a productive link between Lanser’s contextual narrato-
logical approach to authorship and narrative authority and the broader 
accounts of a crisis in literary authority which I have argued underpins 
the emergence of contemporary omniscience. Kathleen Fitzpatrick’s claim 
for the gendered nature of the anxiety of obsolescence proves salient 
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in this regard. For Fitzpatrick, public lamentations over the loss of the 
novelist’s cultural authority in the face of electronic media can be corre-
lated with white male authors simultaneously appropriating a disingen-
uous position of marginality and figuring the mainstream as feminine. 
Toward the end of her book, Fitzpatrick claims that underneath the anxi-
ety of obsolescence “lies a concern about the continuing role of the white 
male subject in contemporary society” (230), an “overwhelming cultural 
theme, which may appropriately be called, after Nina Baym, a melo-
drama of beset white manhood” (231). For Fitzpatrick, the disinvitation 
of Jonathan Franzen from Oprah Winfrey’s Book Club is a key example 
of a conflict between an embattled white manhood equated with literary 
culture and the feminized space of popular mass media: “the otherness 
of the electronic media to the ‘higher’ art of the novel parallels the other-
ness of women and racial and ethnic minorities to the experience of white 
men” (232). The anxiety of obsolescence, then, is not animated so much 
by an attempt to reclaim a broad cultural authority in the form of attract-
ing more readers, as it is by a desire to protect an elitist masculine literary 
culture from the threat of otherness.
 Here we might find a useful hypothesis for why male authors are pre-
dominantly the ones who have renovated omniscient narration—typically 
regarded as the voice in fashion at the high point of the novel’s cultural 
authority—but inscribed this narrative voice with a more relativized and 
agonistic mode of narrative authority, as in the case of Martin Amis with 
which I opened this chapter. Returning to Lanser’s claims about the gen-
dered nature of narrative voice, then, in the case studies of the modes 
of contemporary omniscience which follow, I will endorse Lanser’s claim 
that the degree zero of narrator identity is male, and draw attention to the 
occasions when narrators explicitly mark their gender to facilitate the link 
with authorial voice which I am claiming is essential to narrative author-
ity. The textual marking of gender occurs precisely through the extrarep-
resentative narratorial intrusions which perform an omniscient narrator’s 
authority. I will also show how, in approaching fiction as a mode of public 
discourse, the conventional equation between a narrator’s and an author’s 
“social identity” in Lanser’s terms enables an author’s nonfictional state-
ments to be read as extrarepresentative commentary on the same discur-
sive, rather than diegetic, level. Hence my claim that narrative authority 
arises out of relations between author and reader which are also governed 
by extratextual relations. Understanding the contingency of authority as 
an appeal to the public authority of the author we can start to theorize 
the different functions of omniscience in specific historical periods.
althoUgh  book reviews and scholarly articles on individual works of fic-
tion may mention their use of omniscient narration, general accounts of 
the phenomenon of contemporary omniscience are virtually nonexistent. 
The few attempts to distinguish between classic and contemporary omni-
science that I have found have come from teachers of creative writing. In 
The Power of Point of View: Make Your Story Come to Life (2008), Alicia 
Rasley argues that “classical omniscient” has “attitude and persona,” an 
“ironic, all-wise, witty voice commenting on events” (14), whereas “con-
temporary omniscient” “eliminates the narrative persona, though not the 
narrative control” (140). This formulation replicates the standard distinc-
tion between overt Victorian omniscience and covert modernist omni-
science (or editorial and neutral omniscience in Friedman’s terms) and 
hence is at odds with the phenomenon I am concerned with here.
 In the previous chapter I argued that literary omniscience must be 
understood as more than a narrator’s complete knowledge of the fic-
tional world, evidenced by access to the consciousness of characters. I also 
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The contexts, the great forms of the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century sagas, 
have been exhausted; realism and experimentation have come and gone without 
seeming to point to a way ahead. The contemporary writer, therefore, must 
combine these veins, calling on the strengths of the Victorian novel together with 
the alienations of post-modernism. 
—Martin Amis, The War against Cliché 78–79
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argued that the narrative authority of omniscience cannot be understood 
in purely formalist terms as a narrator’s possession of this knowledge 
(focalization), by virtue of his or her ontological distinction from charac-
ters (voice). If we take access to consciousness as the defining feature of 
omniscience, then virtually all third-person narrators are omniscient, and 
we become mired in epistemological debates about full or partial omni-
science. In my approach, omniscient narrators are distinguished from 
other heterodiegetic narrators by the extent to which they rhetorically per-
form this conventional authority. That is, we cannot assume omniscience 
as a default quality of authorial narrators; it must be manifested in overt 
displays of zero focalization (saying something no character could know) 
and extranarrative statements which establish the intrusive presence of the 
narrator. Approaching narrative authority less as the capacity to report 
reliably on the story world, and more as a type of narratorial status pro-
duced by a relational exchange between agents in the communication 
model, I have argued that the authority of omniscient narrators, by virtue 
of their function as a proxy for the author, is contingent upon a particular 
figure of authorship. The reason the intrusive omniscient narrator of Vic-
torian fiction is said to have fallen out of favor in the twentieth century 
was that its narrative status lost cultural authority in an age of relativism. 
The authorial figure projected by omniscient narrators in contemporary 
fiction can thus be archaic or (post)modern depending on the rhetorical 
performance of this voice.
 On this basis, the distinction I am making between classic and contem-
porary omniscience is not simply a periodizing one between novels writ-
ten before the twentieth century and novels written since the 1990s. The 
fact that a novel has been published recently does not necessarily make it 
contemporary. I am mindful here of John Barth’s claim in his 1967 essay, 
“The Literature of Exhaustion,” that a “good many current novelists 
write turn-of-the-century-type novels, only in more or less mid-twentieth- 
century language and about contemporary people and topics; this makes 
them considerably less interesting (to me) than excellent writers who are 
also technically contemporary” (30). Even Barth’s classic metafictional 
short story “Lost in the Funhouse” (1968) cannot be considered a tech-
nically contemporary example of metafiction in comparison to David 
Foster Wallace’s “Octet,” which introduces extra levels of irony as it self- 
consciously wrangles with the legacy of postmodernism.
 By contemporary omniscient narration, then, I mean works of fic-
tion in which intrusive third-person narrators demonstrate an aware-
ness of the influence of postmodernism on the figure of authorship which 
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their narrative voices project. In this sense, there may be works written 
today which employ omniscient narration but are not contemporary in 
their use of the form. Vikram Seth’s A Suitable Boy (1993) would be one 
such example of classic omniscience, modeling its form on the Victorian 
novel. Richard Russo’s defense of omniscience suggests that it has always 
been the unacknowledged mainstream of narrative fiction in the twenti-
eth century. This may be true if we accept third-person narratives with 
multiple perspectives and an unobtrusive voice, such as Russo’s Empire 
Falls (2003), as omniscient. However, I have established greater emphasis 
on the performance of omniscience through intrusive presence and zero 
focalization to clarify the term and delimit the field, and my focus here is 
on novels whose omniscience differs from classic omniscience as a result 
of their aesthetic and intellectual relation to the legacy of postmodernism.
 Russo’s defense stems from the assumption by writers, literary critics, 
and theorists that omniscient narration is an outmoded relic of the Victo-
rian novel; an assumption which has exerted tremendous influence on the 
production and reception of literary works for the past century, from the 
history of decline which I mapped out in the previous chapter, to the pre-
vailing aesthetic prejudice which underpins the “practical” advice against 
the form dispensed in writing programs, to the professional advice of 
agents and publishers, to the response of reviewers. In other words, in 
the same way that the anxiety of obsolescence, as Kathleen Fitzpatrick 
describes it, operates discursively to enable certain statements about the 
state of the novel, the critical narrative of the obsolescence of omniscience 
constructs a blind spot in which omniscient narration is not recognized as 
an element of contemporary literary culture. When contemporary works 
of fiction are discussed, their use of omniscience is not considered impor-
tant, or it is seen to complicate the contemporaneity of the work. For 
instance, Matthew Paproth claims, in “The Flipping Coin: The Modernist 
and Postmodernist Zadie Smith”:
The problem with classifying Smith’s fiction, then, is its determinedly 
straightforward, traditional presentation of narrative and its relatively 
uncomplicated narrative voice. Rather than presenting us with the kind 
of tortured unremitting narratives that Beckett presents us with, or with 
the kind of mixed-up chutnified narrative that Rushdie presents us with, 
Smith’s narratives are leisurely paced, elegantly structured, and written 
from the perspective of a confident omniscient narrator. (14)
 
 Again we have the assumption that omniscience is a form of narra-
tion and an authorial posture so encrusted with Victorian sensibilities that 
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any use of its conventions can only be understood as nostalgic conserva-
tism or ironic critique. The books I am concerned with here may dem-
onstrate some kind textual self-consciousness of the form but are neither 
nostalgic revivals (in an unreflective or ironic fashion) or parodic meta-
fictional critiques, so much as they are hyperbolic or agonistic searches 
for new modes of narrative authority. The novels I have chosen to study, 
furthermore, are embedded in the governing institutions of literary fic-
tion. They possess cultural capital by virtue of being objects of discussion 
around which a discursive formation or a paratext accumulates, and exert 
some pressure on the way in which the novel circulates as an art form and 
cultural artifact in public life. In other words, I’m interested in the con-
tribution of omniscient narration to current debates on the status of the 
novel as an art form in the wake of postmodernism and on the function of 
authors in public discourse.
omniscience, Metafiction, and postmodernism
I want now to briefly sketch the ways in which postmodern experimenta-
tion has influenced contemporary omniscience. Invoking the term “post-
modern” is inevitably fraught with problems of definition, and I follow 
critical custom in asserting that its deployment in relation to fiction can 
only ever be provisional. The commonly accepted features of postmod-
ern fiction include self-reflexivity, parody, irony, playfulness, pastiche, 
nonlinearity, and a general tendency for formal experimentation which 
challenges what Catherine Belsey, in Critical Practice, called “expres-
sive realism” (7–14). Some prominent definitions of postmodern fiction 
include: metafictional subversions of the relation between fiction and his-
tory (Hutcheon); fiction in which the generic dominant is a narrative fore-
grounding of ontological questions—as opposed to the epistemological 
dominant of modernism (McHale, Postmodernist Fiction); a tendency to 
favor diegesis over mimesis (Lodge, “Mimesis”); and, in a critique of for-
malist approaches, the global expansion of English language fiction in the 
wake of colonialism (Berube).
 If we accept “postmodernism,” at the very least, as a periodizing 
term marking the cultural sensibility and general aesthetic accompanying 
the condition of postindustrial late capitalism, I will define postmodern 
fiction, for the purposes of this book, as an aesthetic move beyond the 
“exhaustion” of modernist experimentation without returning to tradi-
tional realism, and a cultural response to a perceived crisis of authority 
for the novel as a mode of public discourse, dramatized in the phrase “the 
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death of the novel.” David Lodge’s important 1969 essay, “The Novel-
ist at the Crossroads” is a good starting point here, for it identifies three 
genres which emerged from the anxiety of writers faced with this situa-
tion. These genres are fabulism, or what became known as magic realism; 
the nonfiction novel, now sometimes called “faction,” or grouped under 
the broader term of “creative nonfiction”; and the problematic novel, now 
known as metafiction. What I would like to suggest is that Lodge’s three 
genres are examples of postmodern experimentation with narrative voice 
which opened up the possibility for reintroducing omniscient narration in 
literary fiction.
 The privileged mode of postmodern fiction is without doubt metafic-
tion. As Patricia Waugh claims: “Although metafiction is just one form 
of postmodernism, nearly all contemporary experimental writing displays 
some explicitly metafictional strategies” (22). Metafiction itself takes a 
variety of forms, but many examples, such as Barth’s “Lost in the Fun-
house,” overtly assert the presence of an omniscient narrator by virtue of 
the characteristic authorial intrusions which draw attention to the act of 
writing: “The boy’s father was tall and thin, balding, fair-complexioned. 
Assertions of that sort are not effective; the reader may acknowledge the 
proposition, but. We should be much farther along than we are; something 
has gone wrong; not much of this preliminary rambling seems relevant” 
(79). As Wenche Ommundsen claims, in Metafictions?: “The ostentatious, 
intrusive narrator or author-figure, interrupting the story to air his or her 
preoccupations with the processes of fiction-writing, is perhaps the most 
explicit way of expressing a reflexive awareness” (7–8).
 It is precisely the intrusive presence of the author in Victorian omni-
science which modernist poetics reacted against. Henry James, of course, 
famously excoriated Trollope for the reflexivity of his authorial voice, for 
parading his creative omnipotence in direct addresses to the reader. “In a 
digression, a parenthesis or an aside,” James laments, 
he concedes to the reader that he and this trusting friend are only “mak-
ing believe.” He admits that the events he narrates have not really hap-
pened, and that he can give his narrative any turn the reader may like 
best. Such a betrayal of a sacred office seems to me, I confess, a terrible 
crime. (“The Art” 71)
If omniscient narration can be defined as an authorial narrator’s rhetor-
ical performance of narrative authority manifested most overtly in self-
reflexive, intrusive commentary, then postmodern metafiction which does 
the same is surely omniscience with teeth in it. Furthermore, the attention 
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drawn to the armature of fiction by the self-reflexivity of the form estab-
lishes a link between author and narrator.
 Barth’s postmodern manifesto “Literature of Exhaustion” is the key 
document here, suggesting that technically contemporary novelists could 
reclaim the pleasures of plot and narrative as long as they built an ironic 
awareness of this reclamation into the narrative. John Fowles’s meta-
fictional classic, The French Lieutenant’s Woman, is a good example of 
how this postmodern stance might relate to omniscient narration and its 
association with the Victorian novel. After twelve chapters in which the 
authorial narrator of Fowles’s novel diligently mimics the voice of a Victo-
rian novel, we have this famous confessional intrusion:
I do not know. This story I am telling is all imagination. These char-
acters I create never existed outside my own mind. If I have pretended 
until now to know my characters’ minds and innermost thoughts, it is 
because I am writing in (just as I have assumed some of the vocabu-
lary and “voice” of) a convention universally accepted at the time of my 
story: that the novelist stands next to God. He may not know all, yet he 
tries to pretend that he does. But I live in the age of Alain Robbe-Grillet 
and Roland Barthes; if this is a novel, it cannot be a novel in the modern 
sense of the word. (85)
 The French Lieutenant’s Woman is typically characterized as a meta-
fictional parody of the Victorian novel. However, it can also be seen as a 
self-conscious attempt to revive the pleasures of the form. In his “Notes 
on an Unfinished Novel” Fowles wrote: “We suspect people who pretend 
to be omniscient; and that is why so many twentieth-century novelists feel 
driven into first person narration. . . . But in this new book, I shall try 
to resurrect this technique” (153). Of course, the narrator of The French 
Lieutenant’s Woman, as we are told in a direct address to the reader, has 
the problem of dealing with omniscience in “the age of Barthes and Robbe-
Grillet” (85). In other words, an omniscient narrator in the twentieth cen-
tury cannot be the same as an omniscient narrator in previous centuries. 
An awareness of this fact is what underpins contemporary omniscience.
after postmodernism
The same period that I have identified as marking the return of omni-
science in contemporary fiction, from the 1990s to the present, has also 
been described as the period in which postmodern literature gave way to 
68 • ChaPter 2
the post-postmodern, or at least another iteration of postmodernism. For 
instance, in The Routledge Companion to Postmodernism Barry Lewis 
clearly demarcates 1990 as the end of postmodernist writing as the dom-
inant mode of literature (95). Post-postmodern literature has typically 
been defined as fiction which owes some debt of influence to, or at least 
demonstrates a textual awareness of, the major works and characteristics 
of postmodernism, but which attempts to put this legacy of experimen-
tation in the service of more humanist concerns. If metafiction was the 
privileged genre of postmodernism, its critique forms the engine of what 
is now being called post-postmodernism: characterized as an attempt to 
move beyond the “exhausted” form of metafiction and the dead-end of 
formal experimentation which was its legacy (McLaughlin, Burn). This 
impulse has informed a return to or reworking of traditional forms and 
narrative (Hoffmann); a less fraught engagement with popular culture, 
such as embracing the language of the everyday or drawing inspiration 
from comic books, rather than operating within an anticapitalist mode of 
critique (Hoberek); and a more humanistically oriented exploration of the 
self, rather than a critique of the subject, including the ethical questions 
this involves (Timmer). These accounts of post-postmodernism share three 
features: the periodizing (from the 1990s); the generational (a younger 
group of writers who came to prominence in this period); and the combi-
natorial (a synthesis of classical realist form with elements of postmodern 
experimentation).
 The features of post-postmodernism have all been described in both 
British and American fiction, by Vera Nunning, in “Beyond Indifference: 
New Departures in British Fiction at the Turn of the 21st Century,” and 
Stephen J. Burn in “The End of Postmodernism: American Fiction at the 
End of the Millennium.” Burn describes how throughout the last decade 
of the twentieth century a critical mass of artists and theorists prosecuted 
claims for the demise of postmodernism as a movement, partly because 
its continued semantic diffuseness lacked explanatory force, and partly 
because it failed to adapt to the contemporary media ecology, with its 
characteristic self-reflexivity losing its avant-garde dynamism when meta-
fictional strategies became absorbed and co-opted by mainstream popular 
culture and marketing.
 My argument for locating contemporary omniscience within this broad 
concept of the post-postmodern, indeed for suggesting it is the exemplary 
voice of this impulse, is predicated on two claims. First, if postmodern-
ism, by foregrounding the presence of an author-narrator (the metafiction-
ist, the fabulist, and the journalist) self-reflexively revived the omniscient 
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narrator, then this became the point of departure for contemporary writ-
ers. Secondly, this authorial presence can be read as symptomatic of the 
post-postmodern novelistic anxiety over the cultural relevance of fiction 
produced by the institutional conditions of literary culture which I out-
lined in the introduction. Two common critiques of postmodernism, its 
empty formal experimentation and its rejection of the concept of charac-
ter, are founded on the claim that these features render the novel irrelevant 
to public discourse. Contemporary omniscient narration emerges from an 
attempt to engage with the insights of postmodernism while reconfiguring 
the authority of the novelist in the public sphere.
 In suggesting that contemporary omniscience can be characterized as 
post-postmodern, I don’t want to argue that this marks the end of post-
modernism as a literary enterprise, a cultural sensibility, or a mode of criti-
cal and philosophical thinking. But I do want to show how some of the 
forms identified as postmodern have been further extended by contem-
porary writers, regardless of whether these writers are given generational 
labels of postmodern or post-postmodern. I propose, then, four perme-
able and overlapping modes of narrative authority which contemporary 
omniscience relies upon, and whose postmodern lineage can be traced 
back to Lodge’s genres: (1) the Ironic Moralist; (2) the Literary Historian; 
(3) the Pyrotechnic Storyteller; and (4) the Immersion Journalist and 
Social Commentator.
 In analyzing these four modes I will pay attention to two aspects of 
narrative voice: first, the formal manifestations of “authorial” presence 
from evaluative commentary on characters, to aphoristic statements about 
“human nature,” to self-relexive addresses to the reader; and secondly, 
how this commentary configures the narrative voices around modes of 
authority different from that of the novelist in classic omniscience. In 
many cases I will draw upon some of the nonfictional extra literary state-
ments of authors to demonstrate their vital role in establishing the narra-
tive authority of their fiction in the public sphere.
The Ironic Moralist
The first mode of contemporary omniscience, the ironic moralist, grap-
ples self-reflexively with the legacy of the “universalizing” moral author-
ity of classic omniscience, and it does so in the shadow of metafiction. 
The self-reflexivity in this mode, in which the narrator’s intrusive author-
ity is constantly paraded, is less concerned with exposing the artifice of 
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fiction, than with the problem of how to assert the universal in relation 
to the particular. The narratorial direct address is the main device used 
to engage with this problem: demonstrating an anxiety over the extent 
to which moral commentary can be taken as authoritative. Any discus-
sion of contemporary omniscience must begin with the direct address, one 
of the key features of classic omniscient authority, and the feature most 
criticized for working against dramatization. To recall Leon Edel’s claim: 
“In the old novels the omniscient author was nearly always present and 
nearly always addressing an audience” (138). I have already discussed 
Martin Amis’s The Information in this context. The other examples I will 
examine here are David Foster Wallace’s story “Octet” and Adam Thirl-
well’s Politics.
 The narrator of Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses can also be classified as 
an ironic moralist. As I pointed out in the introduction, this narrator self-
consciously asserts his omniscient status, indeed literalizes the metaphor 
of a godlike narrator by claiming to be God. At the same time, he compli-
cates his moral authority by virtue of presiding over a magic realist world 
in which he hints that he may also be the devil: “Who am I? Let’s put it 
this way: who has the best tunes?” (10). There has been some debate about 
the nature and function of narrative voice in this novel, with scholars 
such as James Harrison and Keith M. Booker identifying what they call a 
satanic narrator at play. Roger Clark provides an overview of this debate 
in his book, Stranger Gods: Salman Rushdie’s Other Worlds, before argu-
ing: “While it is something of a simplification to say that the text has only 
two narrative voices, I would argue that it has a conventional, omniscient 
narrator as well as an otherworldly satanic narrator” (134). Clark char-
acterizes the satanic narrator as an insidious covert presence in the novel, 
a puppeteer who wields an omnipotent hand at the diegetic level: “the 
satanic narrator possesses Chamcha then uses him to manipulate Gibreel” 
(144). At the same time, his satanic pride compels him to announce his 
presence at the extradiegetic level, surfacing in various direct addresses 
which undermine the unity and control of the conventional omniscient 
narrator: “I know; devil talk. Shaitan interrupting Gibreel. Me?” (93). 
 Certainly Rushdie’s narrator encourages readers to entertain doubts 
about his nature, and the purposes of his narration. In a broader sense, 
however, the “satanic” narratorial intrusions are ludic distractions from 
a desire to assert universal statements about human nature, even as the 
narrator performs postcolonial critiques of the empire. While the title 
refers to the apocryphal story of the devil reciting passages of the Koran to 
Muhammed, this reference is given a more quotidian parallel in the form 
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of Saladin Chamcha’s desire to gain revenge on Gibreel Farishta for aban-
doning him to the authorities when they first fell from their burst plane to 
the shores of England. Chamcha inflames Gibreel’s murderous jealousy 
through a series of anonymous phone calls in which he whispers lines of 
doggerel intimating sexual knowledge of Gibreel’s wife: “and then it was 
time for the return of the little satanic verses that made him mad” (445). 
This leads Gibreel to murder his wife and kill himself. Recognizing that 
the story is “the echo of a tragedy,” a “burlesque for our degraded, imita-
tive times” the narrator asserts: “Well, then, so be it.—the question that’s 
asked here remains as large as ever it was: which is the nature of evil, how 
it’s born, why it grows, how it takes unilateral possession of a many-sided 
human soul. Or, let’s say: the enigma of Iago” (424). In framing his ques-
tion this way, the narrator is implicitly recognizing the perennial relevance 
of Shakespeare’s tragedy, even after having reported earlier Chamcha’s 
echo of Thomas Babington Macaulay’s famous Minute on Indian Edu-
cation (1835), which called for an educational system in India to create 
a class of anglicized Indians, when he tells his future wife “that Othello, 
‘just that one play,’ was worth the total output of any other dramatist in 
any other language” (398).
 The narrator goes on to ask rhetorically whether Gibreel and Saladin 
represent “two fundamentally different types of self” (427). Gibreel “has 
wished to remain, to a large degree, continuous” whereas Saladin “is a 
creature of selected discontinuities, a willing re-invention; his preferred 
revolt against history being what makes him, in our chosen idiom, ‘false’” 
(427). This is complicated by the fact that:
Such distinctions, resting as they must on an idea of the self as being (ide-
ally) homogenous, non-hybrid, “pure,”—an utterly fantastic notion!—
cannot, must not, suffice. No! Let’s rather say an even harder thing: that 
evil may not be as far beneath our surfaces as we like to say it is.—That, 
in fact, we fall towards it naturally, that is, not against our natures.—
And that Saladin Chamcha set out to destroy Gibreel Farishta, because, 
finally, it proved so easy to do so; the true appeal of evil being the seduc-
tive ease with which one may embark upon that road. (427)
 Here we have an intrusive narrator discussing his characters with his 
readers, as could be found in classic omniscience. The moral commentary 
includes what could be a claim for original sin, our natural state arising 
from the Fall, but it is made hesitantly with the awareness of postcolonial 
and postmodern critiques of an essentialized self.
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david foster Wallace, “octet” (1999)
In both his fiction and nonfiction, David Foster Wallace has deliberately 
framed his intellectual and aesthetic project as an encounter with the leg-
acy of metafiction. In his 1993 essay, “E Unibus Pluram,” Wallace locates 
himself within a class of “fiction writers as a species,” and locates this 
class in “a literary territory that’s gone from Darwinianly naturalistic to 
cybernetically post-postmodern in eighty years” (151). According to Wal-
lace this new generation of American fiction writers must contend with 
two interrelated phenomena: the literary influence of postmodern metafic-
tion, and the cultural power of television. The link between the two, for 
Wallace, is the corrosive power of self-conscious irony and its rebellious 
critique of any position of authority and sincerity.
 Postmodern fiction, Wallace points out, developed at the same time 
that television assumed cultural ascendancy in America. “For postmodern 
fiction—written almost exclusively by young white males—clearly evolved 
as an intellectual expression of the ‘rebellious youth culture’ of the six-
ties and early seventies,” made possible by the homogenizing effects of 
television on national culture (182). The failure of postmodern fiction to 
grapple with the challenge of television, Wallace argues, lies in its inabil-
ity to transcend a position of ironic distance which television had already 
adopted: “The fact is that for at least ten years now television has been 
ingeniously absorbing, homogenizing, and re-presenting the very cynical 
postmodern aesthetic that was once the best alternative to the appeal of 
low, over-easy, mass-marketed narrative” (173).
 Irony, Wallace’s chief target, is a way of “heaping scorn on pretensions 
to those old commercial virtues of authority and sincerity” (179), while 
protecting oneself from this scorn and making the receiver complicit in 
this stance. So if fiction writers are to reclaim cultural authority from tele-
vision they must eschew the irony they have become complicit with; the 
contemporary fiction writer must risk charges of banality and sentimental-
ity in order to separate fiction from its mutually implicated relationship 
with television fostered by postmodern metafiction. Wallace concludes by 
arguing that: “The next real literary ‘rebels’ in this country might well 
emerge as some weird bunch of ‘anti-rebels,’ born oglers who dare to back 
away from ironic watching, who have the childish gall actually to endorse 
single entendre values” (193).
 In this way, like John Barth, he is claiming the need to move beyond 
an “exhausted” form of experimentation and reclaim some of the tra-
ditional territory of authors. However, he understands this as an ethical 
the direCt address and the ironiC moralist • 73
rather than technical challenge, and the exhausted form of experimenta-
tion he is referring to is not modernism, but the postmodernism cham-
pioned by Barth. While his long story, “Westward the Course of Empire 
Takes Its Way,” with its clear intertextual reference to Barth’s “Lost in the 
Funhouse,” is typically seen as the prime example of this project, I would 
suggest that Wallace’s short story “Octet” is by far more important and 
successful. Like “Lost in the Funhouse” and Fowles’s The French Lieu-
tenant’s Woman, this story stages an agonistic encounter with the process 
of writing, but ultimately is less concerned with a formalist interrogation 
of the architectonic structure of fictional narrative and its realist aspira-
tions, than with the nature of fiction as communication. In fact, I suggest, 
“Octet” can be read as a self-reflexive exploration of the key device of 
omniscient authority: the authorial narrator’s direct address to the reader.
 By virtue of the fact that the narratorial direct address is extranarrative 
in its function, that is, a pause in the narrative, it has been condemned as 
breaking the illusion of reality. This is why the direct address, in the form 
of self-reflexive authorial intrusions, became the most important device of 
postmodern metafiction and its critique of realist fiction. Wallace’s strat-
egy, in a sense, is to recuperate the sincerity and intrapersonal efficacy of 
the direct address from its deployment in metafiction as a laying bare of 
the artifice of fiction. If this artifice, the craft of writing, is laid bare, the 
story asks, what can be revealed: an empty fictional structure, or the fibril-
lating self of the “real” author?
 While “Octet” is not a typical example of omniscient narration, its 
authorial narrator experiments with some key features of omniscient 
authority: reflexively demonstrating his creative power by drawing atten-
tion to the fictive nature of the story, addressing readers and discussing 
characters with them. However, this narrator, as a writer and proxy for the 
author himself, does not “know” his characters, and the struggle to pro-
vide universal commentary or write the story he envisaged eventually takes 
over the narrative. The story is structured as a series of “pop quizzes,” 
self-contained but interrelated vignettes in which complicated scenarios of 
interpersonal relations are presented (the relationship between two drug 
addicts, between work colleagues, a wife and her son, and between a man 
and his wife’s family). The questions at the end of each section employ the 
pop quiz format as a direct address inviting readers to make ethical judg-
ments about the characters’ actions or to surmise their motivations. For 
instance, the first section, “Pop Quiz 4” about two “late stage terminal 
drug addicts” concludes with: “Q: Which one lived” (111). Readers are 
thus encouraged to provide the moral evaluation of characters which is 
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normally the preserve of the omniscient narrator. The third section, “Pop 
Quiz 7,” about a “lady” who walks away from a custody battle with her 
wealthy ex-husband to ensure their child retains access to a Trust Fund, 
concludes with “Q: (A) Is she a good mother” (114). The fourth section 
“Pop Quiz 6(A),” about “X” who feels disconnected from his wife’s fam-
ily because he loathes her dying father whom everyone else worships, con-
cludes with “Evaluate” (123).
 The quizzes, however, read like sketchy works in progress, with no 
character names and operating largely through summary. The second sec-
tion, entitled “Pop Quiz 6,” makes this provisional nature of the story 
overt, as it is full of hypotheticals and hesitations. It begins: “Two men, X 
and Y, are close friends, but then Y does something to hurt, alienate and/
or infuriate X” (111). What follows is a narrative based on speculations 
about what this “something” was, concluding with: “In fact the whole 
mise en scene seems too shot through with ambiguity to make a very good 
Pop Quiz, it turns out” (113). “Pop Quiz 6 (A)” proceeds to make refer-
ence to the “abortive PQ6” (120). Here the narrator is both speaking to 
himself as he works through the problems of the story and aware of the 
reader’s “presence.’
 In Towards a Natural Narratology, Monika Fludernik discusses tradi-
tional omniscience in these terms: “To the extent that the authorial narra-
tor exemplifies the laws of human nature on the basis of illustrative case 
studies of a few human subjects (the protagonists), ‘his’ uncanny ability to 
know other people’s minds becomes backgrounded and hardly noticeable 
as an infraction of real-life frames” (124). “Octet” is occasioned by the 
narrator’s anxiety over his inability to provide these “illustrative case stud-
ies,” resorting to the performance of his own anxiety as the exemplifica-
tion of human nature.
 The last section, “Pop Quiz Nine,” becomes an extended metafictional 
examination of the failure of the piece to realize the writer’s original inten-
tion. The authorial intrusion, however, takes the form of a second-per-
son address which simultaneously establishes the narrator of the previous 
pieces as the narratee and protagonist and, by virtue of its grammatical 
form, invites the reader to adopt this position. It begins: “You are, unfortu-
nately, a fiction writer. You are attempting a cycle of very short belletristic 
pieces” which are “supposed to compose a certain sort of ‘interrogation’ 
of the person reading them” (123). This phrase, “a fiction writer,” echoes 
Wallace’s references in “E Pluram Unibus” to a subspecies of voyeuristic 
humans who are representative of the inability to form meaningful rela-
tionships which television fosters. Of course the person reading this cycle 
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of belletristic pieces is the writer himself, who thus becomes a surrogate for 
the reader. “There are right and fruitful ways to try to ‘empathize’ with the 
reader,” the authorial narrator opines, “but having to try to imagine your-
self as the reader is not one of them” (129). The implication is that read-
ers are asked to imagine themselves as the writer. A distinction between 
narrator and narratee is established in a footnote in the first person: “All I 
can do is be honest and lay out some of the more ghastly prices and risks 
for you and urge you to consider them very carefully before you decide. 
I honestly don’t see what else I can do” (133). This narratee is clearly a 
fictional version of the authorial narrator—“You’re still going to title the 
cycle ‘Octet’” (129)—yet it is also clear that the narrator is attempting to 
address readers through his self-directed apostrophe.
 In turning over the problems of the existing pop quizzes, the narrator 
writes that referring to the aborted Pop Quiz 6 has
the disadvantage of flirting with metafictional self-reference—viz. the 
having “This Pop Quiz isn’t working” and “Here’s another stab at #6” 
within the text itself—which in the late 1990s, when even Wes Craven 
is cashing in on metafictional self-reference, might come off lame and 
tired and facile, and also run the risk of compromising the queer urgency 
about whatever it is you feel you want the pieces to interrogate in who-
ever’s reading them. (124)
 Here we find the same critique of metafiction which Wallace articulates 
in his essay on American fiction and television: its own sense of “used-
upness” (to use Barth’s phrase). Can meta-metafiction revive this used-up 
postmodern experiment? We, the reader, are a constant presence in this 
last section, with phrases such as “whoever’s reading them” referencing 
the subject position of the reader, while the second person instantiates the 
narratee.
 In Dear Reader: The Conscripted Audience in Nineteenth-Century 
British Fiction, Garrett Stewart argues that reconstructing a sense of the 
nineteenth-century reading public can begin with a formal study of how 
novels “conscript” their readers through rhetorical invocations of the act 
of reading. The “Dear reader” trope, he claims, is a “synecdoche for a 
nineteenth-century literary public initially made available to us through 
the inferences of fictional reading” (6–7). For Stewart, reading is an 
“event” enacted in classic realist fiction through two interrelated strategies 
which “together establish the discursive situation of the reader” (15): the 
direct address to readers which textually locates them; and scenic descrip-
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tions of characters reading which parallel and analogically dramatize the 
reader’s act. “As independent reading agent outside the story, your relega-
tion by text to a delegate of attention within it converts you to either a 
second or a third person, either an addressee or a character, even if, in the 
latter case, only ‘the reader’” (8).
 Stewart traces the “Dear reader” trope from its epic origins to its high 
point in Victorian fiction, and then its obsolesence as it is outlawed by 
modernism before it “flares up again in the postmodern involutions of the 
nouveau roman” (33). In this lineage, the direct address is given a new 
articulation in second-person narration, and in a novel such as Italo Cal-
vino’s If on a Winter’s Night a Traveler which marks “how the epic stretch 
toward tribal consolidation through narrative is inverted by a postmod-
ern textual circuitry that processes—and so pulverizes—all traces of social 
space into textual space” (34).
 The occasion Stewart offers for his investigation is the decline of liter-
ary reading as a cultural activity in the late twentieth century. If the direct 
address became dated after the “glory days” (5) of the novel in the nine-
teenth century, then its fate, he implies, parallels that of literary reading 
itself. An attendant irony is that critical theories of reading emerge at the 
same time. “Both a vanishing pastime, indeed vanishing craft, and a fading 
cultural stance, fictional reading has thus been ever more insistently theo-
rized—as if with a certain unsaid urgency, if not elegaic plangency—dur-
ing its gradual eclipse by other media” (5). Stewart’s book was published 
in the same year as Jonathan Franzen’s lament in Harper’s for the loss of 
a reading community, and three years after Wallace’s essay. “Octet,” pub-
lished three years after Stewart’s book, can be placed within his trajectory 
of the “Dear reader” trope, both addressing the reader and dramatizing 
the reader by analogy: a second-person address to the writer reading his 
own draft and wondering how to directly address readers. A footnote in 
the final pop quiz sets up the story’s metafictionality as a problem of the 
direct address:
Though it all gets a little complicated, because part of what you want 
these little Pop/Quizzes to do is break the textual fourth wall and kind 
of address (or interrogate?) the reader directly, which desire is somehow 
related to the old “meta”-device desire to puncture some sort of fourth 
wall of realist pretense, although it seems like the latter is less a punctur-
ing of any sort of real wall and more a puncturing of the veil of imper-
sonality or effacement around the writer himself, i.e. with the now-tired 
S.O.P “meta”-stuff it’s more the dramatist himself coming onstage from 
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the wings and reminding you that what’s going on is artificial and that 
the artificer is him (the dramatist) and but that he’s at least respectful 
enough of you as reader/audience to be honest about that fact that he’s 
back there pulling the strings, an “honesty” which personally you’ve 
always had the feeling is actually a highly rhetorical sham-honesty that’s 
designed to get you to like him. (125, emphasis added)
 There is a reference here to the diminished capacity of the (postmod-
ern) direct address to challenge the (modernist) “impersonality” and 
“effacement” of the writer. Its reference to Thackeray’s puppet master 
(“pulling the strings”) also indicates a desire to avoid the ironic distanc-
ing of this narrative voice. The only way to salvage the story, the narrator 
tells the protagonist (himself/the reader), is to rescue the direct address 
from the sham honesty of metafiction. “In other words what you could 
do is you could now construct an additional Pop Quiz—so the ninth 
overall” (131). You could “address the reader directly and ask her straight 
out whether she’s feeling anything like what you feel” (131). The irony, 
however, is that the reader is only addressed indirectly, through a version 
of what Brian Richardson calls the autotelic second person, the “defin-
ing criterion” of which “is the direct address to a ‘you’ that is at times 
the actual reader of the text and whose story is juxtaposed to and can 
merge with the characters of the fiction. It is a narrativization of a form 
of address” (30). Italo Calvino’s If on a Winter’s Night a Traveler (which 
begins: “You are about to begin reading Italo Calvino’s If on a Winter’s 
Night a Traveler”) is posited as the exemplar. “Autotelic texts,” Richard-
son claims, “have the greatest share of direct address to the actual reader 
and superimpose this onto a fictional character designated by the ‘you’ 
that tends to be treated from an external perspective as if in the third per-
son” (32).
 So Pop Quiz 9 becomes a metafictional reflection on the failed octet 
which doubles as a direct address to readers asking them whether they 
think this last pop quiz is enough to salvage the whole piece. Employing 
the second person encourages the reader to adopt the subject position of 
narrator who wants to 
demonstrate some sort of weird ambient sameness in different kinds of 
human relationships, some nameless but inescapable “price” that all 
humans are faced with having to pay at some point if they ever want 
truly “to be with” another person instead of just using that person some-
how. (132)
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This puts the universal comment about “all humans” upfront by perform-
ing that “price,” the exposure of the self, in the act of narration.
 This attempt at direct communication between writer and reader is 
compared to the “universal” problem of human relations, the desire for 
recognition by others: “In fact one of the very last few interpersonal taboos 
we have is this kind of obscenely naked direct interrogation of somebody 
else. It looks pathetic and desperate” (131). For metafiction to have any 
purchase in this goal it must run the risk of desperation. This is the crux of 
the story, the source of its anxiety as well as its rhetorical gambit: 
It may well be that all it’ll do is make you look like a self-consciously 
inbent schmuck, or like just another manipulative pseudopomo Bullshit 
Artist who’s trying salvage a fiasco by dropping back to a metadimension 
and commenting on the fiasco itself. (135)
The last paragraph of the story reads like this:
Rather it’s going to make you look fundamentally lost and confused and 
frightened and unsure about whether to trust even your most fundamen-
tal intuitions about urgency and sameness and whether other people deep 
inside experience things in anything like the same way you do . . . more 
like a reader, in other words, down here quivering in the mud of the 
trench with the rest of us, instead of a Writer, whom we imagine to be 
clean and dry and radiant of command presence and unwavering convic-
tion as he coordinates the whole campaign from back at some gleaming 
abstract Olympian HQ.
 So decide. (136)
 The narratee as writer is being asked to decide whether he will risk 
an honest, desperate direct address to the narratee as reader, who is thus 
being asked whether she actually feels the “queer nameless ambient urgent 
interhuman sameness” (133) which the author-narrator-narratee does. 
The final pop quiz then, which asks readers to decide whether the nar-
rator is being sincere, also self-reflexively poses the question of whether 
postmodern metafiction can be put to service in fiction in the wake of its 
redundancy. At the same time, the reference to the “Olympian HQ” of the 
writer is an obvious invocation of a particular figure of authorship asso-
ciated with omniscient narration, establishing this narrative voice as an 
exemplar of the ironic moralist. The rhetorical function of this narrator, 
then, is to ask whether the universal authority of the author to comment 
the direCt address and the ironiC moralist • 79
meaningfully on human nature can survive the postmodern critique of this 
authority.
 In Gendered Interventions, Robyn Warhol provides a study of the 
rhetorical strategies by which the narrators of Victorian novels establish 
relations between readers and narratees, specifically through the direct 
address to a “you.” In doing so, Warhol distinguishes between “distanc-
ing” and “engaging” narrators. A distancing narrator employs the direct 
address to specifically characterize the narratee, with the effect of discour-
aging readers from identifying with the subject of the narratorial address. 
This strategy, which generates an ironic stance from the narrator in rela-
tion to the reader, operates by referring to the reader as “a third party,” 
whether through specific names or the more general term “reader.” The 
strategy inscribes the narratee as a “flawed” reader by anticipating or 
warning against misinterpretations, thus establishing variant reading 
positions which a reader must be careful to adopt or reject; and playfully 
drawing attention to the narrator’s creative control over the characters 
and the story being told. Conversely, the engaging narrator seeks to close 
the gap between reader and narratee, typically addressing a generalized 
“you,” or collective entities, which readers are more likely to identify 
with, guiding them to a sympathetic response to the plight of characters, 
and earnestly asserting the connection between the fictional world and 
the actual world of the reader. These “interventions” in the narrative dis-
course are, for Warhol, gendered, with distancing strategies most common 
in novels by men (Fielding, Thackeray, Trollope), and engaging strategies 
most common in novels by women (Gaskell, Stowe, Eliot), although she 
is careful not to claim any essentialist link between the two, and demon-
strates overlaps between the strategies.
 For Warhol, “all narrative interventions must, at some level, interfere 
with the illusion of reality” (41), but the over-arching irony of distancing 
strategies move the realist novel toward metafiction, whereas the interven-
tions of an engaging narrator encourage the verisimilitude of the fictional 
world in an earnest attempt to effect social change by drawing attention to 
the social inequalities represented in the novel. Seen in these terms, the use 
of (in)direct address in “Octet” carries the dramatic and thematic tension 
of the story: self-reflexively pondering whether the engaging narrator, who 
is earnest and addresses a public reader, can be regained from the ironic 
metafictional excesses of the distancing narrator. Of course, in doing so 
this narrator performs both engaging and distancing functions, moving 
from isolated direct addresses to readers, inviting their judgment of char-
acters, to the autotelic second person in which the reader and narratee 
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are collapsed into the subject position of the authorial narrator, inviting 
judgment of the act of narration. The question is whether these narrato-
rial strategies can be read as culturally gendered in the way Warhol argues 
they are in the Victorian novel.
 It will be recalled that in his essay Wallace equates metafiction with the 
white male authors of postmodernism. His claim that the post-postmodern 
writer must risk the charge of sentimentality, the exposure of the self, in a 
desire for authorial sincerity might then be seen as a gendered critique of 
the ironic distancing narrator, something which he follows up in “Octet” 
when the narrator discusses the danger of using “words like relationship 
and feeling” (133) in an attempt to engage the reader. The implication is 
that the writer who steps out from the cover of irony risks feminization. 
The narrator in fact takes care to refer to the narratee not only as “you,” 
but, when a third-person reference is syntactically required, as “she.” This 
replicates the decision many writers take to undermine the universaliz-
ing assumption of “he” as the default gender of readers. In this context, 
though, it also has the effect of gendering the reader: 
And then you’ll have to ask the reader straight out whether she feels it, 
too. . . . Right there while she’s reading it. Again, consider this carefully. 
You should not deploy this tactic until you’ve considered what it might 
cost. What she might think of you. (133)
The analogy used to explain this cost is instructive: “It might very well 
make you (i.e. the mise en scène’s fiction writer) come off like the sort of 
person who not only goes to a party all obsessed about whether he’ll be 
liked or not, but actually goes around at the party and goes up to strang-
ers and asks them whether they like him or not” (134). The figure of the 
writer is gendered male, while the figure of the reader is gendered female, 
so when the story concludes by stating the only way to save itself from 
metafictional irrelevance is to be “more like a reader” we can assume that 
the “Olympian HQ” of the Writer is a threatened position of male cultural 
authority. The final injunction “to decide” is thus freighted with the gen-
der implications of multiple subject positions in the narrative communica-
tion model.
 In canvassing the possibility of a direct communication between author 
and reader, the story is designed to provide precisely the sort of “univer-
sal” comment on human nature associated with the omniscient narra-
tor: in this case about the fundamental human need for connection and 
the simultaneous fear of this connection. Rather than asking readers to 
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identify with the situation of the characters in the story, and guiding their 
responses, the narrator enacts this “universal” anxiety about human rela-
tions at the level of the discourse, so the act of writing fiction, the instance 
of writing conflated with the narrating instance, becomes the exemplifica-
tion, in the form of an extradiegetic character, of the universal desire for 
interpersonal relations.
 In her book Do You Feel It Too? The Post-Postmodern Syndrome in 
American Fiction at the Turn of the Millennium, Nicoline Timmer char-
acterizes post-postmodern fiction as the attempt by a generation of writ-
ers influenced by postmodernism to reconfigure or transform the concept 
of self inherited from anti-humanist critiques of subjectivity. Locating this 
impulse in a general move toward the “rehumanization” of the subject in 
contemporary theory, particularly through the influence of cognitive psy-
chology on theories of narrative, Timmer argues that Wallace is a “key fig-
ure in the development of a new ethic and aesthetic in fiction” (23).
 Timmer describes “Octet” as one of Wallace’s “fictionalized manifes-
toes for a new direction in fiction writing, a form of writing that can no 
longer be adequately labelled ‘postmodern’” (102). In this story, I would 
add, Wallace experiments with possibilities for recovering the authority 
of narrators to comment. If third-person metafiction was an ironic revival 
of the intrusive omniscient author, “Octet” is an agonistic recuperation of 
the direct address for the purpose, not of moral commentary on human 
nature, but earnest communication, the author’s desire to speak in his own 
voice. Yet, the legacy of metafiction for Wallace meant this direct address 
was still layered in levels of reflexive irony, operating as a dialogue with 
himself as writer and reader of his failed story.
adam Thirlwell, Politics (2004)
Thirlwell’s insistent narratorial interjections begin to acquire the ring of an 
over-assiduous tour guide, whose determination to ensure that no detail goes 
unnoticed removes your liberty to enjoy the view. 
—Alfred Hickling, “Actually, I Don’t Like It” 22
A similar anxiety about authorial communication can be found in Adam 
Thirlwell’s Politics. In The Twentieth Century Novel, Joseph Warren 
Beach asserted that there are “three major tendencies of the Victorian 
novel which have, for good or ill, gone largely out of fashion in the twenti-
eth century” (20). According to Beach:
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There is the disposition to be edifying in a moral way. There is the fond-
ness for talking the characters over with the reader, taking sides, and 
letting the reader know what attitude he should take. And there is the 
scientific passion for explaining the character, making us understand how 
the particular phenomenon before us illustrates the laws of human nature 
in general (20).
 Thirlwell, who was included as one of Granta’s Best Young Novelists 
for 2003, on the basis of his then unpublished first novel, employs all three 
tendencies in Politics. And it is obvious that in doing so he is grappling 
with the legacy of metafiction, with the direct address appearing as persis-
tently as a nervous tic as the authorial narrator urges readers not to misin-
terpret his evaulative commentary: “This is another moment in my novel 
where you must not let your own private theories affect how you read” 
(266). The irony of this line is that the narrator offers his own theories on 
topics from romance to nationalism throughout the novel.
 The novel opens with a sex scene in which the protagonist, Moshe, 
is excruciatingly self-conscious about his performance: “As Moshe tried, 
gently, to tighten the pink fluffy handcuffs surrounding his girlfriend’s 
wrists, he noticed a tiny frown” (3). Immediately following this opening 
line, the narrator forcefully asserts his presence through a direct address: 
“I think you are going to like Moshe. His girlfriend’s name was Nana. I 
think you will like her too” (3). During this opening scene, Moshe’s con-
cern about what he thinks “must be the most nervous scene in the his-
tory of sex” (10) is interrupted by two pages of narratorial commentary 
which begins: “I am going to expand a little on Moshe’s problem. It is a 
universal problem. It is the universal insecurity that one is not universal” 
(11). The narrator offers an opinion that the genre of the novel can pro-
vide solace precisely for readers with this sort of anxiety—“To get over the 
problem of vanity and other cases of illusion, we have novels” (11)—and 
asserts that “If Moshe had read this novel, then I think he would have 
been happy” (12). The narrator then invites readers to compare Moshe’s 
“universal problem” to their own experiences, before expressing an anxi-
ety regarding his own capacity to provide this solace:
My idea is that you are like this too. Maybe, just maybe, you are not. But 
I reckon that, at some point in your life, something almost identical to 
this has happened to you.
 Of course it has! This book is meant to be reassuring. This book is 
universal. It is a comparative study. The last thing I want is for this to be 
just me. (12)
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 In these comments we find both a brazen display of diegetic authority 
and an agonistic lament for extradiegetic authority. The doubt about the 
capacity of his novel to be universal is a doubt about his capacity to influ-
ence readers, later invoking this doubt as a problem of genre: “I know you 
are not convinced by this. You are unpersuaded. Where is the realism? 
you say. Where is the accuracy of the European novel. Where is the truth 
to nature of Balzac or Tolstoy?” (131). The self-reflexivity facilitates an 
appeal to the subjective personality of the individual writer, relativizing 
the “universal” authority of the narrator’s omniscience, and personalizing 
himself as an extradiegetic character to the extent of discussing his own 
life. “Personally, I think it was a good thing. This is not because I think 
blowjobs are intrinsically a good thing. Well no, I do think blowjobs are 
a good thing. I am rarely averse to a blowjob, but that is not why I think 
that a blowjob was the right thing here” (54).
 The narrator is at pains to remind us that his novel is about good-
ness and kindness, constantly anticipating possible responses to the 
characters or his comments before replying defensively, most commonly 
with the qualifying phrase “I think,” oscillating between hesitancy and 
assertiveness:
Sometimes I think that this book is an attack on sex. Sometimes I think 
it is prudish. It might be. And if it is, then some people, maybe even a lot 
of people, will think that this is wrong. They will think that being prud-
ish is indefensible.
 But me, I do not think that prudishness is indefensible. I really don’t. 
(182)
 There is no confident appeal to a general consciousness, but a rhetor-
ical performance of doubt, the need to argue a position, as if unsure of 
the extent to which readers will be able to enter what Peter Rabinowitz 
dubbed the authorial audience, defined by James Phelan as: “The hypo-
thetical, ideal audience for whom the implied author constructs the text 
and who understands it perfectly” (Living 213). While Phelan makes a 
distinction between the authorial and narrative audience, the authorial 
narrator of Politics collapses any interpretively meaningful distinction. 
The omniscient narrator knows the interior lives of his characters, but 
as a proxy for the author he can only speculate about his readers. Often 
this doubt relates to how readers might respond to the explicit sexual 
nature of the novel: “I am not sure what the general attitude to pissing 
is. I do not know how most people view pissing as a sexual manoeuvre” 
(156).
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 Politics is centered around a “romance” between two young London-
ers, Moshe and Nana, and particularly their self-conscious sexual exper-
imentations, which develop into a ménage à trois with one of Moshe’s 
friends, Anjali. The “comparative study” which the narrator promises 
works by comparing the situations of his characters to the private lives 
of real historical personages, from artists such as Andre Breton and Greta 
Garbo, to political figures such as Hitler and Mao. The ontological plane 
of the narrator is clearly the same as that of flesh and blood readers, which 
means that his “knowledge” of the characters must be a product of his fic-
tional invention, rather than a divine quality of omniscience.
 For instance, building upon Moshe’s anxiety about his sexual perfor-
mance, the narrator cites a conversation about sex between key figures 
of the Surrealist movement in 1928 (the acknowledgements referring to 
a book called Investigating Sex: Surrealist Research, 1928–1932). He 
then comments that: “I really do not think that Moshe needed to be so 
flustered by his performance. André Breton, the founder of the Surrealist 
movement, came in twenty seconds maximum” (60). Commenting on the 
fact that Nana contracts thrush from Moshe, the narrator points out that 
Chairman Mao did the same to multiple women: 
But maybe there is a more human side to Chairman Mao. Maybe he was 
just embarrassed. . . . It is not easy admitting to your doctor that you are 
the carrier of a sexually transmitted disease. Even Moshe found it diffi-
cult, and Moshe is a much less public person than Mao. (93)
 The narrator also seeks to “universalize” his narrative by drawing 
elaborate parallels between the sexual politics of the ménage à trois his 
characters are involved in and real world geopolitical situations. Discuss-
ing Moshe’s concern about how the threesome is developing, his need for 
“more positive signs,” the narrator digresses to state: “In August 2000, the 
Italian police intercepted some conversations in Arabic between Al Qaeda 
members” (177). He goes on to express sympathy for those police who did 
not read these conversations as signs of an impending attack: “It is not 
easy, spotting clues. In retrospect, everything is so much clearer” (178).
 In another chapter, the narrator elaborates Nana’s desire to discon-
tinue her involvement in the relationship by comparing it to the relation-
ship between nation states:
In 1995 the Nobel Peace Laureate, Sir Joseph Rotblat, called for a treaty 
among nuclear-weapons states. Each state would agree not to be the first 
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to use nuclear weapons in any conflict. On 5 April 1995, a No First Use 
Policy of the Declared Nuclear Weapons States was duly signed.
 I know that Nana and Moshe and Anjali were not nuclear-weapons 
states. They were obviously not states at all. So this might seem a little 
melodramatic and irrelevant. But it is not melodramatic and irrelevant. 
(228)
 He goes on to explain the theoretical flaw of Mutually Assured 
Destruction: “This type of agreement only works if everyone is feeling 
threatened” (228). On this basis he establishes a parallel with Nana’s deci-
sion to leave the ménage: “Their tacit agreement to stay together had no 
longer any binding force. It would be no worse for Nana to leave than to 
stay” (228).
 The audacity of the narrator’s self-conscious attempts to universal-
ize the characters’ situations through a “comparative study” is most evi-
dent in the parallels he makes with actual historical personages. In one 
instance, the narrator quotes from a letter Mikhail Bulgakov wrote to the 
government of the Soviet Union in 1930 before writing: “But, you say, 
that is entirely different. Bulgakov was living in Stalinist Russia. What is 
the connection between the pathos and courage of Bulgakov’s letter, and 
the relationship of Nana and Moshe? Surely I am not saying that the rela-
tionship of Nana and Moshe and Anjali was equivalent to living under 
Stalinism?” (132). He goes on to make a distinction between “totalitarian 
aggression” and “the use of friendliness as a coercive technique,” con-
cluding that “in terms of friendliness, I cannot see a difference between 
the individual behaviour of Nana and Mikhail Bulgakov and Moshe and 
Anjai and Stalin” (134).
 The thread of these digressive comparisons is that they establish the 
political conditions under which people live in Communist states from 
Stalinist Russia to the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, to Maoist China, 
inevitably highlighting the conditions under which his fictional charac-
ters live. “Moshe’s problem was entertainingly similar to the problem of 
dissent in a capitalist society. As many left-wing critics have pointed out, 
it is very difficult to object to capitalism” (206). He goes on to describe 
Gramsci’s theory of hegemony before asserting: “I, however, have a dif-
ferent theory why no one cares when someone attacks capitalism. You 
always look like a poseur. . . . Similarly, if Moshe complained that a three-
some was not ideal, you would assume he was being hypocritical” (207).
 Drawing attention to the moral conundrums at play in a threesome, 
the narrator asks: “But what is infidelity?” He goes on to discuss the 
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arrest of the poet Osip Mandelstam in Stalinist Russia in 1934 before 
commenting: “I am not getting at Osip. Honestly, I like him. Because I 
like him, I do not want to idealise him too much” (176). Here we see 
Thirlwell’s intrusive omniscient narrator discussing the motivations of real 
historical personages in the same way he discusses those of his fictional 
characters. He does not make these personages characters in the story, 
they resist fictionalization, yet his evaluation of them exists on the same 
discursive plane as that of the fictional characters. As a result he self-con-
sciously seeks to parlay the conventional authority of the narrator (com-
plete knowledge of his characters) into cultural authority for the author 
through the rhetorical performance of universalizing commentary. For 
instance, the narrator discusses a sexual encounter between Adolf Hitler 
and the film actress Renée Muller in 1936, in which she was asked to play 
the role of dominatrix: “Adolf and Renée had just encountered a central 
human predicament. It is this. Sex is not specific. It is not original. You 
might think your perversions are all your own, but no. Perversion is gen-
eral. Perversions are universal. You have to make them specific” (212).
 In a review of the novel in The Independent Henry Sutton writes that 
ongoing references to historical situations “are used to highlight vari-
ous conundrums Thirlwell’s characters are going through. For instance, 
should Nana be a little less altruistic and a little more self-serving?” Matt 
Thorne, also in The Independent, writes: “the most interesting question 
his novel poses is whether Moshe, Nana and Anjali are representatives 
of a generation which has yet to be depicted in fiction.” For me the most 
interesting question is why Thirlwell’s omniscient narrator so doggedly 
and self-consciously performs an agonized bid for the universality of his 
moral commentary. I would argue that the novel in fact is striving to work 
in the opposite direction: it is an attempt to use the fictional situation of 
the characters as a parallel to the political situation in the actual world, 
to explore the inner lives of characters not as the basis for universal com-
mentary about human nature, but as a mode of metaphorical commentary 
on twentieth-century politics. It is an attempt to assert the authority of the 
novelist to offer political commentary. “I am not interested in anything so 
small as the history of the USSR. I am not writing anything so limited. No, 
what I am interested in is friendliness” (133).
 In the last few pages of the novel, the narrator tells us: “And Moshe 
would come back to her. Of course he would. I know everything. I know 
Moshe very well” (277). So if the narrator knows everything about the 
characters, can this be parlayed into knowledge of the world? “This book 
is universal. I said that at the start. Because it is universal, it is ambig-
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uous. It has something for everyone.” (278). Here is the “moral” of the 
story: “I do not think people are very intelligent about selfishness. I do 
not think they see how moral it can be. Because it is moral, refusing to be 
self-destructive. It is a perfectly moral position” (278). The narrator’s self-
ishness here, his resistance to the “self-destructive” posture of narrative 
impersonality, is a self-conscious claim for the moral authority of omni-
scient narration, albeit an authority relativized by an acknowledgement 
that a general consciousness cannot be invoked. It is an overcompensating 
direct address.
the  seCond mode  of contemporary omniscience, which I will call the 
literary historian, relies upon the authority of the historical record and 
the possibilities of imaginatively recovering private or occluded moments 
in history opened up by postmodern theory and explored in “factional” 
works such as Thomas Keneally’s Schindler’s Ark. Unlike “historiographic 
metafiction”—a form which Linda Hutcheon claims the term postmodern 
fiction should be reserved for (40)—this mode displays a faith in the liter-
ary imagination to supplement the historical record, rather than under-
mine the narrative “truth” of history. Some examples would be stories 
from Gail Jones’s two collections of short fiction, The House of Breath-
ing and Fetish Lives; Michel Faber’s The Crimson Petal and the White; 
Edward P. Jones’s The Known World; David Lodge’s Author, Author, and 
my own short story, “Thomas Pennington’s Fetich.”
 In these works, the traditional metaphor of the novelist as historian, 
established by the prototypical omniscient narrator of Henry Fielding’s 
Tom Jones, becomes literalized in the figure of the contemporary narrator 
as historian engaged in historical and historiographic debate. Like con-
temporary historical fiction in general, this mode of omniscience stresses 
that the inner lives of protagonists (the purview of the novelist), and the 
prolepsis and the Literary historian
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lived experience of everyday people or of historical personages, is impor-
tant to our understanding of earlier periods and past events (the purview 
of the historian). There are different manifestations of this literary histo-
rian, from the biographical narrator of Lodge’s Author, Author (which I 
will discuss in the final chapter), which is modeled on the nonfiction novel 
exemplified by Schindler’s Ark (winner of the Booker Prize for fiction), 
to the fantastic historians of magic realism in which the fictionality of an 
imaginative intervention in history is made palpable. For instance, Patrick 
Süskind’s Perfume (1986) opens with this line: 
In eighteenth-century France there lived a man who was one of the most 
gifted and abominable personages in an era that knew no lack of gifted 
and abominable personages . . . forgotten today . . . because his gifts and 
his sole ambition were restricted to a domain that leaves no traces in his-
tory: to the fleeting realm of scent. (3)
Similarly, Isabelle Allende’s “Phantom Palace” (1992) charts the fate of 
native Indians in Latin America who “lived in peace since the dawn of 
time” before the arrival of the Spanish Conquistadors, and who “came to 
be so skilful in the art of dissimulation that history did not record them, 
and today there is no evidence of their passage through time” (201).
 Formally speaking, the most significant aspect of contemporary his-
torical fiction is the way it establishes a quantifiable temporal gap between 
the modern narrating instance and historical past of the story. The effect 
is that the narrator’s omniscient authority is simultaneously heightened 
and problematized by their distance from the events of the story. Con-
temporary historical fiction thus exploits the implications of the aspect of 
narrative voice which Genette called the time of narrating. According to 
Genette:
The use of a past tense is enough to make a narrative subsequent, 
although without indicating the temporal interval which separates the 
moment of the narrating from the moment of the story. In classical “third 
person” narrative, this interval appears generally indeterminate, and the 
question irrelevant, the preterite marking a sort of ageless past. (Narra-
tive Discourse, 220)
 In the mode of the omniscient literary historian, the “temporal inter-
val” is not only determinable (spanning the years between the histori-
cal period which the story is set in and the present day of the narrative 
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discourse, which by convention we could date as coterminous with the 
book’s publication), it is crucial to the function of the narrative as a form 
of history: the preterite marking a datable past. Furthermore, the rhe-
torical effects of the time of narrating employed in this mode cannot 
be understood in purely narratological terms, for the temporal interval 
between story and narration is established by reference to historical facts 
which are not only posterior to the events of the story, but are referable to 
the actual world of the reader, and hence falsifiable as narrative “report.” 
The narrating instance invokes the extrafictional historical record to 
establish a temporal distance unyoked from tense structures, with con-
temporary historical fiction often employing the “immediacy” of the pres-
ent tense without being simultaneous narration. This sense of history, 
rather than the panchronic omnitemporality of divinity, is the temporal 
model of contemporary omniscience.
 One device for drawing attention to the narrating instance is the direct 
address to modern readers, as in this line from Süskind’s Perfume: “In the 
period of which we speak, there reigned in the cities a stench barely con-
ceivable to us modern men and women” (3). Another is the use of pro-
lepsis, defined by Genette as “any narrative maneuver that consists of 
narrating or evoking in advance an event that will take place later” (40). 
For Genette, this means interrupting the present moment of the story to 
make room for an account of the future, and he uses the term “reach” to 
measure the temporal distance between the narrative present and the pro-
leptic event. More specifically, the omniscient literary historian employs 
external prolepses, that is, reference to events beyond the duration of the 
story, such as this line from Michel Faber’s The Crimson Petal and the 
White: “Of Jack the Ripper she need have no fear; it’s almost fourteen 
years too early, and she’ll have died from more or less natural causes by 
the time he comes along” (7). These external prolepses can then be said to 
be extratextual because they reference the actual world of the historical 
record. In my story, “Thomas Pennington’s Fetich” (2004), the opening 
paragraph contains the line “An epidemic of syphilis festers in the unspo-
ken limbs of polite company, and will continue until the discovery of Sal-
varsan in 1909” (200). The “reach” of this reference is one year beyond 
the protagonist’s contraction of syphilis at the chronological “end” of the 
story in 1908.
 This temporal model underpins the narrator’s capacity to parade the 
archival research of the author through a number of narrative strategies. 
There is expositional summary linguistically indistinguishable from bio-
graphical or historical nonfiction, such as this passage from A. S. Byatt’s 
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The Children’s Book (2009): “The year 1881 was a year of beginnings. A 
number of idealist, millenarian projects and groups were founded. There 
were the Democratic Federation, the Society for Psychical Research, the 
Theosophical Society, the Anti-Vivisection movement. All were designed to 
change and reinvent human nature” (45). There are references to contem-
poraneous publications, such as in David Lodge’s Author, Author: 
Mr Gladstone himself was moved to write an immensely long article 
about it in the May issue of The Nineteenth Century, entitled “Robert 
Elsmere and the Battle for Belief,” describing it as “brilliant but perni-
cious,” which gave a huge further boost to sales. (97)
And there is a welter of descriptive detail which would not be found in 
fiction set in the present. All these narrative strategies are designed to 
establish verisimilar authenticity, while simultaneously offering a narra-
tive predicated on the assumption that the omniscient narrator “knows” 
something about history which the historical record cannot. This knowl-
edge is the product of the authorial imagination, either through fantasy or 
through sympathetically reconstructing the private side of history via the 
available archival evidence.
Gail Jones, “on the 
piteous death of Mary Wollstonecraft” (1992)
The opening two paragraphs of the short story “On the Piteous Death of 
Mary Wollstonecraft,” by the Booker Prize–longlisted Australian writer 
Gail Jones, exemplify the mode of the literary historian. The story begins 
with a lyrical present-tense account of the protagonist’s consciousness: 
“She arises momentarily from the deepsea of unconsciousness, trawls up 
her drowned mind through fluid dimensions” (105). It is an intimate imag-
ining of the character’s mind in a moment of distress: childbirth as we 
later discover. The next paragraph signals an abrupt shift to an impersonal 
authoritative voice with the foreknowledge of history. It reads like a bio-
graphical encyclopedia entry, with the exception that it is rendered in the 
future tense: “She is about to die, this Mary Wollstonecraft. Born in the 
year 1759, she will die at thirty-eight of post-partum complications. She 
is the controversial and august author of A Vindication of the Rights of 
Woman. Both famous and feminist in her own uncongenial time” (105). 
The two key features of omniscience—access to consciousness and intru-
92 • ChaPter 3
sive authorial presence—are sharply juxtaposed, with the biographical 
information lending authority to the fictional imagining of the character’s 
interior. In foregrounding the gap between the historical record and the 
private lives of historical personages, Jones’s story both highlights its fic-
tionality and seeks to legitimate fictional speculation as a form of historio-
graphic enquiry.
 After the opening two paragraphs there are a series of fragmentary sec-
tions which I take to be instances of Wollstonecraft’s life flashing before 
her as she dies. There are the immediate events leading up to her death, 
that is, the birth of her daughter Mary, and then a series of memories 
relating to her husband, William Godwin, and her lover, Gilbert Imlay. 
The focus, however, is on Wollstonecraft’s state of mind in the last hours 
of her life. There are two overt instances of zero focalization—of the nar-
rator saying more than the characters know—which establish the differ-
ence between classic and contemporary omniscience in the mode of the 
literary historian. The first occurs after Wollstonecraft has given birth:
“A daughter,” she whispers. “Once more a daughter.”
 Mrs Blenkinsop notices the ambivalence in her mistress’s voice. Mrs 
Blenkinsop fails to notice, however, that here are evident the symptoms 
of another subsidence, that Mary Wollstonecraft is busy sliding back into 
her own body, a body in which, at this very moment, some torment of the 
womb, some organic agitation, tricks her into thinking that she has not 
yet delivered. (107)
 Here the narrator tells us not only what Mrs Blenkinsop doesn’t know 
but what Mary herself doesn’t know about her own body. In the next 
overt performance of omniscience, the narrator relativizes her “impos-
sible” knowledge by appeal to the proleptic voice of history. We have a 
paragraph which begins: “Mary closes her eyes and knows, as mothers are 
reputed instinctually to know such things, that the baby will die” (109). 
The next paragraph undercuts this maternal instinct:
Had she been better clairvoyant Mary Wollstonecraft would have known 
that her daughter Mary would live for fifty-three years and achieve a 
fame ratified in the twentieth century by that most pompous and pre-
posterous of all institutions, Hollywood. “The Rights of Women” will 
historically prove a difficult concept; her daughter’s “Frankenstein,” 
however, is a convenient cultural nightmare. (109)
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 The irony of this passage is generated not by the narrator’s impossi-
ble knowledge of the “future,” but by reference to the historical record, 
and by a form of cultural commentary only possible from the narrating 
instance of the present day. This external anachrony is unnecessary to the 
story: its extranarrative function is designed purely to establish the nar-
rative authority of the contemporary narrator in relation to the histori-
cal record, setting up the rhetorical purpose of the story, which is made 
explicit in the final section. This section shifts from a present-tense account 
of Wollstonecraft’s death to a past-tense denouement in which the ill- 
considered memoir which Godwin wrote after her death is blamed for the 
reputation of “Villainous Depravity” which Wollstonecraft gained.
Foolishly confounding Virtue and Truth, William Godwin wrote a mem-
oir of his deceased wife’s life. In it he hoped to memorialise the Excellent 
Woman. He spoke of Imlay, of Fuseli, of suicide attempts, illegitimate 
birth, sexual passion and intellectual voluptuousness. “Mary Wollstone-
craft” became synonymous with Villainous Depravity. (119–20)
 So in a sense Jones is trying to set the historical record straight by writ-
ing a piece of fiction, to inhabit the cracks of biographical knowledge, to 
transgress the epistemological limits of historiography. If Wollstonecraft’s 
life became the source of salacious biography, what Jones is trying to do 
is recover this life, provide it with some dignity by imagining the moment 
of her death. The rhetorical function of the narrator, then, is to achieve 
this approach to Wollstonecraft’s life by negotiating the shifts between 
external commentary and internal focalization made possible by literary 
omniscience.
omniscient narration and neo-victorian fiction
Given that the omniscient narrator is commonly seen as synonymous with 
Victorian fiction, any account of contemporary omniscience must address 
its manifestation in the popular genre of neo-Victorian fiction. As most 
scholars in this field would note, the temporal relation between narrat-
ing instance and story is crucial to the effects of the fictional encounter 
with history. On this basis, Christian Gutleben’s Nostalgic Postmodern-
ism: The Victorian Tradition and the Contemporary British Novel distin-
guishes between subversive and nostalgic invocations of Victorianism in 
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contemporary fiction: those which erase the temporal gap or at least do 
not specify it are typically nostalgic; while those which maintain a tempo-
ral distance from the past are typically subversive. In the case of histori-
cal novels set in the Victorian past, Gutleben makes a distinction between 
serious reconstruction (in the form of mimetic pastiche) and ludic parody. 
In this latter category he includes omniscient narration, for parody “seems 
particularly relevant for the retro-Victorian novel’s use of the omniscient 
narrator” (102). This claim is based on the common assumption in neo-
Victorian studies that historical fiction dealing with this period “uses” a 
Victorian model of omniscience, rather than employing contemporary 
omniscient narration to explore the Victorian past.
 Drawing upon Margaret Rose’s definition, Gutleben claims that par-
ody operates by inviting then disappointing generic expectations from 
readers. Omniscient narration in neo-Victorian fiction is then said to be 
parodic because it includes elements we would not expect in Victorian fic-
tion. Gutleben’s chief example of the ludic reworking of omniscience is 
at the level of focalized content provided by the narrator, evidenced in 
explicit sexual descriptions which violate the codes of decorum employed 
in nineteenth-century fiction. Discussing the novel Ark Baby, Gutleben 
writes: “the text subverts this anticipation by violating one of the most 
sacred taboos in Victorian fiction: sexual explicitness. The principle of 
omniscience is retrieved but pushed to the limits which traditional fiction 
was not ready to explore” (103). The juxtaposition of a Victorian setting 
with “the sauciness of the narrative instance,” Gutleben claims, means 
that “what is at stake here is not the parody of a text but of a literary 
convention, i.e. the omniscient narrator” (104). Even if we accept that the 
omniscient narrator’s discussion of sexuality is a ludic parody of Victorian 
conventions, it simply tells us that neo-Victorian fiction is another mode 
by which omniscient narration finds its way into contemporary fiction. 
However, defining this omniscience almost exclusively in terms of parody 
strikes me as formulaic and inaccurate.
 In discussing A. S. Byatt’s Booker Prize–winning novel Possession, Gut-
leben argues that “Byatt organizes her narrative apparatus so as to play-
fully question the Victorian novelistic conventions” (108). So when Byatt’s 
narrator, who must occupy a contemporary narrating instance in order 
to tell the modern day story of two academic biographers, takes up the 
nineteenth-century story and describes the romance of the two Victorian 
protagonists, “a strictly Victorian voice could not have accounted for” the 
sexual thoughts and actions of these characters. As a result, “the narrative 
instance who decides to reveal these indications, although it mimics tra-
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ditional omniscience, realistic trait-connoting descriptions and decorous 
Victorian language, can consequently only adopt a parodic stance towards 
its Victorian referent” (108–9). If this a parody of Victorian omniscience, 
it is not necessarily a parody of omniscient narration itself.
 “Byatt’s final (ab)use of the God-like omniscient narrator” (110), Gut-
leben claims, occurs in the postscript to the novel. Here the narrator pro-
vides information about the past (an illegitimate child produced by the 
affair between two Victorian writers) which the modern academic biogra-
phers of these writers will never know. For Gutleben, this revelation puts 
readers in possession of information which enables them to see the limita-
tions of the biographical enterprises of the academic characters. For me, 
however, this revelation is not an “abuse” of omniscience. It demonstrates 
again an attempt to employ the convention of omniscience to establish 
the authority of the novelist in relation to that of the biographer, not to 
undermine this convention. Byatt herself wrote: “My instinct as a writer of 
fiction has been to explore and defend the unfashionable Victorian third-
person narrator—who is not, as John Fowles claimed, playing at being 
God, but merely the writer, telling what can be told about the world of the 
fiction” (“True Stories” 102).
Michel faber, The Crimson Petal and the White (2002)
The narrative voice of The Crimson Petal and the White is an enigmatic one. Is she 
a Trollopean guide? Or just a trollop, a prostitute who seizes the reader’s hand and 
won’t let go? I leave you in that voice’s care.
—Michel Faber, “Tale of a Street Walker”
In a book chapter that identifies The Crimson Petal and the White as a 
“classic” of the contemporary neo-Victorian novel, Georges Letissier 
claims that “the double temporal perspective, with the twenty-first century 
looking back on the nineteenth century, with the benefit of hindsight, as it 
were, leads to what could be called hyperomniscience” (119). This hyper-
omniscience, which I call the “proleptic voice of history,” is established by 
the narratorial direct address which draws attention to a contemporary 
narrating instance. The novel opens with this paragraph:
Watch your step. Keep your wits about you; you will need them. This city 
I am bringing you to is vast and intricate, and you have not been here 
before. You may imagine, from other stories you’ve read, that you know 
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it well, but those stories flattered you, welcoming you as a friend, treating 
you as if you belonged. The truth is that you are an alien from another 
time and place altogether. (3)
 For Maria Teresa Chialant this opening establishes the omniscient nar-
rator as an “urban flâneur in the Dickensian mode,” recalling the “certain 
shadow” of Dickens’s Asmodean narrator. For John Mullan it estab-
lishes an “intrusive author” modeled on George Eliot’s Victorian omni-
scient narrator; and for Mary Ellen Snodgrass, it implies “a metafictional 
I-thou relationship with the postmodern reader” (112). It is also a claim 
for narrative authority, the authority to tell a story, based on the narrator’s 
assertion that this work of historical fiction will provide a more authentic 
account of Victorian London than other stories. Here we have a rhetori-
cal performance of omniscient authority in which the narrator highlights 
the spatio-temporal gap between modern narrating instance and historical 
story before claiming to overcome the epistemological limitations of this 
gap by taking the reader back in time. The narrator performs this “time 
travel” with the metaleptic trick of encouraging readerly identification 
with a narratee, and then situating the narratee within the fictional world 
via the autotelic second person. The third paragraph establishes a meta-
phorical conflation of the reader seduced by the narrative promise of a 
book and a customer seduced by the sexual promise of a prostitute:
And yet you did not choose me blindly. Certain expectations were 
aroused. Let’s not be coy: you were hoping I would satisfy all the desires 
you’re too shy to name, or at least show you a good time. Now you 
hesitate, still holding on to me, but tempted to let me go. When you first 
picked me up, you didn’t fully appreciate the size of me, nor did you 
expect I would grip you so tightly, so fast. (3)
 This is by way of introducing readers to the lowest rung of Victorian 
society, and one of the minor characters, Caroline, a prostitute who lives in 
Church Lane. According to narratologists who draw upon possible worlds 
and deictic shift theory, readers engage with fiction by cognitively relo-
cating to the storyworld. The direct address of Faber’s narrator is a self-
reflexive strategy designed to locate readers on the same ontological level 
as the characters: “From where you stand you can actually see the shiver 
of distaste travelling down between Caroline’s shoulder-blades” (11). This 
immersion of readers in the fictional world simultaneously maintains the 
narrator’s intrusive presence as the guarantee of its authenticity. By virtue 
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of referring only to a generalized “you,” the narrator is, in Robyn War-
hol’s terms, an engaging one, even to the extent of ensuring it enables dif-
ferent genders to participate in the role of narratee: “Yes, it’s alright. She’s 
sleeping now. Lift the blankets and ease your body in. If you are a woman, 
it doesn’t matter: women very commonly sleep together in this day and 
age. If you are a man, it matters even less: there have been hundreds here 
before you” (8).
 Although the story is narrated in the present tense, the time of nar-
rating is retrospective rather than simultaneous, designed to highlight the 
fact that the narrator’s capacity to immerse readers in a fictional world 
is a product of the author’s knowledge of history: “Apart from the pale 
gas-light of the street-lamps at the far corners, you can’t see any light in 
Church Lane, but that’s because your eyes are accustomed to stronger 
signs of human wakefulness than the feeble glow of two candles behind 
a smutty windowpane. You come from a world where darkness is swept 
aside at the snap of a switch” (5).
 The novel follows the path of Sugar, a prostitute, from a brothel in 
Church Lane to mistress then governess in the employ of William Rack-
ham, aspiring man of letters who becomes a business magnate when he 
inherits his father’s perfume-manufacturing company. As Kathryn Hughes 
writes, in a review for The Guardian: “Michel Faber has produced the 
novel that Dickens might have written had he been allowed to speak freely. 
All the familiar tropes of high-Victorian fiction are here—the mad wife, 
the cut-above prostitute, the almost-artist, the opaque governess—but they 
are presented to us by a narrator with the mind and mouth of the 21st 
century.”
 The novel’s explicit descriptions of sex—“Minute upon minute she lies 
on his thigh, milking him, slyly inserting her middle finger into his anus, 
deeper and deeper, pushing past the sphincter” (116)—is said to be what 
sets it apart from Victorian omniscience and hence makes it a parody of 
the form, demonstrating that the all-knowing narrator of nineteenth-cen-
tury fiction had many social limitations on what could be said. However, 
the novel can also be said to use the convention of omniscience to sup-
plement its historical reconstruction of the Victorian period. The ultimate 
example of zero focalization is this: 
In Agnes’s head, inside her skull, an inch or two behind her left eye, nes-
tles a tumour the size of a quail’s egg. She’s no inkling it’s there. . . . No 
one will ever find it. Roentgen photography is twenty years in the future, 
and Doctor Curlew, whatever parts of Agnes Rackham he may examine, 
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is not about to go digging in her eye-socket with a scalpel. Only you and 
I know of this tumour’s existence. It is our little secret. (218–19)
Here the narrator shares his omniscience with readers to establish trust 
and to demonstrate that what may have been narrated as madness or hys-
teria in a Victorian novel could have been the result of not possessing the 
hyperomniscience of this novelist.
 The omniscience is on occasion coy, or “deliberately suppressive” in 
Sternberg’s terms, about the psychology of characters, but supplements 
this reticence with historical knowledge:
Ah, to know that you’d have to get deeper inside her than anyone has 
reached yet. I can tell you the answers to simpler questions. How old is 
Sugar? Nineteen. How long has she been a prostitute? Six years. You do 
the arithmetic, and the answer is a disturbing one, especially when you 
consider that the girls of this time commonly don’t pubesce until fifteen 
or sixteen. (34)
 These regular narratorial intrusions supplement the welter of descrip-
tive detail, the Jamesian solidity of specification, which operate historio-
graphically, with scenic construction building up layers of ethnographic 
thick description: “Like many common women, prostitutes especially, 
her name is Caroline, and you find her squatting over a large ceramic 
bowl filled with a tepid mixture of water, alum and sulphate of zinc” (6). 
Descriptions such as these also constitute what Michael Riffaterre calls 
“diegetic overkill,” the “representation of ostensibly insignificant details, 
the very insignificance of which is significant in a story as a feature of real-
ism” (30). The significance in this regard is that they declare the factual 
research underpinning the fictionality of verisimilitude, as well as distin-
guishing this as a modern rather than contemporaneous account of the 
period. The foundation of this omniscient narrator’s authority, then, 
resides not in a postmodern parody of the convention (its overt sexuality, 
the key Victorian figure of the governess being a prostitute, the resistance 
to closure similar to Fowles’s multiple possible endings), or in a nostalgia 
for the certainties of the past encoded in the form itself, but in the figure 
of the contemporary historian whose research licenses evaluative commen-
tary: “Morally it’s an odd period, both for the observed and the observer: 
fashion has engineered the reappearance of the body, while morality still 
insists upon perfect ignorance of it” (66).
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 The acknowledgments page, with its references to historical sources, 
and Faber’s public statements about the endorsement of his research by 
professional historians are designed to highlight the extratextual histor-
ical authority of these narratorial observations. Faber begins an  essay 
titled “Eccentricity and Authenticity: Fact into Fiction,” with a reference 
to how the book “has generally been praised for its period authenticity,” 
culminating in an invitation to write this article for the Victorian Institute 
Journal (101). Faber’s article, then, is an attempt to claim the extratextual 
authority of the historian to underpin the authenticity of his work as “a 
highly convincing time-travel experience” (101). In doing so, Faber dis-
tinguishes his work from postmodern encounters with history, describing 
the process of composition as a move away from the influence of post-
modernist fiction. Faber reveals that in the course of writing his novel he 
discovered a number of historical inaccuracies. In the early draft, “my 
response to my error was not to remove it, but to flaunt it” (101), add-
ing a footnote in which he acknowledges the error but dismisses it for the 
sake of the story:
This disclaimer, simultaneously cloying and arrogant, makes me cringe 
now, but it arose naturally out of the late-1970s literary climate I grew 
up in. Post-Modernism encouraged me to assert my freedom to do what-
ever I pleased. I was The Author; I was in charge. The reader must be 
reminded that this story was an artificial construct. Text must be playful, 
must discard the shackles of bogus mimesis, must define itself against 
the pointless inhibitions of the 19th century bourgeois novel. The very 
notion of “history” was rotten to the core; all “fact” was falsification. 
(102)
 Faber suggests that his arrogance diminished when he realized that 
“the deconstructionist desire to expose the apparatus of narrative was 
nothing new” (102). In other words, as many critics have pointed out, 
self-reflexivity has long been a part of the novelistic tradition. He then set 
about to make his novel as historically accurate as possible. According to 
George Letissier:
The Crimson Petal and the White illustrates the classical format of the 
neo-Victorian novel, which has now discarded the postmodernist, decon-
structionist stance of earlier post-Victorian fictions, such as The French 
Lieutenant’s Woman, Possession, or Poor Things, to quote but a few, to 
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embrace the more traditional form of the three-decker, or “large, loose, 
baggy monster” of its Victorian forerunners. (113)
 This reinforces my point that postmodern metafiction self-reflexively 
reintroduced omniscient narration, enabling this voice to be absorbed into 
the mainstream, and that post-postmodern fiction demonstrates a textual 
awareness of this legacy. Faber may have rejected postmodern playful-
ness in favor of a return to the realist novel, but he did not dispense with 
the intrusive omniscient narrator who was the instrument of this playful-
ness, evidenced by a line such as this: “If you are bored beyond endur-
ance, I can offer only my promise that there will be fucking in the very 
near future, not to mention madness, abduction, and violent death” (190). 
The novelistic authority he asserts in relation to history is not one which 
seeks to demonstrate the essential fictionality of historical writing, but one 
which claims fiction can contribute to a knowledge of history. Rather than 
estranging the reader from immersion in the fictional world, the narrato-
rial direct address is designed to engage the reader’s belief in the author-
ity of the author’s historical knowledge, his capacity to invent a possible 
world.
edward p. Jones, The Known World (2003)
I always thought I had a linear story. Something happened between the time I 
began the real work in January 2002 of taking it all out of my head and when I 
finished months later. It might be that because I, as the “god” of the people in 
the book, could see their first days and their last days and all that was in between, 
and those people did not have linear lives as I saw all that they had lived.
—Edward P. Jones, “An Interview”
Edward P. Jones writes as God might, were He to publish fiction. Specifically, 
Jones mobilizes a relatively unusual verb tense to embed the future in the past, 
making every incident in his characters’ lives simultaneously present to the stories’ 
omniscient narrator–cum–celestial census taker.
—Jenny Davidson, “Great Jones”
Edward P. Jones’s Pulitzer Prize–winning novel The Known World has a 
more complicated relationship between its omniscient narration and its 
exploration of history than my previous examples of the literary historian, 
one which throws open for debate the connection between authenticity 
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and authority in the public sphere. The Known World is set in antebellum 
Virginia, and centered on free blacks who owned slaves in the fictional 
county of Manchester. The narrator’s ideological position is clear in this 
comment on the black plantation owner, Henry Townsend: “He did not 
understand that the kind of world he wanted to create was doomed before 
he had even spoken the first syllable of the word master” (64). The title 
refers to a tapestry of America hung on the county sheriff’s wall, and con-
stant references to the characters’ perspectivally circumscribed “worlds” 
are a motif of the book, with lines such as: “the eating of it tied him to the 
only thing in his small world that meant almost as much as his own life” 
(2); “Mildred made him see that the bigger Henry could make the world 
he lived in, the freer he would be” (113); and “there was a whole world off 
to the right that the photograph had not captured” (189).
 The title is particularly resonant in a formalist and historiographic 
sense: what sort of narratorial knowledge is required to explain this fic-
tional world, and what can be known about this aspect of American his-
tory in the actual world? The crux of the book’s treatment of slavery is 
found in this passage of internal focalization: “Moses had thought that 
it was already a strange world that made him a slave to a white man, but 
God had indeed set it twirling and twisting every which way when he put 
black people to owning their own kind. Was God even up there attending 
to business anymore?” (9).
 In formalist terms, the narratorial “god” of this strange world (as 
Jones refers to himself in the above-quoted epigraph) exemplifies the 
unrestricted information of zero focalization. The omniscient narrator 
maps out a panoramic perspective of Manchester County, with a spa-
tio-temporal range beyond the knowledge of any character, proleptically 
reaching as far forward as the late twentieth century to explain the out-
come of events, and revealing the interior lives of multiple characters, 
including what they do not know about themselves: “So he rode on, not 
even knowing that he just wanted some peace, and not knowing, until 
much later, that he wanted back all that he had lost” (227). The narrative 
structure is relentlessly anachronous, opening with the death of the black 
slave owner, Henry Townsend, in 1855 and shuttling back and forth in 
time. The temporal reach is established by historical coordinates, with the 
narrator referring to an “1806 act of the Virginia House of Delegates” 
which “required that former slaves leave the Commonwealth within 
twelve months of getting their freedom” (15) and employing external 
anachrony to mark the story as anterior to the modern narrating instance. 
The narrator refers beyond the limits of the story to inform readers that 
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in 1909 the colored people of Richmond unofficially named a street after 
a deceased slave, and then: “In 1987, after a renewed drive for renam-
ing led by one of Delphie’s great-granddaughters, the city of Richmond 
relented, and it put up new signs all along the way to prove that it was 
official” (205).
 The most striking quality of the narrator is again the persistent use of 
prolepsis, with the action regularly interpolated with brief accounts of the 
ultimate fate of even the most minor characters:
As the crowd made its way back down to the lane, some of the chil-
dren were at the front, and at the head of those children was Elias and 
Celeste’s oldest, Tessie. She began skipping but an adult told her that a 
human being had died and skipping should be left off to another day. 
Tessie would soon be six years old and being the child of her parents 
that she was, she listened and stopped skipping. Tessie would live to be 
ninety-seven years old, and the doll her father was making for her would 
be with her until her last hour. She and the doll, long missing the cornsilk 
hair her father had put on it, would outlive two of her children, and the 
doll would outlive her. (67)
 The proleptic comments are so profuse that rather than plot-motivated 
advance notice (they anticipate events which will not be later narrated, 
although often still within the temporal reach of the story), they create a 
sense of past and future being narrated simultaneously with the narrative 
present. Here is part of a scene featuring Sheriff Skiffington and another 
character, Clara, discussing Clara’s slave, Ralph, as the sheriff prepares to 
depart:
“I’ll take your word that everything will be fine”—and she tipped her 
head in the direction of the back of the house where Ralph was. They, 
Clara and Ralph, would live another twenty-one years together. Long 
before then he became a free man because the War between the States 
came and found them. Skiffington got into the carriage. (162)
 What the narrator tells us about the future of these minor characters 
is generally not significant to the plot, and, indeed, the violent death of 
major characters at the end of the novel is never proleptically anticipated. 
The significance lies in how these recurring prolepses not only authorita-
tively perform the narrator’s complete knowledge of the fictional world, 
but project a conception of the omniscient narrator as a kind of empa-
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thetic local historian who invests peripheral slave characters with a life as 
much worth knowing as their white owners or the central protagonists:
Belle’s second maid, who had never been sick a day in her life, would die 
the night after Belle did. Her name was Patty and she had had three chil-
dren, one dead, two yet alive, Allie and Newby, a boy who liked to drink 
directly from a cow’s teat. Those two children would die the third night, 
the same night the last of Belle’s children died, the beautiful girl with 
freckles who played the piano so well. (33)
 Coupled with the anachronous nonlinearity of the plot, the prolep-
tic intrusions make it almost impossible to feel located in the “narra-
tive present” for any length of time. For instance, when narrating Henry 
Townsend’s 1855 death in the opening pages, the narrative anticipates a 
scene in which Henry’s former teacher, Fern Elston, will discuss his life: 
“After the war between the states, Fern would tell a pamphlet writer, a 
white immigrant from Canada, that Henry had been the brightest of her 
students” (7). This scene is duly narrated later in the novel, in which the 
pamphlet writer is given a name, Anderson Frazier, and the conversation 
a date, August 1881 (107). Throughout the rest of the novel, the narra-
tor constantly refers readers back to this conversation on “that day,” even 
though it is still in the future for the characters:
“Zeus,” Fern said, “please ask Colley to come here. Tell Colley to bring 
the rifle and a pistol.” When she married the second and third times, 
Zeus would be with her. Indeed, as she talked to Anderson Frazier that 
day in 1881, he was inside the house, occasionally looking through the 
curtain at the backs of their heads. He brought out lemonade to Ander-
son after Fern offered him some.
 “Yessum,” Zeus said. (250, emphasis added)
 This passage has an analeptic reference embedded in a proleptic state-
ment. The effect is to frustrate the teleological conception of history as 
cause and effect. What the omniscient narrator knows about the history 
of Manchester County could not be known to historians. It is not only 
knowledge of the minds of characters, but of unrecorded and unrecord-
able information: “Had someone counted up what crops the fields had to 
give, it would have come to more than $325 a slave” (226). In The Known 
World, the omnitemporal freedom of omniscience is deployed to model 
a form of historical writing which would be possible if historians could 
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transcend epistemological limitations and attain complete access to the 
world of the past.
 Ultimately, given the subject of the book, a little known aspect of the 
history of slavery, the question raised for readers must be not how does the 
narrator know about the fictional world and minds of characters, which is 
accepted as a convention of fiction, but how much does the author know 
about this aspect of history in the actual world being referenced? That 
is, the authority this narrator claims is not based purely on the formal 
techniques of omniscient narration, or on the “unnatural” powers of a 
quasi-divine consciousness, but on the figure of the author as a literary 
historian. The narrator’s “quality” of omniscience is supplemented by a 
rhetorical deployment of the apparatus of historiography in the service 
of this claim for authority. First there is reference to contemporaneous 
“primary sources.” One of these is the pamphlet, Curiosities and Oddi-
ties about Our Southern Neighbours, written by the Canadian pamphlet 
writer, Anderson Frazier, after his meeting with Fern Elston:
The pamphlet on slaveowning Negroes went through ten printings. Only 
seven of those particular pamphlets survived until the late twentieth cen-
tury. Five of them were in the Library of Congress in 1994 when the 
remaining two pamphlets were sold as part of a collection of black mem-
orabilia owned by a black man in Cleveland, Ohio. That collection, upon 
the man’s death in 1994, sold for $1.7 million dollars to an automobile 
manufacturer in Germany. (106)
 This “extrarepresentational” information lends the impression that the 
narrator’s knowledge of the storyworld relies upon the archival research 
of the author. The “impossible” knowledge of the narrator, however, high-
lights the limitations of knowledge derived from primary sources: “Had 
Anderson not been white and a man, had the day not started out hot and 
gotten hotter . . . Fern might have opened up to Anderson” (109). Another 
historiographic device is reference to scholarly histories of the period, 
enabled by the temporal distance of the narrating instance:
The town and the county went into a period of years and years of what 
University of Virginia historian Roberta Murphy in a 1948 book would 
call “peace and prosperity.” For the people who depended upon slaves, 
this meant, among other things, that not one slave escaped, not until 
after Henry Townsend died. The historian—whose book was rejected by 
the University of Virginia Press—would also call Skiffington “a godsend 
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for the county.” . . . In the history of the county, the chickens, all of 
which managed to live until 1856, were a momentous event ten places 
below the tenure of John Skiffington as sheriff, according to this one 
historian, who became a full professor at Washington and Lee University 
three years after her book was published. (43–44)
 The first sentence gives the impression of the authorial narrator quot-
ing scholarly sources to establish the authenticity of his narrative. What 
follows, however, is a stinging ideological critique of the scholarship of 
“this one historian.” The novel’s exploration of the question of history is 
thus manifested in the rhetorical strategy of the narrator to employ regular 
intrusions such as these which explicitly pit the unfettered knowledge of 
literary omniscience against the epistemological constraints of historiog-
raphy. The narrative authority which emerges from this strategy is par-
adoxical: on the one hand the apparatus of historiographic scholarship 
is drawn upon to discursively establish the authenticity of the narrative, 
and on other hand this scholarship is shown to be misguided and inac-
curate. Anderson Frazier’s pamphlet, as well as Roberta Murphy’s book, 
and that of the other historians referenced, such as K. Woodford from 
Lynchburg College (207), are fictional. Clearly they serve the purpose of 
lending verisimilitude to the fictional world of Manchester County and 
highlighting the omniscient narrator’s diegetic authority. The more com-
plicated authenticating strategy is the recurring reference to documents we 
know to exist in the actual world: the U.S. Censuses from 1830 to 1860.
 As Tim Ryan writes in Calls and Responses: The American Novel of 
Slavery since Gone with the Wind, The Known World is “continually scep-
tical about the ability of human discourse to adequately represent the past, 
and the novel persistently emphasizes the limitations of the discipline of 
history. For example, the narrative satirically draws attention to the prob-
lematic nature of antebellum censuses—sources frequently utilized by con-
temporary historians” (194). As early as page 7, this engagement with the 
census is established:
In 1855 in Manchester County, Virginia, there were thirty-four free black 
families, with a mother and father and one child or more, and eight of 
those free families owned slaves, and all eight knew each other’s busi-
ness. When the war between the states came, the number of slave-owning 
blacks in Manchester would be down to five, and one of those included 
an extremely morose man who, according to the U.S. census of 1860, 
legally owned his own wife and five children and three grandchildren. 
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The census of 1860 said there were 2,670 slaves in Manchester County, 
but the census taker, a U.S. marshal who feared God, had argued with his 
wife the day he sent his report to Washington, D.C., and all his arithme-
tic was wrong because he had failed to carry a one. (7)
 A phrase such as “according to the U.S. census of 1860” suggests the 
opening figures are based upon this primary source, while the next sen-
tence asserts the inaccuracy of its data. The narrator presents no evidence 
to prove the failings of the census, or whether the original statement is 
produced from the census or not. Does this narrator know what the cen-
sus does not because of access to historical fact? Is this access the result of 
sympathetic imagination? Here we see the fantasy of omniscience, indeed 
the fantasy of fiction, as a desire to correct or at least supplement the his-
torical record.
 The authority of this omniscient narration is nonetheless reliant upon 
a figure of the novelist as literary historian able to contribute to debates 
about history, rather than as maker “using” historical research to tell a 
story. The effect may be to undermine the authority of historians to know 
the past, but instead of a postmodern critique of history as fiction, we 
are presented with a fiction which purports to know the strange world 
of the past with greater authority. As Ryan argues, “while the novel con-
stantly emphasizes that human experience is too complex to be captured 
in language and while it insists that histories are undependable and limited 
forms of discourse, it also acknowledges that there is a significant and con-
crete reality toward which such texts gesture” (196). It is the very reference 
to historical discourse which grounds the capacity of the narrator to proj-
ect a concrete fictional world:
Louis, the son, was also Robbins’s slave, which was how the U.S. census 
that year listed him. The census noted that the house on Shenandoah 
Road where the boy lived in Manchester was headed by Philomena, his 
mother, and that the boy had a sister, Dora, three years his senior. The 
census did not say that the children were Robbins’s flesh and blood and 
that he traveled into Manchester because he loved their mother far more 
than anything he could name and that, in his quieter moments, after the 
storms in his head, he feared that he was losing his mind because of that 
love. (21)
 This passage draws attention not to the human error involved in cen-
sus taking, but the limitations of data collection itself in capturing the 
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unofficial relations between humans, the incapacity of the census to know 
the private lives of people. And yet despite pointing out the method-
ological flaws of the census, such as the 1840 census taker’s inability to 
properly discern whether someone is full-blooded Indian or not, and his 
miscalculation of the square miles of Manchester County, the narrator 
uses the census to lend discursive authority to his own narrative state-
ments: “On one page of the census report to the federal government in 
Washington, D.C., the census taker put a check by William Robbins’s 
name and footnoted on page 113 that he was the country’s wealthiest 
man” (23). These sorts of statements gesture outwards to lend the impres-
sion that the author has consulted the records in order to construct his fig-
ure of the omniscient literary historian. “While frequently subverting and 
satirizing the limitations of the discipline of history,” Ryan points out, 
“The Known World also acknowledges that we have no choice but to rely 
upon it to some degree” (201).
 The figure of the omniscient narrator as literary historian is pitted 
against other figures of authority, from census takers, to pamphlet writers, 
to academics, drawing attention to the unreliability of their methods. Race 
is also factor. Apart from Anderson Frazier being white, we have this refer-
ence to an historian: “In 1993, the University of Virginia Press would pub-
lish a 415-page book by a white woman, Marcia H. Shia, documenting 
that every ninety-seventh person in the Commonwealth of Virginia was 
kin, by blood or by marriage, to the line that started with Celeste and Elias 
Freeman” (352). While the narrator does not undermine these statistics, 
mention of this historian’s race invites us to consider the obvious—that 
the history of slavery is written by whites—and to ponder the race of the 
narrator. Given Susan Lanser’s default equation of the gender of omni-
scient narrators with the social identity of a book’s author, the same could 
be said for race here, constructing a figure of reliable historical authority 
empathetic with his characters.
 According to Michael Riffaterre, the paradox of fictional truth can be 
described as the generic function of verisimilitude, rather than accordance 
with factuality. However, if we approach fiction as a mode of public dis-
course the reliability of this narrator’s omniscient knowledge is ultimately 
dependent upon the narrative’s discursive contribution to history in the 
public sphere, as opposed to the scholarly archive. According to a review 
in the New York Times by John Vernon: “Among the many triumphs 
of The Known World, not the least is Jones’s transformation of a little-
known footnote in history into a story that goes right to the heart of slav-
ery.” This demonstrates that one of the functions of historical fiction is to 
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bring knowledge of the past into the broader public sphere, authorizing 
the novelist to speak about history. In an interview for the BookBrowse 
website, Jones states: “The county and town of Manchester, Virginia, and 
every human being in those places are products of my imagination.” He 
goes on to explain that references to other counties and towns, and his-
torical figures “were employed merely to give some heft and believability 
to the creation of Manchester and its people.” This sort of artistic license 
does not undermine the credibility of the novel’s exploration of history. 
The most important aspect of the narrator’s authority is the status of the 
census data, for this underpins the authenticity of the author’s treatment 
of slavery. Jones freely admits that he also fabricated census records for 
the purposes of verisimilitude, affording “a hard background of numbers 
and dates that makes the foreground of the characters and what they go 
through more real.” That the census figures, the publications and state 
acts and the historians referred to are fictional, only demonstrates further 
an attempt to assert the cultural authority of the novelist to “know” the 
past, even as this must be framed as an encounter with the archive in order 
to claim the power of the novelist to demonstrate the real lesson of history.
 Despite Jones’s protestations that he did not research his book, the 
historian Thomas J. Pressley has shown, in an article for The Journal of 
African American History, how the information in The Known World 
largely correlates with that of available data from the 1830 U.S. Census, 
transcribed by Carter G. Woodson, the “Father of Black History.” Press-
ley demonstrates that “in several Virginia counties, free black slaveown-
ers reached 25 percent or more of the free black heads of families. Thus 
Jones’s Manchester County is well within the general range” (86). His con-
clusion is that “Edward P. Jones’s historical novel successfully meets major 
tests of statistical plausibility for its historical period—whatever may be 
its degree of success or failure in satisfying the various other literary or 
aesthetic criteria by which readers may evaluate it” (86). Pressley’s article 
was occasioned by the fact that Jones’s book brought this aspect of his-
tory to light in the public sphere. He then uses this attention to test the 
fictional statistics in the novel against that provided by Carter Woodson’s 
scholarship, and to argue for more scholarly use of Woodson’s statistical 
information.
 For Katherine Clay Bassard, in “Imagining Other Worlds,” the ongo-
ing conflict between Augustus Townsend who bought himself and his 
family out of slavery, and his son, Henry, who became a slave owner, dra-
matizes scholarly debate about the extent of benevolent and commercial 
black slave owning, with Augustus epitomizing the “Woodson thesis” 
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(that most black slave owners bought only their family members) and 
Henry its refutation (412). Despite his claims to have eschewed research, 
and particularly the sort of historical detail which Michel Faber claimed 
as crucial to the authority of his reconstruction of Victorian England, 
Jones nonetheless speaks with authority in the public sphere about this 
debate. In response to an interviewer’s question about how common it 
was for free blacks to own slaves, Jones asserted:
I don’t have any hard data but I’m quite certain that the numbers of 
black slaveowners was quite small in relation to white slaveowners. The 
fact that many people—even many black people—didn’t know such peo-
ple existed is perhaps proof of how few there were. In addition, as I note 
in the novel, husbands purchased wives and parents purchased children, 
and so their neighbors may have come to know the people purchased 
not as slaves, as property, but as family members. Finally, owning a slave 
was not a cheap proposition, and the economic status of most blacks 
back then didn’t lend itself to owning a human being. (“An Interview”)
 The phrase, “as I note in the novel” is significant for the way Jones 
wants to use the authority of his omniscient narrator to undergird his right 
to speak in public about the history of slavery. This narrative voice, with 
its rhetorical deployment of the discourse of history to supplement his 
impossible knowledge of the past, becomes an occasion to establish the 
cultural authority of the novelist in the public sphere.
 The intrusive presence of the omniscient narrator, engaged in an ongo-
ing critique of historical evidence, even as he reveals impossible knowl-
edge of the fictional world and its characters, is crucial to the rhetorical 
effect of the novel. For Tim Ryan, the effect is to indicate “that the notion 
of accurate history is a contradiction in terms. Representations of slavery 
are always necessarily imaginative narratives, and, the text implies, the 
creative omniscience of the novelist seems more compelling than the com-
promised empiricism of the historian” (195). Ryan argues that the novel 
“defamiliarizes slavery” not only through its subject matter, but its “for-
mal strategies,” by deploying the structure of the Victorian novel, describ-
ing it as “a sort of Middlemarch of American slavery” (204). According to 
Ryan: “On the one hand, this choice allows The Known World to pursue 
traditional social realism, but, on the other, the novel is also an ironic and 
parodic invocation of an earlier literary form” (205). Why the need to 
make this claim? Ryan suggests the novel is not “purely a faux-Victorian 
panorama” because it employs “postmodernist or magic realist elements” 
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such as the persistent prolepses and references to historical documents: 
“The Known World’s commitment to traditional realism and its informed 
engagement with historiography is balanced by its skeptical attitude 
toward history as a discipline and its unsettling metafictional character-
istics” (205). Ryan’s analysis of the novel’s uneasy relationship to histo-
riography is compelling, but it seems unnecessary to say that a part of 
its strategy is a parody of nineteenth-century omniscience, rather than 
simply a deployment of conventions of omniscience in the service of the 
narrative. What makes it post-postmodernist for me is precisely the sense 
of faith in an actual if ultimately unknowable past, and the belief that the 
“creative omniscience” of the novelist is one method for trying to know 
this past, as opposed to undermining the project of historical scholarship. 
In other words it posits fiction as a mode of historiography and sets up 
the novelist as a kind of literary historian. This strategic use of omniscient 
narration, rather than the “invocation” of an earlier form, is a means of 
establishing the cultural authority of the novelist in the discursive treat-
ment of the past.
the PyroteChniC storyteller  is typically humorous or satirical, employ-
ing a flourishing and expansive narrative voice, a garrulous conversa-
tional tone, to assert control over the events being narrated, eschewing 
the impersonality of analytic omniscience to the extent that the narrative 
voice often overshadows the characters being described or analyzed. This 
third mode of narrative authority in contemporary omniscience includes 
Zadie Smith’s White Teeth, Rick Moody’s The Diviners, Nicola Barker’s 
Darkmans, and much of the work of David Foster Wallace. While the 
novels discussed in this chapter display zero focalization and, in the case 
of Smith, overt commentary, the intrusive presence of their authorial nar-
rators is produced most strikingly by expressive features of style which 
characterize the “voice” of the storyteller. Take, for example, this passage 
from Darkmans: “The house (which’d looked fairly bleak prior to this 
new development—with its sagging sills, mouldy fascia, and muddy gar-
den) now peeked out, disconsolately, from beneath its perilous-seeming 
exo-skeleton like a sadly neglected poodle in an ill-fitting muzzle” (182). 
Of course, this authorial style is not a “quality” of omniscience, but in this 
instance it establishes an idiosyncratic expressive presence tied to the nar-
rative voice itself.
Style and the 
pyrotechnic Storyteller
C h a P t e r  4
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 Style in the literary-critical sense usually refers to elements of lan-
guage—such as idiom, diction, tone, syntactic rhythm—which would be 
lost in a paraphrase of the story; the linguistic choices which distinguish 
the writing of one author from another. As a result of the foundational 
distinction between author and narrator, narrative theory has traditionally 
been less concerned with prose style—how a narrative is written—than 
with storytelling methods—how a story is narrated. Hence, in Story and 
Discourse, Seymour Chatman defines discourse as the “structure of nar-
rative transmission,” with style as the “texture of the properties of the 
medium” (10–11), pertinent only to the extent that it facilitates the presen-
tation of discourse. In a more specific sense, style in narrative theory has 
generally referred to linguistic features which enable readers to distinguish 
a character’s “voice” from a narrator’s, particularly in the form of free 
indirect discourse. This narratological linking of stylistic elements to the 
evocation of subjectivity in narrative discourse echoes the literary-critical 
understanding of individual authorial style. In the study of free indirect 
discourse a narrator’s formal diction is conventionally taken as the neutral 
voice against which to measure the stylistic deviation of characterial lan-
guage. With the pyrotechnic storyteller, by contrast, colloquial language, 
informal tone, idiosyncratic syntax, and metaphorical excess all contrib-
ute to the evocation and characterization of a dramatized narrator, whose 
intrusive presence is established stylistically.
 Dan Shen has argued for a need to include stylistic analysis of the lan-
guage choices of writers alongside narratological analysis of the structural 
organization of a narrative in order for a fuller understanding of these two 
levels of presentation. She does not, however, relate this broad approach 
to narrative discourse as the “how” of narrative to the more specific ques-
tion of discourse as the utterance of a narrator. Richard Aczel takes up the 
question of style in his essay “Hearing Voices in Narrative Texts,” which 
criticizes the narratological definition of voice as the generating instance 
of a narrative. He claims that Genette’s functional concept of voice as the 
agent responsible for telling a story, understood as the spatio-temporal 
location of the narrator in relation to the story, is limited because it does 
not establish how a narrator speaks and is thus “inherently deaf to quali-
tative factors such as tone and idiom” (468). Hence voice, for Aczel, must 
primarily be understood as a question of style. He argues for a distinc-
tion between the function of the narrator (the instance of enunciation) and 
the effect of the narrator, which he calls voice. This distinction, for Aczel, 
allows for
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a qualitative, as opposed to merely functional, concept of voice, and 
emphasizes the centrality of stylistic expressivity—features of style which 
evoke a deictic center or subjectivity—in the identification of voice effects 
and their agents. Positing voice as a textual effect rather than an origi-
nary anima, it insists on a radical separation between textual signs of 
stylistic agency and projected (metatextual) principles of narrative orga-
nization and unity. (467)
 In dismissing the claims by Ann Banfield and Monika Fludernik for 
narratorless third-person fiction, he challenges accepted approaches to the 
presence of a narrator. Rather than first-person pronouns, addresses to a 
reader, reflexive statements and overt commentary, which he assigns to the 
function of narration, Aczel locates the presence of a narrator in lexical, 
syntactic, and rhetorical elements of style, claiming that only these features 
can be considered elements of voice:
This is not to say that style necessarily evokes a subjective center (there 
are, for example, impersonal, collective, and period styles), but where 
style does have an expressive function it will produce a voice effect. Not 
only, therefore, does stylistic expressivity—style anchored in subjectiv-
ity—have an important role to play in the identification of narratorial 
audibility, but it must play the central role in the characterization of a 
narrator’s voice. Narratorial self-mention posits a speaker function, and 
comment names a subject position, but it is only stylistic expressivity 
which endows this speaking subject with a recognizable voice. (472)
 Aczel’s evidence is the fiction of Henry James. Despite the restricted 
focalization of The Ambassadors or What Maisie Knew, Aczel claims that 
James’s narratorial presence is clearly audible in the style of narration, and 
this is far more important to the voice effect of the narrator than the occa-
sional intrusive comment which can be found in James’s work. It is easy 
to accept that James’s ornate circumlocutive sentences can be seen as sty-
listic evidence of the subjective presence of a narrator despite the rigorous 
reflectorization of his narratives. However, Aczel’s “qualitative” approach 
seems to leave a lot of interpretive leeway in identifying the voice “effect” 
of stylistic expressivity. Would we deny narratorial characterization to the 
objective narration of a Hemingway story because of its minimalist style? 
And doesn’t stylistic expressivity—a deictic center of subjectivity—indicate 
a “trace” of the narrating instance in the narrative discourse?
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 While I would still retain the importance of the narrating instance as 
the subjective center which generates the stylistic effects of voice, and the 
importance of intrusive commentary as the most overt performance of 
omniscient authority, Aczel’s approach is nonetheless particularly salient 
for understanding how the mode of the pyrotechnic storyteller asserts a 
pervasive narratorial presence. Drawing upon Bakhtin, Aczel argues that 
the voices of narrators and characters emerge in a quotational context, 
audible only in their stylistic difference from each other, and becom-
ing functional via a dialogue between readers and a projected narrating 
instance. The narrator, then, is not a “uniform teller persona” but a “com-
posite configuration of voices, whose identity lies in the rhetorical orga-
nization of their constituent elements” (495). By contrast, I will approach 
style in this chapter as an extranarrative function of the narrator. That is, 
style is part of the act of narration, employed not only in the service of 
telling a story, but of asserting the omniscient narrator’s linguistic pres-
ence at the level of discourse.
 Narratological attention to style further complicates the author-narra-
tor distinction because the stylistic features which Aczel claims evoke the 
voice effect of a narrator—“tone, idiom, diction, speech-style” (469)—
also enable us to identify the prose style of individual authors. In char-
acter narration, I would argue, an author’s style is metadiscursive. That 
is, when Humbert Humbert writes, in the opening to his confession, 
“You can always count on a murderer for a fancy prose style” (9), we are 
invited to attribute the stylistic choices to Humbert’s narrative voice, even 
though we know that they are a product of Nabokov’s authorial craft in 
writing Lolita. In third-person narration, there seems little purchase in 
separating an author’s stylistic choices discernible in the text from those 
which establish the narrator’s voice at the level of discourse. If homodi-
egetic narrators are characterized as much by their manner of telling as 
their diegetic experience, then heterodiegetic narrators must be charac-
terized as much by their stylistic choices as they are by their commen-
tary. The pyrotechnic storytellers of contemporary omniscience invoke 
the highest degree of personalized narration by virtue of these stylistic 
choices.
 There are two writers whose maximalist prose has had the greatest 
influence on the syntactic rhythms of contemporary fiction, and has pro-
vided a stylistic model for the narrative voice of the pyrotechnic story-
teller: Salman Rushdie and David Foster Wallace. Here is a passage from 
the opening page of Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses: 
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Gibreel, the tuneless soloist, had been cavorting in moonlight as he sang 
his impromptu gazal, swimming in air, butterfly-stroke, breast-stroke, 
bunching himself into a ball, spread-eagling himself against the almost-
infinity of the almost-dawn, adopting heraldic postures, rampant, couch-
ant, pitting levity against gravity. (3)
This hectic overdescription is accompanied by metaphorical excess: “The 
aircraft cracked in half, a seed-pod giving up its spores, an egg yielding its 
mystery. Two actors, prancing Gibreel, and buttony, pursed Mr Saladin 
Chamcha, fell like titbits of tobacco from a broken old cigar” (4). In two 
lines the narrator employs images of a seed-pod, an egg and a cigar, hurl-
ing language at us, and this prolixity seems almost to license in stylistic 
terms narratorial commentary, in the following case relating to the influ-
ence of aviation on modern thought and subjectivity:
Yessir, but not random. Up there in air-space, in that soft, imperceptible 
field which had been made possible by the century, and which, thereafter, 
made the century possible, becoming one of its defining locations, the 
place of movement and of war, the planet-shrinker and power-vacuum, 
most insecure and transitory of zones, illusory, discontinuous, meta-
morphic,—because when you throw everything up in the air anything 
becomes possible—wayupthere, at any rate, changes took place in delir-
ious actors that would have gladdened the heart of old Mr Lamarck: 
under extreme environmental pressure, characteristics were acquired. (5)
 For David Foster Wallace, stylistic pyrotechnics, in the form of 
extended sentences replete with qualifications and parentheticals, function 
as a way to elaborate the convolutions of individual character thought, 
while retaining a deliberately bland “style” in terms of lexical choice 
and figurative range. Here is a representative passage from “Luckily the 
Account Representative Knew CPR”:
Particularly the divorced Account Representative, who remarked, silently, 
alone, as his elevator dropped toward the Executive Garage, that, at a 
certain unnoticed but never unheeded point in every corporate evening 
he worked, it became Time to Leave; that this point in the overtime night 
was a fulcrum on which things basic and unseen tilted, very slightly—a 
pivot in hours unaware—and that, in the period between this point and 
the fresh-suited working dawn, the very issue of the Building’s owner-
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ship would become, quietly, in their absence, truly an issue, hung in air, 
unsettled. (46)
 In this passage, the narrator tells us that the unnamed Account Rep-
resentative “remarked silently, alone” that it was “Time to Leave,” but 
the sentence is elongated by a paratactic clause following the semi-colon, 
shifting into a narratorial elaboration of the thought, overwhelming 
the character’s subjective presence with its drawn out explanatory com-
ment. These feature of style—overdescription, metaphorical excess, and 
narratorial elaboration of character thought—are all ways in which the 
omniscient pyrotechnic storyteller rhetorically performs the controlling 
presence of the authorial narrator.
nicola Barker, Darkmans (2007)
Nicola Barker’s Darkmans is the most striking example of the pyrotech-
nic storyteller. Set in the town of Ashford in contemporary England, the 
novel focuses on how the progress of modernity is haunted by the sedi-
mentary layers of the city’s medieval past. As one of the characters says, 
Ashford is “like history in paradigm. At its center beats this tiny, perfect, 
medieval heart, but that heart is surrounded—obfuscated—by all these 
conflicting layers, a chaos of buildings and roads from every conceivable 
time-frame. It’s pure, architectural mayhem” (398). At the beginning of 
the novel we are introduced to sixty-one-year-old Daniel Beede, now a 
broken man working in a hospital laundry after spending much of his ear-
lier life fighting the effects of the Channel Tunnel on his town. In particu-
lar, he had been devoted to restoring an historic water mill threatened by 
an arterial rerouting, a project during which he “had gripped the liver of 
history and had felt it squelching in his hand” (10), but which amounted 
to nothing once the mill was bulldozed. He remains galled by the disap-
pearance of invaluable ancient tiles which had been salvaged from the 
building, and his desire to discover what happened provides the impetus 
of the plot. As the narrator says: “Beede was the vengeful tsunami of his-
tory” (13), and his actions appear to have unleashed the ghostly figure of 
the darkmans, spirit of John Scogin, the infamous court jester to Edward 
IV, whose life Beede is researching.
 Throughout the novel, both Beede and his drug-dealing son, Kane, 
appear to be haunted by this figure, in dreams and in waking life, and 
sometimes possessed by him. Both father and son are besotted with chi-
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ropodist Elen whose disturbed husband, Isidore, is the most affected by 
Scogin, prone to amnesiac lapses of mind during which he unconsciously 
re-enacts the jester’s tricks, and seeming to hear his voice in his head. Elen 
and Isidore’s six-year-old son, Fleet, is monomaniacally obsessed with con-
structing a perfect matchstick replica of the Cathedral Basilica of Sainte-
Cécile and its surrounding buildings, without actually having seen it, and 
which he does not finish because it had not been completed in Scogin’s life-
time. Fleet also talks of a mysterious friend, “John,” relaying information 
about Scogin’s biography he could not possibly know. At one point, pater-
nity tests based on DNA samples reveal Fleet genetically to be Isidore’s 
ancestor rather than his son.
 Most significantly, these hauntings take the form of a linguistic inhabi-
tation, with the characters involuntarily thinking and speaking in archaic 
words and words from other languages of which they are unfamiliar. For 
instance, in one scene between Kane and Elen, Kane is trying to control 
both his feelings of sexual arousal and his jealousy of her relationship with 
his father. He looks down at a coin Elen is holding and thinks: “Coin— / 
Cuneus— / Kunte— / Cunt” (773). Cuneus is Latin for wedge, also an 
architectural element of medieval theatres, suggesting the jester’s hand at 
play. In this context, Elen is the wedge between himself and Beede, leading 
associatively and phonetically to “cunt,” which can be seen as an expres-
sion of both desire for and anger toward Elen. Kane is overwhelmed by 
his experience: “—he saw words clashing and merging and collapsing and 
rotating. He saw chaos—an infinity of teeth, tongues, mouths, breath. He 
saw a storm of confusion” (775).
 This linguistic chaos is replicated in the act of narration. Barker’s 
novel has a manic prose style, full of multiple overblown metaphors, col-
loquial language, parenthetical embellishments and, most strikingly, reg-
ular interpolations of characters’ thoughts (typographically represented 
by italics and separated by line breaks) into the narrator’s discourse. 
There are some overt narratorial assessments, such as this: “In bald truth, 
Beede’s studious attempts to present himself as unfailingly approachable 
to his son were all just so much baloney” (73). However, the omniscient 
authority and intrusive presence of this pyrotechnic narration is largely 
stylistic, emerging from summary, descriptive pause and the representa-
tion of consciousness. The voice “effect” of stylistic expressivity which 
characterizes the narrator is clear in the excessive elaboration of meta-
phors which occur throughout the book. Here is an example of char-
acter summary: “To boil it all down (which might take a while—there 
was plenty of old meat, hard lessons and human frailty in this particular 
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broth), Beede was wildly cynical about the functions of paternity” (73). 
Commenting on a conversation between Beede and his son Kane, the nar-
rator writes: “The unmentionable hung between them like a dank canal 
(overrun by weed and scattered with litter—the used condoms, the bent 
tricycle, the old pram)” (340). In these passages the parentheses contain 
the excessive elaboration of metaphors which are extranarrative in their 
function.
 Another example of stylistic presence is the extended introduction to 
one of the characters. “Mrs Dina Broad had a wonderful facility for get-
ting total strangers to do exactly as she wanted” (104). This introductory 
statement is straightforward enough, but over the next page of character 
summary the narrator’s presence is keenly asserted in the hyperactive prose 
with its regular parenthetical qualifications and extended metaphors. “If 
Dina’s life was a carousel (which it was anything but), then there was only 
enough room on the rotating podium (midst the high-painted roses, the 
mirror-tiles, the lovely organ) for a single pony; and Dina’s was it” (104). 
The metaphor of the single-pony carousel is exhausted before it segues 
into one of the character’s life as a theatrical show: “The Dina Broad 
show (like Celine Dion in Las Vegas) was a show that never ended (it just 
went on and on and on); but this low-budget extravaganza (in perfect 
Technicolor) by no means ran itself” (104). “Nuh-uh,” the narrator says, 
before pursuing the metaphor for another two paragraphs.
 In this following extract we have what appears to be a passage of free 
indirect discourse concerning Fleet’s antisocial behavior at school and the 
response of his parents. The passage is not linked to any single character 
perspective, but its sentiments seem most attributable to the general opin-
ion of the mothers of other children in the school, a summary of their 
assessment of Fleet and his parents:
Fleet on the other hand . . . 
Hmmn
Fleet had . . . 
What did Fleet have? Whatever it was, the parents wouldn’t deal with it 
(were uncooperative, wouldn’t face facts), which automatically rendered 
them a part of the problem. To care too much was a weakness all par-
ents could quite reasonably be found guilty of, but to actively obstruct? 
To smother? To deny? Not only was it unhealthy, but in the voluminous 
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wardrobe of parental misdemeanours, this was that fine-seeming, well-
laundered garment hanging neatly alongside the foul and mouldering suit 
of abuse (contamination was always a possibility when two items were 
hung so close). (151)
 This passage gives the appearance of the narrator reporting the col-
lective opinion of the mothers emerging out of a discussion about Fleet 
and his parents, rendering this opinion in a form of free indirect dis-
course, complete with interrogatives. But as it continues it becomes less 
of a mediated report than a narratorial performance which linguistically 
overwhelms the characters and asserts the narrator’s stylistic authority 
through the hyperbolic wardrobe metaphor. The last parenthetical line, 
“contamination was always a possibility when two items were hung so 
close,” can, in the context of the narrator’s overriding presence, also be 
read as a reflexive metaphor for the operation of stylistic contagion, show-
ing the contamination of narratorial and character language.
 Darkmans was shortlisted for the Booker Prize in 2007, the year in 
which Anne Enright won for The Gathering. In an article in The Guard-
ian, one of the judges, Giles Foden, explains that, while the novel was an 
early favorite of the judges, “the general impression was that not enough 
thought had been given to the reader. It seemed a book written for the 
author whose evident zeal for language could only take one so far,” and 
which “with much more disciplined handling, could have been a Middle-
march for our times.” Enright’s novel, on the other hand, was praised 
for its “controlled” and “carefully modulated” prose. Stylistic excess, 
then, may have cost Barker the chance at a Booker prize. In particular, 
Foden notes that a “number of judges had difficulty with italic interjec-
tions, broken out of the main text, as a way of presenting a character’s 
thoughts.” This style can be seen as idiosyncratic to Barker’s writing, but 
it also matches the novel’s preoccupation with the power of language, per-
forming at the level of the discourse the chaotic inhabitation of characters’ 
thoughts which the darkmans performs in the story.
 The key stylistic technique is a kind of reflexive experimentation with 
stylistic contagion. Throughout the novel, the narration is fragmented by 
separate paragraphs of italicized words and phrases which must be attrib-
uted to a character. Often these appear as snatches of direct discourse sup-
plementing an internally focalized passage such as in the following:
Elen had a sudden sense of how it might feel to be a student who wasn’t 
excelling in Mrs Santa’s class (that atmosphere of “tolerant” disappoint-
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ment; of “accepting” disquiet). She didn’t like it. The angry knuckle 
tensed itself up inside her stomach again—
Cow
—then the second, gentler knuckle—the pacifier—
She’s his teacher—She just wants to help . . . 
—predictably balanced it out. (141)
 Sometimes these italicized passages of interpolated direct discourse 
appear to operate as a character’s response to the narrator’s comments. 
One section elaborates, in free indirect discourse, Kane’s frustration with 
his father’s uptight stoicism. This is interrupted by a narratorial evaluation 
of Kane’s attempt to distinguish himself from Beede:
Of course, by comparison—and by sheer coincidence—Kane’s entire life 
mission—
Oh how lovely to hone in on me again
—was to be mirthful. To be fluffy. To endow mere trifles with an exqui-
sitely inappropriate gravitas. Kane found depth an abomination. (20)
 The following passage is our first introduction to Kane’s ex-girlfriend:
Kelly Broad was sitting on a high wall, chewing ferociously on a piece 
of celery. She was passingly pretty and alarmingly thin with artificially 
tinted burgundy hair. . . . She had bad circulation, weak bones . . . a pen-
chant for laxatives and an Eating Disorder—
Might as well bring that straight up, eh?
Un,
Deux,
Trois . . . 
Bleeeaa-urghhh! (39)
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 In the following example, the narrator—who is describing Beede’s 
efforts, along with a group of volunteers, to restore the Old Mill—seems 
to respond to the character’s interjection:
It wasn’t all plain sailing. At some point (and who could remember when, 
exactly?), it became distressingly apparent that recent “improvements” 
to the newer parts of Mill House had seriously endangered the older 
structure’s integrity—
Now hang on—
Just . . . just back up a second—
What are you saying here, exactly?
The worst-case scenario? That the old mill might never be able to func-
tion independently in its eighteenth century guise; like a conjoined twin, 
it might only really be able to exist as a small part of its former whole. 
(10)
 Here the narrator is articulating what Beede does not want to hear: 
that his attempts to restore the mill contributed to its destruction. If sty-
listic contagion is understood as an assimilation into the narrative voice 
of language a character might use to describe themselves (such as the 
famous “Uncle Charles repaired to the outhouse”), these moments seem 
to be the narrator’s hypothetical interpolations of the response a char-
acter might have to being described by someone else. In other words, 
we have less the sharing of the narratorial function with the character’s 
voice, than the narrator supplying the character’s thoughts for them, lin-
guistically penetrating the psyche of the characters. One of the characters, 
the historian Winifred, is researching the life of Scogin on Beede’s behalf. 
At one point, Winifred tells Kane: “Words are his allies. It’s like he’s at 
his most powerful, his most mischievous, when experimenting with the 
variables of language” (646). In this way, the narrator’s stylistic excess 
matches the Jester, for the characters’ thoughts also suffer from linguistic 
intrusion at the diegetic level.
 In one scene, Beede’s cat scratches Elen’s hand, and he takes her hand 
in his to inspect it: “‘He’s drawn blut,’ Beede murmured thickly, his chest 
tightening as he inhaled the roses on her, then he frowned. ‘Blood,’ he 
repeated” (656). Later, in a scene where he appears to be completely pos-
sessed, prancing around, somersaulting, farting, and eventually hanging 
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his cat, Beede notices blood on his arm and this list of words appears in 
his thoughts: “Reudh? Ruber? Rood? Rud? Red? Red? Blut-red? Eh? 
Blut?” (677). This might be explained by Beede’s interest in the origins of 
languages, but the other characters have no such interest or knowledge. 
Indeed it is the resurfacing of archaic words across characters which links 
them together.
 Toward the end of the novel, Dory explains to Beede that the dark-
mans, whom they know but cannot name, has been a constant voice in his 
head: “He keeps telling me that you made your own key. He keeps repeat-
ing it. He keeps going on and on and on and on. . . . I mean at first I didn’t 
understand—he speaks differently to us. He kept repeating the word kay 
and I just couldn’t . . . but then he said luk . . . then loch . . . and I knew 
he meant lock. Like a lock and a key. A key . . . ” (713). The next chapter, 
focalized through Kane who is driving to meet an art forger called Peta 
Borough, opens this way:
Tenterden. He’d planned to head for Tenterden—
Peta—
Peta Borough—
The f-forger . . . 
The f-fabricare . . . 
She’s definitely the k-k-kay, here
—but when he drew up at the roundabout—
Eh?
—the Rover was just one car ahead of him—
Kay?
—so he calmly proceeded to follow—
F-f-fabric-what?! (716)
 Here we see Kane confused by this linguistic invasion of his own inter-
nal thoughts. Peta Borough in fact turns out to be the key to the plot, 
revealing to Kane in the denouement the fate of the missing tiles, as well as 
her and Beede’s involvement in it. Later, Kane is discussing ash trees with 
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a gardener who tells him they can be recognized by their seeds, known as 
keys.
“Keys?” Kane repeated. “Why do they call them that?”
“Because in the very old days they used to resemble the actual keys that 
people used for their locks.”
“Key,” Kane mused, dreamily, “kay . . . ” (785)
 The word is now uttered in his speech. Later we have this line to intro-
duce a chapter in which the word has found its way into the narration:
Kane took out his kays—
KEYS, Goddammit!
(He shook his head—
STOP this now!
ENOUGH!!)
—inserted them into the lock, then paused for a second and stared down, 
frowning, at his outstretched hands. (796)
 This passage follows the pattern of reporting characters’ thoughts that 
seem to be responses to the narration. In this instance, the narrator’s use 
of “kays,” as an instance of stylistic contagion, is an echo of the Jester’s 
lexical infection of the characters’ thoughts. If Kane cannot get the word 
out of his head, it is because neither the darkmans nor the omniscient nar-
rator will let him. And if Scogin is “at his most powerful, his most mischie-
vous, when experimenting with the variables of language” (646), then so is 
the narrator in her experiment with represented thought. At one point in 
the novel Kane reflects upon the strange words in his mind: “Almost as 
if his thoughts were a war drum (or a tom-tom or a bongo) being deftly 
played by a mysterious hand on the other side of a very distant, very stark 
and yet beautiful snow-capped mountain” (485). This mysterious hand of 
the darkmans, who embodies the return of a repressed history, infiltrat-
ing the characters’ minds and intruding into their idiom, is also a kind of 
spectral figure of the omniscient narrator. Given the history of novelistic 
form as an attempt to repress the intrusive presence of the omniscient nar-
rator by developments in impersonal narration, this presence can be seen 
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erupting in the stylistic excess of the pyrotechnic storyteller exemplified by 
Barker’s novel.
Zadie Smith, White Teeth (2000)
The pyrotechnic narrator is also the mediating voice for much of the fic-
tion which the prominent British critic James Wood denounces as “hys-
terical realism.” For Wood, much contemporary fiction is beset with an 
“excess of storytelling” (Irresponsible 171), neglecting the development 
of characters with genuine humanity. He describes hysterical realism in 
this way: “The big contemporary novel is a perpetual motion machine 
that appears to have been embarrassed into velocity. It seems to want to 
abolish stillness, as if ashamed of silence. Stories and sub-stories sprout on 
every page, and these novels continually flourish their glamorous conges-
tion. Inseparable from this culture of permanent storytelling is the pursuit 
of vitality at all costs” (Irresponsible 167). Wood argues that this mode of 
fiction has absorbed the textual qualities of magic realism into the realist 
novel. The manic flourishes of verisimilar improbability do not tip into the 
surreal, but simply exhaust the conventions of realism. Wood coined the 
term “hysterical realism” in a review of Zadie Smith’s White Teeth, and 
listed Smith’s novel as the latest in a “hardening” genre including Rush-
die’s The Ground Beneath Her Feet, Pynchon’s Mason & Dixon, DeLillo’s 
Underworld and Wallace’s Infinite Jest.
 The publication of White Teeth at the turn of the millennium was a 
genuine media event: a debut novel about contemporary multicultural 
England by a young, attractive female writer, easily situated in a tradi-
tion of postcolonial fiction which explores the hybrid nature of migrant 
identities, with a direct line of descent from Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses. 
“This has been the century of strangers,” utters the omniscient narrator, 
“brown, yellow and white. This has been the century of the late immi-
grant experiment. It is only this late in the day that you can walk into 
a playground and find Isaac Leung by the fishpond, Danny Rahman in 
the football cage, Quang O’Rourke bouncing a basketball, and Irie Jones 
humming a tune” (326). If The Satanic Verses experiments with an omni-
scient narrator who asserts his noninterventionist stance while hinting 
he may also be Satan, White Teeth can be read as a postsecular novel in 
which the omniscient narrator refuses to organize the plot around the tra-
ditional concept of providence. Here, White Teeth’s narrative voice bears 
comparison with that in Henry Fielding’s Tom Jones, the prototype of 
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omniscient narration in the English novel. In God’s Plot and Man’s Sto-
ries, Leopold Damrosch argues that in Fielding’s novel “[a]n omniscient 
and affectionate narrator acts as the disposing deity of the fictional uni-
verse, instructing the reader, by means of a plot whose coherence is only 
gradually revealed, to understand the operations of a Providence that sub-
sumes all of the apparent accidents of chance or Fortune” (263). In the 
final book of Tom Jones, the narrator writes: 
Here an Accident happened of a very extraordinary Kind; one indeed of 
those strange Chances whence very good and grave Men have concluded 
that Providence often interposes in the Discovery of the most secret Vil-
lainy, in order to caution Men from quitting the Paths of Honesty, how-
ever warily they tread in those of Vice. (818)
If, as Wayne Booth argues in The Rhetoric of Fiction, Fielding’s narrator 
establishes an intimacy with readers that “produces a kind of comic ana-
logue of the true believer’s reliance on a benign providence in real life” 
(217), the omniscient narrator of White Teeth, by contrast, engages read-
ers by satirizing this reliance.
 The novel opens with a scene in which the protagonist, Archie Jones, 
is attempting to commit suicide by gassing himself in his car. After the 
scene is established the narrator asserts her colloquial stylistic presence 
and intrusive authority in this passage of zero focalization:
For, though he did not know it, and despite the Hoover tube that lay on 
the passenger seat pumping from the exhaust pipe into his lungs, luck 
was with him that morning. The thinnest covering of luck was on him 
like fresh dew. Whilst he slipped in and out of consciousness, the position 
of the planets, the music of the spheres, the flap of a tiger-moth’s diaph-
anous wings in Central Africa, and a whole bunch of other stuff that 
Makes Shit Happen had decided it was second-chance time for Archie. 
Somewhere, somehow, by somebody, it had been decided that he would 
live. (4)
 This passage seems deliberately designed to prevent us from reading 
Archie’s escape from suicide as some sort of profound statement about the 
fragility of human existence. Its satirical references to various popular the-
ories of universal cause and effect seem to terminate in the suggestion that 
the somebody who “makes shit happen” is either a divine entity about 
which the narrator can only speculate (she knows what happened, but not 
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why), or simply the narrator herself, the storytelling author’s proxy, who 
playfully acknowledges her analogous relation to God. Smith’s narrator, in 
fact, regularly employs intrusive commentary to satirize the desire of char-
acters to assign events to providence:
The principles of Christianity and Sod’s Law (also known as Murphy’s 
Law) are the same: Everything happens to me, for me. So if a man drops 
a piece of toast and it lands butter-side down, this unlucky event is inter-
preted as being proof of an essential truth about bad luck: that the toast 
fell as it did just to prove to you, Mr Unlucky, that there is a defining 
force in the universe and it is bad luck. It’s not random. It could never 
have fallen on the right side, so the argument goes, because that’s Sod’s 
Law. In short, Sod’s Law happens to you to prove to you that there is 
Sod’s Law. Yet, unlike gravity, it is a law that does not exist whatever 
happens: when the toast lands on the right side, Sod’s Law mysteriously 
disappears. (44)
 This passage occurs in the middle of narrating the involvement of two 
characters in a motorbike accident. The narrator goes on to point out the 
character Ryan’s belief that he had escaped injury while his companion 
Clara had her teeth knocked out because God had chosen to save him: 
“Not because one was wearing a helmet and the other wasn’t” (44). Most 
damningly, the narrator comments that if the opposite had occurred “you 
can bet your life that God, in Ryan’s mind, would have done a vanishing 
act” (44).
 Here we see the narrator extrapolating from the report of a character’s 
experience to general commentary on “human nature.” “Authorial narra-
tive,” according to Monika Fludernik,
is most familiar to us in the form of a reliable guide to human affairs. 
There is a consoling ability to know, to see into characters’ minds, to 
grasp the why, how and wherefore of life, and to uncover life’s rules and 
regularities sub specie aeternitatis et mundi. (Natural 165)
This is a conventional understanding of the eighteenth- and nineteenth-
century omniscient narrator established by critical consensus. Rather than 
offering consoling explanation, the narrative voice of White Teeth offers a 
world of random uncertainty, relativizing the authority of her commentary.
 In an essay on the relationship between postcolonial fiction and post-
secular thought, Graham Huggan argues that White Teeth is a contempo-
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rary postsecular text which performs in fiction the aims of postsecularism, 
defined as “a strategy for the deconstructive reading of established reli-
gious texts” (757). Like The Satanic Verses, he points out, Smith’s novel is 
a celebration of hybridity and an attack on cultural purism: 
However, if the promises and illusions of Islam remain very much at the 
center of Rushdie’s novel, their space in Smith’s has largely been usurped 
by the secular history of the genome. . . . White Teeth, in this sense, is 
The Satanic Verses for the age of the Human Genome Project. (761)
A key character in White Teeth is the geneticist Marcus Chalfen, who pub-
licly champions the potential for all humans arising from his attempts to 
produce a genetically engineered mouse. A press release announcing the 
launch of his “FutureMouse©” experiment states that this research “holds 
out the tantalizing promise of a new phase in human history where we are 
not victims of the random but instead directors and arbitrators of our own 
fate” (433). As Huggan points out, the novel undercuts this promise as 
events unfold “through a succession of biological accidents and historical 
contingencies” (762).
 The final chapter of White Teeth brings all the strands of the plot 
together in a set piece centered on the launch of the FutureMouse©. If the 
denouement of Tom Jones resolves the plot to reveal the hand of Provi-
dence, here there is structural unification, but no real resolution. “But first 
the endgames,” the narrator writes, acknowledging the desire of readers 
to know what happens to the characters and projecting several possibili-
ties. “But surely to tell these tall tales and others like them would be to 
speed the myth, the wicked lie, that the past is always tense and the future, 
perfect. And as Archie knows, it’s not like that. It’s never been like that” 
(541). Instead she concludes by following the mouse who has escaped. 
“He watched it dash along the table, and through the hands of those 
who wished to pin it down. He watched it leap off the end and disap-
pear through an air vent. Go on my son! thought Archie” (542). So while 
Smith’s narrator may reject providence, she also rejects secular belief in the 
promise of science to eliminate the random.
 “The humanism that Smith’s novel endorses,” Huggan argues, “is 
neither intrinsically secular nor fundamentally religious; rather, it occu-
pies a postsecular sphere of radical indeterminacy in which fundamen-
talist certainties are rejected and salvationist promises of all kinds are 
unmasked for the self-serving—and sometimes brutally destructive—
ideologies they are” (763). Huggan makes no reference to the formal 
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properties of narration in Smith’s novel, but certainly the humanism that 
the novel “endorses” is facilitated by the narrative voice itself in overt 
commentary. There are substantial passages of digressive and garrulous 
commentary throughout the novel which directly address the reader. In 
each of the following examples, the narrator employs the editorial “we” 
to rhetorically invoke a general consciousness. On each occasion, the 
digression concludes with the narrator distancing herself from this “we” 
by taking issue with conventional wisdom.
 After describing Irie’s rationalization that Millat doesn’t love her 
because he cannot, because he is damaged, the narrator digresses—“It’s a 
funny thing about the modern world” (462)—wondering how this sort of 
thinking came to pass in this century:
We are so convinced of the goodness of ourselves, and the goodness of 
our love, we cannot bear to believe that there might be something more 
worthy of love than us, more worthy of worship. Greetings cards rou-
tinely tell us everybody deserves love. No. Everybody deserves clean 
water. Not everybody deserves love all the time. (462)
 In the following passage, the intrusive commentary invokes a narratee 
and hence implied reader who is culturally different from the characters 
under consideration, that is, not an immigrant. “Because we often imag-
ine that immigrants are constantly on the move, footloose, able to change 
course at any moment, able to employ their legendary resourcefulness at 
every turn” (465). The narrator proceeds to discuss this belief in relation 
to Zeno’s Paradox of pluralism, before concluding that “multiplicity is 
no illusion” despite the allure of the One: “Because this is the other thing 
about immigrants (fugees, émigrés, travellers): they cannot escape their 
history any more than you yourself can lose your shadow” (466). If it is 
true that omniscient narration invokes a conventional link between narra-
tive voice and the social identity of the author, then the narrative author-
ity of this voice invokes the cultural authority of Smith—as the child of 
an immigrant Jamaican mother and English father—beginning the section 
with an editorial “we” that establishes complicity with the implied read-
er’s difference from the characters, and concluding with a direct address 
that speaks on behalf of the characters’ experience.
 As many critics have argued, Smith’s public persona has been vital 
to the reception of her novel, with debate revolving around the extent to 
which White Teeth participates in a contrived multicultural exotica. Pay-
ing attention to the different styles of author photo in the hardback and 
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paperback editions of the novel, Dominic Head writes: “For the author 
of a book that purports to speak authoritatively to a wide range of ethnic 
experience—including Caribbean British and Asian British experience—
the ability to adopt different guises suggests a substantive hybridized 
identity that goes beyond the more cynical marketing objectives” (107). 
Head links this paratextual framing to Smith’s celebration of contem-
porary multiculturalism by focusing on her satirical critique of genetic 
engineering. “From the point of view of ethnicity,” he claims, “this sig-
nals Smith’s conviction: that we are all hybrid post-colonials, biologically 
as well as culturally, and the pursuit of pure ethnic origins is a pointless 
objective. And in celebrating this hybridity, Smith embraces its contradic-
tory and haphazard nature” (114).
 The following passage of commentary indicates again how the narra-
tor addresses assumptions about different cultural beliefs before showing 
how they are not so different from those of the narratee invoked by an edi-
torial “we”:
And it may be absurd to us that one Iqbal can believe the breadcrumbs 
laid down by another Iqbal, generations before him, have not yet blown 
away in the breeze. But it really doesn’t matter what we believe. It seems 
it won’t stop the man who thinks this life is guided by the life he thinks 
he had before, or the gypsy who swears by the queens in her tarot pack. 
And it’s hard to change the mind of the high-strung woman who lays 
responsibility for all her actions at the feet of her mother, or the lonely 
guy who sits in a fold-up chair on a hill in the dead of night waiting for 
the little green men. Amidst the strange landscapes that have replaced 
our belief in the efficacy of the stars, Millat’s is not such odd terrain. He 
believes the decisions that are made, come back. He believes we live in 
circles. His is a simple, neat fatalism. What goes around comes around. 
(506–7)
 In this last comment the narrator assumes our complicity in the absur-
dity of Iqbal’s belief, before going on both to make light of this belief and 
normalize it by parodying other more quotidian attempts at fatalism. Mat-
thew Paproth describes what he considers a “disconnect between post-
modernist tale and modernist telling” (11) in Smith’s novels which, despite 
their postmodern content, employ a stable narrative structure and authori-
tative omniscient narrator. It seems odd to describe these features of “tell-
ing” as modernist, given the radical experimentation with form and voice 
which characterizes modernist fiction. Nonetheless, Paproth’s point is that 
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“while the novels demonstrate the failure of various characters to assert 
their authority and autonomy in a postmodern world, the narrators are 
confident, in total control of their narratives, rarely demonstrating the 
uncertainty or fracturedness that is common in postmodernist fiction” 
(11). The assumption here is that “a confident omniscient narrator” must 
be conservative or at odds with postmodern thought. Referring to the neat 
conclusion of White Teeth, Paproth writes: “It is a typically modernist 
move, one intended to guide readers toward knowledge—paradoxically, 
we are being led toward the message that randomness and chaos prevail 
over resolution and closure. The point here is that the modernist structure 
problematizes the postmodernist message that the final scene reveals to 
readers” (22). I’m not sure what this problematization entails. That the 
“message” is obfuscated or diminished by the form? That Smith doesn’t 
practice what she preaches? At any rate, the use of omniscient narration 
in White Teeth indicates that its form is not necessarily at odds with an 
exploration of postmodern culture, that it operates to establish the cultural 
authority of novelists in the wake of postmodernism, and that in doing so 
it projects a figure of authorship different from that of classic omniscience.
rick Moody, The Diviners (2005)
In a 2001 interview for Paris Review, Rick Moody was asked about the 
literary traditions informing his writing. His response was: “The modern-
ist notion that anything is possible, the postmodernist notion that every-
thing is exhausted, the post-postmodernist notion that since everything 
is exhausted, everything is permitted” (David Ryan). The prologue, enti-
tled “Opening Credits and Theme Music,” which opens The Diviners is a 
highly flamboyant performance of the spatial freedom of omniscience, with 
clear echoes of the famous opening to Dickens’s Bleak House, a canoni-
cal example of zero focalization. The second paragraph of Bleak House 
begins: “Fog everywhere. Fog up the river, where it flows among green aits 
and meadows; fog down the river, where it rolls defiled among the tiers of 
shipping and the waterside pollutions of a great (and dirty) city” (13). In 
Moody’s novel, the fog over Victorian London becomes the light which 
spreads from Hollywood to the rest of the world in the year 2000 on the 
morning after the election of George Bush. And whereas Dickens’s open-
ing passage takes a handful of paragraphs, Moody’s extends over twelve 
pages. Here is the opening:
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The light that illuminates the world begins in Los Angeles. Begins in 
darkness, begins in the mountains, begins in empty landscapes, in doubt 
and remorse. San Antonio Peak throws shadows upon a city of shadows. 
There are hints of human insignificance; there are nightmares. But just 
at the moment of intolerability there’s an eruption of spectra. It’s morn-
ing! Morning is hopeful, uncomplicated, and it scales mountaintops, as 
it scales all things. The light comes from nowhere fathomable, from an 
apparently eternal reservoir of emanations, radioactivities. Light edging 
over the mountaintop and across the lakes of the highlands, light across 
the Angeles National Forest, light rushing across skeins of smog in the 
California skies. Light on Redlands, light on the planned communities, 
light on the guy tossing the morning newspaper from a Toyota with a 
hundred and ninety-three thousand miles on it. Light on the Santa Ana 
river, on a drunk sleeping tenderly beside its dregs, light on the Santa 
Ana mountains, the San Bernadino mountains, light on the Prado Basin, 
where a stabbing victim welters in her wounds. (3)
 The title to the prologue suggests the narration is mimicking the neu-
tral eye of the cinematic camera, as if voicing the implied message of the 
camera movements and theme music (“It’s morning!” suggesting a swell 
of music). At the same time the stylistic reference to Bleak House dem-
onstrates that the filmic opening wide shot derives its logic from the pan-
oramic perspective of zero focalization. This sets up Moody’s novelistic 
satire of the film and television industry which is said to be responsible for 
the decline of readership for print fiction. Here the omniscient narration is 
operating parodically, but it is not a parodic critique of a nineteenth-cen-
tury fictional technique, or the fantasy of omniscience: it is a deployment 
of this technique to parody twenty-first-century American cultural imperi-
alism, flagged from the opening line with its ironic assertion that the sun 
rises in Los Angeles to illuminate the rest of the world. This opening line 
also echoes the statement in Genesis about the omnipotent creative power 
of divinity—“And God said: Let there be light”—although the analogy 
with God is offset by the statement that the light “comes from nowhere 
fathomable” (3).
 The zero focalization proceeds to range across the world, tracking the 
light over the Pacific Ocean—“Light upon the invisible phytoplankton 
and all organic material” (4)—but the narrative voice is not anonymous or 
impersonal: it draws attention to the many metaphorical applications of 
light as it offers commentary on geopolitical issues around the globe. The 
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narrator’s light shines from Japan—“now dawn upon Nagasaki, where 
the second of the explosions was detonated, light of dawn reflective of 
that other light” (6)—to China—“light upon the glass boxes of Chinese 
capitalism” (6)—to the Middle East—“light upon the troops belonging 
to a military dictator bent upon keeping as many Afghan refugees on the 
other side of the pass as is possible” (8)—where “[a]s far as the eye can 
see, the prophet and his vision, the dawn is his metaphor. . . . Dawn is 
for all the people’s of Mohammed’s country” (8). It moves to Europe—
“light upon Western Europe and a history founded on light as a mytho-
logical tool” (10)—where “light is now visible, beginning to shine upon 
the Pantheon, that massive structure of such permanence that even a 
McDonald’s just across the square from it cannot spoil its perfection” 
(10). Then across the North Atlantic before returning to the United States 
where people “have stuff on their mind” and “International concerns are 
not pressing” (12). The spatio-temporal freedom of omniscience is thus 
used to establish the broader international context in which a parody of 
the western media industry is played out, demonstrating the insularity of 
the American perspective before settling in New York—“Light upon all 
the insomniacs, across this city, metropolis of insomniacs” (13)—where 
the novel is set.
 The narrative centers on a group of people who work in a small inde-
pendent film company called Means of Production. The chief executive, 
Vanessa Meandro, has decided that the company needs to stabilize its 
revenue and branch out from art-house films to include television. The 
complication of the plot arises when one of Vanessa’s assistants, Amanda 
Duffy, misplaces a script which had yet to be assessed. To help Amanda 
avoid the wrath of her boss, Thaddeus Griffin, a coworker and washed-up 
action movie star, concocts a treatment for a miniseries called The Divin-
ers, supposedly based on a novel by a best-selling author. The satirical plot 
revolves around attempts by several companies to secure the script devel-
opment rights to this nonexistent universally appealing historical drama 
about water diviners.
 After the prologue the rest of the novel proceeds to orient the narra-
tive perspective of each chapter around an individual character in a large 
cast with a minimum of intrusive commentary. This is a typical pattern, 
setting the scene with panoramic external focalization before “zooming” 
into variable internal focalization. However, the opening establishes a 
frame in which the stylistic presence of the narrator’s voice remains pal-
pable throughout the novel. Despite each focalized chapter relying heav-
ily on free indirect discourse, there is very much the sense of the narrative 
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voice moving from one character to another, performing their thoughts in 
pyrotechnic fashion, in much the same way that the light is traced in the 
prologue, rather than this narratorial consciousness yielding linguistically 
to shifting deictic centers.
 This link between the prologue and the tracing of character thought 
is made to resonant linguistically in a scene describing the addiction of 
the corpulent Vanessa, nicknamed “Minivan” by her employees, to Krispy 
Kreme doughnuts. In this scene Vanessa escapes a meeting for compul-
sive overeaters and is compelled to seek out doughnuts as solace. As she 
approaches the store we have this passage, inviting readers to share the 
experience:
Just stand a little, here, beside the Rite Aid pharmacy, to which Vanessa 
trots with such purpose that the commuters coming up the PATH train 
escalators veer out of her way. Doesn’t matter that the Krispy Kreme at 
concourse level is neither flashy nor fashionable. She will not be diverted 
from the mission, which is the mission of doughnuts. Is the sign illumi-
nated? Do you need to ask? The sign that indicates that the doughnuts 
are fresh. Yes, there is a light at Krispy Kreme, which indicates that the 
original glazed doughnuts of Krispy Kreme are just off the assembly line. 
She looks for the indicator lamp; she looks for a sympathetic light in the 
eyes in her fellow men and women. Yes, the light is still illuminated! . . . 
She is destined to have a doughnut that melts in her mouth, a doughnut 
that tastes like the happy ending of a romantic comedy as purveyed by a 
vertically integrated multinational entertainment provider under German 
ownership. (53)
 Here we see embedded in the free indirect rendering of Vanessa’s con-
sciousness—“Yes, the light is still illuminated!”—the same narratorial lan-
guage which rendered the opening scene of zero focalization: “The light 
that illuminates the world begins in Los Angeles.” The passage then shifts 
into commentary which overtly satirizes Vanessa’s gustatory desire. After 
Vanessa has purchased her doughnuts and begun to consume them, we 
have this passage of commentary:
She doesn’t even wait to be in the open space of the concourse before she 
has one in her mouth. And here’s the lesson. The great spiritual benefit 
of the Krispy Kreme original glazed doughnut is the sensation of noth-
ingness. The satori that is the Krispy Kreme is the obliteration of self, 
the silencing of the voices that are attached to the oppressions of life. As 
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soon as she has the original glazed doughnut in her mouth, relief floods 
in. (54)
 Descriptions of light and its metaphorical applications abound 
throughout the narrative. The first chapter is centered on Vanessa’s alco-
holic mother, Rosa, who suffers from migraines: “These headaches begin 
with visitations, with rainbows, celestial light” (15). Annabel hopes her 
boss will one day display tenderness to those around her, and wants to be 
there “when the world of light opens in Minivan like a flower” (64). Anna-
bel’s adoptive father, the Reverend Duffy, opens his door to find his son, 
Tyrone, returned: “the prodigal son is now in the light on the front step, 
here he is, and the prodigal son is loved!” (380). In another scene, Tyrone 
is sitting on a train peering out the window: “Lighting effects are consis-
tent with the light of late afternoon in Connecticut, which is the flickering 
light of things passing away, the light of things coming to an end” (210).
 The taxi driver, Ranjeet Singh, who meets Vanessa when she orders 
him to ferry her around New York City to feed her doughnut addiction, 
somehow convinces her to hire him as an expert on television in order to 
help her company infiltrate the television market and, as she says to her 
employees, “rocket toward the light” (136). In one of his rants Ranjeet 
argues that television has replaced literature in its pseudo-religious influ-
ence. The “tale of written words, words on the page in alphabets. This tale 
is a sickness . . . This is not the true way because these tales of the alphabet 
have no light in them. . . . No, as you can now see, the true way must be 
the way of bringing light to all the people, and there is but one way to do 
that” (131). Here Ranjeet’s surging monologue to the employees at Means 
of Production sounds exactly like the omniscient opening with its pompos-
ity, its use of anaphora (“the light”) and syntactic rhythm:
That way is the way of television, which is the one light, the light in the 
house, the light in the darkness, the light of the satellite dish, the light of 
the dishwallahs of India, the light of the rural places coming out of the 
darkness, the light of television that brings together all men and women 
in red bathing suits on a shore, the light of a talking horse, the light of a 
red-haired woman and her bandleader husband when they argue and she 
crosses her eyes, the light of an army hospital and its surgeons during the 
war, the light of a special team of policemen from a city in Florida, the 
light of a family of oil barons, the light of four women who sleep with 
many men and talk about it in cafes, the light of all persons who wish to 
be millionaires. (132)
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 Throughout the novel the narrator acts as a sort of ventriloquist, tak-
ing on and parodying the characters’ linguistic habitus, but with the same 
syntactic rhythm. For instance, in a chapter in which Thaddeus Griffin is 
having sex with a yoga instructor we have this focalized passage:
She is allowing herself to be kissed by Thaddeus Griffin, movie star and 
practitioner of yoga, and she is kissing back a little bit, and this is the 
pose called the Adulterous Union, wherein two practitioners, who are 
elsewhere participants in love’s vast covenant, conjoin their mouths on 
the Oriental carpet in the ashram. (283)
Similar to Barker’s Darkmans, the psychonarratorial summary of a char-
acter’s opinion is often elaborated in such hyperbolic fashion that we have 
to see it as neither a narratorial report nor a mediated indirect quotation, 
but a kind of linguistic overwriting of the character’s own metaphor:
If Annabel’s mother, the psychologist, has a view on sexuality as depicted 
on television, it’s that the excessive saccharine of this sexuality is bound 
to create expectations, and not just among young people, who are almost 
honor bound to expect that when they finally get naked with their friends 
the earth will tremble or there will be the sounds of rockets going off in 
their ears or they will feel an overwhelming and intoxicating love, more 
addictive than heroin, and this love feeling, called forth by the commin-
gling of bodily fluids, will never take leave of them, until death comes for 
them. (459)
 So the stylistic excess established in the opening display of zero focal-
ization, and which clearly characterizes the narrator’s voice, is employed 
to retain overt narratorial presence even in passages of internal focaliza-
tion and free indirect rendering of character thought, spilling over into 
narratorial commentary.
the FoUrth mode of contemporary omniscience contains both the immer-
sion journalist and the social commentator. The narrator as immersion 
journalist is a fictional counterpart of the narrators of documentary non-
fiction novels, such as Truman Capote’s In Cold Blood, and is exemplified 
by the work of Tom Wolfe, who shifted from the New Journalism to the 
social novel with the publication of his first novel, The Bonfire of the Vani-
ties. The desire to diagnose and report a social problem through the tech-
niques of omniscience links Wolfe’s immersion journalist with the social 
commentator, under which I would include Don DeLillo’s Underworld, 
Jonathan Franzen’s The Corrections, and Richard Powers’s Generosity. 
The narrative authority here operates by deploying the capacious knowl-
edge of the narrator to analyze postmodern culture. If omniscient author-
ity must be granted by the reading public, rather than unselfconsciously 
assumed by the narrator, “all-knowing,” in this case, has come to mean 
less a divine or telepathic knowledge of the human interior, than a poly-
mathic knowledge of how the world works. “Time and again,” James 
Wood complained in a post-9/11 assertion that hysterical realism and the 
social novel must be abandoned, “novelists are praised for their wealth of 
obscure and far-flung social knowledge. Richard Powers is the best exam-
polymathic Knowledge, 
the Immersion Journalist, 
and the Social Commentator
C h a P t e r  5
136
PolymathiC knowledge, immersion JoUrnalist, soCial Commentator • 137
ple, but Tom Wolfe also gets an easy ride simply for ‘knowing things’)” 
(“Tell Me”). In other words, contemporary narrators “know” more than 
any character not simply because of their omniscient privilege, but because 
of their intellectual scope. In a 2003 article, Judith Shulevitz refers to the 
work of DeLillo and Franzen, among others, when she claims, somewhat 
ruefully, that “novelists, in short, have become our public intellectuals—
our polymaths, our geographers, our scholars of the material world. And 
yet, oddly, you will find very few intellectuals in the modern novel” (B31). 
The intellectuals in the novels under scrutiny here are the narrators them-
selves, extradiegetic characters who function as proxies for the author. 
And the polymathic knowledge which the immersion journalist and social 
commentator deploy to underpin their narrative authority manifests itself 
in intellectual encounters with competing nonliterary paradigms of knowl-
edge, from evolutionary science to the forces of history.
Tom Wolfe, I Am Charlotte Simmons (2004)
This is why God invented journalists. A journalist is as good as an omniscient 
narrator any day. Good at piecing the story together from the raw data, at hearing 
the many voices. You can’t miss him. He’s the guy in the white suit.
—Susan Reynolds, “Down from the Mountains”
In this section I will discuss Tom Wolfe’s third novel, I Am Charlotte Sim-
mons, in terms of its contribution to the contemporary mode of the omni-
scient narrator as immersion journalist. Wolfe’s position in relation to the 
development of twentieth-century fiction is staked out in two manifes-
tos: his introduction to The New Journalism and his article “Stalking the 
Billion-Footed Beast.” The central premise binding these two manifestos 
is Wolfe’s claim that serious writers in the 1960s turned to avant-garde 
experimentation with fabulism, absurdism, surrealism, metafiction, the 
novel of ideas, etc., in the belief that realist fiction was a redundant genre 
incapable of capturing the fragmentation and absurdity of twentieth-cen-
tury existence. Yet, for Wolfe, this was precisely the period in which realist 
fiction should have been flourishing, for the cultural revolution of the six-
ties and the global juggernaut of American society offered an abundance 
of material about how we live. There is an evolution across these manifes-
tos, however, in terms of what the solution may be to this abandonment 
of American society by writers. In 1973, Wolfe argued that journalists 
were taking up the slack from fiction writers and producing nonfiction 
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novels, employing the techniques of fictional realism—which he identifies 
as dialogue, scenic narration, status detail, and point of view—to report 
on actual events. By 1989, Wolfe was no longer championing the emer-
gence of the New Journalism at the expense of the novel, but exhorting the 
revival of the social realist novel precisely in order to reclaim the territory 
lost to journalism.
 In his introduction to The New Journalism Wolfe describes how this 
form of writing emerged out of dissatisfaction with the style of traditional 
objective reportage. The point of his introduction to this anthology, how-
ever, is not to recount the impact on journalism of this new hybrid style 
of nonfiction; it is to situate the New Journalism in relation to the Ameri-
can novel after World War II, and indeed to the history of literary fic-
tion itself. He claims that the journalistic experimentations of the sixties 
introduced a new literary genre. Within a decade or so, the extended form 
of this literary journalism, the nonfiction or documentary novel, had the 
effect of “dethroning the novel as the number one literary genre, starting 
the first new direction in American literature in half a century” (15).
 The success of the New Journalism, for Wolfe, can be attributed to 
its commitment to social realism. The nonfiction novels of writers such 
as Truman Capote, Norman Mailer, and Hunter S. Thompson are placed 
as the heirs to a form abandoned by postmodern fiction (although he 
doesn’t use this word). What gives the nonfiction novel credibility as a 
social document, for Wolfe, is the fact that it records real events. He points 
out that major novelists such as Dickens or Balzac have always employed 
reportage, only this element has been seen biographically rather than as a 
generic feature of the novel itself. “It took the New Journalism to bring 
this strange matter of reporting into the foreground” (28). For the nonfic-
tion novel makes reportage an explicit feature of the novel itself.
 The irony of Wolfe’s declamations is that he has since abandoned New 
Journalism and the nonfiction novel to become a writer of fiction himself. 
He announced this change with his 1989 manifesto, “The Billion Footed 
Beast.” David Lodge had claimed that the nonfiction novel was itself a 
postmodern genre emerging out of the rejection of realism, but Wolfe’s 
essay, subtitled “A literary manifesto for the new social novel,” suggests 
that it was simply a means of reintroducing social realism to novelistic 
form. By this stage Wolfe himself had recently published The Bonfire of 
the Vanities. Despite his bold claims for nonfiction as a literary genre in 
previous decades, Wolfe writes that he always feared a realist novel would 
come along and render irrelevant his nonfiction about American cultural 
life. It never did, he claims, and his essay is both a call to arms to fiction 
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writers and a justification of his own turn to fiction. This was partly moti-
vated, he candidly admits by
the question that rebuked every writer who had made a point of experi-
menting with nonfiction over the preceding ten or fifteen years: Are you 
merely ducking the big challenge—The Novel. Consciously, I wanted to 
prove a point. I wanted to fulfill a prediction I had made in the intro-
duction to The New Journalism in 1973: namely, that the future of the 
fictional novel would be in a highly detailed realism based on reporting, 
a realism more thorough than any currently being attempted, a realism 
that would portray the individual in intimate and inextricable relation to 
the society around him. (50)
 The new social novel would still make a feature of its commitment to 
reportage and to charting contemporary American life, but it would no 
longer have the imprimatur of fact. My argument here is that Wolfe’s new 
social novel is another means of reviving the omniscient narrator in con-
temporary fiction, a narrator whose authority invokes the authorial figure 
of the novelist as a type of immersion journalist.
 Central to Wolfe’s construction of narrative authority for I Am 
Charlotte Simmons, and to his operation as a public intellectual, is the 
“extrafictional” voice of this novel emerging out of its prefatorial mate-
rial and linking it to his 1973 account of the New Journalism, his 1989 
manifesto for the social realist novel, and his 2001 essay collection Hook-
ing Up. Wolfe might argue that the style he developed in his nonfiction has 
now become a style for the writing of fiction, but he is compelled still to 
point out that his work is the product of journalistic immersion. The pref-
ace to this book, in which he acknowledges the help of staff and students 
at a range of universities, and the input of his two daughters, firmly estab-
lishes the authenticity of the book by demonstrating the depth of research 
behind it. Advance publicity also let it be known that Wolfe spent several 
years visiting universities, attending undergraduate parties and observ-
ing student life. This is an appeal not just to verisimilitude (the nonfiction 
credo “this actually happened” becomes in fiction “this actually happens”) 
but to the authority of the narrator. Wolfe’s narrator is omniscient in every 
sense, even to the extent of knowing what the characters don’t know about 
themselves, but the omniscience doesn’t rely upon moral authority, it relies 
upon journalistic research.
 The appeal to observational fieldwork established by this voice pro-
vides a kind of ethnographic distance from the characters as the source 
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of omniscient knowledge, both grounding and relativizing the narrator’s 
authority. Two key elements of narrative authority in this book are the 
generational/sociological distance of the narrator from the characters and 
the anthropological/ethnographic mode of character analysis. Through-
out I Am Charlotte Simmons, the detailed scenic construction is supple-
mented by explanatory commentary. For instance, after an expletive-laden 
exchange of dialogue between two college basketball players we have this 
line: “Without even realising what it was, Jojo spoke in this year’s pre-
vailing college creole: Fuck Patois” (35). This observation is followed by 
a linguistic analysis of these subcultural speech habits, describing with 
examples the multiple grammatical uses the word fuck can be put to. Fol-
lowing this paragraph is a line of narration in which the narrator parodi-
cally adopts the patois himself: “The fucking freshman in question was 
standing about twenty fucking feet away” (36).
 These supplementary explanations clearly establish a tone of bemuse-
ment and an irony which relies upon the appeal to an implied reader 
who is not familiar with the world being reported. In the following two 
quotes we have evidence of Wolfe’s narrator “reporting” on youth culture 
through expositional commentary:
“Aw-right!” said another huge black youth with a shaved head who was 
sitting next to the white giant, whereupon the two black giants bumped 
each other’s fists together in a celebratory gesture called “pounding.” 
(102)
Charlotte recognized none of them, but pastel cashmere sweaters in the 
Reading Room at night screamed out . . . sorority girls! So did the little 
bags they held in their hands. The girls were back from what sorority 
boy-scouters called a “candy run.” (560)
 Another observation that seems to deliberately flaunt the generational 
distance of the narrator from his characters occurs when Charlotte meets 
her first friend at Dupont College. After introducing themselves to each 
other as Bettina and Charlotte, this line follows: “They were members of 
the first generation to go through life with no last names” (145).
 As well as this pseudo-sociological generational distance, the narrator 
draws upon the framework of evolutionary science to chart the inevitabil-
ity of Charlotte’s absorption into the libidinal preoccupations of college 
students. A recurring phrase in the novel, and the title of one of the chap-
ters, is: “the conscious little rock.” This phrase comes from a lecture on 
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neuroscience which Charlotte attends, sparking her interest in the field. 
According to this lecture, genetic coding controls our actions to such an 
extent that free will may be a myth: humans may be nothing more than 
conscious little rocks. Buoyed by her lecturer’s praise for her work, Char-
lotte walks through campus thinking the students around her are “blithely 
ignorant of the fact that they were merely conscious little rocks, every one 
of them, whereas . . . I am Charlotte Simmons” (285). In a later chapter 
detailing Charlotte’s crush on a handsome frat boy, we have the follow-
ing line of narration embedded in a passage of narrated perception: “With 
that, the conscious little rock moved her head ever so slightly closer to 
his and ever so slightly parted her lips” (342). This line hammers home 
the irony of Charlotte’s belief in her own capacity to stand above mating 
rituals hardwired by genetic coding. The chapter ends with an ironic ren-
dering in free indirect discourse of her mantra of individuality: “In all of 
Dupont College, only she was Charlotte Simmons!” (342).
 The mock anthropological distance of the narrator which provides the 
overarching approach of the novel is highlighted to the point of carica-
ture in this comment during a scene where Charlotte hears shrieking in the 
campus hallway:
A girl came running from the entry hall into the Common Room. She 
shrieked again. She was slim and blond and wore shorts that showed off 
her perfect legs, and the shrieks were ones that any girl on earth could 
have interpreted. They were the cries of the female of the species feigning 
physical fright at the antics, probably physical, of the male. (145)
 The omniscient narrator’s capacity to divine and articulate motivations 
which characters themselves are little aware of is based less on explora-
tion of the character’s individual psyche, than on the same anthropologi-
cal observations offering biologically determined explanations of gendered 
behavior:
She knew this was the moment to put a stop to it. The thought of his 
starting to “hit on” her again was unpleasant and even frightening . . . 
and yet she didn’t want to put a stop to it. The present moment was 
much too early in her experience for her to have expressed it in a sen-
tence, but she was enjoying the first stirrings, the first in her entire life, 
of the power that woman can hold over that creature who is as mono-
maniacally hormonocentric as the beasts of the field, Man. (181, original 
ellipsis)
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 The presence of the narrator is felt not only through overt commentary 
or evaluation, but almost as a silent observer, a peripheral character. Gen-
erally a character, especially Charlotte, is used as a deictic anchor but the 
presence of the author as an immersion journalist tends to be signified by 
the explanatory references employing the second-person pronoun:
Soon all three cashmeres were standing around the skank, and the 
whisper party had begun. In these Reading Room whisper parties, girls 
whispered entire conversations, they whispered chuckles, they popped 
consonants and sighed vowels until everyone within earshot wanted to 
cry out “Shut the fuck up!” Nothing could be any worse than these whis-
pered conversations, which got under your hide like an unreachable itch. 
Charlotte put her hand up to her eyes like a blinker, to make sure they 
didn’t recognize her. (560)
 Here we have the scenic narration of an event in the library largely 
through Charlotte’s perspective. The first line linguistically orients us to 
Charlotte’s perspective with its absorption of her metonym (cashmeres) 
and slang noun (skank) into the narrational idiom. There is then a shift 
into iterative narration to explain to the narratee what a whisper party 
is. The use of the second-person pronoun (“which got under your hide”) 
in this context gives the effect of a narrator who knows from observation 
what a whisper party is like and is now looking over Charlotte’s shoulder 
to assimilate the expositional report into her perspective. This is how the 
figure of the immersion journalist as an “immanent” presence is built up 
throughout the book, beginning from the opening paragraph:
Every time the men’s-room door opened, the amped-up onslaught of 
Swarm, the band banging out the concert in the theater overhead, came 
crashing in, ricocheting off all the mirrors and ceramic surfaces until it 
seemed twice as loud. But then an air hinge would close the door, and 
Swarm would vanish, and you could once again hear students drunk on 
youth and beer being funny or at least loud as they stood before the uri-
nals. (3, emphasis added)
 This immanent narratorial presence, the fictional equivalent of Wolfe’s 
immersion research, lends a kind of eye-witness authority to the evaluative 
comments through the novel, such as this description of a frat house party: 
“Gales of laughter, clapping, whistling, unintelligible shouts. By this stage 
of the evening, the brothers were drunk enough to believe that Vance’s 
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verbose buffoonery actually gave the brotherhood an aura of elegance” 
(466).
 The historical importance of Wolfe’s faith in fictional realism is that, 
for Wolfe, postmodern fiction, as a result of its penchant for formal exper-
imentation, has retreated from any obligation to deal with contemporary 
culture. What establishes his work as an example of post-postmodernism, 
is the appeal of its omniscient narrative authority not to the convention 
of the Victorian novel but to the figure of the journalist. Or rather, in his 
attempt to remake the Victorian novelist as a journalist and revive this fig-
ure in the form of a contemporary omniscient narrator.
don deLillo, Underworld (1997)
Only all-seeing God, some might say, could highlight the sidetracks and U-turns, 
the back-doubles and sudden veerings-off. Only a god or a novelist.
 And Don DeLillo duly starts this, his eleventh novel, in a mode of thrilling 
bravura, of rip-roaring godlike omniscience.
—William Boyd, “‘The Course of True Life’”
While Underworld is a multi-voiced novel, shifting between first- and 
third-person narration, its narrative authority is established by the cel-
ebrated prologue, originally published as a stand- alone piece, “Pafko at 
the Wall”, in Harper’s magazine in 1992, providing a frame which subse-
quent sections are assimilated into. The prologue takes the classic form of 
zero focalization, sweeping through the consciousness of multiple char-
acters as it ranges across a panoramic description of the 3 October 1951 
National League playoff between the Dodgers and the Giants, won by 
the Giants with a Bobby Thompson home run, subsequently glorified in 
sporting history as “the shot heard ’round the world.” The description 
both “reconstructs” the famous baseball game, or, more specifically, the 
feeling of being at the game, through its attention to scenic detail and 
its showy use of a periodizing argot, and separates it from the narrating 
instance by a narratorial awareness of the game as a spectacle embedded 
in American cultural memory and associatively connected with Cold War 
history. The simultaneous immediacy and nostalgic distance is facilitated 
by the conjunction of present-tense narration with prolepsis, by the use 
of direct address, and the reporting of a coincidence which has resonance 
only after the event: the simultaneity of the “shot heard ’round the world” 
with the testing of an atomic bomb in the Soviet Union, connected by the 
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fact that J. Edgar Hoover was at this match when he received notice of the 
testing.
 This prologue is concerned with an historical moment, and thus could 
be classified under the mode of the literary historian. John N. Duvall has 
described “Pafko at the Wall” as an example of postmodern historio-
graphic metafiction, and Kathleen Fitzpatrick, in “The Unmaking of His-
tory,” follows his lead in applying this label to Underworld. However, she 
also argues that the novel 
acts to dismantle the genre of historiographic metafiction and its precon-
ceptions, working not to create the past out of its narratives but instead 
to excavate and deconstruct the traces a reified history has left in the 
present. In so doing, the novel undermines all narrative processes, both 
the realist and the metafictional. (151)
 The book as a whole, then, projects a figure of its author as social com-
mentator as the novel sets out to trace the effects of this historical moment 
on the present, with one key strand of the plot following the fate of the 
home run ball over the ensuing decades. At the same time, it is narrated 
backwards after the prologue, from 1992 to 1952.
 The narrator’s omniscient authority is established on the first page with 
this aphoristic statement: “Longing on a large scale is what makes his-
tory. This is just a kid with a local yearning, but he’s part of an assembling 
crowd” (3). This sense of history in the making animates the reconstruc-
tion of the game as the narrator charts the swelling of the crowd. The key 
feature of this effect of nostalgic immediacy, of the forces of history at 
play, is the pervasive presence of the second-person pronoun which per-
forms several different grammatical functions in the service of establishing 
narrator-narratee relations.
 The first function is that of the direct address. In this case, the narra-
tor seeks to invoke a general consciousness in relation to a very specific 
cultural memory. The opening line is: “He speaks in your voice, Ameri-
can, and there’s a shine in his eye that’s halfway hopeful” (3). The “he” in 
question is a black youth, the kid with a local yearning, who has skipped 
school to try and gain entry to the game, which he does by vaulting the 
turnstiles and evading security guards before disappearing into the crowd. 
DeLillo’s “engaging” narrator, then, invites narratees to participate in the 
unfolding of the game, and thus readers to perceive this game as some-
thing enshrined in their own cultural memory which becomes internation-
ally significant in geopolitical terms. The direct address also operates at 
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the level of description: “He has wiry reddish hair and a college jacket—
you know those athletic jackets where the sleeves are one color and leath-
ery looking and the body is a darker color and probably wool and these 
are the college colors of the team” (45).
 Building upon this direct address is the use of “you” as an informal 
variant of “one.” Directly following a passage focalized through the kid, 
Cotter, as he laments the state of the game, we have this line, inviting read-
ers to share Cotter’s experience as a sports fan: “You know that thing that 
happens when you give up before the end and then your team comes back 
to perform acts of valor and you feel a queasy shame stealing over you 
like pond slick” (30). Again, at the level of description: “Branca who is 
twenty-five but makes you think he exemplifies ancient toil” (38). This ver-
sion of “one” also operates as a form of hypothetical focalization, postu-
lating what readers would perceive were they present at the scene:
He stands at the curbstone with the others. He is the youngest, at four-
teen, and you know he’s flatbroke by the edgy leaning look he hangs on 
his body. (4)
You can see it in his face, chin thrust out, a glower working under his 
brow. (30)
 The persistent recurrence of this strategy serves to deictically orient 
readers to the scene by enacting a pseudo-metaleptic move toward the 
autotelic second person in which the narratee is addressed as a protago-
nist. The deictic center shifts, however, to follow the variable focalization 
of the narrator. Here are some examples. In reference to Cotter evading 
security guards, as if the narratee is an onlooker: “Then you lose him 
in the crowd” (14). In the middle of a section focalized through Russell 
Hodges, the commentator in the broadcasting box (but separated by para-
graph breaks which invite attributive hesitation):
Look at Mays meanwhile strolling to the plate dragging the barrel of his 
bat on the ground. (16)
Look at Durocher on the dugout steps, manager of the Giants . . . (17)
 In the middle of dialogue between Cotter and Bill, a spectator who 
befriends the kid, as they sit in the stands: “Look at Robinson at the edge 
of the outfield grass watching the hitter step in and thinking idly, Another 
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one of Leo’s country-boy krauts” (22). After a section focalized through 
J. Edgar Hoover, sitting in another part of the crowd:
Look at the man in the bleachers who’s pacing the aisles, a neighborhood 
crazy. (28)
Look at the man in the upper deck. He is tearing pages out of his copy 
of Life and dropping them uncrumpled over the rail, letting them fall 
in a seesaw drift on the bawling fans below. He is moved to do this 
by . . . (38)
 In each of these instances, the focalizing imperative is directed toward 
readers as if they were sharing the perception of a character, but supple-
mented by narratorial knowledge.
 Fourth, the second-person pronoun functions as a feature of free indi-
rect discourse in the performance of characters’ internal dialogue. In rela-
tion to Cotter: “he’s located near the tail of the rush, running and shouting 
with the others. You shout because it makes you brave or you want to 
announce your recklessness” (4). In relation to Russ Hodges, the broad-
caster: “Somebody hands you a piece of paper filled with letters and num-
bers and you have to make a ballgame out of it” (25). In relation to Bill, 
who chases Cotter in an attempt to wrest away the home run ball as a 
souvenir: “Bill stops completely but is too smart to look around. Best to 
limit your purview to straight ahead. Because you don’t know who might 
be looking back at you. And the more enlightened he becomes, the more 
open grows the space for Cotter’s anger” (57).
 All four uses of the second-person pronoun bleed into each other, cre-
ating the effect of a narrator both addressing an extradiegetic narratee 
and positioning this narratee as an intradiegetic participant in the action, 
linked sometimes to a character, sometimes to a hypothetical onlooker, 
sometimes to the zero focalization of the narrator. These types are com-
bined in this section: “Dodgers go down in the top of the ninth and this 
is when you sense a helpless scattering, it is tastable in the air, audible in 
the lone-wolf class from high in the stands. Nothing you’ve put into this is 
recoverable and you don’t know whether you want to leave at once or stay 
forever, living under a blanket in the wind” (34). Here the “you” could 
refer to the specific thoughts of Cotter, but by virtue of employing the sec-
ond rather than third person, the passage encompasses the collective con-
sciousness of the crowd as well as functioning as a version of “one.”
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 In the following passages the internal focalization operates as the nar-
rator’s psychonarration invoking the collective “one”:
Thompson’s not sure he sees things clearly. . . . He is frankly a little fud-
dled is Bobby. It’s like the first waking moment of the day and you don’t 
know whose house you’re in. (40)
He takes a guess, he anticipates, it’s the way you feel something will hap-
pen and then you watch it uncannily come to pass, occurring almost in 
measured stages so you can see the wheel-work of your idea fitting into 
place. (45)
 In another section the focalization is with Russell and a colleague, but 
it doubles as another second-person pseudo-metalepsis: “They leave by 
way of the Dodger clubhouse and there’s Branca all right, the first thing 
you see, stretched facedown on a flight of six steps, feet touching the 
floor” (59). In other sections, the focalization doubles as the occasion for 
narratorial comment: “Russ keeps pausing at the mike to let the sound 
collect. This is a rumble of a magnitude he has never heard before. You 
can’t call it cheering or rooting. It’s a territorial roar, the claim of the 
ego that separates the crowd from other entities, from political rallies or 
prison riots—everything outside the walls” (37). In this passage the first 
two sentences establish the perspective of Russell. The anaphoric reference 
of the third sentence (“it”) may invite us to attribute its account of the 
“territorial roar” of the crowd to Russ, but the combination of the second-
person pronoun with the analysis of the sound lends the last two sentences 
the authority of narratorial comment employing the informal variant of 
“one.”
 Further conflations occur in the following, where the subject of address 
is both character and narratee:
And Cotter’s hand around the rival’s arm, twisting in opposite directions, 
burning the skin—it’s called an Indian burn, remember? (48)
He holds the ball chest high and turns it in his fingers, which isn’t easy 
when you’re running—he rotates the ball on its axis, spins it slowly over 
and around, showing the two hundred and sixteen raised red cotton 
stitches.
 Don’t tell me you don’t love this move. (57)
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 And here a character momentarily becomes the subject of the address: 
“Edgar loves this stuff. Edgar, Jedgar. Admit it—you love it. It causes a 
bristling of his body hair” (50).
 The prologue contains one key prolepsis which establishes the narra-
tor’s authority as a recorder of history, based on retrospective knowledge:
There’s a man on 12th Street in Brooklyn who has attached a tape 
machine to his radio so he can record the voice of Russ Hodges broad-
casting the game. The man doesn’t know why he’s doing this. It is just 
an impulse, a fancy, it is like hearing the game twice, it is like being 
young and old, and this will turn out to be the only known recording of 
Russ’ famous account of the final moments of the game. The game and 
its extensions. . . . The game doesn’t change the way you sleep or wash 
your face or chew your food. It changes nothing but your life. (32)
 To link back to the opening comment about the making of history, 
DeLillo’s point is made clearly in the final pages of the prologue:
Russ thinks this is another kind of history. He thinks they will carry 
something out of here that joins them all in a rare way, that binds them 
to a memory with protective power. People are climbing lampposts on 
Amsterdam Avenue, tooting car horns in Little Italy. Isn’t it possible that 
this midcentury moment enters the skin more lastingly than the vast 
shaping strategies of eminent leaders, generals steely in their sunglasses—
the mapped visions that pierce our dreams? Russ wants to believe a thing 
like this keeps us safe in some undetermined way. This is the thing that 
will pulse in his brain come old age and double vision and dizzy spells—
the surge sensation, the leap of people already standing, that bolt of noise 
and joy when the ball went in. This is the people’s history and it has flesh 
and breath that quickens to the force of this old safe game of ours. (59, 
emphasis added)
 Here is the notion of cultural memory, which perhaps the second per-
son facilitates. While the passage contains Russell’s focalized thoughts 
about the significance of the game as a form of local, communal history, 
the phrase “midcentury moment” evokes the sense of history established 
by temporal distance, and the line “the thing that will pulse in his brain 
come old age” performs the function of a prolepsis as much as a character 
thought.
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 The range of grammatical uses of the second person which I have iden-
tified continue throughout the novel—“She was fifty-four now, let that 
number rumble in your head” (372)—along with the use of second-per-
son narration. According to David Pike, DeLillo echoes the trope of the 
Asmodean devil with his metaphorical explorations of the word under-
world, and “by sustaining a rooftop vantage point throughout the novel 
that clearly echoes his own authorial position typing away on his Olym-
pus” (86). By this Pike means that throughout the novel perspective is 
often oriented to characters looking down from on high, from Russell 
Hodges in the broadcaster’s booth to Klara Sax on her rooftop to Nick 
Shay in a hot air balloon. He goes on to claim that “for all his omni-
science, DeLillo’s narrator resolves nothing. . . . The halting devil has 
enough chthonic power to unroof the secrets of the urban world to us but 
not enough either to gloss them or to make them cohere” (89).
 To coincide with the publication of Underworld, DeLillo wrote an arti-
cle for the New York Times titled “The Power of History.” In this article 
he presents the novel as under threat from the consumptive speed of con-
temporary culture: “Maybe it is the evanescent spectacle of contemporary 
life that makes the novel so nervous” (2–3). DeLillo argues that the col-
lapse of time in our contemporary experience is evident in the way that 
celebrity becomes instantaneous, pervasive, and then evanescent. “The 
fast-forward nature of the decade is an apt subject for a novelist. But the 
novel itself, the old, slow water-torture business of invention and doubt 
and self-correction, may seem to be wearing an expiration date that takes 
effect tomorrow” (3). He goes on to suggest that fiction can find signifi-
cance in the evocation of history as a counterpoint to the spectacle of con-
temporary life: “In a period of empty millennial frenzy, we may begin to 
see a precious integrity in the documents of an earlier decade or century” 
(3).
 The essay’s argument hinges upon DeLillo’s account of the genesis of 
Underworld, the accidental discovery in the archives of a newspaper with 
two items on its front page: the Giants’ victory in the playoffs, and the 
Soviet atomic bomb test. This moment is presented as a discovery of the 
power of history, thus framing the prologue to Underworld as not only a 
fictional demonstration of this power, but a demonstration of the novel-
ist’s capacity to find connections in the past which are beyond the scope of 
historical discourse: “Against the force of history, so powerful, visible and 
real, the novelist poses the idiosyncratic self” (4) Here DeLillo replicates 
the standard claim for the capacity of fiction to imaginatively recuperate 
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the private, unwritten experiences of history: “Fiction will always exam-
ine the small anonymous corners or human experience. But there is also 
the magnetic force of public events and people behind them” (4). And he 
romanticizes this capacity in terms of the language of fiction itself: 
There is pleasure to be found, the writer’s, the reader’s, in a version of the 
past that escapes the coils of established history and biography and that 
finds a language, scented, dripping, detailed, for such routine realities as 
sex, weather and food, for the ravel of a red thread on a woman’s velvet 
sleeve. (8)
The essay argues for the capacity of fiction to harness the “power of his-
tory” in more effective ways than historical language can, but not in the 
service of recuperating the past from the archive. Instead, DeLillo mobi-
lizes the claims of the novelist as literary historian to explicitly establish 
his authority to intervene in contemporary cultural life.
 This article performs DeLillo’s own critical interpretation of his novel. 
In the prologue to Underworld, the narrative voice draws its authority 
from a showy display of omniscience in which the presence is DeLillo’s. 
The link between narrative and authorial voice encouraged by DeLillo’s 
omniscient narrator enables his comments in “The Power of History” to 
provide the narratorial commentary at the level of public discourse, sitting 
alongside the novel, even as the novel performs in fictional form the point 
DeLillo wishes to make about the role of the novel. While individual read-
ers may or not have knowledge of this article when reading Underworld, 
an approach to fiction as public discourse makes it clear that DeLillo is 
asserting his narrative authority through a conjunction of authorial and 
narrative voice, each one reinforcing his claims as a social commentator.
Jonathan franzen, The Corrections (2001)
Franzen’s Harper’s essay proposed, in effect, a softened DeLilloism. What is  
retained from DeLillo is the tentactular ambition, the effort to pin down an 
entire writhing culture. The DeLilloian idea of the novelist as a kind of Frankfurt 
School entertainer, fighting the culture with dialectical devilry, has been woefully 
influential, and will take some time to die.
—James Wood, The Irresponsible Self 190
Clearly Mr. Franzen’s novel would have benefited enormously from a strict editing 
job. There are lengthy digressions about Lambert friends and acquaintances, 
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which serve no purpose but to provide the author with a wider array of social 
types to send up; and there are passages where the omniscient narrator’s voice 
gratuitously intrudes to tell us exactly what we are witnessing.
—Michiko Kakutani, “A Family Portrait as Metaphor for the 90’s”
Authorial presence in The Corrections is not manifested in overt intrusive 
commentary, despite Kakutani’s complaint quoted above, at least not in 
the form of direct addresses to the reader. However, there are evaluations 
of character embedded in narratorial summary and passages of internal 
focalization describing aspects of the character’s motivations of which they 
themselves are unaware or unwilling to admit, and which cumulatively 
establish a detached assessment of the flaws and interrelations of the Lam-
bert family:
Unfortunately Enid lacked the temperament to manage such a house, and 
Alfred lacked the neurological wherewithal. (6)
None of this occurred to Denise then or after. She was still feeling respon-
sible ten years later. (367)
She was too proud to admit to herself, let alone to Don Armour, that he 
wasn’t what she wanted. She was too inexperienced to know she simply 
could have said, “Sorry—big mistake.” . . . She suffered for her reluc-
tance. (375)
 The omniscient or polymathic knowledge of the narrator, as well as 
his stylistic presence, is more specifically performed through the recur-
ring metaphor of “corrections” which links the exploration of intergen-
erational family dynamics with a broader account of the corporate health 
industry and the global economy. This metaphor begins with the indi-
vidual, charting how three siblings each view their lives in relation to the 
influence of their parents. The character Chip Lambert, we are told, had 
a lengthy, unsatisfying relationship with a woman whom he supported 
through college and beyond as a defiant response to his father’s belief 
in mainintaining rigid distinctions between “Men’s Work and Women’s 
Work”: “in a spirit of correction, he stuck with Tori for nearly a decade” 
(33). Chip’s brother, Gary, is burdened with acute depression, and the nar-
rator reveals through internal analysis that “his entire life was set up as a 
correction of his father’s life” (181). Later in the book, an analeptic scene 
shows their father, Alfred, contemplating his unborn child, Denise: “A last 
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child was a last opportunity to learn from one’s mistakes and make correc-
tions, and he resolved to seize this opportunity” (281). By virtue of being 
isolated in its own paragraph, the following line could be attributed to 
Alfred or the narrator: “What made correction possible also doomed it” 
(281). The metaphor recurs with Denise, where, again through internal 
analysis, the gradual erosion of her lifelong antipathy toward her mother 
is described in these terms: “Not until she was at the pier and her mother 
kissed her . . . did the extent of the correction she was undergoing reveal 
itself” (425). And on the final page, when Enid reflects upon the death of 
her husband, Alfred, we have this line: “The one thing he never forgot was 
how to refuse. All of her correction had been for naught” (567).
 Central to the plot is a breakthrough in neurobiological therapy 
extolled by a corporate representative as “Corecktall,” for “disorders of 
the brain” such as Parkinson’s and Alzheimer’s, and the “social disease” 
of criminality, unchecked by traditional correctional institutions (208). 
A spokesperson for Axon Corporation describes prisons as having “zero 
corrective benefit, and, just to keep this in mind, still the basic model for 
corrections in the United States today” (209, original emphasis). The eco-
nomic sense of the word, in which free markets return to equilibrium, is 
also used: “Bearish analysts, mindful of recent gutwrenching corrections 
in the biotech sector, were cautioning against investing in an untested med-
ical technology that was at least six years from market” (189–90). The 
denouement of the final chapter opens: “The correction, when it finally 
came, was not an overnight bursting of a bubble, but a much more gentle 
letdown, a year-long leakage of value from key financial markets” (563). 
This correction to the global market occurs as the volatile family dynam-
ics of the Lamberts settle down in the wake of the death of the patriarch, 
Alfred.
 With this recurring word, across internal analysis, narratorial com-
ment, and interior monologue, the narrator encourages us to see how the 
desire to correct neurological disorders and aberrant social behavior is 
facilitated by an intrusion of the market economy on all aspects of life. 
A central thread of the story is the attempt by Alfred’s children to secure 
money from Axon Corporation for using Alfred’s patented discovery to 
develop Corecktall. In one scene, Gary and Denise attend a promotional 
dinner at which Axon executives are extolling the benefits of Corecktall to 
potential investors. “Simply put,” a company spokesperson says, “Coreck-
tall offers for the first time the possibility of renewing and improving the 
hard wiring of the human brain” (189, original emphasis). Gary’s motiva-
tion for attending is explained by the narrator as both entrepreneurial and 
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as part of his desire to correct his father’s mistakes in the conduct of his 
own life: “He saw an opportunity here to make some money and avenge 
Axon’s screwing of his father and more generally, be bold where Alfred 
has been timid” (190, original emphasis). As the benefits of the drug are 
explained we have this interchange between Gary and Denise:
“We’ve got to get Dad signed up for testing,” Denise whispered.
 “What do you mean?” Gary said.
 “Well, this is for Parkinson’s. It could help him.”
 Gary sighed like a tire losing air. How could it be that such an incred-
ibly obvious idea had never occurred to him? He felt ashamed of himself 
and, at the same time, obscurely resentful of Denise. (199)
 The metaphorical connection between the market and mental health 
is then shown to penetrate into modes of thought, especially centered on 
Gary, a banker who cannot admit that he is depressed. In his constant 
state of self-assessment he believes in “the overall robustness of his men-
tal economy. He was not the least bit clinically depressed” (140). Later we 
have this metaphor: “Ordinarily Gary wouldn’t have let Aaron get away 
with this. Ordinarily he would have battled his son all evening if that was 
what it took to extract an apology from him. But his mental markets—
glycemic, endocrine, over-the-synapse—were crashing” (161–62). The 
metaphor is then embedded in Gary’s consciousness: “What this stagnat-
ing economy needs, thought Federal Reserve Board Chairman Gary R. 
Lambert, is a massive infusion of Bombay Sapphire Gin” (162, original 
emphasis).
 The thematic connection between the personal and social afforded 
by the word “correction” extends to a connection between narrative and 
authorial voice in the title of the book itself. The recurring metaphor of 
Franzen’s narrator—our desire to correct a perceived malaise in ourselves 
and in our culture—clearly underpins the argument of Franzen’s famous 
Harper’s essay. If we approach fiction as one mode of public discourse 
available to the writer alongside others (such as the journalistic, the essay-
istic, etc.), this continuum across the discourses of fiction and nonfiction 
is more important to an understanding of narrative authority than any 
generic or “ontological” distinction between narrator and author. The 
Harper’s essay, titled “Perchance to Dream: In the Age of Images, a Rea-
son to Write Novels,” is a perfect example of the perceived crisis of the 
novelist I outlined in chapter 1, functioning as an agonistic bid for the cul-
tural authority—defined in the essay as “an appeal beyond the academy, 
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a presence in household conversations” (47)—required to assert the sig-
nificance of The Corrections to public life. The essay anatomizes a crisis 
in American culture which Franzen attributes to “technological consum-
erism”: the conditioning of social behavior by the logic of the economy 
and the pervasiveness of electronic media. One result of this conditioning, 
Franzen argues, is the decline of readership for serious literature, because 
electronic media has both usurped the role of fiction as social report and 
reduced the attention span required to read long novels, demonstrating 
“the incompatibility of the slow work of reading and the hyperkinesis of 
modern life” (39).1 Furthermore, the gratifications of the self afforded by a 
consumer economy have diminished the desire for connection with other 
minds (both characters and the author) which the novel traditionally pro-
vided. In the course of this argument, Franzen harkens back to the author-
ity of the nineteenth-century novel sustained by a culture of readership:
A century ago, the novel was the preeminent medium of social instruc-
tion. A new book by William Dean Howells was anticipated with the 
kind of fever that today a new Pearl Jam release inspires. The big, obvi-
ous reason that the social novel has become so scarce is that modern 
technologies do a better job of social instruction. Television, radio, and 
photographs are vivid, instantaneous media. Print journalism, in the 
wake of In Cold Blood, has become a viable creative alternative to the 
novel. (41)
 The crux of Franzen’s essay is the challenge facing novelists today who 
are committed to the oppositional criticism of the social realist novel, 
embodied in his own “despair about the possibility of connecting the per-
sonal and the social” (36). Franzen’s decision to frame this essay as a con-
fessional account of his personal depression performs this very connection 
of the personal and the social in his nonfictional authorial voice: “does 
the distress I feel derive from some internal sickness of the soul, or is it 
imposed on me by the sickness of society?” (36). Anchoring his critique of 
the diminished “social currency” (38) of the novel, its inability to combat 
the problems of American society, is the story of how he grapples with his 
own sense of obsolescence and irrelevance (his words) as a novelist in con-
temporary culture.
 In a consumer economy fuelled by the speed of information dissem-
ination, Franzen argues, a novelist’s desire to bring the news to society 
is doomed because this news will become out of date before the novel is 
even published. In the course of the essay he criticizes Tom Wolfe’s 1989 
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manifesto, pointing out Wolfe’s “failure to explain why his ideal New 
Social Novelist should not be writing scripts for Hollywood” (42). He 
also echoes David Foster Wallace’s manifesto in his critique of television—
“television has killed the novel of social reportage” (42)—and the lack of 
genuine relationships between people fostered by “our technological and 
economic systems” (44) designed to gratify our self-oriented needs. There 
is a further echo of Wallace’s trope of the (white male) fiction writer as an 
exemplar of the disconnected self, performing this trope in confessional 
fashion: “But of course the more TV I watched the worse I felt about 
myself. If you’re a novelist and even you don’t feel like reading, how can 
you expect anyone else to read your books?” (40).
 The narrative arc of this personal essay is Franzen’s path out of depres-
sion throughout the 1990s, from the end of his second novel—the “cultur-
ally engaged” The Twenty-Seventh City which failed to engage with the 
culture—to the writing of his third novel, which would become The Cor-
rections. Ultimately, the essay is a story about how he overcame writer’s 
block by abandoning his ambition to write the all-encompassing social 
novel in favor of a novel of character, by realizing that “bringing ‘meaning-
ful news’ is no longer so much a defining function of the novel as an acci-
dental by-product” (48). This epiphany enables him to claim: “To write 
sentences of such authenticity that refuge can be taken in them: isn’t this 
enough? Isn’t it a lot?” (49). And to realize, personally, “that the despair I 
felt about the novel was less the result of my obsolescence than of my iso-
lation” (50). This enables him to claim that the novel is crucial for estab-
lishing a community of writers and readers, like-minded, lonely people 
who take comfort in the solace of fiction. Finishing his third novel, then, 
became a path out of loneliness to reconnect with a diminishing commu-
nity of writers and readers. His conclusion is that once he abandoned the 
desire to compete with contemporary media and attended to the unique 
qualities of fiction, its use of language, its construction of character, the 
connection of the social and the personal would be a natural outcome.
 In terms of the interrelation between cultural and narrative authority, 
the Harper’s essay enabled Franzen to offer, in advance of The Correc-
tions, an authorial “direct address” to the culture which overtly provides 
the public context for his novel: a sweeping critique of American foreign 
policy, national debt, the solipsistic victimhood of multiculturalism, envi-
ronmental degradation, the pursuit of money and self-gratification, the 
opiate of mass culture, the problems of academe, the economics of the 
book publishing industry, and so on. In his essay he criticizes “the ide-
ology of the market economy” and its consumer products, listing all the 
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technological changes he saw taking place as a result: “I saw leaf-blow-
ers replacing rakes” (39). In the opening paragraph of The Corrections, 
we have a description of an eerie pre-storm suburban afternoon which 
includes a reference to “the nasal contention of a leaf blower” (3), estab-
lishing an oblique lexical continuum between the novel and the essay. The 
Harper’s essay successfully established one of the most powerfully centrip-
etal paratexts in contemporary fiction, exploiting the very genre of victim-
ized confessionalism which Franzen critiques in fiction, and locating The 
Corrections in a larger extrafictional narrative of the novelist’s search for 
cultural authority. In the essay’s confessional nature we see a recognition 
of the genre required to connect with an audience in the marketplace of 
celebrity and personality, despite Franzen’s critique of this marketplace: 
“To speak extranovelistically in an age of personalities seemed to be a 
betrayal; it implied a lack of faith in fiction’s adequacy as communication 
and self-expression” (50).
 When the Harper’s essay was republished in 2002 in a collection of 
his nonfiction, Franzen claims in the preface that interviewers constantly 
asked whether he saw The Corrections as the fulfillment of his essay’s 
promise that his third book would be a big social novel. His response, 
each time, Franzen writes, was that they had misread his intention, for 
The Corrections was written out of a desire to escape from that ambi-
tion. He then writes that the essay is in fact highly confused but should be 
preserved as a document of his feelings at the time, as “a stalled novelist’s 
escape from the prison of his angry thoughts” (5). In this way, Franzen 
leaves open for continued speculation the link between the essay and the 
novel.
 Some critics have enthusiastically taken up the narrative of Franzen as 
the savior of the social novel in the wake of postmodernism. For instance, 
in a cringe-inducing, self-important review of Franzen’s latest novel, Free-
dom, in the New York Times, Sam Tanehaus claimed that, in the wake of 
September 11, 2001, The Corrections “towered out of the rubble, at once 
a monument to a world destroyed and a beacon lighting the way for a 
new kind of novel that might break the suffocating grip of postmodern-
ism” (11). Tanehaus quotes James Woods’s critique of hysterical realism to 
categorize the sort of postmodern writing prevalent at the time. Taking up 
Franzen’s infectious metaphor, Tanehaus asserts that The Corrections “did 
not so much repudiate all this as surgically ‘correct’ it. Franzen cracked 
open the opaque shell of postmodernism, tweezed out its tangled circuitry 
and inserted in its place the warm, beating heart of an authentic human-
ism” (10).
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 Academic critics, on the other hand, have been anxious to preserve 
Franzen’s postmodern credentials, established in his earlier novels. In his 
2008 book, Jonathan Franzen at the End of Postmodernism, Stephen Burn 
writes: 
Jonathan Franzen occupies a revealing position amongst America’s mil-
lennial novelists. While critics at century’s end began to anatomize the 
end of postmodernism, . . . the conflict between postmodern innovation 
and more conventional narrative forms was internalized and played out 
in Franzen’s novels and essays. (ix)
And Fitzpatrick positions Franzen, along with DeLillo, as the exemplar of 
the postmodern novelist’s anxiety of obsolescence.
richard powers, Generosity (2009)
Having seen a glimpse of the future, Powers has also become known as one of 
the twenty-first century’s notable writers of big cosmic novels to make frequent 
use of that most nineteenth century of literary devices, the omniscient narrator.
—Jan Alexander, “Happy People Need Love Too”
I conclude with Richard Powers’s Generosity. Stephen Burn (“The End”) 
classifies Powers as a post-postmodern novelist for the way he combines 
the techniques of realist fiction with experimental metafiction and deploys 
this combination to explore the tension between art and science as modes 
of explicating human behavior. In Generosity, Powers’s intrusive omni-
scient narrator bleeds across both the social commentator in the way he 
displays comprehensive knowledge of genetic science in a commentary 
on the preoccupations of late capitalism, and the ironic moralist in his 
metafictional reflections on the possibilities of writing to establish human 
relations.
 In Generosity, the conventional authority of the omniscient narrator 
is complicated by the events of the story itself, which concern current sci-
entific research into the operation of the mind. If, by literary convention, 
the highest authority is granted to a narrator who has access to the minds 
of characters, and the novelist’s traditional insight into human nature is 
predicated on this access, the omniscient narrator of Generosity is cogni-
zant of the challenge to his authority presented by scientific knowledge of 
consciousness. This awareness is highlighted in the following passage of 
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thought report: “She sits in the rocker for a moment, examining herself. 
It’s not even an effort, really. Not even a decision. Just large molecules, 
passing their oldest signals back and forth across the infinite synapse gap” 
(179). In this scene, the host of a science television show, Tonia Schiff, is 
deciding whether to stay overnight with the scientist Thomas Kurtzon, 
with whom she has spent the day as part of her research for a documen-
tary film. The first line is reminiscent of a novel by Ann Radcliffe or Jane 
Austen in which the heroine sits down to review the virtue of her conduct, 
or of the cue for an extended interior monologue such as Isabel Archer’s 
in James’s Portrait of a Lady. Instead, it is followed by three sentences 
eschewing internal analysis in favor of a comment on the workings of 
the brain, which is as much as to say, why try to represent a character’s 
thoughts which can be reduced to a neurological process? A paragraph 
later, there is one line of direct discourse: “I have no center. The thought 
wastes her. Not even a thought: just a fact the exact size of her body. She’s 
disappeared into playing herself. She has no clue what her bliss is, and try-
ing to follow it would lead worse than nowhere” (179–80).
 Generosity, like Powers’s earlier novels, is thus an example of what 
Gary Johnson calls neuronarrative: a subgenre of narrative fiction in 
which novelists engage with new advances in cognitive studies to explore 
the problem of human consciousness. Johnson’s two examples in his essay 
“Consciousness as Content: Neuronarratives and the Redemption of Fic-
tion” are Powers’s Galatea 2.2 and David Lodge Thinks. He also includes 
Franzen’s The Corrections, Ian McEwan’s Saturday, and A. S. Byatt’s A 
Whistling Woman. One could add Wolfe’s I Am Charlotte Simmons to 
this list. The challenge for the fiction writer which these works explore, 
according to Johnson, is that working with consciousness in the wake 
of cognitive science involves “an epistemological dimension as well as a 
mimetic one” (171) for scientific research now offers knowledge of the 
human mind not available until recent decades. If the technical challenge 
for novelists has traditionally been how to represent consciousness, thus 
relating to the level of narrative discourse, developments in science now 
make it necessary for novelists to consider consciousness a problem at the 
level of story. In this context, Johnson argues that
the encroachment of neuroscience on the field of literature results in a 
kind of revaluation of narrative fiction on the part of novelists who pro-
duce it. Even as neurologists, psychologists, medical doctors and oth-
ers in the scientific community embrace narrative as a legitimate area of 
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inquiry, Lodge and Powers seem to need to convince themselves of the 
potential value of narrative fiction. (172)
 Johnson talks about how Lodge and Powers seem to use their books 
as occasions to reevaluate the value of fiction in the light of cognitive 
studies, although he makes no conclusion about what the novels offer, 
beyond the continued mutual skepticism of art and science and the signifi-
cance of human consciousness as an area of fictional “content.” Instead, 
Johnson dwells on what he considers one “of the most fascinating char-
acteristics of neuronarratives . . . the novelist’s perceived need to inform 
his or her audience about the current state of neuroscience. To put this in 
narratological terms, the authors seem compelled to facilitate the read-
ers’ entry into the ‘authorial audience’” (174). I don’t find this “perceived 
need” as fascinating as Johnson: it is simply a demand of the craft of writ-
ing. What is fascinating is how Johnson describes the writer’s craft of dra-
matic exposition in terms of the social function of the public intellectual, 
defined by Russell Jacoby as “writers and thinkers who address a general 
and educated audience” (5). According to Johnson: “Lodge’s and Pow-
ers’s neuronarratives serve two important epistemological functions: they 
implicitly validate the notion that science produces a kind of useful and 
true knowledge and they artfully disseminate that knowledge to the lay 
public” (180).
 The omniscient narrator’s authority in Generosity, then, relies upon 
its function as an authorial proxy for the figure of the novelist as pub-
lic intellectual: a translator of specialized knowledge through the genre 
of fiction, and a social commentator on the current cultural state. The 
specialized knowledge which informs the book is genomics. The plot 
revolves around the fate of Thassadit Amzar, a young Algerian refugee 
whose beatific, almost unsettling, optimism belies the trauma of her past. 
She becomes the object of study for Thomas Kurtzon, an entrepreneurial 
scientist who believes she may possess what he has identified as the “hap-
piness gene.” Research into genetic dispositions for happiness is ongoing 
and was reported in newspapers and popular science magazines in the two 
years preceding Powers’s novel. While much of this scientific knowledge is 
dispensed through the dialogue and thoughts of Kurtzon, it also informs 
the commentary of the intrusive narrator. The universal here is couched in 
the authority of science, for the characters’ motivations are examined not 
from the perspective of the Thackerayan “observer of human nature” but 
from that of a scientifically knowledgeable narrator who can explain char-
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acters in terms of genetic coding and evolutionary science. Commenting 
on an awkward scene of budding courtship between the protagonist, Rus-
sell Stone, who is Thassa’s writing teacher, and Candace Weld, a psycholo-
gist, the narrator writes: “They stand there awkwardly, two more victims 
of natural selection, caught between negativity bias and the eternal belief 
that the future will be slightly better than the present” (96).
 The narrator does not assume a posture of specialized knowledge so 
much as one of general commentary. “According to many of the two thou-
sand new self-help titles that appear every year . . . nothing short of phar-
maceuticals can help sustain contentment as much as a satisfying job” 
(38). Musing on the level of job satisfaction that Russell might experi-
ence, the narrator comments: “What pleasure does he get from his selfless 
editing? Stone strikes me as the kind of guy who might not know what 
his pleasures are. He’s not alone. No one does: the happiness books are 
adamant on this. We’re shaped to think the things we want will make us 
happy. But shaped to take only the briefest thrill in getting. Wanting is 
what having wants to recover” (38). This narratorial comment reveals the 
thematic crux of the novel, shifting from a supposition about the character 
to a comment on human nature, complete with the aphoristic final sen-
tence, but its authority is couched less in the universal wisdom of the nar-
rator, than in a report on the science of happiness.
 The paradigm of evolutionary genetics underpins narratorial commen-
tary throughout the novel: “From where I sit, the whole human race did 
something stupid when young—pulled some playful stunt that damaged 
someone. The secret of survival is forgetting” (19). This model of narra-
tive authority also extends to reflections on the role of the novel itself. 
“In my country,” the narrator points out in an intrusive interlude, “a new 
work of fiction is published every thirty minutes. . . . I try to calculate how 
many of those million-and-growing volumes are saddled with a romance—
bright or doomed, healthy or diseased. I can’t do the math. Surely it must 
be most of them” (94–95). The narrator goes on to offer a reason for this 
proliferation:
Sexual selection, the surest and most venerable form of eugenics, has 
molded us into the fiction-needing readers we are today. Part of me 
would love to belong to a species free, now and then, to read about some-
thing other than its own imprisonment. The rest of me knows that the 
novel will always be a kind of Stockholm syndrome—love letters to the 
urge that has abducted us. (94–95)
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 The hesitation about the novelist’s role in explaining human nature 
seems to underpin the metafictional anxiety which animates the intrusive 
presence of the narrator. The determinism of evolutionary science which 
provides the model for “universalizing” commentary about human nature 
finds its parallel in self-reflexive addresses to the reader about the fatalism 
of generic plot structures: “So you know this story: Lord Jim, or a plot to 
that effect” (15); “He knows this story. You know this story: Thassa will 
be taken away from him” (87); “Of course they had to arrive here, even-
tually. What self-respecting author would let them escape alive?” (262). 
These comments function less to assert the authorial narrator’s creative 
control over the fictional world, or to satirize the artificiality of plot, than 
to demonstrate his own “imprisonment” by narrative structures. I engage 
further with the novel’s metafictionality in chapter 7.
from Minimalism to Maximalism
Richard Powers has long been considered one of the most knowledgeable 
and intelligent contemporary novelists for his capacity to draw upon a 
range of disciplines to explain how the world works. In a 1998 article, 
“Ecologies of Knowledge: The Encyclopedic Narratives of Richard Powers 
and His Contemporaries,” Trey Strecker claims that, following the lead of 
Pynchon, a number of contemporary novelists, including Powers, David 
Foster Wallace and William Volkman, are producing encyclopedic nar-
ratives distinguished by the disparate range of information systems they 
organize in their novels. “One notable feature of these encyclopedists’ 
books is the diversity of specialized knowledge—from biology, chemistry, 
economics, entomology, linguistics, music, mythology, painting, physics, 
psychology, and other fields—that they process” (68). What prevents these 
novels from being mere compendiums of knowledge, argues Strecker, is 
the “imposition of narrative. For when narrative enters a static encyclope-
dic system, a living, evolving textual ecology unfolds” (68).
 Obviously the figure which holds this knowledge together, organiz-
ing and directing it through narrative, is the author who becomes a kind 
of public intellectual synthesizing specialized knowledge for readers. The 
polymathic narrator is a clear proxy for this authorial figure, drawing 
upon and reinforcing the authority of the novelist. The narrator’s author-
ity is less a product of reliable knowledge of the fictional world than of 
a capacity to mobilize a range of extraliterary discourses to make sense 
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of this world. “The new encyclopedists,” according to Strecker, “do 
not capitulate to the overwhelming amount of information in postmod-
ern culture” (69). The narrator of Generosity is clearly concerned with 
the problem of this excess of information, as he points out in an intrusive 
comment: “The price of information is falling to zero. You can now have 
almost all of it, anytime, anywhere, for next to nothing. The great major-
ity of data can’t even be given away. But meaning is like land: no one is 
making any more of it” (110).
 All four modes of narrative authority employed by contemporary 
omniscient narrators, but in particular the last two, indicate a general 
shift in fiction from minimalism to maximalism. Throughout the 1980s 
minimalism of the kind exemplified in the tradition from Hemingway to 
Carver was considered dominant in American fiction and slated home 
to the problem of writing workshops. John W. Aldridge’s Talents and 
Technicians: Literary Chic and the New Assembly-line Fiction (1992) is a 
good example of this type of criticism. As James Wood’s critique suggests, 
minimalism is not so much a problem now as its opposite. In a 2004 arti-
cle titled “The War for the Soul of Literature,” Laura Miller argues that 
what Wood denounces as “hysterical realism,” and what Dale Peck calls 
“recherche postmodernism,” can be understood in terms of this shift. For 
Miller, maximalism, in the form of the big ambitious social novel, has 
become the new focus of complaint about the direction of contemporary 
fiction, replacing Carveresque minimalism which had prevailed for the 
previous two decades as a symptom of literary decline.
 The return of omniscience in contemporary fiction has been facilitated 
by the emergence of encyclopedic fictional narratives as an assertion of 
novelistic authority in the postmodern knowledge economy. Maximalist 
fiction need not necessarily be omniscient in narration, but the scope and 
narrative freedom of omniscience certainly lends itself to an expansive 
exploration of social relations, and the garrulousness of narrative voice 
which maximalism encourages is a means of competing with the dyna-
mism of other discourses in the marketplace of opinion and entertainment.
 What James Wood lamented in his “Hysterical Realism” essay as the 
hardening genre of the “big ambitious novel” is now being located in his-
tory by scholars as the contemporary manifestation of the impulse traced 
in Franco Moretti’s Modern Epic: The World System from Goethe to Gar-
cía Márquez. For instance, in a 2009 essay, “‘The Death of the Novel’ 
and Its Afterlives: Toward a History of the ‘Big Ambitious Novel,’” Mark 
Greif writes: “One knows that Thomas Pynchon’s Gravity’s Rainbow, 
William Gaddis’s J R, David Foster Wallace’s Infinite Jest, and William T. 
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Vollmann’s Europe Central help draw a circle around a particular form 
of the novel, if not quite a genre” (11). As his title suggests, Greif argues 
that the “‘big ambitious novel’ as it emerged in the postwar period first 
appeared in response to, then came to depend upon, the maintenance of 
a conceit of the ‘death of the novel’” (12). First gaining traction with Lio-
nel Trilling and other literary critics in the 1950s—who saw the novel’s 
decline resulting from genre exhaustion, changed social conditions, and 
the speed of contemporary life—this conceit was perpetuated by writers 
as a literary challenge, articulated in essays from Philip Roth’s “Writing 
American Fiction” (1961) to the essays by Wallace and Franzen which I 
have discussed here. “Vitality,” Greif suggests, “becomes its own pursuit 
in an age when ‘the death of the novel’ is a presumption that never can be 
laid to rest” (27). Significantly, he points out that these meganovels 
rejected the first-person narration of Ellison and Bellow for a kaleido-
scopic ‘third-person close,’ in which all knowing is accomplished through 
countless limited and idiosyncratic characters who together prove a kind 
of encyclopedic or superhuman range that must belong to the author but 
is never acknowledged as an authorial possession. (28)
Here we see that what is vital to these novels is the projection of a figure of 
the author as polymath, as omniscient in the hyperbolic rather than divine 
sense of the word. The narrative voices of these novels, then, in combi-
nation with their authorial statements, seek to carve out a space for the 
cultural importance of the novel and the status of the author in the public 
sphere.
 In his 2012 essay, “The Maximalist Novel,” Stefano Ercolino sets out 
to define the contemporary maximalist novel as a genre and place it in 
relation to postmodernism. Ercolino argues that this genre emerged in 
the United States in the last quarter of the twentieth century with Pyn-
chon’s Gravity’s Rainbow before emigrating to Europe in the new mil-
lennium with novels such as Roberto Bolaño’s 2666. His examples 
include the usual suspects of Wallace’s Infinite Jest, Smith’s White Teeth, 
De Lillo’s Underworld, and Franzen’s The Corrections, and he names nov-
els by William T. Vollmann and Richard Powers. According to Ercolino, 
“there are ten elements that define and structure” the maximalist novel 
“as a genre of the contemporary novel: length, encyclopaedic mode, dis-
sonant chorality, diegetic exuberance, completeness, narratorial omni-
science, paranoid imagination, inter-semioticity, ethical commitment, and 
hybrid realism” (242). For Ercolino, certain of these elements, such as 
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encyclopedic mode and diegetic exuberance, are centrifugal in their func-
tion while others, such as narratorial omniscience and paranoia, operate 
as a centripetal countermeasure.
 Ercolino understands omniscience purely in terms of focalization, as 
a “narrative regime” which operates on both the micro-structural level of 
the fragment and the macro-structural level of the narrative as a whole. 
By this he means that despite the range of shifts in focalization and sub-
stantial sections of internal focalization, the sum of the parts in each novel 
constitutes a freedom of perspective best understood as omniscience. He 
claims that omniscience
is the consequence of the particularly pressing demand to lend order to 
the novelistic representation; as a result, there is a fundamental need to 
construct a narratorial gaze capable of perceiving from above, and thus 
of dominating the entire narrative flow. This does not mean, of course, 
that in every maximalist novel the narrator must necessarily be omni-
scient; however omniscience is a narrative mood that adapts itself more 
efficiently than others to the control of the narrative material. (249)
 In keeping with my argument in this book, focalization is best under-
stood as a rhetorical strategy of the narrator, as the product of the “gener-
ating instance” of narrative voice. Hence, to talk of a “narratorial gaze” 
we must link this gaze to a narrator. Ercolino also sees omniscience as cru-
cially linked to paranoia, which “remains the engine of maximalist literary 
imagination” (250). The idea that everything is linked is 
the indestructible conviction of the paranoid, a conviction that finds its 
formal correspondence in the interconnection (direct or indirect) of all 
the stories, all the characters, and all the events with which maximalist 
novels are filled. . . . Such an interconnection could have no more effec-
tive support than an omniscient narratorial regime in which the hyper-
vigilant gaze of the narrator controls the narrative material as a whole. 
(250)
Here Ercolino seems to be suggesting that the narrative voice supports and 
facilitates the paranoid imagination, indicating that the controlling pres-
ence of Providence in classic omniscience has become the paranoia of con-
temporary omniscience.
 We could characterize contemporary omniscience as a verbose nar-
rative voice nostalgically invoking the friend and guide of classic omni-
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science, or desperately filling the silence left by the postmodern absence of 
character. But we could more productively approach this narrative voice 
as a kind of heuristic technique, where form is generated by the archi-
tectonic function of the sentence as a line of flight. The idiosyncrasy of 
Wolfe’s prose stems from his claim in The New Journalism, that journal-
ists who deploy the techniques of fiction in the service of nonfiction writ-
ing are free from the constraints of aesthetic convention governing point 
of view and other narrative elements. “For the gluttonous Goths,” Wolf 
wrote, “there is still only the outlaw’s rule regarding technique: take, use, 
improvise” (48).
 Narrative form here is not determined by any sense of formal unity, 
by the categories of narrative theory, but by the writer’s authority as a 
reporter of contemporary culture. For the social commentator, the tentacu-
lar reach of omniscience is underpinned by a creative freedom at the syn-
tactic level. As Don DeLillo explained in an interview about the writing of 
Underworld:
The prologue is written with a sort of super-omniscience. There are sen-
tences that may begin in one part of the ballpark and end in another. I 
wanted to open up the sentence. They become sort of travel-happy; they 
travel from one person’s mind to another. I did it largely because it was 
pleasurable. It was baseball itself that provided a kind of freedom that 
perhaps I hadn’t quite experienced before. It was the game. (DePetrio 
136)
in  ChaPters 2–5,  I focused on the ways in which contemporary omni-
scient narrators draw attention to the narrating instance to rhetorically 
perform their narrative authority: mobilizing the function of narration 
via overt commentary and direct addresses to the reader; displaying the 
proleptic knowledge of history enabled by the spatio-temporal distance of 
the narrator from the storyworld; asserting their stylistic presence through 
metaphorical excess and linguistic control over characters’ thoughts; and 
offering synoptic wisdom through the display of polymathic knowledge in 
which nonliterary paradigms of knowledge (history, journalism, science) 
compete with the narrator’s conventional insight into the psychological 
interior of characters to explain “human nature.” As discussed in previ-
ous chapters, reliable knowledge of characters’ interior lives has typically 
been seen as the basis of narrative authority. In this chapter I investigate 
how contemporary omniscient narrators perform their “privileged” access 
to the consciousness of characters and the concept of the self that emerges 
from the formal techniques employed. If we accept that a general sensibil-
ity of fiction after postmodernism is its attempt to explore the problem 
voice and 
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To read a sentence as free indirect discourse, we must indeed use our ingenuity. 
We must infer who is quoted and which words of the sentence are quotation. 
—Ann Waldron Neumann,  
“Characterization and Comment in Pride and Prejudice” 390
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of character as a knowable human self, distinct from a postmodern cri-
tique of subjectivity embedded in the realist concept of character, then the 
representation of characters’ psychological interior, of their consciousness, 
becomes a key area of investigation. Contemporary omniscient narrators 
explore this problem of character, I will argue, through a self-reflexive 
manipulation of existing conventions of thought representation.
 I will begin by quoting a lengthy passage from chapter 22 of Walter 
Scott’s 1822 novel, The Fortunes of Nigel:
At length his meditations arranged themselves in the following solilo-
quy—by which expression I beg leave to observe once for all, that I do 
not mean that Nigel literally said aloud with his bodily organs, the words 
which follow in inverted commas, (while pacing the room by himself,) 
but that I myself choose to present to my dearest reader the picture of 
my hero’s mind, his reflections and resolutions, in the form of a speech, 
rather than in that of a narrative. In other words, I have put his thoughts 
into language; and this I conceive to be the purpose of the soliloquy upon 
the stage as well as in the closet, being at once the most natural, and 
perhaps the only way of communicating to the spectator what is sup-
posed to be passing in the bosom of the scenic personage. . . . In narra-
tive, no doubt, the writer has the alternative of telling that his personages 
thought so and so, inferred thus and thus, and arrived at such and such 
a conclusion; but the soliloquy is a more concise and spirited mode of 
communicating the same information; and therefore thus communed, or 
thus might have communed, the Lord of Glenvarloch with his own mind. 
(295–96)
 In this passage Walter Scott’s omniscient narrator shares with read-
ers the choice between two modes of representing consciousness: report-
ing a character’s thoughts through narratorial summary or quoting them 
in the form of a soliloquy. What this self-reflexive comment highlights is 
the artificial and hypothetical nature of translating thoughts into speech: 
“thus communed, or thus might have communed, the Lord of Glenvar-
loch with his own mind.” Histories of the novel tell us that authors from 
Jane Austen onwards pioneered ways of combining the quotation of inner 
thoughts with the voice of the narrator in the grammatical form of free 
indirect discourse (FID), and trace the development of this technique from 
ironic narratorial distance in the nineteenth century to empathetic fig-
ural closeness in the twentieth. As Casey Finch and Peter Bowen claim, 
“the development in Austen’s hands of free indirect style marks a crucial 
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moment in the history of novelistic technique in which narrative author-
ity is seemingly elided, ostensibly giving way to what Flaubert called a 
transparent style in which the author is ‘everywhere felt, but never seen’” 
(3). In describing this elision of narrative authority as a key feature of the 
move away from the intrusive presence of the omniscient narrator in Vic-
torian fiction to the effaced presence of the narrator in modernist fiction, 
these histories tend to present FID as a means of liberating character con-
sciousness from that of their creator. “Imagine FID,” writes Kathy Mezei, 
“as an expression of the character’s bid for freedom from the controlling 
narrator” (68).
 In The Dual Voice, one of the earliest comprehensive studies of FID in 
the novel, Roy Pascal takes up where Percy Lubbock left off, providing an 
historical account of the progression from indirect to direct means of rep-
resenting consciousness, clearly echoing Lubbock in his account of Flau-
bert’s Madam Bovary as the historical touchstone. According to Pascal:
Flaubert wanted to hide the very function of story-telling, as it were, 
to allow the story to tell and interpret itself, as far as this was possible; 
hence the narrator should, as he put it, “transport himself into his char-
acters.” Thus free indirect speech is not an occasional device, nor some-
thing employed for a specific situation or person; it is a major instrument 
for achieving the Flaubertian type of novel. (98)
 Pascal is thus extending Lubbock’s preoccupation with point of view 
and the dramatization of consciousness to demonstrate, in greater analytic 
detail, how the aesthetic doctrine of impersonality is achieved by authors. 
For Pascal, what he calls free indirect speech “belongs essentially to the 
third-person novel in which the narrator, depersonalised and impossible 
to name, has the right to enter into every mind and every closet” (100). 
From Pascal’s “dual voice” to Bakhtin’s “double-voiced” language to Ann 
Banfield’s “unspeakable sentences,” the historical development of FID has 
been posited as a challenge to the singular voice of omniscient narration. 
Here the paradox of presence and absence in theories of literary omni-
science is dramatized as a kind of struggle between narrator and char-
acter. On the one hand, the effacement of narratorial presence is figured 
as a rejection of authorial omniscience; on the other hand, the more an 
author’s presence is given over to the perspective and consciousness of 
characters, and the urge to comment is resisted, the more the key fea-
ture of access to consciousness comes to the fore. In this chapter I will 
address how the critical reception of contemporary omniscience is framed 
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by this scholarship on FID. In pointing out the limitations of this critical 
reception, I want to suggest the need to reconsider some of the ways in 
which we theorize the relation between narratorial report and character 
thought.
Grammatical Transformation and the Method of attribution
FID is generally understood as a phenomenon of speech and thought rep-
resentation which appears to merge the perspective of both narrator and 
character. Much of the scholarly debate over FID has been generated by 
different methodological approaches derived from narrative theory, sty-
listics and linguistics, governed by a taxonomic impulse which focuses 
on how this phenomenon is to be identified and defined. Debate cen-
ters on the range of possible indices, from the purely grammatical to the 
more interpretive semantic and contextual, with difficulties arising from 
attempts to reconcile two methods of study: the linguistic identification of 
individual sentences which are grammatically discrete from indirect and 
direct discourse; and the literary-critical analysis of techniques of thought 
representation along a continuum from diegesis to mimesis. Moreover, 
FID gains its dynamism as a literary technique and as an object of study 
by virtue of being placed within a tripartite model of representing con-
sciousness: as a mediating technique between a narrator’s report of mental 
activity on the one hand, and a direct quotation of a character’s thought 
on the other.
 FID is traditionally defined as a syntactic unit in which a character’s 
“original” utterance or thought has undergone a pronominal and tense 
shift to the grammar of the narrative discourse, typically from first to 
third person, and present to past tense, and is marked by an absence of 
tag clauses or reporting verbs. The central method of analyzing FID is one 
of linguistic attribution, which functions by parsing sentences of thought 
representation and assigning a range of stylistic features to the subjectiv-
ity of the narrator or the character. Anne Waldron Neumann highlights 
the methodological difficulties that emerge from the hesitancy of attribu-
tion that the ambiguity of FID fosters: “Because free indirect discourse 
lacks attribution, how do we recognize it as possibly reported discourse? 
That is, how does a novelist foreground the subjective language and view-
point of a particular character against the usually more objective narrato-
rial background?” (367). The more salient problem arises, I suggest, when 
scholarship on FID is put in the service of interpretive criticism, where 
170 • ChaPter 6
aesthetic and ethical prejudices latent in novelistic theory are operational-
ized via the method of attribution.
 This method is founded on the traditional idea of FID as the transfor-
mation of a character’s utterance into the grammar of its narrative report. 
In her classic study, Transparent Minds, Dorrit Cohn describes FID, or 
what she calls “narrated monologue” as a “transformation of figural 
thought-language into the narrative language of third-person fiction” and 
suggests that “a simple transposition of grammatical person and tense will 
‘translate’ a narrated into an interior monologue” (100). For Cohn, this 
translation is a grammatical “litmus test” for confirming the attribution of 
“a narrative sentence to a character’s, rather than to a narrator’s, mental 
domain” (101). Many scholars have rejected the derivational properties 
of FID which underlie this theory because in fiction there is no “original” 
utterance which can be recovered as a measure of reportorial fidelity: we 
have only the narrator’s representation of a fictional act, in the same way 
that the fictional storyworld is constructed from the narrative discourse.
 Despite this criticism, it is recognized that the hypothetical postula-
tion of a character’s direct thought derived from its narrative report is a 
useful analytic tool, precisely because such a possibility is an essential ele-
ment of the mimetic illusion of fiction, and an intuitive cognitive process 
of readers. So those who reject what is called the “representational fal-
lacy” or “direct discourse fallacy” often recuperate the transformational 
properties of FID via the notion of naturalization (McHale, “Free Indirect 
Discourse”; Sternberg, Expositional Modes; Fludernik, Fictions of Lan-
guage). The argument here is that expressive elements may not be directly 
attributable to an original utterance, but we can surmise that a character 
would have used such language were they called upon to articulate their 
thoughts. Alan Palmer describes this as the hypothetical argument:
Although the discourse may appear to present the “actual” words of 
inner speech, it is in fact presenting a reconstruction by the narrator that 
is hypothetically based on what characters would have said that they 
were thinking, had they been asked; and although the discourse may 
appear to present an “actual” episode of inner speech, it is really present-
ing a summary of several possible such episodes. (71)
 The phrasing of this passage implies the narrator hypothetically recon-
structs a character’s thought, although scholarship has emphasized the 
interpretive role of readers in identifying FID. Monika Fludernik’s monu-
mental study of FID in The Fictions of Language and the Languages of 
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Fiction provides a good example of this approach, offering a linguistically 
founded “anti-mimetic model of speech and thought representation in lan-
guage” (398), and providing an exhaustive list of potential indices, before 
invoking cognitive theory to lend theoretical weight to the naturalizing 
tendencies of readers.
 In other words, the rejection of a derivational approach to defining 
FID has had little effect on the analytic practice of attribution. Now, the 
method of attribution is essential to the study of FID—in the sense that a 
method constructs its own object of study. The problem resides in what 
signals of subjectivity are privileged by this method. Besides pronomi-
nal and temporal shifts, as well as deictic adverbials which establish the 
“here” and “now” of a character’s subjective center of perception, the 
most prominently analyzed indices of FID tend to be expressive features, 
especially idiomatic markers of a character’s “voice” in the narration. 
Identifying examples of FID, then, often relies as much upon psycholo-
gizing assumptions about the lexical range and intellectual capacities of 
characters (would a character use this word, or think this way?), and 
upon stylistic assumptions about narratorial diction (would a narrator, 
or author, use such language?) as it does upon linguistic evidence. For 
instance, in analyzing a passage from Flannery O’Connor’s “Good Coun-
try People,” Lucy Ferriss writes:
The hint is slight, but unmistakable. Though she was thirty-two years old 
and highly educated. Mrs. Hopewell would never use this expression, nor 
would Mrs. Freeman. Nor is the description neutral; it passes a judgment 
on Mrs. Hopewell for which the story has provided scant evidence. Such 
judgment comes—and has to come—from Joy herself. (182)
 Here, the narratological analysis of FID is inseparable from character 
evaluation. FID is not just recognized by its context, but by the reader’s 
subjective attribution. I myself can easily imagine both Mrs. Hopewell and 
Mrs. Freeman, or the author, using such an expression.
fId, voice, and focalization
“By leaving the relationship between words and thoughts latent,” Dor-
rit Cohn argues, “the narrated monologue casts a peculiarly penumbral 
light on the figural consciousness, suspending it on the threshold of ver-
balization in a manner that cannot be achieved by direct quotation” 
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(Transparent Minds 103). Cohn thus recognizes FID as the evocation of 
an unverbalized consciousness. Two pages later, however, she says that 
narrated monologue imitates “the language a character uses when he talks 
to himself” and thus superimposes the two “voices” of narrator and char-
acter (105). This “voice” is thus largely identified by idiomatic attribu-
tion, backed up by Cohn’s claim that narrated monologue “may be most 
succinctly defined as the technique for rendering a character’s thought in 
his own idiom while maintaining the third-person reference and the basic 
tense of narration” (100). The emphasis on the presence of a character’s 
idiom as a key textual marker of FID, even in its hypothetical formula-
tion, can be found in this well-known definition by Anne Waldron Neu-
mann: “that mode of indirectly reported speech or thought which quotes 
what we feel could be at least some of the words of a character’s actual 
utterances or thought, but which offers those words interwoven with the 
narrator’s language” (366, my emphasis).
 The privileged method of lexical attribution means that FID is often 
taken to be an instance of, or even synonymous with, the broader phe-
nomenon of stylistic contagion, or what Hugh Kenner, in Joyce’s Voices, 
dubbed the Uncle Charles Principle, where any word in the narrative dis-
course which seems to “belong” to a character’s lexicon can be taken as 
an example of a character’s voice “infecting” the more formal or sophis-
ticated language of the narrator. For instance, in a recent study of narra-
tive authority in Jane Austen’s Emma, Daniel Gunn argues: “But why, in 
a narrative situation such as Austen’s, should such ‘coloured’ or ‘infected’ 
passages be seen as a phenomenon distinct from FID. I would propose 
that, in Austen at least, what happens in ‘stylistic contagion’ is the same 
thing that happens in FID” (37). The conflation of FID and stylistic conta-
gion makes sense in literary critical analysis which is less concerned with 
identifying discrete syntactic units of FID than with analyzing overall pas-
sages of thought representation in terms of their relative closeness to a 
character’s consciousness. However, this is part of the problem. There is 
a difference between a narrator imitating figural subjectivity by deploying 
language associated with a character, and a narrator yielding deictically 
to a character’s perspective through a range of strategies for which char-
acterological idiom is but one indice.1 It is a difference recognized by the 
distinction between voice and focalization.
 The method of attribution in the study of FID, as I pointed out ear-
lier, is typically a means of answering questions such as: Whose language 
is this? Whose voice is this? and Who’s speaking here? In the phraseo-
logical formulation of these questions we can see that the difficulties of 
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theorizing FID are apparent precisely in its capacity to manifest the ana-
lytic interdependence of voice and focalization. However, there is also a 
tendency to collapse the distinction between the two categories and thus 
return to the “regrettable confusion” between who sees and who speaks 
which Genette set out to remedy. This confusion can be found in Pascal’s 
book, which is a study of point of view in the Anglo-American tradi-
tion, of the relative presence of narratorial subjectivity in the representa-
tion of a character’s perspective. According to Pascal, FID can operate in 
passages of description which record a scene entirely through a charac-
ter’s impression and subjective response to her environment. “Perhaps it 
is stretching the concept of free indirect speech too far to apply it to such 
writing?” he asks, before concluding that the “essence of the free indi-
rect form” is the “reproduction of the inner processes of the character, 
expressed in the same syntactical form as objective narrative and embed-
ded firmly in the narratorial account, but evoking the vivacity, the tone 
and gesture, of the character” (108). On this basis he describes the tech-
nique of FID as the “dual voice” of narrator and character, even though 
the character cannot be said to be “speaking” in any meaningful way.
 When employed to represent thought, I suggest, FID is primarily a 
question of focalization, what Genette calls the regulation of narrative 
information, dictated by degrees of restriction on a narrator’s reporting 
of character’s thoughts. Genette’s brief discussion of FID (what he calls 
transposed narration) is included in his chapter on mood, thus establishing 
its relationship to focalization. The presence of idiom or other expressive 
features attributable to a character may indicate a “deictic shift” which 
is a feature of focalization, but it does not alter the narrating instance, 
the generating instance of the narrative. The relationship of FID to other 
modes of thought representation is more properly a question of distance. 
However, most scholarship on the phenomenon of FID departs from Gen-
ette in categorizing this phenomenon as a feature of voice.
 Part of the confusion in the study of FID, then, stems from the com-
bination of several different concepts of voice, all designed to demon-
strate the structural dispersal of the narrating instance and the stylistic 
fragmentation of authorial voice. In these approaches, narratives become 
populated with a variety of voices, from the stylistic infections of charac-
terological idiom to the polyphonic clashing of living social languages in 
a dialogic novel. Or, in its ultimate manifestation, FID effects the mod-
ernist ideal of impersonality in the negation of any narrator, as in Ann 
Banfield’s notorious formulation of the unspeakable sentence: “Es with 
a third person SELF cannot also contain a SPEAKER” (111). Banfield’s 
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work is the extreme version of scholarship on the empathic or neutral 
relation of narrator to characters, while accounts of stylistic contagion 
and dialogism emphasize the ironic relation between narratorial and 
other “voices.”
 Whether FID is understood as the grammatical transformation of a 
direct thought, or the hypothetical postulation of what a character might 
have said were they called upon to articulate their thoughts, it rests con-
ceptually upon the potential of a character to take on the act of narration 
and speak for him or herself. As a result the study of FID often tends to 
elide the terminological difference between “language” and “voice.” So 
when the method of linguistic attribution is described in terms of voice we 
see a tendency to equate the presence of language which is indicative of a 
character’s subjectivity with a speaking position for that character within 
the narrative.
 As an example of how this works in interpretations of contemporary 
fiction, I refer again to Timothy Aubry’s article on the “politics of interi-
ority” in contemporary American middlebrow fiction, which claims that 
“most third-person narrators, at least within American mainstream liter-
ary fiction, report the action of the novel almost entirely from the stand-
point of the character or characters through free indirect discourse” (85). 
Aubry’s analysis is thus predicated on a standard assumption about the 
natural relationship between FID and focalization. His case study is Anita 
Shreve’s Oprah Book Club selected novel, The Pilot’s Wife. This novel, 
Aubry writes, 
is written entirely in free indirect discourse, exclusively from Kathryn’s 
perspective, without a single statement of authorial wisdom or entry into 
another character’s consciousness. And it is all written in Kathryn’s voice. 
Moreover, in certain moments, Kathryn actively assumes the narrator’s 
function. (90)
Here is the passage which Aubry provides as evidence:
The camera slid back to the old man and moved in close to his face. He 
looked shocky around the eyes, and his mouth was hanging open, as 
though it was hard for him to breathe. Kathryn watched him on the tele-
vision, and she thought: That is what I look like now. Gray in the face. 
The eyes staring out at something that isn’t even there. The mouth loose 
like that of a hooked fish. (11)
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 This quotation only demonstrates the hyperbole of Aubry’s claim that 
the novel is written “entirely” in FID. It may be a passage of internally 
focalized narration, and perhaps the second sentence could be described 
as narrated perception, but, beyond the word “shocky” potentially indi-
cating stylistic contagion, there is no evidence of FID. “Kathryn watched 
him on the television” is obviously narratorial report. Furthermore, the 
last four sentences, supposedly evidence that the character Kathryn has 
assumed the narrator’s function, are clearly lines of direct discourse or 
quoted monologue. Aubry’s assertion is that the “style Kathryn deploys 
in her self-description is identical to the overall style of the book” (90). 
Here we have the idea of stylistic contagion, described by Hugh Kenner 
as “the normally neutral narrative vocabulary pervaded by little clouds 
of idioms which a character might use if he were managing the narrative” 
(17) extended so far as to be meaningless, because if the novel is all writ-
ten in Kathryn’s voice there is no narrative voice to infect.
 The equation of language with voice has led many critics to cham-
pion stylistic contagion or the dual voice or double-voiced language as a 
liberation of the character from the governing ideology of authorial dis-
course. Or if not a liberation, a site of conflict between textual agents, as 
if characters had some kind of cognizance and control over their modes of 
representation. In a book chapter titled “Who is Speaking Here? Free Indi-
rect Discourse, Gender, and Authority in Emma, Howard’s End, and Mrs. 
Dalloway,” Kathy Mezei claims that in these three novels “a struggle is 
being waged between narrators and character-focalizers for control of the 
word, the text, and the reader’s sympathy” (66) and “[t]he site for this tex-
tual battle between author, narrator, and character-focalizer and between 
fixed and fluctuating gender roles is the narrative device ‘free indirect dis-
course’” (67).
 Hence the practice of linguistic attribution is used not just to identify 
the perspectival orientation of the narrative, but to reconstruct a char-
acter’s voice from the narrative discourse, and this voice becomes both 
mimetically and politically representative of the character’s autonomy. FID 
is thus one of the key elements in what Dorothy J. Hale calls the “aesthet-
ics of alterity” which informs and unites novelistic theory from James to 
Bakhtin. Hale describes this strain of theory as social formalism, a belief 
in the capacity of novelistic form to instantiate social relations which gen-
erate a sympathy for otherness.2 Hale points out that “Pascal’s brief over-
view of the discovery and early theorization of FID shows how, from the 
outset, this syntactical form was associated with an all-consuming appre-
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ciation of alterity” (92), before demonstrating that “Pascal’s own account 
of ‘dual voice’ is primarily interested in a single question: has an author 
been able to represent a character in his own terms?” (93). This sort of 
ethical investment in recuperating the representative voice of a character’s 
alterity is at the heart of theoretical discussions of FID.
free Indirect discourse and 
the Interpretive frame of “alterity”
From a pragmatic and cognitive perspective, Monika Fludernik writes: 
“What makes speech and thought representation recognizable as such, 
then, is its interpretability as an evocation of linguistic or mental alterity 
within the current discourse” (“Linguistic Illusion” 108). From a Bakhtin-
ian perspective, Richard Aczel claims “in the narrative representation of 
speech and thought, voice is best identified contextually as an alterity 
effect” (494). Although differing in their methods, and their stance on the 
dual voice thesis, both Fludernik and Aczel define alterity as the projec-
tion of a subjective textual presence different from that animating the nar-
rating instance. This embeds in formal terms the philosophical concept 
of alterity as a self defined in relation to its other, providing the method-
ological basis for ethical evaluation in terms of the aesthetics of alterity. 
Furthermore, the emphasis on context, particularly in Fludernik’s formu-
lation, shows how FID is as much a heuristic strategy as it is an analytic 
category, an interpretive frame which informs the search for alterity and 
the method of attribution as an evaluative practice: the extent to which a 
character is given a “voice” by the narrator.
 In his discussion of some of the “theoretical problems arising from free 
indirect speech,” Pascal writes:
The first difficulty arises from the interweaving of FIS and narratorial 
description. Once FIS has become of frequent incidence in a novel, once 
we have become used to descriptions that are projections from the view-
point of a character, we tend to expect it everywhere, and may find it 
confusing if the objective, narratorial mode is used instead. This is espe-
cially likely when few and unobtrusive indicators accompany FIS pas-
sages. (103)
Here Pascal is claiming that the use of FID establishes a cognitive frame 
of reception—an invitation to identify a passage of writing as generated 
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by the perspective of a character—which is ruptured if the passage dis-
plays a narratorial style too sophisticated for the character or for that 
character’s mental state at a particular moment. Pascal describes this as 
a kind of “usurpation” of a character’s language and perspective (110). 
This usurpation is not simply narratorial presence, he is careful to explain, 
for the constant presence of the narrator in passages of FID is necessary 
to the “dual voice” effect of irony or empathy. Usurpation occurs when 
an author’s concern with style, rather than the perspective of the charac-
ter, dictates the language of narration. And although he discusses narrato-
rial usurpation as a theoretical problem, he displays an evaluative bias in 
also describing it as a “stylistic flaw” (108) because “the lure of fine writ-
ing . . . may infect the passages in FIS themselves” (119). Here we see sty-
listic contagion is lauded when a narrator’s style is infected by the idiom 
of the character, but when a focalized passage of FID is infected by nar-
ratorial language it becomes inartistic, intrusive, and dictatorial. My point 
is that scholarship on FID retains this evaluative bias by establishing the 
cognitive frame of alterity as a default effect and the motive for the prac-
tice of attribution, and by mobilizing the historical narrative of novelistic 
development in support of this frame.
 Here we see the metatheoretical explanatory value of Fludernik’s prag-
matic account of FID as an interpretative strategy of readers made possible 
by a set of syntactic conditions. Fludernik writes:
According to my own model, FID can be defined by means of the conjunc-
tion of an interpretative intervention on the part of the textual recipient, 
who posits a discourse alterity (that is, a notional discourse SELF differ-
ent from that of the reportative SELF of the current narrator-speaker), 
with a minimal set of syntactic features, which constitute a sort of nec-
essary condition, a mold that has to be fitted. (“Linguistic Illusion” 95)
The two minimal syntactic conditions, as I understand them, are the capac-
ity for a sentence to be contextualized by anaphoric reference to a previous 
instance of character perspective (which could include the back shifting of 
tense), and the traditional absence of tag clauses or reporting verbs.
 If we accept the claim that FID is an interpretive act, a decision on 
the part of the reader to attribute a statement to a character, then we can 
see FID not simply as a choice which individual readers make, but a kind 
of overarching critical paradigm fostered by the modernist aesthetic with 
its emphasis on impersonality and the erasure of narratorial presence, a 
paradigm in which our default position is to assume the existence of FID 
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whenever Fludernik’s minimal syntactic conditions occur. “If a passage 
contextually signifies discourse alterity,” Fludernik argues, “and if it fits 
the minimal requirements for a prototypical FID form, then—in a flexible 
account of forms of speech and thought representation—one can catego-
rize it as FID” (111). The question is: why would one want to? My argu-
ment is that when omniscient narrators in contemporary fiction provide 
access to the consciousness of a character through internal focalization, 
critics look for indices of FID, not necessarily because it is a feature of the 
work, but because they are deploying the interpretive frame of alterity. 
In other words, since the “discovery” of FID by scholars such as Charles 
Bally in the early twentieth century, and the linking of this discovery to 
theories of point of view, we now search for FID instead of other modes 
of thought representation. As Alan Palmer claims, in a critique of the ver-
bal bias of the speech category approach which leads to a privileging of 
consciousness as inner speech: “I would also dispute the weighting given 
to free indirect thought and would suggest that it can only be arrived 
at by classifying a good deal of coloured thought report as free indirect 
thought” (62). And when FID is invoked in textual analysis, it is with the 
aim of constructing alterity as an aesthetic and ethical ideal, thus con-
demning writing which complicates this interpretative intervention.
 I now turn to ways in which the interpretive frame of FID as an alter-
ity effect operationalizes the historical, aesthetic, and ethical prejudices of 
modernist criticism in the reception of contemporary fiction, specifically 
via the method of linguistic attribution. A good example can be found 
in a 2004 article by Brian Phillips, called “Character in Contemporary 
Fiction.” In this essay Phillips argues that contemporary prose style has 
inherited from Hemingway an impulse for plainness and efficiency which 
has become stale, not so much at the level of syntax, but in terms of the 
capacity to create character. He goes on to claim that Zadie Smith’s White 
Teeth, Jonathan Franzen’s The Corrections, and Don DeLillo’s Under-
world are all examples of books where characters have been buried by 
the style of contemporary fiction. Phillips claims that the characters in 
The Corrections, for instance, often “speak and think like Franzen, whose 
management of indirect discourse is compromised by his enthusiasm for 
narratorial incursion, and who places too much faith in the comedic and 
analytical properties of his crude interruptions” (640). As evidence, he 
cites this passage of thought representation in the novel:
With a pounding heart Enid made her way to the bow of the “B” Deck. 
After the nightmare of the previous day and nights she again had a con-
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crete thing to look forward to; and how sweet the optimism of the person 
carrying a newly scored drug that she believed would change her head; 
how universal the craving to escape the givens of the self. No exertion 
more strenuous than raising hand to mouth, no act more violent than 
swallowing, no religious feeling, no faith in anything more mystical than 
cause and effect was required to experience a pill’s transformative bless-
ings. She couldn’t wait to take it. (324)
 Phillips then employs the analytic method of attribution to ask: 
“Whose thoughts are these? They are certainly not Enid’s” (640). And by 
virtue of asking these questions, he must conclude that Franzen’s style is 
incapable of fully rendering Enid’s character. He “adjourns to analysis and 
the ease of his own vocabulary. And so Enid disappears. . . . Her words 
are the wrong words, because they are not hers” (640). Hence the govern-
ing method of FID analysis—the attribution of language to either narrator 
or character according to the psychological measure of plausibility, the 
mimetic measure of verisimilitude, and the aesthetic measure of authorial 
style—underpins an interpretive frame animated by ethical evaluation of 
the relative “alterity” of the character. Phillips isolates the phrase “givens 
of the self” for censure on the grounds that it is incompatible with lan-
guage we might expect from Enid. Yet it is clear that the passage quoted 
is not FID, besides the last italicized line; it is psychonarration or thought 
report. Indeed, the phrase resonates with one used earlier to describe the 
mental state of her husband, Alfred: “The dream of radical transforma-
tion: of one day waking up and finding himself a wholly different (more 
confident, more serene) kind of person, of escaping that prison of the 
given, of feeling divinely capable” (272).
 One of the most significant features of contemporary fiction in the 
wake of postmodern experimentation, as I have pointed out, is the trend 
away from the impersonality of limited third-person narration, and 
toward an aesthetic of maximalism in which the presence of the narrator 
is constantly foregrounded. I turn again to the work of James Wood, who 
has relentlessly excoriated contemporary fiction for its stylistic excesses. 
Wood codified his critical principles in his 2008 book, How Fiction 
Works, which is significant for being the modern successor to Percy Lub-
bock’s The Craft of Fiction. Wood follows Lubbock in his commitment 
to modernist psychological realism, the importance of “point of view” as 
the means to show rather than tell, and in his reliance on Henry James 
as his aesthetic touchstone. However, whereas Lubbock and others such 
as Joseph Warren Beach historicized modernist fiction as a move toward 
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dramatization which eradicated the intrusive authorial presence of ear-
lier omniscient narration, Wood rails against postmodern fiction as the 
debasement of these achievements. His critique of authorial presence as a 
rupturing of verisimilitude rests less on overt evaluative commentary than 
on “annoyingly authorial” (23) style resulting from technical mishandling 
of FID.
 What is important to note is that Wood draws upon many of the 
established principles of FID to underpin his evaluative denunciation of 
what he calls “the contemporary writing project” (27): an authorial style 
committed to evoking the “debased language” of today’s media-saturated 
world found in writers such as DeLillo and Wallace. First, if Lubbock 
described the development of novelistic method as an ongoing refinement 
of point of view, Wood notes that “the history of the novel can be told 
as the development of free indirect style” (58). Modernist impersonality, 
achieved by the development of FID, thus becomes the aesthetic standard 
by which to judge subsequent experiments in writing. Secondly, Wood 
upholds the “transformational” theory of FID, such as when, in a dis-
cussion of Nabokov, he writes: “As usual, if we turn it into first-person 
speech, we can hear the way in which the word ‘thing’ belongs to Pnin and 
wants to be spoken” (22). This quote, which concerns a passage of nar-
rated perception, also demonstrates the third principle: a willing confla-
tion of thought with speech, and hence indicative of a “verbal bias” which 
allows the equation of character language with a character’s “voice.” 
Fourthly, Wood extends the category of FID beyond its grammatical limits 
and privileges lexical features of expressivity when he claims: “The Uncle 
Charles principle is just an edition of free indirect style” (17). Fifthly, all 
of these principles are brought into play by the key metholodogical tool 
of linguistic attribution. In fact, Wood’s most common critical strategy is 
to scour passages of thought representation and weed out for condemna-
tion any expressive elements that indicate intrusive authorial style. Often 
Wood is in fact criticizing novelists for employing psychonarration or 
thought report because they are unable to manage the empathetic subtle-
ties necessitated by FID.
 In condemning the intrusive features of authorial style, Wood is ulti-
mately betraying an ethical judgment about how characters should be rep-
resented in fiction. In his review of Zadie Smith’s White Teeth, he writes: 
“And what of that phrase, ‘he was going to beat but he wasn’t going to 
eat’? ‘Beat’ is not Samad’s word; he would never use it. It is Smith’s word, 
and in using it she not only speaks over her character, she reduces him, 
obliterates him” (“Human” 45). When it comes to the representation of 
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speech this sort of naturalization might make sense, but when applied to 
the representation of consciousness we have what I think is an unproduc-
tive assumption that characters must think in the same linguistic regis-
ter in which they would speak or write. What follows is that if a passage 
of thought representation contains language which does not seem to 
“belong” to a character it becomes marked as a sign of narratorial intru-
sion into their interior monologue. This leads to a collapsing of the dis-
tinction between authorial style and narratorial reportage, glossed as an 
instance of aesthetic failure on the part of the author, an inability to fully 
imagine characters in their own idiom, or an unwillingness to refrain from 
evaluative commentary, rather than a deliberate rhetorical strategy of the 
narrator.
 In an interesting inversion of the idea of stylistic contagion as an idi-
omatic deviance from a formal style of narration, Wood here assigns the 
colloquialism “beat” in the passage from White Teeth to the narrator, 
indeed to the author, rather than the character. This is indicative of the 
linguistic register of much contemporary fiction, and here we find the 
challenge to many of the assumptions underlying theories of FID which 
inhere in the privileged method of lexical attribution. I would suggest that 
if we eschew the transformational presupposition of the “direct discourse 
fallacy,” and see FID as a mode of represented thought without necessar-
ily being a translation of the verbal form of that thought, then the empha-
sis on lexical attribution should become less important to analysis. We 
might then see FID not as an indirect report of a mental utterance, or even 
as a mediated representation, but as a performative statement, a narra-
torial performance of the kinetic flow of a character’s thought, incorpo-
rating the rhythm of the thought process into the syntactic structure of 
narration.
 Here we would foreground indices which evoke the activity of think-
ing rather than its verbal form, indices such as hesitations, ellipses, and 
intonations, alongside the more common exclamations and interrogatives. 
In which case, language which cannot be attributed to a character may 
be understood less as an intrusion in the character’s interior monologue, 
than an element of the narratorial performance which highlights the spec-
ulative nature of verbalizing thoughts. That is, we can see the hypotheti-
cal approach to FID—this is what a character would have said were they 
asked—not only as a theoretical explanation of the cognitive reconstruc-
tions of readers, but as a rhetorical strategy of narrators, invoking doubt 
about the linguistic nature of a character’s thought processes. The hypo-
theticality of FID might also then be construed as an example of what the 
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narrator would say were he or she to adopt the character’s perspective. 
Rather than presenting a transparent mind or knowable self, contempo-
rary omniscience suggests we can only know the self through the otherness 
of the narrator.
 We would then be in a better position to see how the use of FID in con-
temporary fiction displays a reflexive awareness of the technique itself, by 
overt reference to its artificiality or by deliberating stretching its boundar-
ies: collapsing the linguistic borders between narrator and character which 
inform the principle of stylistic deviation, or parodically highlighting 
these borders, shading the already hazy distinction between authorial psy-
chonarration and figural narrated monologue, and producing what might 
be described as a kind of immanent psychonarration: with commentary or 
analysis embedded in the stylistic evocation of character thought (this is 
what the character would have thought if they had the narrator’s insight), 
or invoking a deictic center of consciousness but verbalizing the thought 
in narratorial language.
narratorial Self-reflexivity
In discussing a passage of FID in Pride and Prejudice which is included in 
quotation marks, Anne Waldron Neumann writes: “The quotation marks 
in this passage—Austen did not know that free indirect discourse is sup-
posed to omit them—ensure that we are reading Mrs. Bennet’s ‘actual’ 
reply to Mr. Collins (with the usual grammatical transformations)” (371). 
The first thing to remark about contemporary omniscience is that it mani-
fests a high degree of authorial awareness regarding FID as a convention 
of writing: authors today know what FID is “supposed” to do. Here are 
some examples of narratorial self-reflexivity in contemporary omniscient 
narration which highlight the arbitrariness of grammatical and expressive 
features derived from modernist literature:
Richard looked at his watch and thought: I can’t tell him yet. Or rather: 
Can’t tell him yet. For the interior monologue now waives the initial per-
sonal pronoun, in deference to Joyce. (Amis, The Information 11)
But how can he possibly make his mark in any of these (William frets 
as he finds his favourite bench in St James’s Park) when he’s being virtu-
ally blackmailed into a life of tedious labour? How can he possibly be 
expected. . . . But let me rescue you from drowning in William Rackham’s 
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stream of consciousness, that stagnant pond feebly agitated by self pity. 
(Faber, The Crimson Petal and the White 57–58, original ellipsis)
 Here is an example of a narrator mocking the representation of 
thought in verbal form:
You know what they are feeling. They are feeling enjoyably fucked. It 
is what they are thinking that is the problem. You already know what 
would be written inside Moshe’s thought balloon. “Nana,” he would be 
moaning in this sketch, “darling Nana.” His thought balloon was soppy 
and romantic. Anjali’s thought balloon was different. (Thirlwell, Politics 
201)
 I have already pointed out in my chapter on the pyrotechnic story-
teller how authors such as Nicola Barker and Rick Moody play with the 
conventions of thought representation, asserting linguistic control over 
characters’ own modes of self-description by staging hypothetical dia-
logues between narrator and character regarding lexical choices, and 
hyperbolically extending in the narrative discourse metaphors attributed 
to characters. I will focus here on two other features of FID in contem-
porary omniscience: shared linguistic habitus (the self-reflexive mixture 
of stylistic contagion and narratorial usurpation); and characterological 
cognitive self-awareness (the concept of self animating this deployment).
Shared Linguistic habitus
Shared linguistic habitus operates when narratorial colloquialisms and 
syntactic rhythm disrupt the sense of a neutral or formal diction against 
which to measure stylistic deviation. It also operates in the sense of char-
acters and narrator sharing a professional language (Charlotte Simmons 
studying neuroscience, Gary Lambert reading books on clinical depres-
sion, Russell Stone reading books on happiness and genetic science, Rich-
ard Tull being a writer of fiction) which complicates the projection of 
alterity.
 To demonstrate the first case, I return to Nicola Barker’s Darkmans. 
On the whole, this novel eschews interior monologues, but it has multiple 
instances of diegetic summary of a character’s past which function as what 
Alan Palmer calls thought report of states of mind rather than a single 
mental event or series of events. A good example is this passage:
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Progress, modernity (all now dirty words in Beede’s vocabulary) had 
kicked him squarely in the balls. I mean he hadn’t asked for much, had 
he? He’d sacrificed the Spider Orchid, hadn’t he? A familiar geography? 
He’d only wanted, out of respect, to salvage . . . to salvage . . .
What?
A semblance of what had been? Or was it just a question of . . . was it 
just a matter of . . . of form? Something as silly and apparently significant 
as . . . as good manners? (12)
 Employing the method of attribution, we could read the first sentence 
as an example of FID, particularly due to the presence of the colloquial 
expression, marking the parenthesis with its proper noun as narratorial 
intrusion. However, given the informal nature of the narrative voice, we 
could easily assign the colloquialism to the narrator and see the sentence 
as psychonarration. The hesitancy of attribution which arises from the 
ambiguous nature of FID itself leads me to see this simply as a narratorial 
performance of the character’s mental state.
 The second sentence is a very interesting example: “I mean he hadn’t 
asked for much, had he?” What should be a clear instance of FID is com-
plicated by the inconsistency of pronoun and tense. On one hand you 
could say the author had no choice but to retain this inconsistency because 
a full grammatical “transformation” into “He meant he hadn’t asked for 
much” wouldn’t make sense. However, the fact that the sentence is not 
rendered in direct discourse demonstrates to me a willingness to court 
confusion in order to retain the presence of the narrative voice. In fact 
because this passage is part of a much longer section of analeptic sum-
mary, and not a scenic report of Beede’s reflection, we could easily assert 
that here the narrator is fumbling for the words to articulate Beede’s men-
tal state, highlighting the hypothetical nature of FID. “I mean” is in fact 
a recurring phrase in the thought representation of virtually all the char-
acters, such that it becomes a stylistic device associated with the narrator, 
rather than something idiosyncratic to the characters. It is often used as 
a parenthetical supplement to dialogue in sentences of thought represen-
tation which effect a backshifting of tense while retaining the pronoun. 
Here are two examples: “‘No salad?!’ Kelly’s jaw dropped (no salad?! 
I mean where’d he think this was? Fucking Ethiopia?)” (221); “‘Okay.’ 
Gaffar nodded (registering Kane’s inner turmoil, but taking it all with 
a pinch of salt: I mean, how hard could life be for this spoiled, flabby, 
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Western pup?)” (85). In the following passage the narrator seems to sum-
marize collective thought: “The whole party was quiet for a moment, as if 
jointly considering the most feasible solution to this perplexing dilemma (I 
mean what could Kelly do?)” (107). Here we have a sense of the narrator 
intruding to agree with the characters. The following passage occurs in an 
expositional summary of the character Gaffar, a Kurd who barely speaks 
English: “An epiphany. Or this was the mythology. The truth was much 
simpler. Things didn’t actually change all that much in Turkey (I mean, the 
Kurds were persecuted everywhere, weren’t they?). The fabric of his life 
remained virtually identical. He’d simply crossed over (or turned inside 
out, like a polythene bag)” (66–67). These passages all echo the narrator’s 
device of parenthetical elaborations of descriptive metaphors, carrying the 
stylistic presence into the performance of FID.
 The most reflexive example of linguistic intrusion or narratorial usur-
pation as a conscious stylistic technique is Tom Wolfe’s I Am Charlotte 
Simmons. Here is a passage from a scene where the virginal eponymous 
heroine is making out with a frat boy called Hoyt and trying to stop him 
from going any further:
Slither slither slither slither went the tongue, but the hand—that was 
what she tried to concentrate on, the hand, since it had the entire terrain 
of her torso to explore and not just the otorhynolaryngological caverns—
oh God, it was not just at the border where the flesh of the breast joins 
the pectoral sheath of the chest—no, the hand was cupping her entire 
right—Now! she must say “No Hoyt” and talk to him like a dog—. (369)
 This is clearly a passage of internal focalization, but how much of it 
is rendered in FID? In narratological terms, we might say that the passage 
opens with narrated perception, shifting to psychonarration after the dash, 
and perhaps into narratorial comment with the explanatory conjunction, 
“since.” The ejaculation, “oh God” is a clear instance of FID, along with 
the anaphoric pronoun “it,” but the deictics of the rest of the sentence (the 
breast, the chest) suggest a narratorial perspective. We could then say that 
the passage shifts into a line of narrated perception and concludes with a 
line of FID, marked by the ejaculation “Now!”. Thus, a lexically oriented 
analysis of the micro-shifts between narrator and character might yield 
only the two exclamations as instances of FID in an overall passage of 
psychonarration or narrated perception rendered in the anatomical dis-
course of the narrator. However, the most important quality of the pas-
sage is the syntactic structure which is not indicative of an original mental 
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utterance so much as it is expressive of the rhythm of Charlotte’s hyper-
conscious mental activity. This, along with the third-person pronoun and 
back-shifted tense, is why the passage as a whole can be defined as free 
indirect thought.
 Now if we employ the method of lexical attribution we are clearly 
going to see a term such as “otorhynolaryngological” as evidence of nar-
ratorial usurpation and claim that the mimetic effect of FID has been 
diluted because Charlotte would never use such a word, particularly at 
this time of heightened emotion. The whole passage can be condemned 
as an example of reverse stylistic contagion, the author writing over the 
character’s thoughts. Yet this seems to be the wrong judgment to make, 
because it is based on an assumption of what FID should do.
 The key line for me is the one which begins with the ejaculation, “oh 
God.” There is an obvious irony in the juxtaposition of phrases such as 
“Oh God” and “pectoral sheath” in a single sentence, highlighting the 
anthropological distance from the characters which the narrator adopts 
throughout the book. But I don’t see why irony, with its implication of 
narratorial distance, is any less mimetic than empathetic figural close-
ness. Do we not get a clear sense of Charlotte’s thought processes? Rather 
than dramatizing this sentence as an uneven conflict between “voices,” I 
see it as the clearest example of what I mean by describing FID as a self- 
conscious narratorial performance of the process of characterological 
thought, mimicking the character’s own disembodied perspective on the 
action.
 There are several passages throughout the book in which the omni-
scient narrator relays what characters don’t know about themselves—
which, for Dorrit Cohn, is the prime feature of psychonarration—but 
nonetheless employs the conventions of FID. Here is a passage concerning 
the nerdy Adam Gellin and his crush on Charlotte Simmons:
He had no way of knowing it, but he was filled—suffused—with a love 
for a woman that only a virgin could feel. In his eyes she was more than 
flesh and blood and more than spirit. She was . . . an essence . . . an 
essence of life that remained tactile and alive—his loins certainly 
remained alive at this moment, welling up beneath his tighty-whiteys—
and yet a . . . a . . . a universal solvent that penetrated his very hide and 
commandeered his entire nervous system from his brain to the tiniest 
nerve endings. If he could only embrace her—and find that she had been 
dying for him to do just that—she, her tactile essence, would come flood-
ing into every cell, into all the billion miles of spooled DNA—he couldn’t 
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imagine a unit of his body so minute that she would not suffuse it—and 
they would . . . explode their virginities in a single sublime ineffable yet 
neurological, all too neurological, moment! (379–80)
 The first line in this passage could be described as what Cohn calls 
dissonant psychonarration, revealing an aspect of Adam’s mind which he 
is not conscious of, and cannot express, establishing an ironic distance 
between narrator and character. Phrases which follow—such as “In his 
eyes,” “If he could only embrace her” and “he couldn’t imagine a unit of 
his body”—indicate internal focalization, but the passage offers a mock-
ing neurobiological explanation of his supposed “love” for Charlotte 
embedded in the form of FID, with hesitations and emphases tracing the 
flow of Adam’s thoughts, and pronouns and tense in the grammar of the 
narrative report: “She was . . . an essence . . . an essence of life.” To read 
this passage as FID, however, we cannot hypothesize that this is how the 
character would narrate his thoughts. Instead it is a kind of immanent 
psychonarration, not simply representing his “thoughts” in narratorial 
language, but performing them from the basis of the narrator’s omniscient 
insight.
 Toward the end of the novel, after Charlotte has been in a prolonged 
state of depression, Adam becomes exasperated and yells at her in attempt 
to break her out of her funk. This is the turning point for her, leading her 
out of depression:
There was also, unbeknownst to either of them consciously, a wom-
an’s thrill!—and that’s the word for it!—her delicious thrill!—when, as 
before, a man expands his chest and drapes it with the sash of righteous-
ness and . . . takes command! . . . upon the Heights of Abraham. (608)
 The word “thrill” in this passage cannot be attributed to Charlotte or 
Adam, as the narrator makes clear, for they are unconscious of the thrill 
itself. Yet the narrator’s account of the underlying implacable biological 
forces at play here, unconsciously governing their behavior, is nonetheless 
rendered in the same form as other instances of FID, including exclama-
tions and ellipses, where the “vivacity, the tone, and gesture,” to use Pas-
cal’s phrase, evoke a narratorial rather than characterological subjectivity.
 Throughout the novel there are different manifestations of a shared 
linguistic habitus: between narrator and character, from stylistic contagion 
to narratorial usurpation; and between characters and their social milieu. 
To take the latter phenomenon first:
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A small matter, very small, for Charlotte was now transported! . . . not 
so much by the Olfactory Workers and their odors and music and danc-
ing and singing as by the fact that this was something experimental, 
esoteric, cutting-edge (she had picked up that term in the modern drama 
course), one of the exciting, sophisticated things Miss Pennington had 
assured her awaited her on the other side of the mountain, the things 
that would open up her eyes to harness and achieve great triumphs 
with . . . (364, original ellipsis; emphasis added)
 Later in the novel, the narrator describes “a skanky girl facing front at 
the far end of the table. ‘Skanky’ had slipped into Charlotte’s vocabulary 
by social osmosis; and this girl was skanky” (560). In both of these pas-
sages we have the narrator “borrowing” words from Charlotte’s lexicon 
to render her perspective, while pointing out that these words do not in 
fact “belong” to her. This reflexive reference to stylistic contagion in the 
service of focalization serves to undermine the linguistic unity of Char-
lotte’s consciousness itself.
He paused. The ensuing silence, in a roomful of drunks in an advanced 
stage of wreckage, was a tribute to the periphrastic performance he was 
putting on. Charlotte wondered if anybody in the room other than her-
self knew the adjective “periphrastic.” She doubted it. A smile of superi-
ority stole over her face. And the coolest guy in all of Dupont, who has 
fallen in love with me, is massaging my back, and everyone in this room 
can see that. (466, emphasis added)
 In this passage there is again a kind of reflexive use of stylistic conta-
gion, in which the colloquial “advanced stage of wreckage” is juxtaposed 
with the more sophisticated “periphrastic performance,” but the following 
sentence indicates that not only has the narrator borrowed the term peri-
phrastic from Charlotte’s linguistic field, she is consciously thinking it as 
she perceives the scene.
 On the other hand, we have passages of textually identifiable narrato-
rial usurpation. In a chapter titled “The Conscious Little Rock,” Charlotte 
meets up with the Frat boy, Hoyt: “So moved was she by the dreadful 
wounds, the awful beating he had taken for her sake, that she barely 
noticed the incidental bit of Fuck Patois” (335). This recalls the narrator’s 
elaboration of the grammatical forms of “Fuck Patois” in an earlier chap-
ter focused on the basketball player, Jojo Johanssen. In the next chapter, 
Charlotte is waiting in line with other underage college students hoping to 
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gain access to a nightclub: “As usual, their nervousness took the form of 
the Fuck Patois, which they thought gave them a front of cool and confi-
dent twenty-one-year-old moxie” (348). The phrase then surfaces a page 
later in Charlotte’s interior monologue: “Momma. If Momma showed up 
right now and saw her, thought Charlotte, saw her in a line full of people 
talking Fuck Patios, about to sneak into a bar with a fake ID . . . Every-
body does it, Momma . . . Everybody?” (349). Here, as if by another sort 
of osmosis, the narrator’s term has slipped into Charlotte’s vocabulary. She 
is the conscious little rock of his narratorial manipulation, and he is Char-
lotte Simmons.
Characterological Cognitive Self-awareness
The broader argument I want to make is that the representation of con-
sciousness in contemporary fiction is not just a device for rendering char-
acter’s thoughts with greater or lesser degrees of mimesis, but a means 
for interrogating the relation of language and thought. Which is to say, 
the question of how a character would articulate their thoughts is fore-
grounded as a technical challenge because it is a preoccupation of the char-
acters themselves. In contemporary fiction, the classic interior monologue 
in which characters subject themselves to a self-scrutiny of their behavior, 
motivations, and beliefs, is often accompanied by an extra level of self-
conscious awareness, a detached reflection on the act of cognition itself, 
including of their own lexical choices, and this becomes a way of high-
lighting the importance of language as a shared medium which structures 
thought itself, rather than “belonging” to an individual as a marker of 
their alterity. Here is a passage from another interior monologue in Wolfe’s 
novel, indicating Charlotte’s self-conscious awareness of her own chang-
ing linguistic habitus: “You . . . bastard! Sharp intake of breath—she had 
never used that expletive before, not even in her thoughts. Hoyt had done 
this just to torment her! Comes over as if to see her and veers off to some 
little . . . slut! Never even thought that word before, either . . . or had she 
once, about Beverly” (387).
 This characterological cognitive self-awareness is highlighted in much 
of the fiction of David Foster Wallace. Here is a quote from the story “Mr. 
Squishy”:
At various intervals throughout the pre-GRDS presentation the limbic 
portions of Schmidt’s brain pursued this line of thinking—while in fact 
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a whole other part of his mind surveyed these memories and fantasies 
and was simultaneously fascinated and repelled at the way in which all 
these thoughts and feelings could be entertained in total subjective pri-
vate while Schmidt ran the Focus Group through its brief and supposedly 
Full-Access description of Mister Squishy’s place in the soft-confection 
industry. (31)3
 Another example is David Lodge’s “neuronarrative” Thinks, in which 
the protagonist attempts to dictate his own “stream of consciousness” to 
a tape recorder, and by necessity reflects upon his own cognitive processes: 
“Ah, a blank, a definite blank, for an instant, not more than a second or 
two, I didn’t have a reportable thought or sense impression, my mind as 
they say went blank, I thought of nothing” (4). In this passage from Zadie 
Smith’s White Teeth, the narrator reports a character’s assumption that 
language can infiltrate his prelinguistic consciousness: “It was his most 
shameful secret that whenever he opened a door—a car door, a car boot, 
the door of KEVIN’s meeting hall or the door of his own house just now—
the opening of Goodfellas ran through his head and he found this sen-
tence rolling around in what he presumed was his subconscious: As far 
back as I can remember, I always wanted to be a gangster” (446, emphasis 
added).
 An example of how a character’s cognitive self-awareness is self-reflex-
ively performed by a narrator can be found in this passage from Jonathan 
Franzen’s The Corrections, which must be quoted in full:
He turned to the doorway where she’d appeared. He began a sentence: 
“I am—” but when he was taken by surprise, every sentence became an 
adventure in the woods; as soon as he could no longer see the light of the 
clearing from which he’d entered, he would realize that the crumbs he’d 
dropped for bearings had been eaten by birds, silent deft darting things 
which he couldn’t quite see in the darkness but which were so numerous 
and swarming in their hunger that it seemed as if they were the dark-
ness, as if the darkness weren’t uniform, weren’t an absence of light but 
a teeming and corpuscular thing, and indeed when as a studious teenager 
he’d encountered the word “crepuscular” in McKay’s Treasury of English 
Verse, the corpuscles of biology had bled into his understanding of the 
word, so that for his entire adult life he’d seen in twilight a corpuscular-
ity, as of the graininess of the high-speed film necessary for photography 
under conditions of low ambient life, as of a kind of sinister decay; and 
hence the panic of a man betrayed deep in the woods whose darkness was 
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the darkness of starlings blotting out the sunset or black ants storming 
a dead opossum, a darkness that didn’t just exist but actively consumed 
the bearings that he’d sensibly established for himself, lest he be lost; 
but in the instant of realizing he was lost, time became marvelously slow 
and he discovered hitherto unguessed eternities in the space between one 
word and the next, or rather he became trapped in that space between 
words and could only stand and watch as time sped on without him, the 
thoughtless boyish part of him crashing on out of sight blindly through 
the woods while he, trapped, the grownup Al, watched in oddly imper-
sonal suspense to see if the panic-stricken little boy might, despite no 
longer knowing where he was or at what point he’d entered the woods 
of this sentence, still manage to blunder into the clearing where Enid 
was waiting for him, unaware of any woods—“packing my suitcase,” he 
heard himself say. This sounded right. Verb, possessive, noun. (11)
 In this scene we find the faltering patriarch Alfred standing in front of 
his dressing table, in a haze of dementia. Alfred is interrupted by his wife, 
who asks what he is doing. His response—“I’m packing my suitcase”—is 
punctuated by a long paragraph of ostensibly iterative summary, employ-
ing the psycho-analogy of being lost in the woods to explain the intricacies 
of Alfred’s thought processes when he is confronted with such neurologi-
cal failures. When the elaboration of this psychoanalogy describes the 
darkness of the woods as “a teeming and corpuscular thing” we have a 
tangential comment about how from his teenage years, Alfred confused 
the words corpuscular and crepuscular. Here we have what seems to be a 
narratorial acknowledgement of stylistic contagion, of having borrowed 
the character’s word. As the passage continues, however, it describes the 
self-conscious detachment that Alfred has in these moments, with the nar-
rator inhabiting the cognitive space between one word and the next, and 
performing Alfred’s own reflection as he “watched in oddly impersonal 
suspense.” So the passage hovers between psychonarration and FID as a 
self-conscious narratorial performance of Al’s own self-conscious reflec-
tion on his cognitive process, as if seeing himself as a character.
 According to Dorrit Cohn, psycho-analogies are found in modern 
novels “most frequently in works where the narrated monologue is the 
prevailing method for rendering consciousness, but at moments when an 
author is for some reason unwilling to entrust the presentation of the inner 
life to the character’s own verbal competence” (Transparent Minds 45). In 
this passage from The Corrections, the psychoanalogy performs this func-
tion because the character has momentarily lost his verbal competence, 
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but it also appears to be the case that the psychoanalogy is Alfred’s. In this 
case, it is a mimetic rendering of Alfred’s thoughts.
The hypotheticality of free Indirect discourse
I don’t want to suggest that any of these examples necessarily indicate 
new types of FID, because one can always find similar examples in ear-
lier work. For instance, Dorrit Cohn draws attention to this passage in 
The Magic Mountain: “But for him and his relationship with Madame 
Chauchat—the word ‘relationship’ must be charged to his account, we 
refuse to take the responsibility for it” (qtd in Cohn, Transparent Minds 
121). I make two claims, however. First, that there is a high degree of self- 
reflexivity in the use of FID in contemporary fiction, particularly in rela-
tion to idiomatic indices, highlighting a skepticism about linguistic dif-
ference as a marker of alterity; and secondly, that this self-reflexivity 
facilitates the representation of characters who themselves reflect on their 
own cognitive processes and the role of language in producing rather than 
expressing thought. I am also arguing that these features of thought rep-
resentation require different ways of talking about the function and effect 
of FID than those offered by a method of linguistic attribution under-
pinned by the interpretive frame of alterity. In particular, that an inter-
pretive frame which mobilizes the aesthetic and ethical prejudices of 
modernist criticism and its attendant history of novelistic progression is 
not suitable for the analysis of FID in contemporary omniscience.
 Consider a passage from Richard Powers’s Generosity which I quoted 
in a previous chapter: “She sits in the rocker for a moment, examining 
herself. It’s not even an effort, really. Not even a decision. Just large mol-
ecules, passing their oldest signals back and forth across the infinite syn-
apse gap” (179). This passage presents the syntactic conditions of FID and 
invites an alterity effect, before undermining it. One would normally read 
the last two sentences as narratorial commentary. Given the fact that this 
character, Tonia Schiff, is a television science journalist immersed in the 
world of genetic science, one might at least consider attributing the sen-
tences and even their idiom to her thoughts. If we do, they then indicate 
characterological self-awareness of thought processes.
 FID, then, is one of the major strategies which contemporary omni-
scient narrators employ to perform their narrative authority. My argu-
ment is similar to that of Daniel Gunn who demonstrates how, in Jane 
Austen’s novels, passages of FID do not give voice to the autonomous 
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subjectivity of characters because they are always framed by the control-
ling presence of the narrator and hence must be understood as a “nar-
rative mimicry of figural thought” (40). I use the term “narratorial 
performance” rather than “mimicry” to highlight the self-reflexive use 
of conventions of thought representation; the sense of acting a role, of 
performing a character’s lines rather than imitating them; and the con-
notation of pretense, in the sense that FID is a hypothetical projection of 
character thought. The hypothetical approach is best able to engage with 
the hesitancy of attribution that arises from the characteristic ambiguity 
of FID. The logic of this approach is not only that the verbal representa-
tion of character thought is a speculative adoption of the character’s mode 
of articulation, but that the represented thought itself may sometimes be a 
hypothetical postulation of a possible thought.
 This conception of FID can be found in Michel Faber’s The Crimson 
Petal and the White. The global narrative frame of this novel has an intru-
sive omniscient narrator who persistently addresses readers via a form of 
autotelic second person, “introducing” them to characters and guiding 
them through the fictional world. In the following passage the narrator 
performs, as a direct address to readers, the thoughts of Sugar regarding 
how she might respond to the narratee’s presence as she eavesdrops on 
Agnes, the wife of Henry Rackham (a response which she may or may not 
be rehearsing to herself):
Don’t be judgemental: this is not the way Sugar usually occupies her 
Tuesday afternoons; in fact, it’s her first time. No, really! William Rack-
ham is in Cardiff, you see, until Thursday, and Agnes Rackham is indis-
posed. So, rather than being idle, what’s the harm in following Clara, 
Agne’s lady’s-maid, on her afternoon off, and seeing what comes of it?” 
(354)
 Given the potential counterfactuality of FID, I would conclude by sug-
gesting we can profitably think about the relationship between FID and 
what David Herman calls hypothetical focalization. I will discuss this con-
cept in more detail in the following chapter. For now I will quote Herman’s 
general explanation of hypothetical focalization as “the use of hypotheses, 
framed by the narrator or a character, about what might be or have been 
seen or perceived—if only there were someone who could have adopted 
the requisite perspective on the situations and events at issue” (“Hypo-
thetical Focalization” 231). If we substitute here the phrase “what might 
have been thought in this way” we can see that omniscience provides the 
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“requisite perspective” for seeing into a character’s mind and that FID is 
the form the narrator employs to perform this character’s thoughts had 
they been able to adopt this perspective. This means that FID does not 
need to be an account of how the character may have articulated their 
thoughts, hence requiring a kind of lexical fidelity to the character’s lin-
guistic habitus, but a kind of translation of these thoughts which is not 
“telling” as opposed to “showing” them but a performative inhabitation 
of a fictional mind.
in  the  introdUCtion  to Transparent Minds, Dorrit Cohn draws atten-
tion to the paradox of realist fiction: that its realism is heightened by the 
fantasy of complete access to a person’s inner life: “narrative fiction attains 
its greatest ‘air of reality’ in the representation of a lone figure thinking 
thoughts she will never communicate to anyone” (7). Hence the conven-
tional authority of omniscience is founded upon what Cohn calls “the 
unnatural presentation of the inner life found in third-person fiction” 
(Distinction 16). In this chapter, I discuss a different paradox: when the 
unnatural knowledge of omniscience is mobilized by the narrative voice of 
first-person character narrators.
paralepsis and 
omniscient Character narration
C h a P t e r  7
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But what the hero cannot say, the author cannot tell.
—Anna Laetitia Barbauld, “Life of Samuel Richardson” xxv
How to dispense with Padma? How give up her ignorance and superstition, 
necessary counterweights to my miracle laden omniscience? 
—Salman Rushdie, Midnight’s Children 170
No individual owns any story. The community is the owner of the story, and it can 
tell it the way it deems it fit. We would not be needing to justify the communal 
voice that tells this story if you had not wondered how we became so omniscient 
in the affairs of Toloki and Noria. 
—Zakes Mda, Ways of Dying 12
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 There is a long history of character narrators saying more than the 
conventions of realism dictate they should know, in novels from Tristram 
Shandy to Moby Dick to The Great Gatsby, sometimes on isolated occa-
sions throughout the narrative, sometimes persistently, with lesser and 
greater degrees of explanation for this excess of knowledge. My focus 
here is on novels over the past few decades which collectively have devel-
oped “first-person omniscience” as virtually another category of narrative 
voice. Some well-known examples include best-selling and prizewin-
ning novels such as Salman Rushdie’s Midnight’s Children (1981), Peter 
Carey’s Oscar and Lucinda (1988), Toni Morrison’s Jazz (1992), Rick 
Moody’s The Ice Storm (1994), Carol Shield’s The Stone Diaries (1995), 
Jeffrey Eugenides’s The Virgin Suicides (1993) and Middlesex (2002), Ian 
McEwan’s Atonement (2001), Alice Sebold’s The Lovely Bones (2002), 
and Junot Diaz’s The Brief Wondrous Life of Oscar Wao (2007). It is no 
coincidence, I think, that these works have appeared at the same time that 
new modes of heterodiegetic omniscience have been developed, together 
firmly establishing omniscient narration as a key feature of experimenta-
tion in contemporary fiction.
 When first-person narrators adopt the privilege of omniscience typi-
cally associated with authorial narration, and narrate with authority the 
thoughts of other characters or events at which they were not present, our 
default response seems to be: how do they know? I want to suggest that 
the ways in which narrative theory has engaged with this question dem-
onstrate the extent to which it is in thrall to an “epistemological fallacy,” 
where questions regarding practices of storytelling are framed as a prob-
lematics of knowledge. The debates which result from this approach point 
to a narratological preoccupation with attribution: to whom do we assign 
vision, voice, consciousness, intentionality, etc., resulting in a multiplica-
tion of possible agents: author, implied author, narrator, focalizer, charac-
ter, and reader. In this case, the “problem” has been: to which agent do we 
assign responsibility for impossible knowledge?
paralepsis and focalization
The most common approach to the “problem” of first-person omniscience 
has been through an extension of Genette’s concept of paralepsis. In his 
chapter on mood in Narrative Discourse, Genette claims that “a change 
in focalization, especially if it is isolated within a coherent context, can 
also be analyzed as a momentary infraction of the code which governs that 
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context without thereby calling into question the existence of the code” 
(195). Genette gives the name alterations to these “isolated infractions” 
(195), and christens as paralepsis any alteration of focalization which 
involves “giving more [information] than is authorized in principle in the 
code of focalization governing the whole” (195). This “excess of infor-
mation” is not an “epistemological” problem in third-person narration, 
where it is assumed the narrator knows more than the focal character, but 
it is framed as such in first-person narration.
 Some apparent paralepses in first-person narration can be under-
stood as speculations or reconstructions of events based on subsequent 
knowledge. “The real difficulty arises,” Genette says, “when the narrative 
reports to us, on the spot and with no perceptible detour, the thoughts of 
another character in the course of a scene where the hero himself is not 
present” (207). In particular, for Genette, when Proust’s narrator provides 
us with “access to the last thoughts of Bergotte on his deathbed” (207–8), 
this is “one paralepsis to end all paralepses; it is irreducible by any hypoth-
esis to the narrator’s information, and one we must indeed attribute to 
the ‘omniscient’ novelist” (208). Some critics argue that instances of Mar-
cel’s impossible knowledge highlight the fictionality of his autobiographi-
cal writing, the tension between his novelistic desires and his memoiristic 
project. For Morton P. Levitt there is no “omniscient inconsistency” in 
the novel if we separate narrator from character and attend to the fact 
that the novel we are reading is the work Marcel devotes himself to writ-
ing: “The presumed autobiography turns inevitably—for Marcel is above 
all an artist, and he has an agenda of his own—into a fiction” (82). It is 
possible, then, that in this paraleptic moment Marcel could be assuming 
the omniscience of the novelist in the act of narration. Genette does not 
countenance this hypothesis because Marcel does not admit speculation, 
unlike other instances where modal locutions become indices of a focal 
restriction. This is consistent with Genette’s project to apply grammatical 
categories to narrative theory, in which he claims the function of narrative 
is to tell a story by reporting facts and therefore “its one mood, or at least 
its characteristic mood, strictly speaking can only be the indicative” (161).
 In Narrative Discourse Revisited Genette reiterates that focalization is 
to be understood as “a selection of narrative information with respect to 
what was traditionally called omniscience.” He goes on to write: “In pure 
fiction that term is, literally, absurd (the author has nothing to ‘know,’ 
since he invents everything), and we would be better off replacing it with 
completeness of information—which, when supplied to a reader, makes 
him ‘omniscient’” (74). For Genette, then, the author selects what infor-
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mation about the story to convey in the narrative, with the various modes 
of focalization offering choices of restriction or regulation of this informa-
tion. The function of the narrator in Genette’s model is really only to be 
the instrument of this focalization, what he calls “a sort of information 
conveying pipe,” to report the story which the author has invented (74). 
This allows Genette to claim, in Narrative Discourse, that Balzac’s nar-
rator is never Balzac, “even if here and there he expresses Balzac’s opin-
ion, for this author-narrator is someone who ‘knows’” the events being 
narrated “whereas all Balzac himself does is imagine them” (214). A key 
methodological claim which results from this separation of author and 
narrator is that “the narrating situation of a fictional account is never 
reduced to its situation of writing” (214). This is fair enough, but when 
Genette attributes a paralepsis to the novelist’s omniscience, I think he is 
effectively reducing the instance of narrating to the instance of writing, 
and this is because his theory cedes responsibility for the regulation of nar-
rative information to the author rather than the narrator.
 Genette’s solution to Marcel’s moments of impossible knowledge is 
to explain them as elements of what he calls Proust’s transgressive poly-
modality. However, I think it is worth looking again at his theory of focal-
ization. In his revision of earlier theories of point of view, Genette argued 
that what was traditionally understood as omniscient narration can 
be termed “nonfocalized narrative, or narrative with zero focalization” 
(189). Following Todorov, he provides this definition: “where the narrator 
knows more than the character, or more exactly says more than any of the 
characters knows” (189). I want to dwell for a moment on this relation-
ship between knowing and speaking.
 In the introduction to Narrative Discourse, Genette is clear in stating 
that “[s]tory and narrating thus exist for me only by means of the inter-
mediary of the narrative” (29). This is a statement of method. Its premise 
is that we reconstruct the temporal order of events, receive information 
about the story, and identify traces of the narrating instance solely from 
the narrative discourse itself. If we approach a narrative with this method, 
rather than the presuppositions of convention, Genette’s formulation 
of omniscience suggests to me that we know a narrator possesses more 
knowledge than the characters only because the narrator says more than 
they know. Hence my claim that the authority of omniscience is con-
stituted by a narratorial performance which invokes the conventional 
assumption of competence.
 It could therefore also be the case that a narrator does not necessarily 
possess more diegetic knowledge than the characters, but, in saying more, 
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possesses a narrative authority predicated on the assumption of superior 
knowledge. In other words, omniscience is the performative effect of a 
text’s narrative voice, rather than a product of its focalization. The idea 
that knowledge about the story world is called into being by the act of 
narration should make sense when we consider Genette’s definition of nar-
rating as “the generating instance of narrative discourse” (213). But in 
separating voice from focalization, Genette methodologically prioritizes 
knowing over saying. This is the basis of the epistemological fallacy in nar-
rative theory.
 Genette’s extra-textual recourse to the omniscient novelist to explain 
paraleptic instances is more coherent, I think, in James Phelan’s rhetorical 
narratology, which takes a more explicitly pragmatic approach to paralep-
sis. For Phelan, these “deviations from the dominant narrative technique” 
(Living 83) are cases of the implied author providing necessary informa-
tion to the authorial audience while still trying to retain the mimetic effect 
of the overall narrative. Phelan calls this the disclosure function, describ-
ing it as an authorial strategy which trumps the narrator function. Again, 
there is no room to attribute the paralepsis to the narrator’s invention for 
the sake of the story. We can see here that the theory of paralepsis func-
tions as an interpretive vacuum, in which critics feel compelled to furnish 
an explanation for a character narrator’s impossible or illicit knowledge.
Unnatural narratology
As examples of first-person omniscience have increased in volume and 
prominence over the past three decades, they have demanded attention 
from narrative theorists, and have continued to be understood in the epis-
temological terms determined by the theory of paralepsis. In Narrative 
Discourse Revisited, Genette describes the “correlations between mood 
and voice” in terms of a contract where “the heterodiegetic narrator is not 
accountable for his information,” but a homodiegetic narrator “is obliged 
to justify” any illicit knowledge (77). For Genette, any breach of this trust 
is a paralepsis, and, “as a consequence of its ‘vocal’ selection,” homodi-
egetic narrative “submits a priori to a modal restriction” which he calls 
“prefocalization” (78).
 When he goes on to add homodiegetic narration with zero focaliza-
tion to his typology of possible combinations of voice and focalization, 
offering Moby Dick as an example, Genette has completed the transition 
of paralepsis from a focal alteration which could apply to heterodiegetic 
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narration with external or internal focalization, to a synonym for first-
person omniscience. Paralepsis is no longer an isolated infraction of 
a governing code, but a governing code itself which is by definition an 
infraction. The foundations laid by Genette’s structuralist narratology 
have since been reworked by cognitive narratology concerned with read-
ers’ naturalizing practices, enabling paralepsis to become a key object of 
study for the emergent research field of unnatural narratology.1
 In their 2010 manifesto, “Unnatural Narratives, Unnatural Narratol-
ogy: Beyond Mimetic Models,” Alber, Iversen, Nielsen, and Richardson 
argue that paralepsis should be understood as the product of an unnatu-
ral mind. In keeping with their critique of the “mimetic bias” of narrative 
theory, which they claim rests upon “the idea that narratives are modeled 
on the actual world” (114), they emphasize that many forms or techniques 
which may have become “conventionalized over time” are nonetheless 
inherently unnatural, in the sense that they do not occur in real-world acts 
of communication. The capacity of fictional minds to know the thoughts 
of characters is a chief example. “The differences between the rather 
diverse forms of unnatural minds,” they argue, “may be sketched out as 
a continuum ranging from well-known and thus conventionalized cases” 
such as omniscient narrators, “to the most bizarre and opaque cases found 
in experimental fiction” (120). Toward this end of the continuum are “the 
unnatural minds of ‘omniscient’ (or telepathic) first-person narrators” 
(120).
 So here is the claim that we cannot rely on the idea of human con-
sciousness to explain narratorial models. “In some first-person narratives,” 
it is pointed out, “the narrator knows significantly more than he could if 
he or she were a real person” (124). This is a theory of paralepsis which 
highlights how the code of prefocalization which first-person omniscient 
narrators defy is founded on real-world possibilities, making the obliga-
tion for homodiegetic narrators to justify their knowledge a product of 
the mimetic bias. The difference in approach between classical narratology 
and unnatural narratology then lies in how this “deviation” is explained, 
how the interpretive vacuum is filled. In challenging the mimetic bias, 
unnatural narratology also seeks to resist the impulse of much cognitive 
narratology to explain strange narratives by adapting them to real-world 
scripts, such as the Theory of Mind, arguing instead that “one can simply 
accept the fact that many narratives go well beyond imaginable real-world 
situations” (129).2
 I’m not sure, however, whether the category of the unnatural mind 
really challenges the mimetic bias, or that it leads to more insightful inter-
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pretations. The problem with unnatural narratology for me is that in 
wanting to preserve the “unnatural” qualities of first-person omniscience 
from the conventionalization undergone by third-person omniscience it is 
obliged to keep the mimetic bias always present as a default model to be 
challenged. If the theory of a paraleptic infraction is based on a mimetic 
bias, why continue to label it paralepsis? All that it is accomplished is a 
displacement of the infraction from a textual convention to a cognitive 
framework. Furthermore, the desire to resist conventionalization leads to 
an oversimplification of what counts as real-world cognitive parameters. 
If the authors of unnatural narratives are able to imagine impossible sto-
ryworlds, antinomic temporalities, mind reading and unnatural narrative 
voices, presumably these imaginative acts are real-world cognitive activi-
ties. To put it bluntly, writing fiction is a natural act of communication, 
and this is the model first-person narrators invoke when performing omni-
science in the act of narration.
paralepsis and naturalization
To demonstrate some of the interpretive problems and typological limita-
tions generated by the “unnatural” approach to first-person omniscience, 
I turn to Ruediger Heinze’s 2008 essay “Violations of Mimetic Epistemol-
ogy in First-Person Narrative Fiction.” Heinze presents the existence of 
first-person omniscience as a research problem to be addressed by narra-
tive theory: “How, then, can one conceptualize first-person narrators in 
fictional narratives whose quantitative and qualitative knowledge about 
events, other characters, etc., clearly exceeds what one could expect of a 
human consciousness and would thus make them prone to being labeled 
‘omniscient’?” (280).
 His first move is to claim that these narrators can’t be “naturalized” 
or “narrativized” as unreliable, because, despite their unusual knowl-
edge, there are no indicators of insincerity or inconsistency in the narrative 
report. He also dismisses the possibility of satisfactorily explaining these 
narratives as narratorless or voiced by nonhuman narrators because of the 
clear presence of human consciousness in the act of telling. And he dis-
misses recourse to possible worlds theory on the same grounds: “With the 
slight but significant exception of unusual knowledge, the narrators belong 
to a ‘natural’ world very much like the actual one” (285).
 Heinze’s approach is to follow Culler’s lead and reject the concept 
of “omniscience,” instead using “the term ‘paralepsis’ whenever refer-
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ring to the phenomenon of a first-person narrator knowing and/or sens-
ing something to which he/she should not have access by all that we as 
readers know about human cognition and perception” (282). One can see 
by this definition that Heinze is not using the term “paralepsis” in the 
classical structuralist sense that Genette employed it, where the infraction 
is defined in relation to the dominant mood of the text. Instead, rather 
than an “alteration” of focalization, paralepsis is defined as the infrac-
tion of real-world frames of reference which readers bring to a text. “As 
a purely text-immanent phenomenon,” Heinze argues, “paralepsis cannot 
be adequately explained. . . . Without knowledge of some basic cognitive 
and phenomenological aspects of the actual world (for example our inabil-
ity to mind-read),” statements requiring unusual knowledge would not 
“qualitatively differ” from mere report of action (283).
 The result is to limit his account of first-person omniscience to what 
he calls a violation of mimetic epistemology. With this method in place, 
Heinze presents five types of “first-person paraleptic narrators” before 
“discarding” or “disqualifying” three of them because their impos-
sible knowledge can be naturalized. The case of illusory paralepsis can 
be explained by the delayed disclosure of a plausible reconstruction from 
available evidence; humorous paralepsis can be seen as parody or unreli-
able narration; and mnemonic paralepsis can be seen as an extension of 
accepted narrative conventions. This last category refers to the “impos-
sibly comprehensive and infallible memory” of some narrators, but is 
dismissed because readers are habituated to the fact that “all first-person 
narrators remember pages and pages of dialogue verbatim” (286).
 So after discarding the majority of examples of first-person omni-
science for being “natural” paralepses and thus not paraleptic enough, 
we are left with two “real” cases of paralepsis which, Heinze says, “can 
be called ‘non-natural’ because their paralepsis cannot be rationalized 
within a natural world. They are true violations of mimetic epistemology. 
The explanation is either beyond the known physical laws or simply not 
given” (286). These two paralepses are the global and the local. Global 
paralepsis “is situated within a non-natural impossible frame” such as the 
narrator of Alice Sebold’s The Lovely Bones narrating the story of her 
murder from heaven (286). Local paralepsis is “situated within a natural 
world but, nevertheless, is assumed by a first-person narrator in a style 
that suggests epistemological sincerity” (286). The example here is Rick 
Moody’s The Ice Storm, in which a character, Paul, assumes the role of 
authorial third-person narrator to look back upon his adolescence and tell 
the story of the annus horriblis of his family.
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 The problem I have here is that if, as Heinze indicates, his typology 
is determined by the degree to which each paralepsis can be naturalized, 
and local paralepsis “is perhaps more difficult to naturalize because it is 
situated in a basically natural and realistic world with the physical laws of 
the real world intact” (286), then positing The Ice Storm as his exemplar 
makes his case difficult to sustain. The Ice Storm opens with the line: “So 
let me dish you this story about a family I knew when I was growing up. 
There’s a part for me in this story, like there always is for a gossip, but 
more on that later” (3). This opening leads us to believe the narrator is a 
homodiegetic witness, but the novel quickly moves into an authorial voice 
employing variable internal focalization to shift perspectives between the 
father, mother, daughter, and son, while also containing many nonfocal-
ized “authorial” comments about the 1970s. The last paragraph of the 
novel, however, reminds us not only that it is homodiegetic narration, 
but that the narrator is in fact one of the main characters, the son of the 
family:
Or, that’s how I remember it, anyway. Me. Paul. The gab. That’s what 
I remember. And that this story really ends right at that spot. I have to 
leave Benjamin there with that news . . . and I have to leave myself—
Paul—on the cusp of my adulthood, at the end of that annus mirabilis 
where comic books were indistinguishable from the truth, at the begin-
ning of my confessions. I have to leave him and his family there because 
after all this time, after twenty years, it’s time I left. (279)
 Heinze runs through the ways in which this revelation might be natu-
ralized, dismissing the illusory, the humorous, and the mnemonic because 
the narrator does not reveal a natural source for his knowledge or high-
light his subjectiveness or speculation, and claims that the authorita-
tive heterodiegetic report can only be the result of unnatural knowledge. 
He seems to contradict his rejection of naturalization, though, when he 
asserts that as a result of the revelation “the reliability of everything that 
has been told has to be reevaluated” (291). In fact, The Ice Storm really 
does belong to Heinze’s most “naturalizable” and easily dismissed cat-
egory: that of illusory paralepsis. Indeed, it would best be described as an 
example of what Heinze relegates to a footnoted subcase of this type: the 
cloaked paralepsis, in which “a first person narrator is cloaked for some 
time in an authorial (heterodiegetic) narrative situation” (294). The rea-
son I say this is because Heinze fails to quote what for me is the key line 
of the novel, which comes after the narrator describes the uncanny experi-
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ence of Paul having the exact same dream that his father had years earlier: 
“This congruency—between Paul and his dad—is sort of like the congru-
ency between me, the narrator of this story, the imaginer of all these con-
sciousnesses of the past, and God” (206).
 This line draws attention to the imagination rather than unnatural 
telepathy of the narrator, and obviously refers to the convention of omni-
science with its reference to God. So why does Heinze privilege The Ice 
Storm as an example of the highest degree of unnaturalizability, as a true 
violation of mimetic epistemology, for which the “paraleptic insights” of 
the narrator “cannot be explained or rationalized” (289)? It seems to be 
because he can’t accept that the narrator has imagined the “conscious-
nesses of the past” rather than reported them.
 If we need to posit and then discard three types of paraleptic narrators 
then paralepsis is surely not the best term to understand the phenome-
non of first-person omniscience. Paralepsis, from structuralist to unnatural 
narratology, seems to be defined as a case where a first-person narra-
tor does not justify his or her possession of knowledge. The absence of 
modal language is interpreted as an epistemological dilemma, when really 
this refusal would, in many cases, more productively be approached as a 
rhetorical strategy of the narrator, along with the decision to maintain a 
homodiegetic presence from the beginning or to resort to delayed disclo-
sure. So rather than charting different types of paralepses according to 
degrees of naturalization, we might think about different rhetorical mobi-
lizations of the conventional performative authority of omniscience.
 It could be argued that in claiming homodiegetic omniscience is the 
product of the character narrator’s imagination rather than impossible 
knowledge I am practicing another form of naturalization. This is true, 
and my response would be that this is the most accurate form of natural-
ization for these texts. However, I would also argue that we have recourse 
to naturalization as a reading practice only if we first consider a narrative 
to be unnatural. This first move, of encountering something strange which 
needs to be explained, is not necessarily a “natural” response of readers, 
it is the product of the mimetic bias itself. In Genette’s formulation, para-
lepsis relates to momentary or isolated infractions of the governing code 
of focalization. If a narrative establishes homodiegetic omniscience as the 
governing code, one cannot point to instances of impossible knowledge 
as an infraction of this code, unless one invokes the mimetic bias as an 
external code or cognitive frame. Rather than focusing on the unnatural 
qualities of first-person omniscience by terming it paralepsis, I suggest an 
approach which highlights the fictional invention of the narrator.
ParalePsis and omnisCient CharaCter narration • 205
paralepsis and hypothetical focalization
This brings me to David Herman’s work on hypothetical focalization 
(HF). In his project to bring the theory of possible worlds semantics into 
dialogue with narratology, Herman suggests a way of building upon the 
classical structuralist typology of focalization. “My claim is that by exam-
ining narratives told from a more or less obviously hypothetical point of 
view, we can start to rethink narrative mood generally, focalization spe-
cifically, in the context of the theory of possible worlds” (“Hypothetical 
Focalization” 233). He proceeds to outline Genette’s categories of zero, 
internal and external focalization before asking:
But what about narratives whose development provokes, in a more or 
less direct or explicit way, speculation about some nonexistent focalizor? 
At issue are narratives focalized such that we gain as it were illicit access 
to the materials of the story—materials not in fact focalized, or not focal-
izable even in principle, in the world(s) of the narrative. (236)
 This discussion of “illicit access” sounds very much like a reference to 
paralepsis, and indeed in a footnote to this passage Herman writes: “Thus, 
we might want to construe HF as a special case of what Genette terms 
‘paralepsis,’” arguing that his purpose “is to analyze in detail the specifi-
cally paraleptic effects of HF—effects which may suggest less the infrac-
tion of a code, than grounds for rethinking the principles on which the 
code itself is based” (249).
 Herman’s goal is to reconfigure our understanding of focalization from 
a distinction between internal and external perspectives on a story (in Bal’s 
understanding of these terms), to a scale of epistemic modalities in which 
varying degrees of doubt or certainty about the storyworld are encoded in 
the narrative discourse by grammatical moods. And here he suggests that 
we can take Genette’s application of grammar to narrative not in a loose 
metaphorical sense, but literally by attending to modal locutions. This 
approach to what he calls the intensional properties of narrative, Herman 
argues, will facilitate greater attention to the study of narrative meaning 
because it posits focalization as a means of establishing propositional atti-
tudes toward the reference world.
 This is the context in which he discusses the category of HF, the appeal 
to a nonexistent or virtual focalizer or focalizing act, marked by modal 
locutions which offer a counterfactual perspective on what might have 
been observed or thought. Herman places HF at one end of a scale of 
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“epistemic deixis,” marking maximal doubt about the reference world, 
and zero focalization at the other end, indicating maximal congruence 
between the expressed and the reference world of the narrative. For Her-
man, then, “‘omniscience’ entails an epistemic stance in which a focalizer 
has absolute faith in the veracity, the actualness or actualizability, of the 
states of affairs detailed in the narrative” (246).
 The question here is, what happens when this omniscience is attached 
to a character narrator? We have the discursive appearance of certainty, 
but the narrator’s role as a character calls this epistemic stance into doubt, 
not through the presence of modal locutions, but by the very act of adopt-
ing an “external” perspective in the act of narration. So if first-person 
omniscience is defined as a paralepsis, and if Herman calls HF “a special 
case” of paralepsis, what is the relation between first-person omniscience 
and HF?
 First-person omniscience, I suggest, offers an epistemic stance in which 
a “focalizer,” which I understand as a perspectival position rather than an 
agent, may express no doubt about the reference world, but the narrator, 
in saying more than he or she knows or could know, cannot unproblem-
atically claim the epistemic authority associated with this focal position. 
As a result, first-person omniscience becomes a performance of knowledge 
based on the hypothesis of a virtual focalizer: this is what would have 
been perceived by an omniscient narrator if such a perspective were pos-
sible. The extent to which readers doubt the epistemic stance of this virtu-
alized zero focalization is dictated by the rhetoric of the narrating agents, 
their willingness to “justify” this stance, to make light of it, or their deci-
sion to conceal it. So the difference between what Heinze calls the “illu-
sory” paraleptic narrator of Jeffrey Eugenides’s Middlesex, who reminds 
us that “of course, a narrator in my position (prefetal at the time) can’t be 
entirely sure about any of this” (9) and Moody’s local paraleptic narrator 
who utters third-person authorial pronouncements, is one of rhetorical 
strategies rather than degrees of knowledge.
 As Herman’s examples show, isolated passages of grammatically 
encoded HF operate across a range of narrative categories, from first- to 
third-person voices, and from internal to zero focalization. While he care-
fully delineates the different functions of direct and indirect HF in their 
strong and weak versions, the case of homodiegetic omniscience highlights 
the importance of demonstrating how these types of HF interact with dif-
ferent modes of focalization and different narrative voices.
 For instance, it is obvious that omniscient narrators may deploy HF 
to demonstrate hyperbolically their own epistemic authority, conjuring a 
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virtual focalizer to speculate about what they already know, as is the case 
in Herman’s example from Possession: “An observer might have specu-
lated for some time as to whether they were travelling together or sepa-
rately” (273). The narrator, of course, knows that these two characters 
are secret lovers travelling together. In this sense, hypotheticality could be 
understood as a paralipsis, Genette’s term for a narrator saying less than 
they know. At the same time, the narrator’s rhetorical use of this “hypo-
thetical observer” (274) orients contemporary readers to a subject position 
aware of nineteenth century models of propriety. The Ice Storm, on the 
other hand, has several instances of modal locution which paradoxically 
serve to solidify its narrative authority by counterfactualizing the already 
imaginary act of focalization. Here is Benjamin Hood, Paul’s father, turn-
ing up at a “key” party in the 1970s and realizing that the ascot tie he is 
wearing is no longer fashionable: “Had Hood been in a mind to comfort 
himself, he might have approved of his ample shirt collar, spread wide on 
the wings of his lapels. But how had he managed to get out the door wear-
ing the ascot? How had he let himself?” (107). The modal locution in the 
first sentence marks the thought as virtual. The conjunction suggests the 
following questions could easily be an extension of the narrator’s HF, even 
as it takes the form of free indirect thought. In fact, the whole passage of 
internal focalization is counterfactualized by the revelation that the narra-
tor is this character’s son, adopting the privilege of omniscience in the act 
of narration and describing himself as “the imaginer of all these conscious-
nesses of the past” (206).
omniscience across person
All this is by way of arguing that the relation between voice and focaliza-
tion is crucial to the effects of HF, and that, like other modes of focaliza-
tion, HF is a rhetorical strategy of storytelling akin to the strategies of 
justification employed by first-person omniscient narrators. So my claim 
is that first-person omniscience is an extension of HF beyond isolated 
modal locutions to the governing code of a narrative, in which a char-
acter, in the act of narration, draws upon the “privilege” of authorial 
omniscience to posit what could be known or perceived from the epis-
temic stance of zero focalization. The hypotheticality is not necessarily 
a propositional attitude of doubt, however, first because in its grammati-
cally encoded manifestations HF can operate as a rhetorical strategy for 
highlighting epistemic authority (such as in the case of Possession), and 
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secondly because the epistemic logic of first-person omniscience is often 
one of invention. So when the narrator of Middlesex undermines his 
epistemic authority by pointing to the limitations of his knowledge of the 
past, he is nonetheless asserting his narrative authority to tell the story 
of his life with conviction, established with this early invocation: “Sing 
now, O Muse, of the recessive mutation on my fifth chromosome!” (4).
 In The Rhetoric of Fictionality Richard Walsh argues that positing the 
idea of a narrator who knows cancels out the fictionality of fictional nar-
ratives. “The function of the narrator,” Walsh points out, “is to allow the 
narrative to be read as something known rather than something imag-
ined, something reported as fact rather than something told as fiction” 
(73). Walsh is not dismissing the idea that someone is telling a story, or 
arguing that fiction is not a communicative act. His rejection of the narra-
tor is a rejection of the concept of level and its implication of a narrative 
act outside the frame of representation. In claiming that “the narrator is 
always either a character who narrates, or the author” (78), Walsh argues 
that “omniscience is not a faculty possessed by a certain class of narrators, 
but, precisely, a quality of authorial imagination” (73).
 The fictional counterpart to Walsh’s argument, I suggest, is Ian 
Mc Ewan’s Atonement. This novel employs delayed disclosure to reveal 
that the apparent third-person omniscient narrator is in fact a character, 
Briony, herself a novelist, who has written the book we have just read, and 
admits to having invented the ending of the story she has narrated. Here is 
Briony’s justification for her choice of narrative voice:
The problem these fifty-nine years has been this: how can a novelist 
achieve atonement when, with her absolute power of deciding outcomes, 
she is also God? There is no one, no entity or higher form that she can 
appeal to, or be reconciled with, or that can forgive her. There is nothing 
outside her. In her imagination she has set the limits and the terms. No 
atonement for God, or novelists, even if they are atheists. It was always 
an impossible task, and that was precisely the point. The attempt was 
all. (371)
 The metafictional game being played here involves the “omniscient” 
author, McEwan, displacing his novelistic privilege of invention onto a 
character-narrator. Briony, in fact, can more accurately be described as 
the author of the first three parts of the novel, employing an omniscient 
narrator to report this fictionalized narrative of her life, creating an onto-
logical distinction between these parts and her revelations in the final sec-
tion, “London 1999.” In this case, the narrating Briony is enacting the 
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experiencing Briony’s desire for the unnatural or impossible knowledge 
of omniscience. This desire has two competing aspects: to access the 
thoughts of Cecilia and Robbie which would have afforded her experienc-
ing self the requisite empathy for understanding their motivations; and to 
assert creative control over the lives of her characters, offering the lovers a 
happy ending in fiction denied them in life by Briony’s misreading of their 
motivations.
 It should be made clear that I am not rejecting the argument that iso-
lated cases of impossible knowledge in many novels throughout history 
can be understood as paraleptic infractions where the author’s desire for 
exposition “trumps” the dominant focalizing code of first-person narra-
tion. I am arguing that the desire of characters to perform omniscience in 
the act of telling constitutes a global frame in much contemporary fiction, 
in which narrators invoke the genre of the novel rather than the memoir 
or the autobiography, which character narration originally mimicked pre-
cisely for the purposes of verisimilar authority. First-person omniscience, 
then, highlights the fact that telling one’s story is as much an act of imagi-
native reconstruction as it is a narrative report by someone who knows. 
In turn, it highlights what self-reflexive novelists have said for centuries: 
the capacity to invent fictional truths is part of the author’s discursive 
authority.
 What, then, are the ways in which the relation between first-person 
omniscience and traditional authorial narration have been explained? In 
considering the “functional design” of first-person omniscience, Heinze 
concludes that “paralepsis in first-person narrators can then be read as a 
satiric comment not only on the alleged panopticism of authorial narra-
tives but also on those critiques of these fictions that read them as pan-
optic” (292). Heinze locates these narrators historically as “the legitimate 
heirs of the postmodern language games,” with the unnatural knowledge 
of narrators parodically highlighting the fantasy of omniscience in real-
ist fiction: “If epistemic unity—or its pretense—is a form of assuming 
discursive control, then these narratives assume an impossible control, 
emphasizing that it has always been illusory anyway” (292). Morton P. 
Levitt makes a similar claim on behalf of modernism in The Rhetoric of 
Modernist Fiction, arguing that what he calls the “seeming omniscience” 
at play in the work of Carol Shields and José Saramago demonstrates the 
triumph of point of view and the subjectivism it entails over the certain-
ties of the form inherited from the Victorian novel.
 Can we see omniscient character narration, therefore, as a govern-
ing code or frame of hypotheticality which operates as a critique of the 
epistemological surety of traditional omniscience? Only, it seems to me, 
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if we perpetuate the epistemological fallacy of focalization as a mode of 
knowing rather than a strategy of telling. While it is certainly true that 
first-person omniscience produces a metatextual stance on the concept of 
omniscience itself, I would suggest that it is not a critique of omniscience, 
but another deployment of omniscience in the wake of postmodern meta-
fiction. I have already argued that metafiction reflexively re-introduced 
omniscience by highlighting the author’s creative power in agonistic 
rather than triumphalist fashion. I would suggest that first-person omni-
science can be characterized as a post-postmodern move beyond meta-
fiction because it draws attention, particularly in examples of delayed 
disclosure, to the artifice of the fiction, but locates the authorial figure 
within the diegesis, providing a characterological motivation for the 
reflexive experimentation with conventions of omniscience. In this way it 
contributes to the development of a relativized omniscience across person 
in contemporary fiction.
 Here I return to Richard Powers, whose post-postmodern sensibil-
ity is characterized as a combination of realism and metafictional experi-
mentation. As reviews of Generosity attest, the novel courts uncertainty 
about the diegetic status of the narrator. The novel opens with the narrator 
voyeuristically observing the protagonist, Russell Stone, on a train, and 
attempting to read the notes he is taking, while simultaneously drawing 
attention to the spatio-temporal distance of the narrating instance from 
the story: 
A man rides backwards in a packed subway car. . . . He’s just thirty-two, 
I know, although he seems much older. I can’t see him well at first. But 
that’s my fault, not his. I’m years away, in another country, and the El car 
is so full tonight that everyone’s near invisible. (3)
At times the narrator assumes the role of an immanent presence in the die-
gesis, spying on his own creation—“His pen freezes in midair; he looks up. 
I glance away, caught spying” (5). At other times he indicates that he is 
recreating the “real” world in fiction: “I watch him twist, the way he did 
so often in real life” (96).
 These intrusions display an anxiety about the extent of the narrator’s 
knowledge of the protagonist, similar to Martin Amis’s narrator in The 
Information: “The train sways, he pitches in his seat, and I don’t know 
anything. I stop deciding and return to looking” (4). The narrator’s con-
ventional access to consciousness seems insufficient, as he resorts to obser-
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vation and the documentary traces of Russell’s existence (his notes, the 
books he reads):
I search for Russell Stone all over. I read the almanac for that year. I 
read his class textbook, of course. I read back issues of his magazine. I 
even loot those hall-of-mirrors avant-garde novels whose characters try 
to escape their authors, the kind he once loved, the kind he thought he’d 
write one day, before he gave up fiction. (37–38)
 The equivocation between creative control—“I have her flip up her 
window slide and look out the plastic portal” (80)—and lack of insight—
“I wish I could make out Stone’s students better. I can see how they dis-
turb him. But I just can’t see them in any detail. They’re hiding in the 
sullen, shiny performance of youth” (7)—underpins the metafictional com-
mentary on the armature of fiction, from the arbitrariness of plot to the 
handling of time: “Time passes, as the novelist says. The single most use-
ful trick of fiction for our repair and refreshment: the defeat of time. . . . 
I needed 125 pages to get from Labor Day to Christmas vacation. In six 
more words, here’s spring” (156). There is enough evidence to suggest 
that this self-reflexive omniscient narrator is less of an authorial figure 
exposing the artifice of realist fiction and its representational claims than 
Russell himself writing about his life in a form he has lost faith in: “Just 
beyond the South Bend, Stone has an epiphany. He knows why he could 
never in his life or anytime thereafter write fiction: he’s crushed under the 
unbearable burden of a plot” (273). That the narrator is a character sepa-
rated from his experiencing self by temporal distance (subsequent narra-
tion) and by narrative voice (heterodiegetic) can be assumed from a line 
such as this: “Purveyors and contractors, drug dealers, number crunchers, 
busboys, grant writers. Just brushing against them in memory makes me 
panic” (4).
 The conclusion suggests that Russell has self-consciously adopted the 
role of omniscient authorial narrator as he turns his life into a work of fic-
tion to make sense of the death of his student, Thassa. In the final pages, 
Thassa meets up with the journalist, Tonia Schiff, and it is unclear at first 
whether this is an actual event in the storyworld, or a fictional encounter 
in which Thassa remains alive only in the novelist’s imagination. In this 
scene, Thassa wants to return the writing handbook which Russell set for 
his students to read, Make Your Writing Come Alive. The following line 
suggests an equivalence in identity between narrator and character:
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“It’s not mine,” she says. “Give it to Russell. He will need this.”
 I will need much more. Endless, what I’ll need. But I’ll take what I’m 
given, and go from there. (295)
 The novel, then, draws parallels between a heterodiegetic authorial 
narrator metafictionally commenting on a character he has created but 
cannot fully know, and a character narrator acknowledging the process of 
fictionalization involved in reconstructing his life as a narrative: “And I’m 
here again, across from the daughter of happiness as I never will be again, 
in anything but story. . . . She’s still alive, my invented friend, just as I 
conceived her, still uncrushed by the collective need for happier endings” 
(295). In a sense this severs the existential link between narrating and 
experiencing self which provides the epistemological grounds for a char-
acter narrator’s focal restriction. To the extent that the novel itself takes 
the relation between fiction and nonfiction as an object of exploration, 
Generosity shows how Powers has offered omniscient character narra-
tion as an extension of his practice of combining metafiction and realism, 
locating the metafictional elements in the character’s self-authorship.
first-person omniscience and narrative authority
Many first-person narrators go far beyond transcribing that which they have 
experienced themselves by letting the narrative arise anew from their imagination.
—Franz K. Stanzel, A Theory of Narrative 215
My argument is not simply that “unnatural” narratives can be natural-
ized, or to provide different interpretations of the texts under consider-
ation. In suggesting hypotheticality as the way to understand first-person 
omniscience, particularly as it highlights invention rather than specula-
tion and doubt, I want to think more about the relation of first-person to 
third-person omniscience in contemporary fiction. I have argued through-
out this book that omniscient narration is best understood not as a qual-
ity of authorial or narratorial knowledge, but as a specific rhetorical 
performance of narrative authority. As a result of this approach, I have 
suggested that focalization, the narratological category under which omni-
science is typically discussed, must be seen as a rhetorical strategy of nar-
rative voice. Instead of conceptualizing an all-knowing authorial narrator 
who is already in full possession of all there is to know about the story-
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world and who can then deploy different modes of regulating informa-
tion about this storyworld when representing it to readers, I am suggesting 
that we think of omniscient narrators as storytellers who generate and 
perform this knowledge in the act of narration. First-person omniscience 
“dramatizes” this concept of omniscience. If the impossible knowledge of 
homodiegetic narrators draws attention to the “unnaturalness” of omni-
science assumed by authorial narrators, what it highlights is our willing-
ness to understand the convention of omniscience in terms of narratorial 
knowledge rather than authorial invention. What is at stake in this form is 
a tension between two modes of narrative authority which have informed 
the history of the novel: the verisimilar authority of the eyewitness derived 
from the nonfictional form of the memoir or autobiography or confession; 
and the authority of “fictional truth” claimed by the novelist.
 My argument about imagination as the central paradigm for homodi-
egetic omniscience is anticipated by Scholes and Kellogg, who point to an 
uneasy relationship between empirical and fictional impulses in the his-
tory of the novel as a problem of authority associated with the question 
of point of view. The empirical authority of eyewitness narrators, they 
argue, is balanced by the fact that they cannot witness everything and can 
know only one mind: their own. “But the novelist’s determination to have 
the benefits of eyewitness narration without accepting its limitations has 
been indefatigable” (259). In tracing this determination of novelists, Scho-
les and Kellogg point to Tristram Shandy whose eyewitness status cov-
ers events before his birth, and to the narrator of Madam Bovary who 
begins as an eyewitness before fading into an omniscient presence (259). 
They also draw attention to Dickens’s “famous resort to a combination of 
disembodied omniscience and direct reporting in Bleak House” (260). In 
particular, they discuss the work of Proust who “has given us some of the 
most flagrant cases in all literature of the novelist’s insistence on having 
things both ways” (260). The paralepses in Proust which have become the 
touchstone of the epistemological fallacy in narrative theory are discussed 
here in terms of
Proust’s entire esthetic, which continually mentions the limitations of 
the empirical and asserts the extraordinary power of those insubstan-
tial essences, memory and imagination. He simply rejects the notion 
that “real” people can be apprehended without the assistance of these 
esthetic essences. Thus, conversely, as long as the eye-witness is imagina-
tive enough he need not be hindered, like poor Lucius in the stable, by 
any merely physical bonds. Since we are all makers, he suggests, creating 
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our lives as we go, there is no incompatibility between the narrator as 
witness and the narrator as creator. Proust’s esthetic enables the narrative 
artist to regain some of the ground he had lost when he abandoned his 
position as inspired bard for the more empirically oriented positions of 
eye-witness and histor. (260–61, original emphasis)
 Unencumbered by the epistemological fallacy, Scholes and Kellogg are 
able to acknowledge Proust’s focal transgressions but discuss them as a 
function of Marcel’s narratorial imagination (as opposed to telepathy). 
They go on to discuss the peripheral eyewitness narrator in the work of 
Conrad, claiming that: “Since the imagination plays the central role, the 
factual or empirical aspect of the protagonist’s life becomes subordinated 
to the narrator’s understanding of it. Not what really happened but the 
meaning of what the narrator believes to have happened becomes the cen-
tral preoccupation in this kind of narrative” (261). Fitzgerald, Faulkner, 
and Warren, they claim, “have all worked variations on this basic tactic” 
(261). The novels which I mentioned at the start of this chapter extend 
this tradition of emphasizing the role of imagination in narrative report. 
As examples of ways in which authors construct narrators who deploy 
omniscience in order to solve the limitations of first-person narration, they 
are also examples of ways in which first-person narration has extended the 
possibilities of omniscience in contemporary fiction.
hypothetical focalization and the narrating Instance
I do not wish to reject all claims for impossible knowledge, but the par-
adox of characters narrating more than they know can be construed as 
a rhetorical function of voice rather than an epistemological problem of 
focalization if we pay attention to the distinction between the narrating 
and experiencing selves of a character. In works of contemporary omni-
scient character narration, narrators constantly draw attention to the nar-
rating instance, providing a range of justifications for their “impossible” 
knowledge. These justifications necessarily imply a narratee as the nar-
rators contend self-reflexively with the “mimetic bias,” asserting their 
authority to narrate the story. On the majority of occasions, I suggest, 
they do so by invoking the importance of the imagination to the narra-
tive act. So, instead of displaying impossible knowledge attributable to an 
unnatural mind or the (implied) author, these character narrators deploy 
HF to assume the narrative authority of omniscience. Their narratives are 
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not the product of unnatural narrative acts, but of narratorial invention, 
drawing authority from the figure of the novelist who creates rather than 
the memoirist who reports. They self-consciously replicate, in the narrat-
ing instance, the determination of novelists to have it both ways, drawing 
attention in most cases to the fact that they are written narratives.
 Classifying omniscient character narration according to a model of 
paraleptic violations of mimetic epistemology with varying degrees of 
naturalizability creates a kind of artificial distinction between examples 
of this form. Instead, we can pay attention to the self-reflexive refer-
ences to the narrating instance in justificatory statements to establish the 
rhetorical means by which narrators perform the conventional author-
ity of omniscience as an imaginative heuristic, a search for knowledge. 
A typology of different modes of omniscient character narration would 
then focus on strategic deployments of the conventions of omniscience: 
autobiographical reconstruction of the narrator’s past in an attempt to 
make sense of their lives, narrated in autodiegetic mode (Midnight’s Chil-
dren, Middlesex, The Lovely Bones) or in heterodiegetic mode (The Ice 
Storm, Atonement, Generosity), typically employing delayed disclosure; 
or biographical reconstruction of the lives of other characters, known 
and unknown to a peripheral narrator, narrated by a singular (Oscar and 
Lucinda, Jazz) or plural (Ways of Dying, The Virgin Suicides) homodi-
egetic narrator.
 References to the imagination are common in many of these exam-
ples. The first-person plural or “we” narrator of Jeffrey Eugenides’s The 
Virgin Suicides speaks for a group of neighborhood boys who are unable 
to understand the female “point of view” represented by the mysterious 
Lisbon girls. Their capacity to narrate scenes and thoughts to which they 
were not privy is not explicitly explained, but readily alluded to early in 
the novel: “He had a high voice, and when Joe Larson told us how Mr. 
Lisbon had cried when Lux was later rushed to the hospital during her 
own suicide scare, we could easily imagine the sound of his girlish weep-
ing” (8). The desire which animates this imagination is evident in their 
experience of seeing Cecilia Lisbon moments before she commits suicide: 
“She kept her face to the floor, moving in her personal oblivion, her sun-
flower eyes fixed on the predicament of her life we would never under-
stand” (29). This is what the boys do witness, at a party they were invited 
to. They then hear Cecilia walk up the stairs and fling herself out of a 
window to her death. They will never understand Cecilia or her sisters and 
this whole narrative, written years after the event in the narrators’ adult-
hood, is an attempt to flesh out what they know in the act of narrating, 
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of imagining, of performing omniscience. “Like us,” the narrators say of 
news reporters, “they became custodians of the girls’ lives, and had they 
completed the job to our satisfaction, we might never have been forced to 
wander endlessly down the paths of hypothesis and memory” (224).
 In Tony Morrison’s Jazz, the narrator opens with the line “Sth, I 
know this woman” (3), and proceeds to relay the private life and inner 
thoughts of the woman, whom she does not actually seem acquainted 
with, and many other characters, even those in the past. Caroline Rody 
describes Jazz as having “a form of narration we might call the first-
person omniscient anonymous” which makes “the identity and the status 
of the knower a central puzzle of the story” (622). Rody claims that the 
combination of personal subjective narrator and omniscient knowledge 
make this an “impossible” and “logically infeasible” voice (622). How-
ever, the narrator makes clear the grounds of her knowledge: “Risky, I’d 
say, trying to figure out anybody’s state of mind. But worth the trouble if 
you’re like me—curious, inventive, and well informed. . . . So he didn’t 
know. Neither do I, although it’s not hard to imagine what it must have 
been like” (137). The narrator in fact goes on to make this invention 
the grounds for a confession to the reader: “How could I have imagined 
him so poorly? . . . I have been careless and stupid and it infuriates me 
to discover (again) how unreliable I am” (160); “I believed I saw every-
thing important they did, and based on what I saw I could imagine what 
I didn’t” (221). The concluding section reveals the desire animating the 
narrator’s performance of omniscience: selfishness—“confused in my sol-
itude into arrogance, thinking my space, my view was the only one that 
was or that mattered” (220); and envy—“I envy them their public love. I 
myself have only known it in secret” (229).
 I will examine in more detail the narrative voice of Salman Rushdie’s 
1981 novel, the Booker of Bookers, Midnight’s Children, for this is the 
earliest of contemporary omniscient character narrators, referred to by 
Nicholas Royle as evidence for the necessity of recasting omniscience as 
telepathy, and because it certainly does have “unnatural” elements. In the 
magic realist world of this novel, the first-person narrator, Saleem Sinai, 
asks readers to believe that he somehow became a radio receiver when he 
was nine, able to hear the thoughts of other characters: “Telepathy, then: 
the inner monologues of all the so-called teeming millions, of masses and 
classes alike, jostled for space within my head” (168). In an account of 
how he dealt with this transformation, Saleem gives us a list of different 
types of focalization: “By sunrise I had discovered that the voices could 
be controlled—I was a radio receiver, and I could turn the volume up or 
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down; I could select individual voices; I could even, by an effort of will, 
switch of my newly-discovered inner ear” (164).
 And yet, despite this account of the unnatural mind of his younger 
experiencing self, the act of narration is a “natural” frame, in which the 
self-consciously unreliable narrator persistently refers to the process of 
writing in his attempts to reconstruct his past, to fill in the gaps in his 
knowledge: “Most of what matters in our lives takes place in our absence: 
but I seem to have found from somewhere the trick of filling in the gaps of 
knowledge, so that everything is in my head, down to the last detail” (14). 
This “trick” is the function of memory, “my new, all-knowing memory, 
which encompasses most of the lives of father mother grandfather grand-
mother and everybody else” (97). Here we have a magic realist justifica-
tion for the narrator’s mnemonic overkill. If this all-knowing memory is 
the product of his telepathic access to the memories of his family, how-
ever, it does not guarantee the infallible knowledge of omniscience. Indeed 
telepathy is far less important as both a theme and a mode of knowledge 
than memory:
“I told you the truth,” I say yet again, “Memory’s truth because mem-
ory has its own special kind. It selects, eliminates, alters, exaggerates, 
minimizes, glorifies, and vilifies also; but in the end it creates its own 
reality, its heterogeneous but usually coherent version of events; and no 
sane human being ever trusts someone else’s version more than his own.” 
(242)
 Rushdie’s narrator is aware of the role the imagination plays in the 
function of memory, thus recognizing that distortions and factual errors 
are inevitable in his narration: “I reply across the unreliable years to S. 
P. Butt, who got his throat slit in the Partition riots and lost interest in 
time: ‘What’s real and what’s true aren’t necessarily the same’” (87). This 
awareness is built into the act of narration itself: “as my decay accelerates 
(my writing speed is having trouble keeping up), the risk of unreliability 
grows” (310).3
 Furthermore, the act of narration is not informed by telepathic access 
to other character’s thoughts. In the following passage Saleem discusses 
the differences between his (older) narrating self and his (younger) experi-
encing self:
Then as now, someone was awake in the dark, hearing disembodied 
tongues. Then as now, the one deafened ear. And fear, thriving in the 
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heat . . . it was not the voices (then or now) which were frightening. 
He, young-Saleem then, was afraid of an idea—the idea that his par-
ents’ outrage might lead to a withdrawal of their love; that even if they 
began to believe him, they would see his gift as a kind of shameful defor-
mity . . . while I, now, Padma-less, send these words into the darkness 
and I am afraid of being disbelieved. He and I, I and he . . . I no longer 
have his gift; he never had mine. (190, original ellipses, emphasis added)
 This suggests that Saleem’s narrating self no longer possesses his 
youthful gift of telepathy and must rely upon his memory. In this sense, 
then, the narrator is paradoxically paraliptic, saying less than he knew. 
The “disembodied tongues” that he hears in this passage are present only 
in his confusion of past and present self: “Different and similar, we are 
joined by heat. A shimmering heat-haze, then and now, blurs his then-time 
into mine . . . my confusion, travelling across the heat waves, is also his” 
(191). Although Saleem discusses how as a child he would enter a person’s 
mind, he typically refrains from relaying the contents of that mind. To 
cope with his telepathic gift, he tells us, he had to assume some sense of 
control:
Because the feeling had come upon me that I was somehow creating a 
world; that the thoughts I jumped inside were mine, that the bodies I 
occupied acted at my command; that, as current affairs, arts, sports, the 
whole rich variety of a first-class radio station poured into me, I was 
somehow making them happen . . . which is to say, I had entered into 
the illusion of the artist, and thought of the multitudinous realities of the 
land as the raw unshaped material of my gift. “I can find out any damn 
thing!” I triumphed, “There isn’t a thing I cannot know!” (199)
 This admission, of course, raises the specter of doubt regarding the 
young Saleem’s “gift” within a global narrative framework of unreliability. 
The story being narrated is an imaginative reconstruction rather than a 
reliable paraleptic account, and subject to the dictates of the narrative act 
itself: “And now I, Saleem Sinai, intend briefly to endow myself-then with 
the benefits of hindsight; destroying the unities and conventions of fine 
writing, I make him cognizant of what was to come, purely so that he can 
be permitted to think the following thoughts” (270). This narrator is liber-
ated from the mimetic bias not by virtue of his unnatural mind, but by his 
self-reflexive awareness of narrative as an act of invention.
 Writing about Midnight’s Children in his 1982 essay, “Imaginary 
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Homelands,” in the context of his status as an Indian writer, Rushdie 
claims:
Writers are no longer sages, dispensing the wisdom of the centuries. And 
those of us who have been forced by cultural displacement to accept the 
provisional nature of all truths, all certainties, have perhaps had modern-
ism forced upon us. We can’t lay claim to Olympus, and are thus released 
to describe our worlds in the way in which all of us, whether writers or 
not, perceive it from day to day. (12–13)
 Midnight’s Children can thus be seen as the refracted voice of Rush-
die’s cultural authority in the relativized omniscient voice of Saleem Sinai. 
That Rushdie chose, several years later, to write The Satanic Verses with 
an omniscient “satanic” narrator, suggests another experimental attempt 
to lay claim to Olympus.
authorship and homodiegetic omniscience
I have pointed out how Genette attributes Marcel’s paraleptic statements 
to the transgressive polymodality of the “omniscient author,” and how 
Phelan attributes similar statements in other works to the implied author 
operating along a different track of communication from the narrator. 
More recently, Henrik Nielsen has drawn upon the premises of unnatural 
narratology to assign paraleptic statements to an impersonal first-person 
voice separate from the character narrator (“The Impersonal Voice”) or 
to a kind of authorial intrusion in a character’s narrative, both of which 
expose the logical unity of the narrating instance as an anthropomorphic 
projection. The latter argument is made in “Natural Authors, Unnatural 
Narration,” in which Nielsen suggests the need to reconsider the impor-
tance of authorship in narrative theory. Nielsen refers to Richard Walsh’s 
argument that to employ the concept of narration as report, and thus posit 
the figure of a narrator who knows rather than invents, cancels out the fic-
tionality of a work. He draws upon this insight to investigate works which 
problematize distinctions between fiction and nonfiction, and he does so 
to suggest that we need to pay more attention to how authors commu-
nicate information to readers through local manifestations of unnatural 
narration.
 Any attempt to acknowledge the importance of craft-based decisions 
by authors is productive. However, such a move seems again to rely upon 
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the epistemological fallacy and its logic of deferred attribution. This is 
because Nielsen wants to describe a narrative, or a moment of narration, 
as unnatural if its narrator could not know what is being reported. “Since 
narrators as ‘agents’ do not invent, they cannot help to explain passages 
that are—inside fiction itself—obviously invented and not reported” 
(298). Hence Nielsen’s recourse to the author to explain this invention. 
Yet surely the point of Walsh’s insight is that we don’t need to rely upon 
a model of narration as report, of a narrator who knows. If the author 
directly narrates a fictional invention, then why can’t a character narrator 
also invent a narrative report? Not, by virtue of the same logic of natu-
ralization, an unreliable report, but simply a fictional narrative. That is, 
in many cases it may be profitable to read a character narrator’s story as 
a novel about their lives with all the conventions of novelistic storytell-
ing available to them, rather than a memoir or autobiography, with the 
attendant focal restrictions accompanying the narrating instance of these 
forms. Only if we understand memoir or autobiography as the global 
generic frame of first-person narration will we deem instances of “impos-
sible” knowledge as unnatural.
 The problem of unnatural narratology is the assumption it shares with 
cognitive approaches to theories of naturalization: that only a “naturally” 
occurring form of oral conversational storytelling in the real world can be 
considered natural, and that this is the default mode of communication by 
which fictional narratives are understood. According to Nielsen:
While the narrative in texts of this nature can globally be considered a 
form of communication from author to reader, this global narrative may 
include local noncommunication rather than a report from an unwitting 
narrator. It may, for example, include narration that is unnatural, in the 
simple sense that it transcends the norms of everyday conversation and 
communication, and in the sense that it is without sender or receiver, 
without narrator or narratee. (297)
 So unnatural narration is seen here as non-communication if it can-
not be assimilated to the knowledge of the narrator. Nielsen provides a 
line from James Frey’s A Million Little Pieces which he says is unnatural 
because it cannot be communicated by a narrator: “I fade in and out. The 
TV is narcotic. In and Out. In. Out. In. Out.” For Nielsen, “there is no 
one to tell, and no one with a conscious mind able to do the telling” (297). 
Hence the line must be a global communication from the author, a fic-
tional invention which “violates the limits of narratorial communication” 
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rather than a local report from the narrator (298). But if, as Nielsen points 
out, “written narrative lends itself more easily to non-communication” 
(297), and the character narrator is authoring his own life, why can he not 
have written this? For Nielsen it is because rather than two tracks of com-
munication, in which the author communicates through the narrator, we 
have two voices:
My proposal has the advantage of acknowledging the ability of authors 
to employ such features of their choosing, as well as their ability to tran-
scend normal communication and the rules governing conversation or 
storytelling from narrator to narratee. This ability to go beyond com-
municational models is paradoxically, yet completely logically, possessed 
by no narrator understood within the framework of the very same com-
municational model. (299)
 My argument in this chapter has been that such claims deny the capac-
ity of authorial invention to character narrators when this capacity would 
seem to be a central rhetorical element of the narrative. Nielsen, at least, 
directs the epistemological preoccupations of unnatural narratology to 
questions of authorship, concluding that “narration cannot always be 
understood according to the rules of communicational discourse. Further-
more, this fact ties narration more closely to its flesh-and-blood author” 
(299). In my final chapter I will address the question of global communi-
cation between author and reader in terms of fiction as a mode of public 
discourse.
i F  n arrat i V e  aU th or it y  is the contingent product of a relational 
exchange between textual agents, and of the institutional and cultural con-
ditions of production and reception, I want in this final chapter to elabo-
rate the broader narratological ramifications of investigating the formal 
category of narrative voice in a discursive context. In doing so I will dis-
cuss how narrative theory can address its most significant lacuna: attention 
to the role of real authors in the structure of narrative communication. 
Acknowledging authorship is crucial to the function of narrative authority 
in contemporary omniscient narration.
 The foundational claims of Narrative Discourse, Genette’s “essay in 
method,” is that a narrative “can only be such to the extent that it tells 
a story” and “to the extent that it is uttered by someone” (29). This def-
inition informs Genette’s study of the ways in which a narrator reports 
information about the story in the narrative discourse. In The Rhetoric of 
Fiction, on the other hand, Wayne Booth is interested in “the technique 
of non-didactic fiction, viewed as the art of communicating with read-
ers,” in the “rhetorical resources” which writers employ to “impose [their] 
fictional world upon the reader” (xiii). Booth’s study is concerned with 
understanding how fictional form conveys the values of (implied) authors. 
real authors and real readers
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Adopting Roman Jakobsen’s linguistic account of the act of verbal com-
munication—in which an addresser sends a message to an addressee—as 
its basic model, narrative theory incorporated Genette’s narrator, Gerald 
Prince’s narratee, and Booth’s implied author and the reader he “makes” 
(named by Iser as the implied reader) to facilitate the study of narrative 
communication. Peter Rabinowitz’s 1977 “Truth in Fiction” drew these 
figures into a typological account of the relations between narrative 
agents, focusing on the receptive roles a text invites, such as the narrative 
audience and the authorial audience. Seymour Chatman’s diagrammatic 
model of narrative communication, proposed in his 1978 book, Story and 
Discourse, remains the standard (see figure 1).
 Thus, classical narratology posited as its object of study a series of 
agents immanent to a work of narrative fiction while leaving aside the 
agents which bracket this formulation: the author and the reader. As 
Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan argued in Narrative Fiction: “the empirical pro-
cess of communication between author and reader is less relevant to the 
poetics of narrative fiction than its counterpart in the text” (90).
 There have since been any number of variations and revisions of this 
basic model, depending on the methodological focus of individual scholars. 
In a 2005 book chapter titled “Why Don’t Our Terms Stay Put? The Nar-
rative Communication Diagram Scrutinized and Historicized,” Harry E. 
Shaw makes two points: first that “users of the diagram bring to it two 
different implicit models of the communication situation; and second that 
the terms the diagram seeks to describe necessarily become hazier as we 
move from left to right” (299). If the communication diagram evokes “the 
image of someone telling a story to someone else” (300), Shaw claims, the 
first model emphasizes the flow of information between the various com-
municative agents, while the second emphasizes the “effects and purposes 
the teller wishes to achieve” (300).
 For me, two important points arise from this account. First, Shaw’s 
distinction between an emphasis on the flow of information and an 
emphasis on the rhetorical features of telling can be seen as a difference 
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in analytical focus between focalization and voice. Information theo-
rists would see the narrating as the medium by which a focalized story 
is accessed or constructed by readers. Rhetoric theorists would see the 
focalized story as a vehicle for establishing a narrative effect. Given criti-
cal consensus that story is an effect of discourse, I think the latter must 
be privileged. Secondly, despite Shaw’s emphasis on the importance of the 
narrator, postclassical narratology has engaged primarily with the hazier 
right-hand side of the diagram. The story of postclassical narratology may 
be seen as an attempt to take up the challenge of theorizing the brack-
eting agent on the far right of the diagram, what is variously called the 
real reader, the actual reader, the empirical reader and the flesh-and-blood 
reader. Two prominent approaches to this challenge are the rhetorical-eth-
ical and the cognitive. One focuses on the ethical judgments readers make 
in response to the rhetorical techniques employed in a narrative; the other 
investigates how readers process and make sense of narrative elements to 
construct mental storyworlds. Both betray a tension between academic 
and general readers even as they try to elide the distinction.
 In the rhetorical approach, the critic stands in as a test case for this 
flesh-and-blood reader, one capable of entertaining a range of cognitive, 
emotional, aesthetic, and ethical responses, while still asserting a final crit-
ical judgment. For instance, in applying his model of rhetorical poetics to 
Ian McEwan’s Atonement, James Phelan writes: “I believe that flesh-and-
blood readers who respond in these ways are missing some of the intri-
cacies of McEwan’s communication, but I also believe that in McEwan’s 
strategies they have good reasons for their responses” (Experiencing 131). 
This emphasis on readers begs the question: how do we know the ways in 
which readers respond to a narrative?
 This question has animated criticisms leveled at the related field of 
reader response theory, in which it has been pointed out that the reader 
under study is typically an idealized version of the (androcentric) critical 
self. For instance, in a 1982 essay Mary Louise Pratt argued that “given 
the autobiographical bent of his recent book, Is There a Text in This 
Class?, it is fair to see [Stanley] Fish’s theoretical work partly as a per-
sonal quest to examine, and with any luck to validate, the bases of his own 
critical and pedagogical practice” (221–22). In a review of Phelan’s Living 
to Tell about It, Michael Eskin claims that Phelan cannot generalize into 
a theory of narrative his claims about the range of readers’ responses to 
narratives unless he incorporates an empirical approach into his critical 
practice. It should be pointed out, though, that in many instances Phelan is 
dealing with well-established public responses to narrative texts, evidence 
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for which can be found in reviews and essays about these texts. Responses 
to the revelation at the end of Atonement provide one clear example. At 
any rate, Phelan would legitimately claim that while his approach is reader 
oriented, it is nonetheless focused on the rhetorical strategies designed to 
evoke particular responses.
 The cognitive approach in narrative theory attempts to address this 
empirical shortcoming by overtly drawing its theoretical authority from 
research in cognitive science. In doing so, it collapses reader responses to 
a narrative into universal shared mental processes—such as “our evolved 
cognitive capacity for mind-reading” (10), in Lisa Zunshine’s words—
while still retaining a scholarly distance able to apprehend these processes 
in operation and articulate their relation to the narrative text. Manfred 
Jahn, in his cognitive approach to third-person narration, warns against 
the distinction between professional and general readers, arguing that to 
juxtapose “a sophisticated narratologist’s reading and a general reader’s 
reading highlights in a rather unflattering way the detrimental effect of 
mainstream narratology’s failure to account for what should be one of its 
prime considerations, the cognitive mechanics of reading” (464). Jahn goes 
on to argue that narratological readers not only share the same cognitive 
mechanics as general readers, but they must embrace this shared process 
of reading in order to generate more sophisticated textual analysis:
Despite the fact that recourse to readers, readers’ intuitions, and reading 
plays an important part in narratological argument, the contribution of 
mainstream narratology is preoccupied with bottom-up analyses, often 
assuming determinacies in violation of the Proteus Principle and indeter-
minacies in the presence of established cognitive preferences. (465)
 To what extent does a theoretical and empirical focus on real readers 
affect the validity and usefulness of the narrative communication model, 
and what sort of attention should be paid to real authors? While rhetori-
cal approaches to the effects of narratives on readers necessarily require 
a theory of narrative communication which attends to the agential func-
tion of narrators and (implied) authors, these occupants of the left-hand 
side of the communication diagram have been less important to cogni-
tive studies. The overwhelming focus on the cognitive mechanics which 
enable readers to make sense of stories has shifted attention firmly onto 
the constructivist role of reception. David Herman’s account of his cog-
nitive approach in Story Logic makes clear this focus on reception. “In 
the approach outlined in the present book,” Herman explains, “the real 
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target of narrative analysis is the process by which interpreters reconstruct 
the storyworlds encoded in narratives” (5).
 We can see that a focus on how readers process narrative, rather than 
how authors construct them, would lend itself more easily to a concern 
with focalization or perspective because this will yield the ways in which 
information about the storyworld is conveyed to readers.1 In cognitive 
narratology, the role of the narrator tends be subordinated to this func-
tion of narrative. I will focus here on two challenges to the concept of 
the narrator and narrative communication offered from cognitive perspec-
tives. In the “psychonarratological approach” of Marisa Bortolussi and 
Peter Dixon, the narrator is seen as a reader construct, the mental repre-
sentation of a speaker in the reader’s mind derived from textual features. 
For Monika Fludernik’s “natural narratology,” the narrator is the illusory 
product of an interpretive strategy based on a false presupposition that a 
narrative must be told by someone. For both, the communication model 
of narrative which accepts the textual existence of a narrator must be dis-
carded because the postulation of a fictional narrator derives from the 
application of real world frames of conversational storytelling to a written 
narrative.
 “In our view,” Bortolussi and Dixon claim in Psychonarratology, 
“it is common sense to analyze the words of the narrative as presented 
by a narrator, and a departure from this view strikes us as nonintui-
tive” (63). However, they are at pains to stress that the relation between 
readers and the narrators they construct can only be understood analog-
ically: “although there is no real communication in the linguistic, con-
versational sense, we argue that readers treat narrators as if they were 
conversational participants” (73). Bortolussi and Dixon claim that focus-
ing on “the essential communicative transaction between the narrator 
and reader” (69) is necessary because there is no actual communication 
between author and reader in written narratives, there is no “direct con-
tact between interlocutors” and hence no “feedback loop and progressive 
interchange of utterances” (70).
 The inapplicability of oral conversation to narrative fiction would 
appear to be obvious and common sense. Bortolussi and Dixon take the 
odd position of claiming author–reader relations cannot be understood 
in terms of a communicative model of oral conversation, before asserting 
that narrator–reader relations operate precisely according to this model. 
Yet if reader and author “do not share common perceptual ground” and 
“cannot engage in the communicative process of confirmation and error 
correction” (74), these problems surely also apply to the reader and the 
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narrator. So if, as they postulate, readers construct narrators as interlocu-
tors, why can they not do the same with authors? Bortolussi and Dixon 
will admit that they do, and it would seem remiss to disregard this aspect 
of the reading experience.
 Bortolussi and Dixon seem to be quibbling over an analogy they them-
selves have introduced, particularly in regard to the question of inten-
tionality: “suggesting that readers can be concerned with the historical 
author’s intention is not the same thing as suggesting that there is a sub-
stantive communicative interaction between the author and the reader 
analogous to what transpires in conversation” (70). But what proponent 
of narrative fiction as communication has made this suggestion? James 
Phelan defines his rhetorical account of narrative as “somebody telling 
somebody else on some occasion and for some purpose(s) that something 
happened,” but he emphasizes a double communicative situation in fic-
tional narrative, with both author and narrator addressing different audi-
ences. Bortolussi and Dixon claim that “readers perceive that the narrator 
addresses them for some purpose, and they feel naturally motivated to dis-
cern this purpose” (73). This would seem to tally very much with Phelan’s 
conception, yet while Phelan focuses on the intentionality behind “tex-
tual features,” they would like to keep reading at the solipsistic level of an 
imagined communication.
 The problem is a conception of reading as a private individual act anal-
ogous to a conversation unfolding in real time. To say that narrative fiction 
is not a form of communication because it is not the same as conversation 
is to operate with a very restrictive definition of communication. As I will 
argue later in this chapter, if we conceive of narrative fiction as a mode of 
public discourse, “real” communicational exchange between author and 
reader does in fact take place extratextually in interviews, reviews and 
responses to reviews, and so forth, which calls for a different formulation 
of communication.
 In the case of Bortolussi and Dixon, the analogy of the narrator as 
a conversational participant has analytic force for the empirical study of 
how readers engage with the narrator. Fludernik’s concept of a natural 
narratology, first proposed in Fictions of Language and Languages of Fic-
tion and elaborated in Towards a “Natural” Narratology, is far more 
complex and sophisticated than psychonarratology, while still retaining 
the central focus on how readers apply cognitive frames to make sense of 
texts, or, in Fludernik’s words, to narrativize them. Fludernik describes 
narrativization as an interpretative practice by which readers process a 
work as a narrative. She defines narrative, at the base level, as the presen-
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tation of experientiality through the mediating function of consciousness, 
whether a character’s or a narrator’s.
 On this basis, Fludernik claims, cognitive frames allow us to establish 
a continuum from naturally occurring spontaneous storytelling to experi-
mental postmodern fiction, and this continuum can be the basis of a dia-
chronic account of the ways in which new modes of narrative develop 
throughout history. This enables her to trace the development from oral to 
written narratives, and the absorption of non-natural modes of storytell-
ing into narrative fiction. The model of natural narratology thus allows 
her to criticize the narrative communication model as a theoretical fal-
lacy produced by the reification of cognitive frames. Like Bortolussi and 
Dixon, however, Fludernik criticizes a model for which she has provided 
an explanation, claiming for example that “one can now comprehend 
Stanzel’s narrative situations as a direct development from natural catego-
ries” (47).
 In relation to the concept of teller figures, Fludernik writes: “One can 
thereby explain the entire communicative analysis of fiction as an (illicit) 
transfer of the frame of real-life conversational narrative onto literary 
personae and constructed entities (such as that of the notorious ‘implied 
author’)” (47). This supports her argument, along the same lines as Ann 
Banfield in Unspeakable Sentences, that the persistent investment of nar-
ratologists in this illicit transfer operates against the grain of their own 
theoretical distinction between author and narrator, and, crucially, of the 
implications of modernist fiction:
Even more absurd, since the earlier (script-logical) tendency to identify 
the non-personalized narrator with the (historical) author has become 
untenable in the wake of the Modernist aesthetic, the responsibility 
for the telling has now been transferred to the (covert) narrator, or the 
implied author, and that even in narratological circles. The persistence 
of this preconceived notion that somebody (hence a human agent) must 
be telling the story seems to derive directly from the frame conception of 
storytelling rather than from any necessary textual evidence. (47)
 If Fludernik devotes four hundred pages to explaining how narratives 
are interpreted according to cognitive frames derived from real-life story-
telling, why criticize narratology for doing the same thing which “read-
ers” do? At stake seems to be a supposed misreading of the privileged 
mode of modernist fiction. Fludernik deploys cognitive science and lin-
guistics to provide theoretical grist for the modernist aesthetic mill that 
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Lubbock codified in The Craft of Fiction, from his idea of the creative 
reader reconstructing a fictional world from the shadowy phantasm of 
the book, to the ideal of an effaced authorial presence deriving from the 
distinction between telling and showing. The difference being that what 
Lubbock addressed in terms of an author’s methods Fludernik describes as 
scripts and schema brought to bear on a text by readers: 
Figural or reflectoral narrative allows them [readers], instead, to expe-
rience the fictional world from within, as if looking out at it from the 
protagonist’s consciousness. Such a reading experience is structured in 
terms of the natural frame of EXPERIENCING, which includes the expe-
riences of perception, sentiment and cognition. (48)
 Two points must be made in relation to these cognitive approaches to 
narrative. First, postulating a narrator is not simply an interpretive strat-
egy of readers that narratologists have illegitimately replicated; it is a via-
ble method for addressing the rhetorical features of narrative, and it is 
surely strengthened by the very fact that “readers” approach narrative in 
the same fashion. Hypostasizing the narrator as a formal element of nar-
rative strikes me as no less viable than arguing that we can understand 
narrative in terms of how readers construct narrators as conversational 
participants. Most importantly, like cognitive narratology in general, the 
paradigm of the natural is based on a study of the private individual read-
ing experience as a cognitive processing reliant on a facsimile of one on 
one communication, neglecting the crucial public dimension of the recep-
tion of literature in which narrative fiction is understood as a written arti-
fact to be discussed. It cannot help address the interrelation of narrative 
voice and authorial discourse that is at the heart of omniscient narrative 
authority.
defining the reader: how “real” Is real?
The cognitive study of narrative most reliant on empirical research is the 
psychonarratological approach offered by Bortolussi and Dixon. This 
approach is founded on their view that “[h]ow readers process narrative is 
essentially an empirical question that can only be answered by systematic 
observation of actual readers reading actual texts” (13). In distinguishing 
between “textual features (i.e., objective and identifiable characteristics 
of the text) and reader constructions (i.e., subjective and variable mental 
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processes)” (37), Bortolussi and Dixon make a series of hypotheses about 
how readers will respond to a particular text feature and then test out 
these hypotheses by conducting “textual experiments, in which particular 
features of a text are identified and manipulated by the researcher” (51). 
This method provides the bridge between narrative theory concerned with 
“real” readers and broader empirical studies of readers and the process of 
reading.
 In a 2006 article titled “Empirical Approaches to Studying Literary 
Readers: The State of the Discipline,” David Miall locates the work of 
Bortolussi and Dixon in this field, claiming that the “serious commitment 
to the examination of reading and the testing of hypotheses about read-
ing with real readers . . . differentiates it clearly from the reader-response 
studies of the last thirty years, from Fish to Wolfgang Iser” (307). An 
important part of this differentiation, for Miall, is that real readers are to 
be sharply distinguished from “professional” readers who produce pub-
lished interpretations of literary texts. Real readers are “nonprofession-
als” whose “ordinary literary reading” (294) may not be concerned with 
interpreting literature. Significantly, while acknowledging the importance 
of “a reader’s particular identity and cultural situation,” Miall claims that 
that the processes which precede and support any act of interpretation 
“themselves are constituted by the cognitive and affective equipment that 
we possess in common with our reading ancestors” (293).
 For Miall, “empirical studies of readers and reading” offer the poten-
tial to “provide new landmarks for a more socially responsible and eco-
logically valid form of scholarship” (307). The problem with this sort of 
claim, I would argue, is that the empirical approach remains open to the 
charge that it does not study real readers so much as lab-rat readers. Miall 
points out that “often experimental methods involve laboratory condi-
tions in which acts of reading can be controlled and monitored” and that 
“typically, the readers studied will be drawn from the student population” 
(292). The category of the “real” reader can then be seen as a virtual con-
struct of literary theory, which seeks to corroborate and universalize the 
professional theorist’s critical response to a text under the guise of testing 
how readers actually read.
 The limitations of this approach are taken up in a 2009 special issue 
of Language and Literature which collects articles devoted to a more eth-
nographically oriented and thus, it is claimed, more ecologically valid 
study of reading. In this issue, Joan Swann and Daniel Allington distin-
guish between two approaches to the empirical study of real readers: the 
“experimental” and the “naturalistic.” The first, they suggest, involves 
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“the artificial environment of a reading experiment,” generally taking stu-
dents and testing “pre-specified and isolated aspects of reading” (248). 
The second approach, which they favor, involves observing readers “in 
their usual environment, engaged in habitual reading behaviour” (248). 
The case study of “social reading” which Swann and Allington provide 
in this article is of reading groups, and their focus is on the interpreta-
tions and evaluations of literary texts which readers make in these envi-
ronments. This allows them to emphasize the importance of interpersonal 
discussion and the “culturally and historically contingent” nature of spe-
cific reading contexts.
 While Swann and Allington draw a contrast “between experimental 
and naturalistic studies of ‘real’ readers in terms of research design and 
focus” (260), what these two empirical approaches share is their attention 
to a certain type of reader, which they characterize as “‘ordinary read-
ers’—i.e. readers other than academic critics and professional reviewers” 
(248). However, if we are serious about the “ecological” value of empiri-
cal studies of reading, it would seem unproductive to dismiss published 
“interpretations” by professionals in favor of ordinary acts of reading by 
nonprofessionals, especially given the influence of “unreal” professional 
critics and reviewers on the publication and reception of literature, and 
hence upon practices of social reading. Swann and Allington do acknowl-
edge this briefly, pointing out how reading group participants respond 
to reviews of the books they are discussing. Therefore, a comprehensive 
account of the ecology of literary reading might distinguish between differ-
ent types of readers, but it would then need to incorporate all these types 
in its analysis.
public readers
Ultimately it must be recognized that the reader is a methodological con-
struct, emerging out of the specific research questions being posed. So 
how would I theorize the real reader when trying to account for the nar-
rative authority of contemporary omniscience? The empirical approaches 
outlined above are concerned with the cognitive and affective mechanics 
of reading and the social interpersonal discussions of reading. My con-
cern is with the public reception of literary works. This derives from my 
intention to reconsider the narrative communication model by articulat-
ing an approach to the study of narrative founded on the recognition of 
fictional narratives as public statements in a broader discursive formation, 
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and therefore as vital elements of public discourse. By doing so, I wish 
to proceed not from a distinction between what is inside a narrative text 
and what lies outside, but from an approach to the narrative discourse 
of fictional texts alongside other nonfictional and nonliterary discourses 
in the public sphere. Here I am betraying the influence of Bakhtin and, 
especially, Foucault. In one sense I’m trying to negotiate a link between 
Bakhtin’s belief in authorial agency, that person who orchestrates public 
discourses in the novel, and Foucault’s claim that we must avoid seeing 
literature as a substitute or “general envelope for all other discourses” 
(“Functions” 308). This leads to my second aim: to investigate the ramifi-
cations of this discursive approach for a narratological theory of author-
ship, particularly one which takes into account the question of authorial 
responsibility and narrative authority in relation to contemporary omni-
scient narration.
 Recognizing the literary ecology which I outlined in the introduc-
tion makes it necessary to approach fictional narratives not as a medium 
for private or abstract communication between the individual entities of 
author and reader, but as a public “zone of transaction” between a range 
of subject positions. In doing so, I wish to develop a model of narrative 
communication which situates the various agents of this model as subject 
positions anchoring textual utterances in the public sphere. In “Estrang-
ing Unreliability, Bonding Unreliability, and the Ethics of Lolita” James 
Phelan proposes to discuss the unreliable narration of Lolita in order to 
“account for two especially notable groups of readers”: those who are 
seduced by Humbert’s narrative voice and those who are not (223). What 
is implicit in Phelan’s rhetorical approach to readers’ responses is what I 
want to make explicit. I’m interested in the actual public textual responses 
of readers as concrete evidence to be situated alongside the narrative dis-
course. The textual forms of this public response would range across three 
overlapping forums: the literary establishment in the form of reviews and 
feature articles; academia in the form of scholarly essays and monographs; 
and the general public in the form of letters, blogs, online forums, and 
customer reviews. This would constitute empirical textual evidence of the 
reader as a public reader, a figure which has the most material impact on 
the survival of a book. Such an approach is important for understanding 
that narrative authority is not something which is purely immanent to a 
text, to be recuperated from a formalist study of narrative conventions 
such as privilege or level. And if, culturally speaking, narrative authority 
must be granted by readers, it must not reside only in the cognitive pro-
cesses of readers as individual agents of textual perception. This authority 
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is contingent upon the collective public textual response to the narrative in 
question.
The author in narrative Theory
The corollary of this approach is that to understand the modes of nar-
rative authority specific to contemporary omniscient narration we must 
investigate the rhetorical strategies employed by authors as public figures, 
not just those employed by narrators. Narratology has long eschewed con-
sideration of authorship, except in the controversial guise of the implied 
author, originally proposed to unyoke the question of “intentionality” 
from its relation to authorial biography. The implied author is a way of 
providing an anthropomorphic center for a narrative, even if there is no 
narrator or an effaced narrator, for it attributes implicit personal values 
and norms to the design of the narrative itself, or at least acknowledges 
that readers construct a sense of the authorial persona out of the text. The-
ories of implied authorship have undergone a range of permutations since 
Wayne Booth’s original formulation, and in many cases have moved so 
far from questions of authorial agency that we can have claims that each 
reader constructs a different implied author to guide and affirm his or her 
reading. For instance, Wolf Schmid writes in his survey of debates over 
the concept: “it must be remembered that, like the readings of different 
recipients, the various interpretations of a single reader are each associ-
ated with a different implied author” (161). We can even have a claim such 
as Ansgar Nunning’s that “a pederast would not find Humbert Humbert, 
the fictitious child molester and narrator of Nabokov’s Lolita, unreliable” 
(97). Such claims leave us with the problem of weighing up the relative 
significance of the individual private act of reading, and the general public 
reception of a text.
 My question here is: when readers infer an authorial persona from a 
fictional text do they “know” that this persona is only that of an implied 
author? That is, are they complicit in their own construction of an imag-
ined entity, or do they infer what they think is the real author? If we wish 
to posit an implied author as a mediating entity between author and narra-
tor, we need to define what we actually mean by a real author. We typically 
define the author as the historical figure who wrote the book, and then 
spend our time debating the existence of narrators and implied authors.2 
The author emerges as an aporia, granted both an existential solidity and 
an epistemological evanescence, disappearing from our knowledge in the 
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act of reading. The problem, I think, is that we’re dismissing a straw man 
concept of authorship: a figure with singular intentions and coherent val-
ues and norms.
 Sometimes, in defense of the idea of an implied author, we have the 
claim that of course an author is assuming a particular persona when writ-
ing a book, in the way that we assume a professional persona when we are 
writing a job application, and that we must therefore be careful to distin-
guish this ideal, or at least different, self from the real author. Discussing 
the implied author as a way of thinking about how authors present them-
selves, Peter Rabinowitz writes: “think of your own implied authors as 
you write letters of applications, ads for dating services, thank-you notes, 
even academic articles” (“‘The Absence’” 102). In promoting the contin-
ued ethical importance of the implied author, Wayne Booth writes: “In 
every corner of our lives, whenever we speak or write, we imply a ver-
sion of our character that we know is quite different from many other 
selves that are exhibited in our flesh-and-blood world” (“Resurrection” 
77). This, for me, is a kind of endless deferral of the “real” to a zero 
point of an essentialized private self, only ever accessible in the “flesh and 
blood.” Or, it is the opposite, evacuating any sense of a knowable self in 
favor of a series of performative selves which we all construct for differ-
ent social occasions. In which case an authorial persona cannot be any 
less “real” than any other self that writers adopt in their lives, or those 
of a real reader. Either way, surely the figure which readers infer is that of 
an author, a public figure whom they hold responsible for the book which 
they are reading, rather than simply a private citizen whose personal val-
ues and norms underpin the narrative. And readers construct a sense of 
this public figure not only from the narrative text, but from extratextual 
elements.
 The rationale for positing an implied author is that communication 
between authors and readers is mediated by the narrative text, and hence 
there is no direct access to an author’s intentions. But, as I have pointed 
out, in the actual world of the public sphere such access is available, and 
there is enormous interest in hearing the voice of the author, from writ-
ers festivals and readings through to interviews and essays. These are part 
of the empirical reading experience. So, what James Phelan (Experienc-
ing) calls the “recursive relationship” between authorial agency and reader 
response is facilitated not just by textual phenomena, but by the author’s 
and readers’ extratextual statements which circulate alongside the fictional 
text in the public sphere. If readers do construct an implied author, I’m 
suggesting, it is only to facilitate their response to the real author. Once 
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we accept this, it means we need to attend to the crucial function of real 
authors, not simply as producers of a narrative text, but as active partici-
pants in the process of reception.
a discursive narratology
A discursive approach begins with the assumption that a key challenge 
of contemporary narratology is how to negotiate methodological rela-
tions between formalist approaches to textual features, and contextualist 
approaches to the contingencies of textual production and reception. Pro-
ceeding from an understanding of fiction as public discourse, how might 
we incorporate extratextual public statements of authors and readers in 
the narrative communication model to develop a theory of authorship? My 
aim is to achieve this by refining the two major narratological approaches 
to fictional texts as published books active in the public sphere, rather 
than static formal artifacts: that proposed by Susan Lanser in The Narra-
tive Act and that proposed by Gerard Genette in Paratexts.
 The authority of a published text, Lanser argues, is vested in what she 
calls its extrafictional voice, “the most direct textual counterpart for the 
historical author,” which “carries all the diegetic authority of its (pub-
licly authorized) creator and has the ontological status of historical truth” 
(122). Now this formulation, as Lanser points out, is very similar to the 
implied author; however, she locates its manifestation not in the narra-
tive discourse, but in extrafictional elements of the material book itself, 
from chapter divisions to authorial prefaces and publication details. Lan-
ser is content to speculate about how readers respond to this extrafictional 
voice, but the very concept, I think, provides the methodological point of 
departure for theorizing authorship more broadly in relation to the nar-
rative communication model. It enables us to approach the author not as 
a private citizen speaking to readers through the narrative text in order 
to convey personal values and norms, but as a public intellectual discur-
sively engaging the reader via the link between narrative and extrafictional 
voice. “The extrafictional voice,” Lanser argues, “is the most immediate 
vehicle available to the author, and although most novelistic communica-
tion does not take place on the extrafictional level, the extrafictional voice 
carries more than its quantitative proportion of impact” (128).
 Lanser indicates that this extrafictional voice, which can be recon-
structed from textual information within the book itself, is different from 
“extratextual sources of information about the author or the book” (124, 
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original emphasis). I would argue, however, that if this extrafictional voice 
frames the text and its narrative discourse, it also turns the text outwards 
to the broader public sphere and its range of extratextual sources. Here 
we find other vehicles of communication available to authors: public 
statements ranging from essays to manifestos to interviews and opinion 
articles, which together constitute a rhetorical strategy to establish their 
literary authority in public discourse. For Lanser, the “author” is “a textu-
ally encoded, historically authoritative voice kin to but not identical with 
the biographical person who wrote the text” (152). In which case, this tex-
tually encoded authorial voice must be constituted by both the extrafic-
tional voice of a book, and the author’s extratextual material. But it is also 
constituted by the narrative voice of the author’s various fictional works, 
for these feed back into the author’s status as a public figure. Here we see 
the value of Foucault’s author function, not necessarily as the basis for 
a critique of authorial criticism, but as an anatomization of the ways in 
which an author’s name “points to the existence of certain groups of dis-
course and refers to the status of this discourse within a society and cul-
ture” (“What Is an Author?” 123).
 A founding premise of the “discursive narratology” I’m attempting to 
elaborate is that a work of fiction is a public statement which circulates 
in the same discursive formation as its author’s nonfictional statements. 
Furthermore, narratives are not static for they are read differently each 
time according to their context of reception. Narrative authority, then, 
operates via a continuum between narrative voice, extrafictional voice and 
authorial voice, and establishes a dialogue with the public response. These 
voices have different textual forms and diegetic levels, but they co-exist as 
public statements in the same discursive field, and operate as interrelated 
rhetorical strategies for asserting the cultural significance of the novel to 
public life which establish a dialogue with the public response.
 A theoretical framework for studying this continuum of voices can be 
derived from Genette’s theory of the paratext.3 For Genette, the “verbal or 
other productions” that frame and present a literary work to its readership 
constitute the paratext: “what enables a text to become a book and to be 
offered as such to its readers and more generally, to the public” (Paratexts 
1). This paratext is a threshold between the text and its frame “that offers 
the world at large the possibility of either stepping inside or turning back” 
(2). Genette works with a spatial relationship between text and paratext, 
so that the location of a paratextual element “within the same volume” (4) 
can be defined as a peritext, while the elements which are “located outside 
the book, generally with the help of the media” (5) can be defined as the 
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epitext. “In other words,” Genette writes, “for those who are keen on for-
mulae, paratext = peritext + epitext” (5; original emphasis). Genette also 
works with a temporal relationship between text and paratext, pointing 
out prior, original, and later or delayed paratexts, defined in relation to the 
date of the text’s original publication.
 The significance of the paratext to my work is the emphasis Genette 
places on its pragmatic status as a form of authorial communication in 
which the addressee is the public. “By definition,” Genette claims, “some-
thing is not a paratext unless the author or one of his associates accepts 
responsibility for it, although the degree of responsibility may vary” (9). 
Of most importance is Genette’s emphasis on the functionality of the para-
text, arguing:
Indeed, this fringe, always the conveyor of a commentary that is autho-
rial or more or less legitimated by the author, constitutes a zone between 
text and off-text, a zone not only of transition but also of transaction: 
a privileged place of a pragmatics and a strategy, of an influence on 
the public, an influence that—whether well or poorly understood and 
achieved—is at the service of a better reception for the text and a more 
pertinent reading of it (more pertinent, of course, in the eyes of the 
author and his allies). (2)
 My approach has two crucial points of departure from Genette’s 
model. First is the claim that this paratext is not only the author’s attempt 
to frame a positive interpretation of the fiction, but an attempt to estab-
lish the fictional text as the basis for the cultural authority of the author 
as a public figure. For my purposes, Lanser’s extrafictional voice will be 
located within the peritextual elements of the book, and linked via a dis-
cursive continuum to the authorial voice that is manifested in what Gen-
ette calls “the public authorial epitext,” comprised of interviews, essays, 
etc. Secondly, I will define paratext more broadly than Genette in the 
sense that if it constitutes “a zone of transaction,” an attempt to influ-
ence the public, this zone must also include textual phenomena produced 
by the reading public as the other party in this transaction. The interview, 
for instance, a key feature of the “public authorial epitext,” necessarily 
includes readerly responses in the form of the interviewer’s questions, 
and itself is an example of a transaction between author and reader over 
the significance of the text. The paratext, then, I am arguing, is a type of 
discursive formation, a set of textual statements in which the relations 
between these statements construct the text as its object. This leads to my 
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discursive reformulation of the diagram of narrative communication, as 
shown in figure 2.
 A discursive approach to the narrative communication model situates 
the narrative text in a broader discursive formation to investigate how 
narrative authority emerges out of the relations between subject positions 
within this formation. So the epitext (author and reader), the peritext 
(extrafictional voice) and the text (narrative voice) contain the discursive 
sites at which these subject positions are articulated, and together the three 
sites constitute the paratextual zone of transaction, the discursive forma-
tion, in which what is being “transacted” is not so much textual mean-
ing, but the significance of the text to public discourse. I have excluded 
the implied author and the implied reader from this model because, while 
they may be legitimate critical/cognitive constructs which facilitate read-
ing, they are not concrete subject positions within or without the text so 
much as they are anthropomorphic postulations of the act of reading. I 
have retained the narratee as a fictional subject position because, especially 
in omniscient narration, it is given textual form by virtue of a specific nar-
ratorial address. The two-way arrows indicate that each discursive site 
facilitates a dialogue between the subject positions, that communication 
is always ongoing, drawing into play the temporal relations of a zone of 
transaction, and that the text itself always gestures outwards or beyond to 
public dialogue on the paratextual level.
omniscient authority
A key reason for postulating an implied author has been the need to retain 
the valuable theoretical distinction between author and narrator. Susan 
Lanser points out, though: “If an author–narrator separation is true in the 
abstract, it is nonetheless not abstractions that determine the reading of lit-
erature, but the conventions governing linguistic and literary use” (Narra-
tive Act 149). She goes on to argue that “in the absence of direct markings 
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which separate the public narrator from the extrafictional voice, so long as 
it is possible to give meaning to the text within the equation author = nar-
rator, readers will conventionally make this equation” (151). Omniscient 
narration is one fictional form for which such an equation is tradition-
ally made, and recognizing this is crucial for understanding omniscient 
narrative authority beyond that of a literary convention. Hence the need 
to frame the relationship between narrator and author in pragmatic and 
flexible terms beyond the binarism of formalist distinctions if we are to 
understand the historical contingency of omniscient narration. The nar-
rator and the author may be separate entities, but the act of narration, 
while fictional, nonetheless constitutes a statement within public discourse 
which is attributed to the author. The intrusive commentary of omniscient 
narration draws attention to this relationship, so that the “fictionality” of 
its discourse can be seen as a rhetorical device for asserting the importance 
of the novelist in public intellectual life, particularly when this narrative 
voice resonates textually with the extrafictional and extratextual voices of 
the author. As Lanser points out, “the equivalence of author and narrator 
implies an authorial responsibility that is similar to an author’s responsi-
bility for his or her nonfictional work” (153).
 So if omniscient authority is not so much a textual phenomenon, 
the narrator’s complete knowledge of the fictional world, but a type of 
narrative performance articulated through commentary, it gestures out-
wards, extratextually, to a particular figure of authorship. And if the nar-
rative authority of contemporary omniscience no longer relies, as it did 
in previous centuries, on the consonance of its formal conventions with 
the cultural authority of the novel itself, this performance must necessar-
ily operate with a tension between its form and its status. The narrators 
of contemporary omniscience, I am suggesting, must gesture outwards to 
the broader realm of public discourse, in which less “universal” modes 
of public address circulate, in order to gain traction for their commen-
tary. And here a knowledge of authorial voice becomes important, not for 
anchoring a biographical reading of a book, but for understanding how 
contemporary omniscient narration engages with the very question of nov-
elistic authority.
The paratext of david Lodge’s Author, Author
I will conclude with a discussion of David Lodge’s Author, Author, which 
provides a good example of how contemporary omniscient authority 
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operates along a discursive continuum from narratorial to authorial voice, 
and of a narrative text whose paratext stages an ongoing debate over the 
status of contemporary fiction. This book, which operates in the mode 
I have labeled the literary historian, self-consciously situates itself in the 
generic boundaries between novel and biography as it reconstructs a 
period in the life of Henry James: his relationship with George Du Mau-
rier, and his forays into writing for the theatre. The rhetorical purpose of 
the narrator is clear: to demonstrate the influence of James’s catastrophic 
attempts at writing for the theatre on both his life and his novelistic out-
put. This is in the service of demonstrating the importance of James to the 
history of the novel. Author, Author opens with a present-tense account 
of James on his deathbed, immediately establishing the narrator’s diegetic 
authority through historical detail and asserting his moral authority 
through commentary:
London, December 1915. In the master bedroom (never was the estate 
agent’s epithet more appropriate) of Flat 21, Carlyle Mansions, Cheyne 
Walk, Chelsea, the distinguished author is dying—slowly but surely. In 
Flanders, less than two hundred miles away, other men are dying more 
quickly, more painfully, more pitifully—young men, mostly, with their 
lives still before them, blank pages that will never be filled. The author is 
seventy-two. He has had an interesting and varied life. (3)
 A biographical summary completes the paragraph, underpinning the 
right of the narrator to place James’s comparatively rich life in immedi-
ate historical context. The rest of this opening frame narrative is vari-
ably focalized through James’s deathbed companions, but the bulk of 
the novel, which revisits his life, is internally focalized through James, 
although the preponderance of summary means the guiding presence of 
the narrator-biographer is palpable. The major exception to this struc-
ture is a chapter covering the key scene of the opening night of James’s 
stage play, Guy Domville. The chapter begins: “In his practice as a novel-
ist and short story writer, Henry had developed a firm faith in the supe-
rior expressiveness and verisimilitude of the limited point of view” (230). 
The narrator amplifies this comment with an account of the technical 
means by which James felt the limited point of view could be realized. 
“The antithetical method,” the narrator continues, “was well exempli-
fied by Trilby, in which the authorial narrator, in Thackerayan fashion, 
took out his puppets from the box, and set them capering, and told you 
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in his own confiding ruminating voice exactly what they were all thinking 
at a given moment” (230). The narrator, then, is highly self-conscious of 
James’s position in literary history, his contribution to the diminishment 
of the authority of the nineteenth-century omniscient narrator.
 This discussion of narrative form serves to justify a structural shift to 
multiple focalization, providing a comprehensive account of the fateful 
opening night of Guy Domville from the perspective of a range of differ-
ent participants. The narrator has James speculating that to do justice to 
the events of the evening which he later pieced together from second-hand 
information, he would have to imagine that “while his story, with its dras-
tically limited point of view, was proceeding, other connected stories were 
in progress, other points of view were in play, at the same time, in paral-
lel, in brackets as it were” (231). The narrator dutifully provides readers 
with these stories, replete with brackets and amplified by his omniscient 
knowledge.
 The novel concludes by returning to the present-tense frame narrative 
of James’s death bed. In this last section the narrator intrudes overtly to 
draw attention to the narrating instance: “as I conjure up this deathbed 
scene, looking at it as through the curved transparency of a crystal ball” 
(373, original emphasis). It is obvious then that the narrator’s omniscient 
knowledge is a conflation of historical research and fictional speculation, 
and his authority relies not only on making this manifest, but on explain-
ing why. In one of these italicized interpolations, the narrator clearly estab-
lishes his temporal distance from the story:
It is therefore tempting to indulge in a fantasy of somehow time-trav-
elling back to that afternoon of late February 1916, creeping into the 
master bedroom of Flat 21, Carlyle Mansions, casting a spell on the little 
group of weary watchers at the bedside, pulling up a chair oneself, and 
saying a few reassuring words to HJ, before he departs this world, about 
his literary future. (375)
 Omniscient commentary in this novel is not geared to a moral evalua-
tion of character so much as it is to James’s contribution to literary history, 
and the “communal mind” invoked is that established by the evidence of 
canonization, scholarly interest and popular cultural adaptation. The obvi-
ous conflation of narratorial with authorial voice encouraged by this com-
mentary, linking the narrator to the extraliterary world, is given weight by 
the prefatorial comment in the extrafictional peritext:
242 • ChaPter 8
Sometimes it seems advisable to preface a novel with a note saying that 
the story and the characters are entirely fictitious, or words to that effect. 
On this occasion a different authorial statement seems called for. Nearly 
everything that happens in this story is based on factual sources. With 
one insignificant exception, all the named characters were real people. 
Quotations from their books, plays, articles, letters, journals, etc., are 
their own words. But I have used a novelist’s licence in representing what 
they thought, felt, and said to each other; and I have imagined some 
events and personal details which history omitted to record. So this book 
is a novel, and structured like a novel.
 Here Lodge claims the authority of the historical record as well as that 
of novelistic convention in his biographical treatment of Henry James’s 
life. Clearly the omniscient authority of this narrator is bound up in the 
contemporary “postmodern” debate about the generic boundaries and 
discursive status of history and fiction. The extrafictional voice operates 
not only to underpin the narrator’s omniscient knowledge, but to link it 
with the professional status of Lodge himself, a well-regarded critic and 
theorist of the novel. The peritextual acknowledgments which follow the 
text shore up this status, providing bibliographic references and archi-
val sources, as well as identifying the invented sections of the novel. The 
acknowledgements conclude by pointing out that only when he had com-
pleted the manuscript of Author, Author, did Lodge discover that Colm 
Tóibín’s novel about Henry James, The Master, would be published in the 
same year. “I leave it to students of the zeitgeist to ponder the significance 
of these coincidences” (389). Hence Lodge anticipates the reception of his 
novel by “real” readers in the epitextual public sphere.
 A survey of the reviews of Author, Author indicates that the novel was 
received and evaluated according to the coordinates established by Lodge’s 
extrafictional voice: its hybrid generic status, and its comparison with 
Tóibín’s The Master. Here I turn to James Wood’s review as an exemplar 
because it provides a critique common to many reviews: the novel’s lack of 
convincing interiority resulting from the language and form of biographi-
cal writing. Wood goes further, though, and links this problem specifically 
to the question of point of view. Like many reviewers, Wood points out 
the dilemma of writing a novel about Henry James, the “novelist of con-
sciousness,” before asserting: 
It is not only that Lodge’s prose must be judged by James’s. The larger 
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difficulty is that it is not always clear from whose point of view Lodge is 
writing. “Point of view,” of course, was an obsession for James, because 
he had come to the conclusion, rightly, that there is no such thing in fic-
tion as “omniscient narration.” (“The Spoils” 3)
Ultimately, then, his aesthetic critique of Lodge’s craft as a writer is based 
on an ideological critique of the narrator’s omniscient presence, his dis-
play of unfocalized knowledge. Wood criticizes this omniscience not only 
for violating James’s own aesthetic creed, but for being based less on 
accepted novelistic convention than on an appeal to an extraliterary fig-
ure of authorship: the biographer. On these grounds he compares Lodge’s 
work unfavorably to Tóibín’s, arguing that “Tóibín’s willingness to take 
his novel seriously as a novel fruitfully detaches it from its historical refer-
ent; but Lodge’s unwillingness to do so manacles it to mere record” (1).
 One might say, then, that on balance, Lodge’s extrafictional bid for the 
omniscient authority of his narrator was unsuccessful, with his novel gen-
erally seen to have failed in comparison with that of Tóibín, who employs 
the more favored internal focalization to explore James’s interior life. As 
Wood points out, though, Tóibín is inventing a fictional character (while 
still historically grounded, as evidenced by his own list of references), 
whereas Lodge is attempting to imagine the real historical figure. Wood’s 
review is a defense of the novel over any generic incursions on its terrain. 
And yet Author, Author, it could be argued, is concerned more with assert-
ing the cultural authority of the novelist to contribute to contemporary 
critical and biographical scholarship on James than with simply drawing 
on this scholarship for verisimilitude.
 Turning to academic articles as another form of paratextual pub-
lic response by readers, we can see that these articles locate both nov-
els within a particular discursive formation—academic scholarship on 
James—and argue that their form, the biographical novel, is what enables 
this link. Indeed, scholarly articles on these books tend to discuss them 
precisely in terms of the plausibility of their biographical speculation. In 
The Cambridge Quarterly, Max Saunders claims that
the way for these novels was prepared by very specific developments in 
James biography and criticism. They didn’t come out of nowhere, or 
out of a generalised “Zeitgeist,” but out of recent rethinking of James’s 
friendships with men and women. Where Lodge might be right, though, 
in that they might be a sign of our postmodern times, is in the fact that 
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these biographical explorations of James are presented as novels, not 
biographies, and that their autobiographical dimension is also empha-
sised. (125)
 Saunders does, however, replicate Wood’s aesthetic judgment on these 
novels: “where Tóibín allows fictional biography to do the work of liter-
ary criticism, Lodge increasingly fuses novel with lecture on literary tech-
nique in Author, Author,” suggesting that Lodge “is better at theorizing 
literary consciousness than representing it” (126). Again we see extralit-
erary claims to narrative authority established by Lodge’s omniscient nar-
rator judged in terms of the modernist aesthetic of impersonality.
 John Harvey follows a similar line of comparison, in the Yearbook 
of English Studies, yet still discusses both novels in terms of their con-
tribution to Jamesian biographical and critical scholarship, speculating 
as to whether they have captured the “real” Henry James or the myth of 
Henry James, whether they have managed to reveal anything about his 
works themselves. In the Journal of Modern Literature, Daniel Hannah 
treats the narratorial intrusions in Author, Author as a conscious interven-
tion in current literary-critical discourse: “Against these two forms, Lodge 
calls on fictional biography as a form that might both more graciously 
reclaim (rather than merely expose) James on a popular stage and reposi-
tion “queer” James as an author of consciousness and style (rather than an 
author of erotic subtexts)” (80). Like reviewers in the mainstream press, 
these academic articles have little interest in a rigid distinction between 
author and narrator, and no theoretical need for the implied author. Saun-
ders points out that Lodge concludes his novel “in his own authorial first 
person” (126), and Karen Scherzinger, in the Henry James Review, indi-
cates that: “As his novel draws to an end, Lodge finally gives up all pre-
tense of disguising his own presence and seeks to recuperate James one 
last time” (191).
 If these reviews and articles constitute the readerly epitext in a broader 
paratextual discursive formation which constructs Author, Author as its 
subject, and circulate around the authority of Lodge’s omniscient narra-
tor, the other side of this zone of transaction is represented by Lodge’s 
The Year of Henry James: The Story of a Novel, which was published 
two years after Author, Author appeared to “mixed” reviews. This book 
constitutes what Genette would call a “later epitext,” and specifically an 
authorial response. If the narrative voice of Author, Author gestures out-
wards to the authority of its extrafictional voice, this discursive continuum 
can be traced further to the authorial voice in The Year of Henry James 
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where Lodge draws upon his authority as a literary critic to contextualize 
his aesthetic choices in relation to point of view. One of his strategies is to 
provide extracts from his private notebooks, demonstrating an awareness 
of the relevance of his choices beyond the artistic integrity of his treatment 
of the subject: 
A persistent theme in many of the notes, widely separated in time, is an 
anxiety that the novel should not read like a biography, and the hope that 
I could avoid this effect by foregrounding the machinery of narration 
itself, through abrupt time-shifts, switches of point of view and “post-
modernist” authorial interpolations. (50)
Lodge proceeds to quote a section from his notebook which reads: “On 
reflection I think it would be a mistake to draw attention to myself as the 
‘real’ author in this way. I couldn’t then ‘invent’ freely. The authorial nar-
rator must have authority” (52). He then comments that
what this first attempt revealed to me was that I really wanted to write a 
novel in which the joins between documented facts and imaginative spec-
ulation would be seamless and invisible, and that drawing attention to 
myself as narrator would entail coming clean about the extent to which I 
was selecting from and embellishing the historical record. (52)
 It seems, though, that Lodge did end up “foregrounding the machin-
ery of narration itself” through his omniscient narrator, but saved coming 
clean about his embellishments for the acknowledgements, thus dividing 
the authorial narrator’s authority between the narrative and the extrafic-
tional voice of the text. Author, Author, by virtue of this epitextual autho-
rial response, becomes a discursive site at which its narrative voice enacts 
the struggle of contemporary fiction for cultural authority, and part of the 
paratextual zone of transaction regarding the significance of the novel in 
public discourse.
 I have argued throughout this book that the emergence of contempo-
rary omniscience alongside cultural anxieties about the relevance of the 
novel in the new millennium can be read as symptomatic of a broader 
desire to reclaim the cultural authority of nineteenth-century novelists. At 
the same time, novelists aware of the legacy of postmodernism have devel-
oped new modes of omniscient narration. In another public authorial epi-
text, a 2005 interview for Sources magazine (Gallix et al.), Lodge provides 
a similar context for his novel:
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There are lots of people who openly say that they cannot be bothered 
reading novels but they read biographies all the time. It is a pity but 
I think it may also have something to do with the lack of a coherent 
body of shared values in the reading community. If you think of the great 
nineteenth-century novelists, they could assume their readers shared basi-
cally the same beliefs, the same values, the same ideals of what the good 
life was, what evil was. In a much more relativistic age, a multicultural 
society with different ethical systems competing or coexisting, it is very 
difficult to create a fictional world in which you have the kind of moral 
authority which the classic novelists used to have. But if you say: “this is 
how it was, this is what happened,” it does not raise the same expecta-
tions. Instead of trying to persuade readers to share your view of life, you 
just say: “this is a human record: make of it what you will. (21)
 The rhetorical strategy of the omniscient narrator of Author, Author is 
thus simultaneously to draw upon the contemporary popularity and cul-
tural authority of biography and to reassert the novel as a pre-eminent 
mode of exploring historical figures. This narrative voice cannot be under-
stood in purely formalist terms, it must be located in a broader discursive 
context which recognizes the significance of extrafictional and extratextual 
subject positions to the performance of narrative authority.
my aim  in this book has been to reconsider the prevailing view that omni-
scient narration is no longer aesthetically viable in literary fiction or prom-
inent in the contribution of novelistic discourse to cultural debate. I have 
argued that contemporary omniscience should not be characterized as a 
nostalgic revival or parodic critique of an archaic form, but as a legacy 
in mainstream fiction of postmodern experiments with narrative voice. 
This has led me to investigate what distinguishes “post-postmodern” 
modes of omniscient narration from classic examples of the form in eigh-
teenth- and nineteenth-century fiction, and what this might reveal about 
the cultural status of the novel in contemporary public discourse. In doing 
so, I have located the emergence of new modes of omniscient narration in 
the context of millennial anxieties about the decline of book culture and 
argued that omniscient narration is best understood as a rhetorical per-
formance of narrative authority that simultaneously invokes and projects 
an historically specific figure of authorship.
 To investigate this figure of authorship, I have analyzed the narrative 
voice of a work of fiction in relation to its author’s nonfictional commen-
tary in the public sphere. These statements, as I have shown, typically 
lament the loss of cultural authority supposedly invested in the omniscient 
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voice of nineteenth-century fictional narrators while recognizing the need 
to relativize this voice in contemporary fiction. I have further argued that 
the narrative voices of contemporary omniscience self-reflexively demon-
strate an agonistic awareness of the diminished “universality” of authorial 
narration, drawing authority not from the novelist as observer of human 
nature and guide to ethical conduct, but from the writer as public intel-
lectual both competing with and deploying other nonliterary discourses of 
“knowledge”: journalistic, historical, scientific, critical, and so on.
 Another aim of this book has been to employ this investigation of con-
temporary omniscience to engage with ongoing theoretical debates about 
the formal category of omniscient narration itself and develop a model of 
narrative voice more sensitive to the historical contingency and cultural 
contexts of fictional form. In formalist terms, omniscient narrators are 
invested by convention with the highest authority to tell a story because 
they possess reliable knowledge about the storyworld, particularly through 
their “privileged” access to the consciousness of characters. I have pointed 
out the need to reconceive narrative authority in more dynamic terms, as 
performance (the actual use of knowledge) rather than as competence (the 
possession of knowledge). I have thus approached focalization as a rhe-
torical strategy which narrators employ to perform their authority, a per-
formance which generates “omniscient” knowledge in the act of narration 
in order to assert the significance of a story.
 To avoid reducing omniscience to a synonym for third-person narra-
tion, I have argued that the term ought to apply to narrators who not only 
report the thoughts of characters, but who narrate what characters do not 
know (zero focalization), typically aspects of consciousness which charac-
ters themselves are unaware of (psychonarration), or information which 
none could be privy to (prolepses, unwitnessed events). Furthermore, this 
performance of knowledge ought to contribute to an intrusive narratorial 
presence established by devices such as direct addresses, commentary, self-
reflexive statements, and stylistic expressivity. This intrusiveness can also 
be a form of zero focalization, in the sense that to offer commentary is to 
provide insight beyond the awareness of characters, and that references 
to the act of narration itself are obviously at a higher diegetic level than 
characters. At the same time, instances of zero focalization are intrusive to 
the extent that they draw attention to the narrator’s capacity to tell rather 
than show.
 I have also used this study of contemporary omniscience to argue for 
greater narratological attention to authorship, suggesting that authorial 
voice can be approached as a formal textual feature of narrative commu-
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nication if we approach narrative fiction as a mode of public discourse. 
This contextualist approach has been designed to show that narrative 
theory offers more than just a “toolkit” for textual analysis, that atten-
tion to narrative form can be the basis for engaging with critical debates 
about the cultural status of contemporary fiction. Finally, I hope that this 
book contributes to broader studies of the novel today, particularly in rela-
tion to the legacy of metafiction, the historical novel, and the stylistic and 
encyclopedic features of maximalism, by demonstrating that new modes 
of omniscient narration have emerged as a vital feature of fiction after 
postmodernism.

Introduction
 1. See Dawson (“Historicising”) for a critique of this “pros and cons” approach to 
the teaching of writing and how it perpetuates a prejudice against omniscient narration. 
See McGurl for an account of the relationship between American fiction and creative 
writing programs.
 2. The only references I have found to contemporary omniscience in fact come from 
writers and teachers of writing. See Kress, Anderson, and Boulter. All three suggest omni-
science has made a “comeback,” listing novels by Isla Dewar, John Irving, and Mary 
Wesley (Kress), Rick Moody’s Purple America (Anderson), and the novels of A. S. Byatt 
(Boulter). Byatt, Pullman, Boswell, Russo, and Dunning also offer defenses of omni-
science as a narrative technique.
 3. This intellectual enterprise draws its main inspiration from the scholarship of 
Friedrich Kittler in works such as Grammaphone, Film, Typewriter. Daniel Punday more 
explicitly relates this enterprise to narratological concerns, such as the story/discourse 
distinction.
 4. Some of the books of nonfiction by these writers include Zadie Smith’s Changing 
My Mind, which includes her review essay, “Two Paths for the Novel”; David Foster 
Wallace’s A Supposedly Fun Thing I’ll Never Do Again, which includes his essay “E Uni-
bus Pluram: Television and U.S. Fiction”; Jonathan Franzen’s How to Be Alone, which 
includes the Harper’s essay; Salman Rushdie’s Imaginary Homelands and Step across 
This Line, which includes his “In Defense of the Novel, Yet Again”; Martin Amis’s The 
War against Cliché and The Second Plane: September 11: Terror and Boredom. David 
Lodge is also a literary critic, but some of his important works since he retired from the 
academy include The Practice of Writing, Consciousness and the Novel, and The Year of 
Henry James.
 5. Ross Chambers offers a psychoanalytically informed account of the dynamics of 
the narrative act as a form of seduction. For Chambers, narrative authority is based on 
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the possession of information, but it is authorized by the interest of the narratee who 
seeks this information, and narrators must yield their authority in exchange for this 
interest.
Chapter 1
 1. Also see Ermarth, who argues that if we understand omniscient privilege as the 
product of the collective consciousness of the characters, we can dismiss the problem of 
how to account for impossible knowledge.
 2. Amis has encouraged this autobiographical correlation in an interview about The 
Information:
There’s an “I” in the first sentence. The narrator is me but he disappears halfway 
through the book. I wondered about that: I think that I wanted to tell the reader 
where I was coming from. It is a book about mid-life, and for me the mid-crisis 
came in the form of blanket ignorance, I felt. I just didn’t know anything about 
the world. . . . I felt that I had to open up to the reader about that and say “How 
can I be an omniscient narrator when I don’t know anything.” Which is what it 
felt like. (Laurence and McGee)
 3. See “From Imagination to Creativity” in my book Creative Writing in the New 
Humanities for an account of the historical development of theories of creativity.
 4. Dorothy Hale brilliantly anatomizes the formalist circumscription of James’s 
ideas in Lubbock’s book.
 5. Our modern understanding of omniscience is mapped out in Clayton Hamil-
ton’s 1908 book Materials and Methods of Fiction, which provides the first account of 
“limited omniscience” that I have found. This book provides a comprehensive overview 
of point of view long before it was made prominent by Percy Lubbock. In his chapter 
“The Point of View in Narrative,” Hamilton writes that aspects of narrating a story 
“are all dependent directly on the answer to the question, who shall tell the story?” 
(117).
 6. William Nelles (“Getting”) aptly suggests we rename zero as “free” focalization 
precisely to demonstrate that all other types are contained.
 7. Jaffe similarly argues that “omniscience is not so much evidence for the posses-
sion of knowledge as an emphatic display of knowledge, a display, precisely, of what 
is not being taken for granted.” From an overtly post-structuralist interest in how 
transgressions define the limits they exceed, particularly how Dickens’s Asmodean fig-
ure negotiates the boundaries between the public and the private, Jaffe suggests that “a 
narrative mode that has traditionally signified an unquestioned assertion of authority 
may be understood instead to interrogate the grounds of its authority.” She thus locates 
omniscience in the tension at play between the authorial presence which earlier critics 
bemoaned and the absence of a unitary voice which contemporary theorists argue for.
Chapter 5
 1. Nicholas Dames, in The Physiology of the Novel, sets out to prove that the long 
Victorian novel was in fact designed to train readers to adapt their consciousnesses to the 
new rhythms of industrial life.
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Chapter 6
 1. Dorrit Cohn (Transparent) more accurately places stylistic contagion under the 
category of psychonarration, demonstrating how it facilitates a move from psychonarra-
tion to narrated monologue.
 2. Cognitive narratology offers the next iteration of social formalism. In Why We 
Read Fiction, Lisa Zunshine draws upon scientific research into the Theory of Mind 
to explain the reading process as a stimulation and test of our mind-reading capacities 
which have evolved to aid social interaction. Zunshine does not specifically discuss FID, 
for this feature can be collapsed into our larger evolved cognitive ability to attribute 
(source monitoring) and keep track of states of mind (metarepresentation) when reading 
fiction.
 3. Compare this character’s simultaneous fascination and repellence to the omni-
scient narrator’s internal analysis of Isabel Archer in the opening to chapter 53 of Henry 
James’s The Portrait of a Lady: 
She had plenty to think about; but it was neither reflexion nor conscious purpose 
that filled her mind. Disconnected visions passed through it, and sudden dull 
gleams of memory, of expectation. The past and the future came and went at 
their will, but she saw them only in fitful images, which rose and fell by a logic 
of their own. It was extraordinary the things she remembered. (581)
The narrator’s wonder at the workings of the mind becomes in contemporary fiction a 
character’s wonder at their own mental processes.
Chapter 7
 1. See Alber and Heinze, Hansen et al., and Alber, Nielsen, et al. .
 2. Fludernik (“Naturalizing”) draws on the latest craze of blending theory to sup-
plement her natural narratology, arguing that it can help explain how new storytelling 
frames arise. In this view, first-person omniscience, a form which she traces to Midnight’s 
Children, emerges when the source domain of omniscient narration is blended with the 
target domain of first-person narration, although it is possible to see the form as a dou-
ble-scope blend. The explanatory power of blending theory strikes me as underwhelming 
in this instance. Also see Alber 89–91.
 3. In “Imaginary Homelands,” Rushdie draws an autobiographical link between 
himself and Saleem Sinai, revealing that the motivation for writing the novel was his 
desire as an expatriate to somehow recover the history of Bombay for himself: “what 
I was actually doing was a novel of memory and about memory. . . . I tried to make it 
imaginatively true, but imaginative truth is simultaneously honourable and suspect. . . . 
This is why I made my narrator, Saleem, suspect in his narration; his mistakes are the 
mistakes of a fallible memory compounded by quirks of character and of circumstance, 
and his vision is fragmentary” (10).
Chapter 8
 1. Herman has recently affirmed the importance of intentionality to the study of 
narrative. In “Narrative Theory and the Intentional Stance,” he explains the intentional 
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stance as an evolved human predisposition to attribute intentionality to persons, objects, 
and artifacts, a heuristic strategy along the lines of folk psychology which we all employ 
to solve problems.
 2. Brian Richardson offers an insightful account of the possible relations between 
historical authors, implied authors, and narrators, emphasizing that each category is 
valid if it performs a useful function in the analysis of texts.
 3. Marilyn Edelstein points out that Genette’s Paratexts makes no reference to Lan-
ser’s earlier pioneering work on the significance of extrafictional elements to narrative 
theory and that critics have tended to refer more to Genette’s work than to Lanser’s. 
According to Edelstein, what Lanser calls “extrafictional elements” Genette would call 
the “peritext,” since they are part of the book, and what she would call “extratextual ele-
ments,” framing discourses such as authorial interviews, Genette calls the “epitext.”
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